FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS

ESCOLA DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE SÃO PAULO

SIMÓN MARTI COLOMBAS

POWER RELATIONS PERCEPTIONS IN A BRAZILIAN FAVELA:

A CASE STUDY OF VILA NOVA ESPERANÇA INHABITANTS ASSOCIATION

DIRECTORS

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Dissertação apresentada à Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas, como requisito para obtenção do título de Mestre Profissional em Gestão Internacional.

Campo do Conhecimento: Poder nas organizações

Orientador Prof. Dr. Isabela Baleeiro Curado

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_____

Prof. Dr. Claudio Couto

FGV-EAESP

_____

 Prof. Dr. Adrian Gurza Lavalle

FFLCH - USP

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# ABSTRACT

Vila Nova Esperança is one of more than 400 favelas in the state of Sao Paulo. In recent years this community has survived a tough judiciary process against powerful government bodies and has gained the attention of non-governmental organizations that see this community as a successful place to implement their projects. The aim of this dissertation is to analyze who the inside and outside actors with the most influential roles in the community are, how they gained that power and the implications of the distribution of power. The main conclusions of this dissertation are that power inside the community is centralized in just one person, that community members feel they are not in control of their personal circumstances, that there is a communication gap between the local community and the public administrations and that NGOs that reach influential positions inside the community do so thanks to their effort and persistence.

# RESUMO

Vila Nova Esperança é uma das 400 favelas do estado de São Paulo. Nos últimos anos, esta comunidade sobreviveu a um duro processo judiciário em contra de poderosos órgãos governamentais e ganhou a atenção de organizações não governamentais que vêm esta comunidade como um lugar de sucesso para implementar os seus projetos. O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar quem som os atores de dentro e de fora que mais influencia têm na comunidade, como foi que eles conseguiram esse poder e as implicações da distribuição de poder. As principais conclusões desta dissertação são que o poder dentro da comunidade está centrado em apenas uma pessoa, que a os membros da comunidade sentem que eles não tem controle da sua situação, que existe um déficit de comunicação entre a comunidade e as administrações publicas e que as ONGs que alcançam posições de influência dentro da comunidade fazê-lo graças ao seu esforço e persistência prolongado no tempo.

**Palavras Chave**; Poder em comunidades, mapa do poder, relações do poder, favela

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**CBPM -** Caixa Beneficiente da Policia Militar do Estado de São Paulo

**CDHU-** Centro de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano

**SP** – São Paulo

**TS** – Taboão da Serra

**UMM**- Uniao dos Movimentos de Moradia. national association of local housing-rights movements

# Contents

# 1   INTRODUCTION

There has been an increased interest in understanding the way power is distributed in local communities (Adhikari & Di Falco, 2009, Machado, 2011). Researchers have realized that not all projects that are implemented in local communities have the same results and that part of this heterogeneity of outcomes is a consequence of the way power is distributed (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

NGOs and administration have seen how their projects were not sustainable in the long run due to a lack of implication from those who will supposedly benefit from the projects (Lillemets, 2003). As a result, these organizations have tried to involve local communities in the development of these projects in what has been called empowerment of communities (Speer, Hughey, Gensheimer & Adams-Leavitt, 1995).

Empowerment of local participants and including them in the decision making processes regarding the issues affecting a community, increases the effectiveness of those decisions, ensures that the results are sustainable and gives the community a way of adapting to the variability of the actions and policies of administration and organizations (Schiffer, 2004, Cornwall, 2001).

However, power is not always distributed as an outside agent would want it to be. Power is affected by culture, the socioeconomic situation and the particular characteristics of the community (Thapa, Shrestha & Yadav, 1998).

If we define power as the influence that one actor has on another actor's behavior (Dahl, 1957), in a particular situation and in a particular moment, power can be considered independent from the external actors' perception of the social interaction in question. However, when measuring power through different participants and non participants' perception of the social interaction, the result becomes relative to the point of view of the interviewed party.

Organizations aiming to maximize the results of their actions will need to understand the power relations that exist inside a community and between a community and the external

actors.

This dissertation aims to shed some light on the issue of the perception of power distribution in Brazilian favelas, through the in-depth analysis of one of these communities which may helps future researchers and organizations when dealing with this type of communities and its members.

The analysis was performed through a series of interviews done during the month of May 2013 with the key members of the community Vila Nova Esperança – the directors of the inhabitants association -  using the power mapping tool described in the methodology section of this dissertation.

This paper starts with a description of the Vila Nova Esperança, after of which a general review of the literature regarding power un communities is done. Then, the research question will be defined and the methodology used for colleting the data will be described in detail. This dissertation ends with an analysis of the results and a summary of the key findings.

## 2   THE VILA NOVA ESPERANÇA COMMUNITY

Vila Nova Esperança is a community of 1200 inhabitants living in 400 households. It is located in the limit between the cities of São Paulo and Taboao da Serra, both in the state of São Paulo in Brazil. In the city of São Paulo the community belongs to the neighborhood of Butanta at the farthest point west of the city.

Vila Nova Esperança is surrounded by two state parks of Atlantic Forest (*Mata Atlantica*), a local forest type protected by federal laws.



Figure 1: Vila Nova Esperança location

Source: google earth, 2014

Vila Nova Esperança is a favela, which means that it is an unplanned settlement which lacks general infrastructure such as electricity and paved streets. Actual ownership of the land where Vila Nova Esperança is raised is unclear, due to the lack of control of Brazilian property registers. There are three legally recognized owners:

- **Delfin S.A.** A private company.
- **Caixa Beneficiente da Policia Militar do Estado de São Paulo (CBPM).** The pension fund of the military police of the state of São Paulo.
- **Centro de Desenvolvimento Habitacional e Urbano (CDHU)** A company partially owned by the São Paulo state government, created for the development of urbanization projects for local communities. Houses are normally sold to the people

occupying the area once they are built.

The defective registration of land property resulted in double ownership of some parts of the land. For example, Delfin S.A. and CBPM claim ownership of the same area.

Vila Nova Esperança has an inhabitants association ("Associação de Moradores") since 2002. The inhabitants association is the only community organization inside Vila Nova Esperança, with most of the inhabitants belonging to it, although there are some inhabitants participating in the association activities and meetings which are not formally registered in the association. Therefore, it is usual that inhabitants use association and community as interchangeable terms. The current president of the association is Maria de Lourdes Andrade de Souza, better known as Lia.

## 2.1 HISTORY

The occupation of Vila Nova Esperança began 52 years ago when Sebastiana Do Prado Souza moved in to the area inside the Mata Atlántica thanks to a contract signed with the owner of the park at that time, which entitled her to live there. Twenty years ago, immigrants from the northeast region of Brazil, especially from the State of Bahia, started coming to Vila Nova Esperança seeking after the economic prosperity of the city of São Paulo.[1]

Simultaneously, various private entities registered the ownership of the area, which, after a number of sales, resulted in the current ownership distribution described previously.

In 2001, in an attempt to unify the Mata Atlántica, an environmental Public Minister prosecutor, known in Vila Nova Esperança as Lute, opened a legal procedure against one of the owners of Vila Nova Esperança, the CDHU, so as to include the land of the community in one of the surrounding national parks, the Parque Urbano de Conservação Ambiental e Lazer Fazenda Tizo.

Inside Vila Nova Esperança this was viewed as a ploy on behalf of both the CDHU and Lute to remove them from their homes and make profits through real estate investments.

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[1] History of Vila Nova Esperança is the result of a series of interviews with different residents of the community

In 2010 the situation reached its critical point with the authorization for the CDHU to remove the settlement. The inhabitants of Vila Nova Esperança were given 6 months to move out and were given the option to buy an apartment in Cotia, a town located a few kilometres north of the community.

It was during that period of time that the current president of the inhabitants association, Lia, started leading the community. Lia began by appointing a new lawyer for the community, Lawyer Maciel. Maciel had been recommended by other community members who worked with him. He was, at the time, an 80 year old retired judge. He agreed to receive R$1.000 from each family once the legal situation of the community was solved.

A Few weeks later, CDHU officials accompanied by armed policemen without uniforms went to Vila Nova Esperança threatening inhabitants to leave their homes. Lia's success in confronting them began to build her reputation as a community leader. Nonetheless, 88 families accepted the offered apartment in Cotia and left the community.

After the incident, Lia opened a legal procedure against the CDHU, as the representative of the inhabitants association. She filed a Prohibitory Injunction (*Interdito Proibitorio),* which prevents the community's eviction based on their property of the land.

Months later, Lia, together with Eliani, another resident of the community, travelled to Brasilia to denounce the abuse of power of the CDHU. Maciel, their lawyer, had prepared a document describing the situation. Once in Brasilia, Lia refused to present the document because she thought it was overstating the situation. Trust between Lia and Maciel was broken after this decision, and some of the inhabitants started positioning themselves in favor of one or the other.

However, the situation in the community improved greatly soon afterwards for several reasons. First, because the Prohibitory Injunction was won at the beginning of 2013; Second, because in 2012 the NGO Teto, an international NGO that builds wooden houses in disadvantaged communities, began working with Vila Nova Esperança, thanks to a direct request made by Lia. This revitalized the activity of NGOs inside the community. Since this turning point, NGOs were welcomed by the residents of the community and the implementation of projects was greatly improved.

In 2012, the community, with the legal support of Maciel, their lawyer, opened a legal procedure against the CDHU claiming for acquisitive prescription of the land. In Brazil, acquisitive prescription is the acquisition of ownership by continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public and unequivocal possession for the last 5 years.

However, disagreements between Lia and Maciel that had been worsening since the Brasilia episode ended with Lia firing Maciel and hiring the lawyers of the Uniao dos Movimentos de Moradia (UMM), a national association of local housing-rights movements. Since Maciel had taken part in some of the most significant events of Vila Nova Esperança, this decision was arrived upon democratically in a resident meeting.

In 2013, Lia started to arrange meetings with the town halls of both São Paulo and Taboao da Serra asking for support in the regularization process. In the city of São Paulo, Vila Nova Esperança was considered an area of special environmental protection and no actions were planned for the near future. In the city of Taboao da Serra, the settlement was recognized but there were no plans concerning regularization. However, after these meetings, and thanks to the support of Eletropaulo, the electricity company of the State of São Paulo, the city of São Paulo recognized the community and authorized an electrical installation plan for the inhabitants homes. However, the electrical installation was only carried out in the part of the community belonging to the city of São Paulo. The part of the community belonging to the city of Taboao da Serra still lacks a legal electrical installation.

# 3 POWER RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF POWER DISTRIBUTION IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES

The concept of power has been widely discussed over time and many authors (Bell, Wolker & Willer, 2000; Courpasson, Golsorkhi, & Sallaz, 2012; Dahl 1957) have tried to identify the different trends for defining and investigating it.

Although there is no universal concept of power, most scholars seem to agree in defining power as the influence that one individual (or organization) has over the action of another individual (or organization). For example, Foucault defines the exercise of power as "a mode of action upon the action of others" (Foucault, 1983, p. 221).

More specifically, Dahl (1957) defines a power relation as: "A has power over B to the extent that A makes B do something that B would not do otherwise". In a similar way, Robbins, DeCenzo & Sacristán (2002) define power as the influence that someone has on the behavior of other people, so that they do something they would not do otherwise.

As one might infer from those two last definitions, the concept of power is closely related to resistance, meaning that in order for power to be exercised, there is a need for resistance from those whom the power is being exercised upon (Foucalt, 1978).

Some authors such as Pfeffer, use the concept of power and influence interchangeably, (Bell 2000). However, Raven (1959) considers power as the potential for influence, meaning a person's ability to exercise that influence.

In this dissertation, Max Weber's definition of power is used: "the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (Weber 1978, p.53). This definition implicitly states that there are levels of power depending on the probability of one actor influencing the behavior of another actor. This would mean that power is measurable or, at least, comparable among a particular set of actors.

## 3.1 POWER FRAMEWORK

Several analytical frameworks describe the power dynamics of organizations and the sources of this power. Hill (1994) described two main sources of power, positional and personal. Positional power stems from the position that a person occupies in the organization structure. If the position of the person changes, the power derived from it also changes, therefore, it can be considered a context dependent source of power. Sources of this positional power are formal authority, relevance, centrality, autonomy and visibility.

Personal power is related to what the person represents and does not depend on the position held by that person in the organization. Sources of personal power are expertise, track record, attractiveness and effort (Hill 1994).

Raven (1959) defined 5 available resources for the execution of power:

- **Reward power:** The agent of power offers incentives to the target upon which the power is being exercised.
- **Coercive power:** The agent of power induces the target's action by threatening with a punishment.
- **Legitimate power:** The target accepts that the agent of power has the right to demand a particular action.
- **Expert power:** The target accepts that the agent has more valuable insights, due to greater knowledge or experience, and, as a result, its command must be executed.
- **Referent power:** The agent of power has some attributes that make him a model the target would want to emulate.

Besides these frameworks, Hardy (1994) defined three dimensions of power which allowed identification of what she called the dominant directions of political performance. These dimensions are the control and management of resources, the control of processes and the control of legitimacy.

The first dimension, control and management of resources, considers power as a result of the

control of a resource on which others depend. This resource could be information, contacts, money, etc. Considering the first dimension alone would be like saying anybody can enter the political game. The second dimension, control of processes, refers to the access to the networks where decisions are made. It is not strange to see examples in which decision makers limit the access to others to guard the status quo (Crenson, 1971; Hunter, 1980). These first two dimensions only arise when there is a conflict between the interested parties. However, influential power of one actor over another also exists in the absence of conflict, which is the focus of the third dimension, control of legitimacy (Hardy, 1998).

## 3.2   POWER IN COMMUNITIES

When analyzing the concept of community, Cohen (1985) showed that a community and the sense of belonging of the members of such community are built through the commonality amongst insiders, and difference with outsiders.

In this sense, a community is defined by the physical and mental "boundaries" that separate members from non-members. The physical space of the community becomes something a particular community shares, but which by no means defines in itself the boundaries of the community. This becomes even more true in the context of the past 20 to 30 years, where increased mobility, migration, globalisation and social networks have made communities more complex (Crow & Mah, 2012).

According to Banyai (2009), a community should involve the geographical and social concept of community, and therefore, should include all stakeholders who have some kind of interest or carry out an activity in the area.

Speer, Hughey, Gensheimer & Adams-Leavitt (1995) stated that community organizing for power is of particular interest because: "(1) it is a process that capitalizes on individual, organizational and community strengths with minimal control by professionals;
(2) represents a form of citizen participation that promotes indigenous leadership on often poor or declining urban areas with concentrations of "at-risk" populations; and
(3) embodies our values of community, diversity, and change for improvement of individual and collective well-being."

Organizational theories can and have been applied to community based organizations (Kime, 2001). However, given the broad understanding of the concept of community, it is important first to define the context in which the discussed theory will be applied during this article. In his classification of levels for decision making and activities for development, Uphoff describes the community level as "an established socioeconomic residential unit, often referred to as the village level" (Uphoff, 1993, p608).

In the reviewed literature, it has been agreed to differentiate between two types of community organization. For example, Uphoff (1993) divides community organizations in membership organizations, which have the goal of defending the common interest of the members of the organization, and cooperatives, which seek after the economic prosperity of its members. Bernard, Janvy & Sadouet (2008) made a similar distinction between what they called community-oriented organizations and market-oriented organizations.

There is a discussion in the literature on whether a community organization should be based on democratic participation with distributed power or whether power should be located in certain individuals or leaders who make the decisions for the community. Paulson, Butler & Pope (1969) said that cities or communities in, what he called, "execution" stage have a more centralized power than those communities that were in a "dropout" or "never in program" stage. They justified this point of view by arguing that communities with centralized power are more effective in making decisions than diffused power structures which required a huge effort to implement a decision. So, one would normally expect that in communities with many decisions to be made, the power would tend to be located in individual leaders who could more effectively act without sharing the responsibility with the rest of the members of the community.

In this same line of argumentation, Bianchi (2002) supported that a centralized leader in a community brings effectiveness and continuity, whereas, a lot of direct participation by inexperienced members can harm the organization's ability to perform efficiently. However, the findings of Bernard, Janvry & Sadoulet (2010) suggest that leadership-based governance might be seen as a threat to the members of the community organization, when this organization's goal is to generate income for its members. As a consequence, the members of the community tend to increase their participation, therefore diminishing leadership governance.

In decentralized communities, one would expect to find a better distribution and sharing of knowledge among its members. In addition, the participation process will provide a wider range of possible solutions and knowledge creation. In centralized organizations knowledge is shared among specific individuals while the majority of the members are not allowed to participate, which will limit the transmission and creation of knowledge (Roberts, 2006).

Given the controversy surrounding power distribution inside communities, it is the aim of this literature review to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a participatory process for decision making inside communities. Afterwards, the positive and negative effects of a leader-based organization are discussed.

### 3.2.1 *Participatory processes in community organization*

Mansuri and Rao (2003) stated that participation in the implementation of a project in a local community ensure that "projects are better designed, benefits better targeted, project inputs delivered in a more cost effective and timely manner, and that project benefits are distributed more equitably and with smaller leakages due to corruption and other rent-seeking activity". The objective is to reduce the distance between political decisions and excluded members of the society to achieve social justice (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). "Participation is at the same time a basic need and a basic human right" (Cornwall, 2001, p30).

According to the greater responsiveness hypothesis, public participation improves success of the decisions made by removing the communication gap between the leader and the rest of the members. As a consequence it creates opportunities for the most disadvantaged social groups in the community to communicate their needs and be heard (Echeverri-Gent, 1992).

However, a participatory system is not necessarily the best way to manage a community organization. There are several factors that influence the effectiveness of participation in delivering good results. The control of legitimacy is crucial for effective participation, and having elected official representatives is the first step to achieving this control (Kaifen and Sanjai, 2011).

A history of participation might be necessary to be effective in the first place. First, because it

the participants some expertise and second because it creates a sense of community which can be extremely important in generating involvement. A low sense of ownership by the members of the community might have a negative impact on the quality of the participation (Schiffer, 2004). According to McMillan & Chavis (1986), this sense of community is greatly influenced by personal relatedness: the influence that the member of the community has over other members and the feeling that the members of the community have a common history.

In a self-study as manager of an all-volunteer professional organization, Githens (2009) states that "True collaboration and democratic decision-making can result in a conflict-filled process where power issues and individual agendas complicate the process". Githens asserted that, in order to protect the sense of community, the autonomy of the organization is sometimes put at risk.

Another factor affecting the efficiency of participation stems from the structure of the organization where this participation is held. For example, burdensome administrative rules usually have negative results on participation efficiency. At the same time, a hierarchical authority that remarks differences among members of the community is negatively correlated with effective participation (Kaifen and Sanjai, 2011). However, Schiffer (2004) points out that flexibility of procedures can be problematic as it gives room for the most powerful and intelligent members to use it for their own needs.

It must be noted that the exercise of participation, especially by those who are more socially disadvantaged, does not come without a cost. First, the time put into the cause implies a direct or indirect loss. In addition, confronting influential and powerful members might cause considerable psychological damage (Mansuri and Rao, 2003). As a result, only members with higher resources are able to have higher degrees of dedication, which normally lead to a higher level of power inside the community (Conrwall, 2002).

Also, people of the community might not be interested in the issue, which always reduces the effectiveness of the participation (Scheiffer, 2004).

The channels through which a member of the community is able to participate are also an important aspect of effective participation. Multiple communication channels are positively correlated to the better outcome of a participatory process (Kaifen and Sanjai, 2011). Ritchie (2010) discusses how to apply the Habermas theories on the utilization of messages in organizations to community organizations, with the objective of sustaining the hierarchy of

the organization and the marginalization of the disenfranchised groups. Ritchie states that limited access to discussion of the members of the organization maintains the inequalities of power in favor of those at the top of the organization and limits the involvement of the members with the organization. The distance that a member must cover in order to attend a meeting is also an important factor that affects participation negatively and distributes power unequally (Scheiffer, 2004).

Another problem derived from participation processes is that, if the community is not correctly represented, there is little hope that the participation process will contribute to better results for those who are not being represented (Kaifen and Sanjai, 2011). As Joanne Roberts said: "Those members who have full participation will have a greater role and therefore are likely to wield more power in the negotiation of meaning."(Roberts, 2006, p 627). The existence of strong networks also prevents other members from reaching central positions of power inside the community (Schiffer, 2004).

Representation problems are common to many community organizations. Adhikari & Di Falco (2009) stated that "households belonging to higher-caste groups often have privileged access to village leadership and decision-making processes of the local commons." In fact, Graner (1997) argued that the decentralization of power in forest management communities in Nepal has not only helped the poor, but also worsened their situation because of the control of the resources by the socially higher members of the community.

Formal representation does not entirely solve the problem; even when a person coming from a socially disadvantaged group is represented their thoughts and opinions are ignored and their ability to influence other members is lower (Thapa et al, 1998). In fact, unless the difference in power among social groups is compensated to create a more egalitarian community, the control over the resources, especially the economic one, will mark the social domination of the most powerful members over the weakest (Echeverri-Gent, 1992). As Carson, Chappel & Dujela (2010, p.173) said, further inequalities might arise from the effect that "subpopulations, often powerful at controlling social norms, have on other less-powerful community sub-populations."

The profile of the participants can also influence the effectiveness of participation. Members with few skills and little knowledge on the issues discussed are unlikely to contribute positively to the participatory process. Leaders do not trust members to have the required

competences and this limits that the consideration these leaders give to the inputs of the members of the community (Kaifen and Sanjai, 2011).

On the other hand, members who lack education are more easily manipulated by those in better positions. In addition, lack of information on the specific issue being discussed often leads to wrong decisions being made (Schiffer, 2004).

In addition to who participates and who is represented in the community, there is also concern about the level at which the community members participate. In fact, in many projects, most community members only participate when the project reaches the implementation stage, and are disregarded in the management and decision making stages White (2000).

### 3.2.2 Leadership influence in community organization

Leaders can play an important role in communities. Leaders can help spread the image of the community in order to attract new investors and, at the same time, can also serve as a guide to keep things running inside the community (Galloway, 1997). Leadership promotes mass mobilization, articulates interests and brings isolated people together who do not share a common space to share their views.

Prepared leaders are capable of identifying and solving the many problems of a community, and know the steps to be taken towards effective solutions. In addition, holding that position during a significant amount of time provides them with an extensive network and applied knowledge that give them the ability to attract new investments (Galloway, 1997).

Other authors, such as Purdue (2001), emphasize the importance of community leaders as a link between government initiatives and the local residents. Banyai (2009, p.258) defines community leadership as "the ideal outcome of community capacity development, insofar as it enables any member of the community to take initiative in correspondence with the community vision and specific objectives."

However, it is not rare that leaders in organizations develop their own interests apart from those of the community members they are representing, even in democratic participatory processes. Among the interests that derive from this divergence are the pursuit of political power and financial profit. Leaders may also have an effect on discouraging members to

participate, therefore weakening their position (Fox, 1992).

However, not all leaders are the same. Purdue (2001) distinguishes between transformational leaders and transactional leaders. The former build the support of their followers on their charisma and their reputation on their ability to manage resources. The latter generate trust based on their reliability as accountable representatives. Their leadership is based on the possession of credit, which is earned by demonstrated reputation during a period of time.

### 3.2.3   Power of individuals

A leader, by gaining trust from his followers finds himself in a powerful situation. However, trust is not the only way for a community member to gain power. In her study of two local communities, Scheiffer (2004) identifies several causes of influential decision-making positions inside a community. A person who is in a formal position of power usually has a higher influence on the community. The dedication of a person to the community also implies a position of power and influence, especially since work in this type of organizations is paid lowly or not paid at all.

If we saw before that few skills and little education are a cause of ineffective participation, high skills and education imply high levels of power inside a community. Power relations and networks also play a substantial role in defining the level of power of a member of a community (Scheiffer, 2004).

### 3.2.4   External actors in local communities

Moses (2001) identified that decision making processes inside communities were manipulated by external organizations. Needs of the community are redefined by what external organizations believe those needs are. In fact, they use the communities to legitimize the goals of their own projects using the bargaining power (especially economic) they have for control of resources. In addition, these external organizations might be forced to provide measurable outcomes even though this is not completely aligned with the needs of the community.

**Public administration and communities**

Public administration is usually one of the stakeholders with the most resources, which increases the influence they have in the community and in the private or public actors with interests in the community. The State is interested in controlling the political process inside communities, especially regarding inhabitants associations which control most of the political participation. These associations have no influence over the amount of money that the State dedicates to favelas, so their political influence over the public administration is limited to the decision of which favelas are going to receive the money (Machado, 2011).

Until the late 70s, the Brazilian government's policy was to identiy and eradicate these settlements. However this policy caused severe protests, and social complaints, especially from favela inhabitants associations, which forced a change of policy. Recent initiatives include more conciliatory measures, where favelas are considered as a part (though marginalized) of the city (Riley et al, 2001).

The work of the Public administration in favelas is different from that of NGOs. They usually have a completely assistencialist approach where a solution is given for an externally perceived problem. This reduces the feeling of responsibility that inhabitants of favelas have over government actions, which reduces their influence over them (Lillemets, 2003). In addition, people inside communities believe that most issues affecting them should be taken care of by the government (Eyben and Landbury, 1995).

NGOs and external actors usually have different sources of power. NGOs provide funding, training and advice which can influence the decisions of the community. Control of resources by NGOs and its use to influence decisions, brings up the issue of legitimacy and democracy (Scheiffer, 2004).

The actions of NGOs in communities do not always have positive outcomes. Collier (2000) describes that NGOs can reduce local capacities and responsibilities by substituting local resources with the NGO's resources, therefore reducing the sustainability of their interventions. In addition, by overpassing local governments in the provision of goods they might reduce their responsibilities towards local communities. Short-term measurable goals of these NGOs might not really fulfill the needs of the local inhabitants of the community.

Volunteer-based interventions are also two-faced. According to Uphoff (1993), voluntary work reduces the costs of implementation of their projects, but at the same time, voluntary activities are volatile and depend on external factors such as stability or public opinion, which again bring up the issue of sustainability of their actions.

The action of NGOs and its effects on power distribution are another controversial topic. Lillemets (2003) asserted that even though NGOs understand the necessity of community participation for project implementation, this participation is often limited to the implementation stage of the project and not to the design and elaboration stages. This limits the real power that local inhabitants have over what is happening in their own community.

### 3.2.5   Power relations in Brazilian favelas

 "Brazil is currently undergoing a major transformation largely due to the economic development experienced over the last decade, unequally distributed among the social and urban spheres"   (Feltran, 2012, p 1)

There is a social barrier between a favela and the rest of the city. Inhabitants of favelas usually present a severe social disadvantage due to a greater proportion of young, non-white people with lower education than that of their socioeconomic surroundings (De Queiroz, 2001).

Machado (2011) considers favelas as a group of people who share a geographical space, but with several social differences among its members and deep connections with their socioeconomic environment. He states that a favela is an extremely capitalized society with marked differences between the highest and lowest social classes. Upper classes usually dominate the political decisions through the control of internal resources and political contacts. Little control over decisions is exerted by the lower classes, which contributes to perpetuate the power of the dominant class. The upper classes are in contact with politics who help them   achieve specific goals, usually of personal interest. However, this does not mean that a higher participation of the socially disadvantaged members of a community would lead to better results, due to the low bargaining power that these would have with the political forces.

Relations of power between members of a community and with external stakeholders are key to understand social interactions in the favelas. Inside favelas, worst social conditions are usually linked to limited personal networks. (Castello & Marqués, 2010). In the specific case of Sao Paulo, Marqués (2012) showed that those with less resources inside the favelas were the ones with weaker social networks and more dependent on their local neighborhood. This explains the difficulties of these people to create and maintain social ties, which also emphasizes the difference with the middle class.

Lack of social relations between poor and non-poor individuals is one of the most important features in the perpetuation of poverty and social inequality, which represents a relational pattern in the Brazilian social structure. (Marqués, 2012)

Lack of personal connections of the people living in favelas also intensifies the difficulties of this people to access resources given that they tend to connect only with people in a similar situation. (Castello & Marqués, 2010). At the end, certain áreas of the metropolitan regions in Brazil are very exposed to an intense accumulation of risks and negative situations (Torres & Marques, 2004)

In an ethnographic study in a favela in Sao Paulo Feltran (2010) identified four instance of justice where members of the favela can seek resolution of their daily conflicts which are the state's legal justice system, the local justice "administration", the justice of the police and the divine justice. A favela represents a society in itself, and articulates the necessary norms of conduct and measures of control which are considered to be legitimate by the members of the community. (Feltran, 2010)

Inside communities, the inhabitants association plays a great role and its president tends to centralize much of the power (Lillemets, 2003). Oliveira et al (1993) argue that this centralization of power comes from the Brazilian history of dictatorship. According to them, the society is still run by a culture of autocratic traditions, where there is a necessity of identifying powerful leaders. In the Brazilian favelas, due to the absence of public authorities, all hopes for remedying their situation are left in the hands of the presidents.
Only when their own house is put at risk, and they fear being moved to peripheral parts of town, do the residents of favelas feel the necessity to form associations to pursue collective action (Lillemets, 2003).

# 4   METHODOLOGY

Given that power is a broad concept with multiple implications it was necessary to narrow down the research question in order to have sensible and useful results.   The methodology responds as well to the need to delimit and organize the outputs of the field work performed.

As an action research paper (Miller, Greenwood & Maguire, 2003), it is the aim of this dissertation not only to identify and describe the power relation of this particular community but also to serve as a reference for future actions in the Vila Nova Esperança either coming from local member of the community, which some already participated as interviewees on this research, or from external actors as ONGs willing to maximize the success they have when implementing their projects in the community.

It is important to point at this stage that, as power is measured in this paper through the perception that certain actors have of that power, the results of this dissertation should not be considered as the best description of the real situation of the favela, but the subjective perception of that situation that the members interviewed have.

## 4.1   RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS

Continuing the work of other lines of research mentioned in the literature review, this dissertation proposes the study of the perpection of the distribution of power in a local Brazilian community called Vila Nova Esperança. The main question this paper seeks to answer is the following:

What are the perception of power relations in the Vila Nova Esperança favela, especially in the face of land regularization processes, from the perspective of the directors of the inhabitants association?
To answer this question, this dissertation addresses the following hypothesis which is based on the literature review described above:

Hypothesis: The regularization process in the Vila has lead to a centralized authoritarian power structure.

## 4.2   A CASE STUDY

As mentioned before, power is constructed among social interactions as one person's ability to influence another person's actions. Power is not a fixed attribute, but a variable value which depends on the social setting in which it is being studied. In addition, as a relative concept, power becomes difficult to measure. There is no objective indicator from which we can estimate the amount of power that someone has in a particular situation.

All these characteristics of power force any researcher willing to find empirical demonstrations of power relations to focus on concrete situations of a group or society where all power relations can be qualitatively identified and analyzed. Therefore, a case study is the preferable methodology for this type of studies. Vila Nova Esperança gathers some characteristics that make it of particular interest for this type of study:

(a) The community has been organized since 2002, when they formed an association of inhabitants and has existed for more than 20 years. As a result, the community has achieved a stable form of organization which might be similar to other communities;

(b) There are several identifiable groups of power within and outside the community. The community has long term relations with NGOs, housing rights movements and local and federal governments. This enriches the amount of data that can be collected;

(c) The community is involved in several legal processes (real estate property rights and environmental damage) that affect several communities similar to this one.

In summary, Vila Nova Esperança provides a comprehensive set of data with particular issues which are frequent in other local communities, helping to reach conclusions that could serve as a guide for other communities in similar situations.

In addition, the author has been working in Vila Nova Esperança for the last year in various voluntary projects, which facilitates the relation with the directors to be interviewed. Due to the difficulties that arise from the social barrier existing between a researcher and an inhabitant of a local favela, a previous contact is necessary to extract sensitive information.

## 4.3 DESIGN AND DATA ANALYSIS

The methodology consisted in a two step process. First, questionnaires with members of most of the families were conducted to analyze the socioeconomic situation. Second, semi-structured interviews with the directors of the association were made to assess power distribution.

Ignoring social relationships in the study of power in Brazil might result in misleading conclusions. As it was shown in the literature, social classes tend to dominate power relationships in Brazil, and therefore, understanding the socioeconomic characteristics of the residents of the community first will help to understand power relations.

In order to understand the social context, a questionnaire, which can be found in the appendix, was given to 395 families living in the community. Although such extensive research was not necessary to understand the social situation of Vila Nova Esperança, a detailed questionnaire was developed for its use in the legal procedures in which the Vila was involved.

It took 3 months to finish the field work which was conducted with the help of volunteers of the NGO Teto. The information requested of each family was:

- Personal information: Name, age and ID.
- Socioeconomic information: Job, means of transport.
- Information about the house: Appearance, materials and infrastructure.

According to Haunschild Nienhueser & Weiskpof (2009), the study of power as a social field is comprised by "The interests of the actors involved (scientists, but also managers and politicians), their resources, their practices and, last but not least, their theoretical concepts and methods" (Haunschield, Nienhueser & Weiskpof, 2009, p. 1).

Furthermore, according to several authors, (Neueberger, 1995; Schirmer, 2000; Morgan 2006) any power study has to deal with at least three questions:

- Who are the actors involved?

- What are the interests?

- How is power executed to satisfy those particular interests?

POWER MAPPING TOOL

In order to answer these questions, 10 semi-structured interviews with the directors of the inhabitants association were conducted using a modified version of the Power Mapping Tool described in Schiffer (2007). The Power Mapping Tool was created specifically to assess the perception of power of different actors in a given governance network. The tool provides a framework in which both quantitative and qualitative data can be extracted, and helps to create a structure which facilitates the discussion of the perception of power relations with the actors involved.

The steps of the interviews are described below:

1. The first step was to identify the actors involved in the regularization process. Although a list of reliable actors was made using previous knowledge of the situation, it was the interviewee who decided which actors he considered to be involved in the process.
2. In addition, the interviewee was asked to situate these actors on a size A2 paper based on what group or body they belonged to. The shape of this map depended on the interviewee's perception, according to the central or peripheral role an actor has in the process studied;
3. Once the interviewee had identified the actors, he was asked to decide what the interests of each actor in the process discussed were. The interviewer asked what the goals that an actor had at a personal and at a social level were. This ensured that the interviewee would not limit his/her answer to "he is against us" or "he is with us". Actors could have more than one interest.
4. The next step was to ask the interviewee where the actor's power came from. Based on Hardy's (1994) three dimensions of power (management of resources, control of processes and control of legitimacy), the author identified five possible sources of power which are closely linked to the way this actor exercises the power he/she possesses. It was emphasized that power was related to the particular process of regularization and not as a global concept. For example, if one actor was said to have some knowledge, the

interviewee was asked if his/her knowledge was useful in this particular situation. The sources of power used were the following:

- **Money:** The actor can influence other actor's decisions by giving them money, directly or indirectly. Linked to management of resources;
- **Knowledge:** The actor has some education, background or contacts which gives him/her some kind of knowledge which other actors might need. Linked to management of resources as well;
- **Stop:** The actor has some influence or control over complicating the regularization process at some point of time. Linked to control of processes;
- **Speed up:** Similar to the previous source but, the actor now has the ability to facilitate the process. Linked to control of processes as well;
- **Legitimacy:** The actor has been elected or possesses the authority to play a certain role in the regularization process. It was emphasized that someone else must consider that he/she has the right to exercise that power. Linked to control of legitimacy.

An example of the symbols used to identify these power sources can be seen in Figure 2.



Figure 2: Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up and Legitimacy power sources

Source: Simon Marti collected material

These sources of power helped both the interviewer and the interviewee to understand the roles of the actors and the real power they already had. In some situations it helped to discover new actors that the interviewee had not considered before, because their source of power was not apparent.

5. At this point, the interviewee had a clear view of the actor's interests and sources of power which helped him to measure the level of power each actor had. The interviewee

was given some circular pieces which he had to place next to each actor to make "towers of power". Weber's definition of power mentioned before was used. During the interviews power was explained as the ability of one actor to reach his/her goal in a particular social situation. The interviewee was challenged by comparing the power of different actors and was given the opportunity to change his decision in order to have a final result. Although there is a relationship between the level of power and the sources of power that an actor has, interviewees were totally free to choose the level of power with independence of the sources of power they had already allocated.

The first output of this method was a map that served as a basis for the discussion of power relations. The map offered a framework that centered the discussion and helped to simplify complex and multi-personal situations. In addition, it served to dehumanize the relation between actors which facilitated the expression of the interviewee's opinions and let him/her see the relations and conflicts from an outside perspective.

During the mapping phase of the interview, a summary table was created which provided a set of information from which quantitative data could be extracted.

An example of this table is included:

Table 1 - Example of table summary which provide a set of information from which quantitative data could be extracted

| Actor | Interest | Sources of Power | Height of Power-tower |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lia | Helping the inhabitants, self-recognition | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimacy | 15 |
| CDHU | Economic, no responsibilities | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Legitimacy | 20 |
| … | … | … | … |

Source: Simon Marti collected material

Once the table and the map were created the interviewer lead the discussion deeper into the relations of the actors mentioned. The interviewer looked for conflicts between actors, trying

to see how each actor used the power he/she had and how he/she reached that level of power. All interviews were recorded.

# 5   RESULTS

In this section we will analyze the quantitative and qualitative data collected that will serve as a base of the following discussion and the final conclusions.

## 5.1   SOCIOECONOMIC SITUATION

In this section the results from the questionnaires are presented to contextualize the socioeconomic situation for a better understanding of the power relations.

### 5.1.1   Demography

In the population pyramid of Figure 2 it can be seen that more than one third of the population is less than 18 years old. As a result, the community develops a familiar environment. The average number of family members living inside each house is 3.

### 5.1.2   Economic evaluation

To measure the economic situation of the families in the community, three variables were measured:

- Family members with a job;
- House appearance, classified into A, B or C. In the appendix there is an example of each of these classes;
- Private means of transport.

Figure 3: Population pyramid of Vila Nova Esperança. With these 3 variables, 7 socioeconomic categories were made.

Source: in the field data collection

Whit these 3 variables, 7 socioeconomic categories were made:

Table 2 -   7 socioeconomic categories used

| Variables Category | Category |
|---|---|
| With car + house type A + any family member with a job | 1 |
| Without car + house type A + any family member with a job | 2 |
| With car + house type A + no family member with a job 3 | 3 |
| With car + house type B + any family member with a job 3 | 3 |
| Without car + house type B + any family member with a job | 4 |
| With car + house type B + no family member with a job | 5 |
| Without car + house type A + no family member with a job | 5 |
| With car + house type C + any family member with a job | 6 |
| Without car + house type B + no family member with work | 6 |
| Other | 7 |

Source: Simon Marti collected material

The families in each of the categories can be seen in Figure 3. As these categories show, the economic situation of the community members is not homogeneous. Therefore, access to power for a family in category seven is not as easy as for a family in category 1. These differences should be taken into account.

### 5.1.3 Employment

The questionnaires show that of the 700 people in working age (between 18 and 65 years old), only 493 were employed, which equals an unemployment rate of 29,6%. However, it should be noted that these 700 people were not truly active population because they were not looking for a job (mothers with small children), they were studying or because they were retired before the age of 65.



Figure 4: Families in each economic category

Source: in the field data collection

The most frequent position among men inside Vila Nova Esperança was construction worker, whereas for women it was cleaning lady. Other jobs were varied and included security guards, waiters, bus drivers, etc.

In terms of place of work we can see in Figure 4 that residents of the community tend to work in the surrounding neighborhoods, normally in the city of São Paulo, which shows that they are not as isolated as expected.

### *5.1.4 Families*

At 50% of the households inhabitants have a relative living in the community. Family means a strong support in these cases with grandparents usually taking the highest responsibilities.

### *5.1.5 Needs*

During the questionnaires, interviewees were asked to mention what their most important necessities were. In Figure 5 we can see a summary of their answers.

Electricity is clearly the most important need of the community. Currently electricity is taken illegally from the surrounding neighborhoods. Electricity plays a double function. First, it is a basic need of the inhabitants who see how some of the most basic daily activities such as taking a shower cannot be done normally. Second, there is a feeling inside the community that when legal electricity comes it will be much harder to take them out of their houses.



Figure 5: Place of work of employed residents

Source: in the field data collection

## 5.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION

The maps provided a comprehensive set of data from which both qualitative and quantitative information could be extracted. A total of 65 actors were mentioned with an average of 18,3 actors per interview; We helped create an enriching discussion about power distribution and conflicts. The maps themselves provided a vast amount of information which is first discussed in this section. Later on, using the information recorded in the second part of the interviews, a deeper discussion about power relations in this local community is conducted.

The complete list of actors mentioned ordered by the height of their power tower can be seen in Appendix II.

In this table, interviews mentioned is the number of interviews in which that actor appears. The number below Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up and Legitimate is the number of interviewees who considered that actor to have that source of power. Power tower is the sum of all the power towers given by all interviewees. Since there were 10 interviewees and the maximum level of power was 10, the maximum value of that variable is 100. Finally, average power takes into consideration the number of interviewees that mentioned that actor by dividing the total power by the number of interviews where that actor was named.



Figure 6: Number of families that mentioned each need

Source: in the field data collection

### 5.2.1 Power groups

The first analysis that can be extracted from the maps is which are the power groups that are most significant. Even though the interviewees were asked to individually group the actors, there were several similarities among the groups mentioned. Figure 6 summarize the power groups and the number of interviews in which they were mentioned.

We can see that there are four groups that were mentioned in almost all interviews: Inhabitants, Public administration, lawyer group and NGOs. Inhabitants were mentioned in all interviews although the inhabitants considered important in this group were rarely the same. In total there were 17 inhabitants that were mentioned just one time. On the other side, Lia, the favela leader was mentioned in all the interviews.



Figure 7: Number of interviews that mentioned each group of actors

Source: in the field data collection

Public administration was a group that was usually considered as the greatest enemy of the inhabitants' interests. Inside this group the most mentioned actors were Lute from the Ministerio Publico and the CDHU which are the ones that have shown their interest in removing the settlement of Vila Nova Esperança more actively.

The Lawyer, Maciel, was sometimes included in what was called the Lawyer's group together with some inhabitants that were close to him, and other times he was placed alone as an independent actor. Normally, when grouped together, it was because he was considered to

have an active role in confronting the leader of the favela, Lia. When he was placed alone, the interviewees would create what was called the opponents group, which were those who were with Lawyer Maciel and against Lia.

The NGOs was also a very repeated group of which the most common actors were Teto and the UMM (Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia, Housing Rights Movements Union). It is remarkable to mention that the UMM, because of its relevance, was considered as an independent actor 4 times, and once as the central actor in this context.

Neighbors refers to all stakeholders which are physically close to Vila Nova Esperança. It is interesting to notice that, even though the claim of the legal issue they are facing is about environmental issues, they place very little importance in the Parque Tizzo, which is the natural park they are claimed to cause the damage to.

The rest of the groups are usually non-important groups that were created by the interviewee due to his/her inability to include them in other groups.

### 5.2.2   Actors

A total of 65 persons and institutions were mentioned during the interviews, although most of them where declared to have a limited amount of power or were not recognized by many of the persons interviewed. So, it was necessary to decide which actors should be considered in the analysis. The following rules were used to exclude some actors from the analysis:

- **Actors who were mentioned two times or less:** Even though there were actors who were considered important by one or two interviewees, in this analysis they were considered as non-active actors;
- **Actors with 0 power:** Actors with no influence over other actors are passive players of the power relations and, therefore, they were excluded from the analysis;
- **Myself:** I have been working as a volunteer in Vila Nova Esperança the past year and, as a result, I might be considered as one of the NGOs and organizations acting in the community. However, as I was the one conducting the interviews, the opinions about

my role in Vila Nova Esperança might be biased and should be not considered in the analysis.

After this, the result was a list of 17 actors which is summarized in the following table:

Table 3 -    Summary of the 17 actors with power in the favela

| Actor | Interviews mentioned | Money | Knowledge | Stop | Speed-up | Legitimacy | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lute (MP) | 10 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 61 |
| Lia | 10 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 58 |
| UMM | 9 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 8 | 4 | 57 |
| CDHU | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 54 |
| Prefeitura SP | 6 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 43 |
| State government | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 39 |
| Teto | 8 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 30 |
| Liga Solidaria | 7 | 3 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 18 |
| Lawyer Maciel | 10 | 1 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 16 |
| Electropaulo | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 14 |
| Prefeitura TS | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 14 |
| Sabesp | 3 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| Parque Tizzo | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Laurent | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| Manacas | 3 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 2 |
| Eliani | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Ciclopack | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

Source: in the field data collection

POWER

It is impressive how out of the 25 different inhabitants mentioned, just two remained on the list. One of them is Lia who has been the favela leader during the last 3 years. She has been in charge of all the issues affecting Vila Nova Esperança. All interviewees consider her as one of the most relevant actors as it can be seen from the height of her power tower. All interviewees, including Lia, recognized that she has an authoritarian style of leadership. Reasons mentioned for this vary from inability to work with other people to efficiency of managing the workload.

Lia is the only actor considered by all interviewees to have legitimacy to execute her power. Not even the government institutions which would normally hold legitimacy are considered to have that kind of power in the favela.

The huge difference between Lia and the second inhabitant, Eliani, in terms of power, confirm the assumption that power inside Vila Nova Esperança has been totally centralized. Understanding why and its implications will be the objective of next section.

The most powerful actor is Lute, who is a procurator of the Public Ministry of the city of São Paulo. The fact that he has more power than any other public administration shows the distorted perception of the inhabitants with respect to the authority. In fact, some interviewees did not understand this actor's role wll, and even considered him an employee of the CDHU.

*"Lute is the head of the CDHU" Irene*

*"I do not know. I believe he [Lute] wants our money but I do not know how" Inacio*

In the eyes of the interviewees the power of this actor came from his money, knowledge and control over the process.

After Lute and Lia, the Uniao de Movimentos de Moradia (UMM) is the next most powerful actor. It is the first non-governmental organization on the list, which is something interesting taking into account that the UMM has only had a direct participation in Vila Nova Esperança since the previous lawyer was fired. In fact, the previous lawyer, Maciel, has considerably less power than the UMM. The explanation for this power distribution is that the inhabitants give

full control over the process to the lawyer in charge, which is the reason why the UMM has quickly reached that level of power.

*"They [UMM] are experts, they have treated with other favelas and they know what to do. They are the ones who can help the most" Vanija*

Another factor explaining power of this actor is that even those inhabitants who are actively involved in community issues are not fully aware of the legal situation of Vila Nova Esperança, which is the reason why they give the highest levels of power to external actors who they believe understand the situation.

CDHU, which is one of the owners of the land that the inhabitants of Vila Nova Esperança occupy, is next in the level of power. CDHU has played a very active role in trying to remove the settlement during the past 4 years. All interviewees identified economic profit as the main interest of the entity, and none of them could see any social goal in their behavior.

Power is mainly held by these 4 actors, while others have the ability to influence the process but no real control over it. Of this second group the public administrations are the most powerful. It is interesting to see that, even though the state government wasn't considered in most of the interviews, in those where it was considered, it was placed as the most powerful actor. The state government in the eyes of the interviewees is an actor which can do a lot (high levels of power) but which is not doing much (only some interviewees consider it).

Out of the NGOs, the best ranking is Teto, which has been working consistently during the last year in Vila Nova Esperança. Actually, Teto and Liga Solidaria are not directly involved in the legal process but the interviewees recognized that these organizations could be of great support thanks to the political power they have, and their access to the media.

Finally, the low power they give to the Parque Tizzo is remarkable, since it is the natural park next to Vila Nova Esperança. Even though it was mentioned in some of the interviews, the inhabitants do not consider it as an influential factor, even though the environmental issues are the main legal cause against the Vila. Inhabitants see economic interest as the main reason of the government entities for taking them out, and see the damage to the environment as an excuse to reach that goal.

INTERESTS

Discussing interests was one of the most conflictive parts of the interview. First, because it was difficult for them to identify the interests of most of the actors since it was something they never thought about, and second, because the concept of interest has some negative connotations so they were reluctant to mention interests of actors which they considered supporters of Vila Nova Esperança.

It was very common for all interviewees to classify actors as friends or enemies, which forced the interviewer to ask why they had that status and what the interest behind that was.

The majority of actors were regarded as having similar interests in the view of the different interviewees. For example all interviewees agreed that Lia's main interest is to help the others and Lute's main interest is economic profit.

On the other side, lawyer Maciel generated confronted impressions. While some considered that he wanted to make money from the inhabitants, others saw him as an altruistic kind of person.

*"Lawyer Maciel wanted the money out of our pockets. We all fired him together with Lia because of that"* Val

*"Lawyer Maciel is a great person and a knowledgeable lawyer. There were inhabitants trying to take profit from him"* Joao Leite

*"Lawyer Maciel was here to help and he helped a lot. He is a great person. I do not think we are going to manage to stay without him"* Eliani

Some public entities and administrations obtained similar results. There was no agreement on the interests of the Prefeitura of São Paulo, which some considered as another supporter as it is signing in favor of bringing the energy to Vila Nova Esperança, while others considered it as a passive actor. Eletropaulo, the electricity company, generated similar reactions, with some seeing it as an ally:

*"Workers of eletropaulo that I met are very good persons. Thanks to Moisés [Eletropaulo*

*manager] we have the town hall signing in favor of the electricity"* Lia

While others see it as an enemy or as a powerless actor:

*"Eletropaulo just do what they are told to do. They have no real power. If they put electricity it is because we forced them to"* Irene

It is very interesting that none of the government bodies' interests identified by interviewees were similar to their supposed objectives or functions. Lute, who is a procurator of the Public Minister in environmental issues, was not seen as having any environmental goals. Similarly, the CDHU, a government company that works in the development of favelas, was not considered to have any social goals.

### 5.2.3   Sources of power

In order to better understand power relations, it is useful to understand where the power of an actor comes from. During the interviews, the interviewees were asked to state the sources of power of each actor, therefore it is possible to analyze which of these sources is more important or, said in different words, where each actor obtains his/her power from.

In order to do that a small modification was made. Even though an actor's ability to stop or speed-up the process were treated as different things, they both boil down to control over the process, and what differs is the intention of the actor. Because of that, stop and speed-up have a strong negative correlation, which means that those who have the ability to stop the process won't use that ability to speed-up the process, even if they can. This shows in the fact that no actor has both during the same interview.

In order to tackle this issue, a new variable was created, control over the process, which is the result of the sum of stop and speed-up columns. This variable shows the power of controlling the process regardless of the purpose. It must be taken into account that when asked about sources of power, the interviewees where forced to give a yes or no type of answer and this might have caused a significant loss of information.

The next table shows the correlation between the independent variables, the sources of power, and the dependent variable, the power tower.

Table 4 -   Correlation between the independent variables, the sources of power, and the dependent variable, the power tower

|  | Money | Knowledge | Process control | Legitimacy | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Money | 1,000 | 0,384 | 0,544 | 0,051 | 0,633 |
| Knowledge | 0,384 | 1,000 | 0,895 | 0,761 | 0,921 |
| Process control | 0,544 | 0,895 | 1,000 | 0,761 | 0,921 |
| Legitimacy | 0,051 | 0,718 | 0,761 | 1,000 | 0,706 |
| Power tower | 0,633 | 0,880 | 0,921 | 0,706 | 1,000 |

Source: in the field data collection

Among the independent variables, we can see strong correlations between knowledge and control over the process. This results from the fact that all actors with control over the process have some kind of knowledge which inhabitants find useful for the process, as the majority of them have a university education which most of the interviewees lack. It is not the case of Lia, whose knowledge comes precisely from her experience as the favela leader. Analyzing actors with lower power, we can see that knowledge is usually their main source of power, which shows that their knowledge is not of great influence on this issue, if they do not have any process control.

The power tower was strongly correlated to knowledge and process control, especially to the second one. Similar correlation with these two variables is not unexpected as both variables were strongly correlated. We can conclude that process control is the most important factor when it comes to explaining the variables "knowledge" and "power tower".

If we calculate a regression between power tower and each of the independent variables we can extract the following information:

Table 5 - Information extracted with a regresion between power tower and each of the independent variables

|  | R squared | Standard desviation | Interception | Slope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Money | 0,401 | 18,026 | 10,829 | 5,264 |
| Knowledge | 0,775 | 11,061 | -0,787 | 6,118 |
| Process control | 0,849 | 9,068 | -0,093 | 6,708 |
| Legitimacy | 0,498 | 16,507 | 13,588 | 6,334 |

Source: in the field data collection

Again control over the process seems to be the variable that best explains the level of power of each actor. It is as if the interviewees gave little importance to external or indirect influence and gave the highest power to those actors who have a direct relationship with the process.

The fact that money is the least important element in explaining power is also very significant. Even though the interviewees recognized economic profit as the main interest of some of the actors, they do not consider that the money they have can play a significant role. Actually, most interviewees see that the situation of Vila Nova Esperança is exclusively decided in courts and, therefore, those actors that can somehow understand and influence the legal process are the ones who have the power.

This could also explain why the interviewees, even though there were selected active members of the community, find that Lia is the only inhabitant with power. Lia is the only one who is aware and understands the legal issues of the favela, and because of that, she is the one deciding what to do and how to do it. All the other inhabitants feel powerless due to the fact that they are not in control of the situation, which they do not even fully understand.

# 6 DISCUSSION

Once results have been presented, in this section a qualitative discussion will be conducted reviewing the main concepts highlighted in the literature review.

## 6.1 CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF CENTRALIZED POWER

Lia concentrates all the power inside Vila Nova Esperança. Even though in the literature reviewed a centralized power was expected, the fact that none of the other people working for the community are mentioned by the majority of the interviewees is surprising. Understanding how Vila Nova Esperança reached this point is as interesting as it is important to understand the implications.

In Vila Nova Esperança there are several factors that prevent members of the community from actively participating in the discussion. Culture plays a big role. As Olivieria (1993) said, Brazilians tolerate severe power differences and accept that other people take control of issues that affect them directly. Lia, being the president of the association, seems to be the most likely person whom that power would rely on.

The cost of participation is also affecting power distribution negatively. Lia left her job as a flower maker to dedicate herself full-time to the management of the association. As stated by Mansuri and Rao (2003), the costs of participation are especially high for those with fewer resources, which reduce the amount of time they dedicate to participating in community issues. As a result, there is a huge difference between the amount of time devoted by Lia and the rest of the community, which emphasizes the differences in power. However, for the members interviewed, the non-participation was seen as a lack of interest, which, as Machado (2011) mentioned, is a normal characteristic of the controlling elite inside favelas:

*"There are several people that complain but they do not do anything. They have no interest"*
*Leila*

In addition to the amount of time devoted, there are huge socioeconomic differences that sustain this distribution of power. Higher levels of education and better economic resources are the main factors affecting the ability of some members to participate. It is significant that

8 out of 10 inhabitants interviewed who possess functional roles inside the community belong to the first two socioeconomic categories. However, controlling members do not believe that there is a difference in capacity and attribute this reduced participation, again, to a lack of interest:

*"I do not think I am more intelligent than them. [. . . ] But when I asked someone to go to a meeting in my place, they do not get anything. I think it is lack of interest" Lia*

As some interviewees mentioned, Lia's power was not always so strong. Most of them recognized that Lia has achieved outstanding results for the community which has increased the trust the community has in her. The reasoning is simple, if someone has assumed all the power and because of her I still have my home and the electricity is coming, why would I want to interfere with what she is doing. Most of the interviewees strongly believed Lia's best intentions, which justifies the amount of power they give her:

*"There have been other presidents but they were not so influential. It is because Lia has done a lot, she has demonstrated she wants to help us" Val*

*"I am the first supporter of Lia. I know she is all heart" Joao Leite*

Some of the interviewees justified the centralization of power in Lia with the way she works.

*"Once I was going to a meeting but at the end I could not. The next time I went to the association building she [Lia] received me with bad manners saying that I was irresponsible. [. . . ] It took me much longer to come back the next time " Leila*

*"She did not know how to work with other people, so she make them leave the association" Deca*

Even Lia accepts that she feels forced to be an authoritarian leader, due to the negative aspects that she sees when she has to put ideas in common:

*"If I do not do it this way [without considering other members opinion] it would never get done. People like to talk about these things but they never do anything. [. . . ] There are negative people that create a feeling that things will not work, so I prefer they do not*

*interfere" Lia*

In fact, all interviewees believe that without Lia, they would never be in the situation in which they are now. Part of Lia's success is a result of their governing model. As it is suggested in the literature, a high number of decisions that need to be made in a community tends to increase the centralization of power, as it reduces the time required to make a decision. The ability Lia has shown for making those decisions is what has legitimized the centralized model.

However, centralized models, even when successful in their results, may have some negative outcomes. The first and most obvious is that this model is built around a single individual, in this case, Lia. Lia has been suffering health problems in the last year due to the excess of responsibility that comes with her position. That she has been the only person doing her job in the last three years and that no one feels capable of replacing her is a risk that Vila Nova Esperança faces for the next coming years.

As Schiffer (2004) said, a culture of participation might be necessary for participation to be effective. If inhabitants of the community are used to leaving the responsibility of decision making to another empowered inhabitant, they will probably not take this responsibility when this central figure disappears, but instead would wait for someone else to replace the former president.

Another question that should be addressed is whether the decisions made under centralized systems of power are always the best ones. In cases with a very clear community goal, it seems understandable that those operational decisions that a leader would make are the same that the community as a whole would make if they share the same objective. However, when the decisions are not that clear, and the opinion of the leader differs from the opinion of part of the inhabitants, the inhabitants would embrace more easily those solutions which they felt as theirs:

*"A decision taken by several people is better than just by one. For example in the park, maybe with more people we would have decided it to be a library and not a park, and it would be accepted by everyone" Leila*

Another issued raised in the interviews is the learning process of the leader in a centralized

power structure. Although even those who oppose Lia consider that she has improved significantly in her activities as a leader and that most consider her to be the best prepared, some interviewees complain that, under this authoritarian leadership she was not profiting from other residents knowledge:

*"The problem is that to be a leader you need to be involved in politics, and Lia isn't. [. . . ] Lia does not have the contacts with politicians. [...] There are people here that could help her with that." Deca*

## 6.2 POWER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND EXTERNAL ACTORS

### 6.2.1 *Relationship with the public administrations*

Public administrations occupy five out of the ten highest power positions according to the data analyzed. This was not unexpected, since they are the actors with the most resources to exercise their will (Machado, 2011). What was unexpected was that those actors who were considered to have the highest level of power, such as Lute, the prosecutor of the Public Ministry, and the CDHU, are not the traditional public authorities with a higher influence on this type of communities.

One explanation for this is that the CDHU and the Public Minister were the ones who took the situation of the community to the courts, and because of that, they are considered as "enemies" of the community.

Power is only seen when exercised. If there are other powerful actors, their lack of action, either positive or negative, limits the perception of power inside the community.
Power of other public administrations is seen as an ability that is not carried out.
*"They could do a lot but they are not doing much" Deca*

### 6.2.2 *Relationship with the NGOs*

The involvement of NGOs in the community has been prolific in recent years. This shows in the analysis conducted, where they are considered powerful actors by the members of the community, although less powerful than public administrations. This is especially relevant for those NGOs which are not involved in the regularization process which interviewees were asked about.

The main reason given for the power of these NGOs is the trust that the inhabitants have in them because of the capacity to help they have demonstrated. Thanks to that trust, they can assume assistential responsibilities inside the community with the acceptance of the inhabitants:

*"Power in the Vila [Nova Esperança] comes from the work. Once people have seen them working and defending our interests, they give their trust and accept them as one of us"*
*Vanija*

Successful NGOs in Vila Nova Esperança are those who have shown a predisposition to help in any issue related with the Vila, independently of what the objectives of the NGO are. In fact, community members do not see major differences between NGOs in terms of objectives, but they do see huge differences in terms of dedication and involvement.

When asked, none of the interviewees found any negative effects of these organizations inside the community. Only Lia considered that, sometimes, the amount of work they did was not too much for the benefits they received:

*"I have people coming everyday. Some come to help but others not. [. . . ] Once I helped a veterinary to raise funds for the dogs in the community. At the end we saw almost nothing"*
*Lia*

The interests of these organizations are not clear in the community. The interviewees did not seem to care what they wanted as long as they left something for the community. Only a few interviewees saw an interest other than uninterested help:

*"NGOs come here to learn, to practice. That is how I see it. They put in practice their*

*projects and we also profit from it" Ivan*

In fact, this predisposition of the community to welcome outside helpers of any kind has lead to some people profiting from the community by selling some kind of long-term non-material benefit for the community. During the questionnaires there were inhabitants who declined the interview without even asking the purpose, while there were others who accepted it also without asking any questions. This lack of control over the intentions of people from outside the community has made them severely vulnerable.

# 7 CONCLUSIONS

Power inside the community is centralized in only one member. Inside Vila Nova Esperança everything must pass through the president of the association. This is a result of her demonstrated capacity, her leadership style and the cultural values of the inhabitants. Even though this has resulted in outstanding outcomes, which are perceived by the members of the community, this type of organization gives rise to many issues, such as the ability of the community to continue her job once she has left her position.

**Local community members feel powerless compared to external actors.**

Power in Vila Nova Esperança comes from the outside. Only the president of the association could compete with external administrations and organizations. This perceived lack of control over their problems, leaves them with little motivation to take care of the community issues. In addition, this lack of power shows the vulnerability of the inhabitants, who left all hopes in the hands of people from outside the community whom they do not control. As a result they become an easy target to be used and manipulated.

**There is a lack of understanding of community-public administrations.** The greater the will of a public administration to remove the community from where it is, the greater the power perceived by the community. This is especially striking for those government entities that work on solving the situation of those communities. An administration that wants to be effective in provoking change inside a community should make sure that the community is in perfect understanding of the purpose of their actions.

**NGOs strengthen their position through work.** The community perceives NGOs as an important collaborative external agent. Again, the goals of said NGOs are sometimes confused and the scope of their actions is not well received by the members of the community. NGOs wanting to increase their level of influence inside the community should take into account that (1) power inside a community increases with the continuity of their work and (2) the community expects involvement of the NGO in issues which might not be directly related to the objectives of that NGO.

This dissertation gives the opportunity for future research in the field of power in favelas to

continue on top of these findings. Two clear paths of research could be started from this point. First, the Power relations in Vila Nova Esperança from the perspective of different stakeholders could provide a better understanding of the power relation in this community. Second, power relations in different favelas in Brazil could help identify commonalities and differences in power relations that could give greater support to these communities in their search of an effective solution of their main problems.

Finally, mention that this dissertation could and is expected to be used as a guide for both local members of the community as well as external stakeholders in the future implementation of ideas and projects, especially in the area of the legal process in which the Vila is involved and this dissertation has focused.

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# A APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR SOCIOECONOMIC DATA

| F1 rev 01 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ficha feita por | Simón Marti Colombas | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Data | 23 feb 2013 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Formato | Papel e computador | | | | | | | | | |
| Endereço | Av Eng Heitor Antonio Eiras Garcia | | | | | | | | | |
| Número | 9292 D | | | | | | | | | |

**Dados dos moradores**

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Primeiro morador | Saionara de Silva Santonel | | RG | 45352498-0 | CPF 400008838-67 |
| Sexo | | | | | |
| Segundo morador | Hamilton de Santos Silva | | RG | | CPF |
| Sexo | | | | | |
| Terceiro morador | | | | | |
| Quarto morador | | | | | |
| Anos morando na Vila | 9 | | | | |

Idade dos homens na família

| <6 | 6-11 | 11-17 | 18-23 | 24-29 | 30-35 | 36-41 | 42-47 | 48-53 | 54-59 | 60-65 | 66-71 | >71 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | |

Idade das mulheres na família

| <6 | 6-11 | 11-17 | 18-23 | 24-29 | 30-35 | 36-41 | 42-47 | 48-53 | 54-59 | 60-65 | 66-71 | >71 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |

Ocupação dos moradores

| | | Setor de ocupação | Lugar de trabalho |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adulto 1 | Saionara | Telemarketing | Belem |
| Adulto 2 | Hamilton | Autonomo | Autonomo |
| Adulto 3 | | | |
| Adulto 4 | | | |

**Dados da moradia**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Número de andares | 1 | |
| Material principal da construção | Tijolo | 1 |
| | Madeira | |
| | Chapa | |
| | TETO | |

| Estado aparente | | |
|---|---|---|
| | A: Trabalho profissional acabado | |
| | B: Não é mal estado mais não é trabalho profissional | 1 |
| | C: Mal estado | |

| Nível de risco | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 0: Sem risco | 1 |
| | 1: Risco largo prazo | |
| | 2: Risco corto prazo | |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Número de carros | 0 | |
| Número de motos | 0 | |

| Usos da casa | | |
|---|---|---|
| | moradia familiar | 1 |
| | comercial | 0 |
| | social | 0 |
| | religioso | 0 |
| | outros | 0 |

**Características da moradia**

| | |
|---|---|
| Fossa séptica | 0 |
| Manutenção da fossa | |
| Agua | 1 |
| Energia eléctrica | 1 |
| Telefone fixo | 0 |
| Problemas como a chuva | 1 |

**Necessidades dos moradores**

| | |
|---|---|
| Energia eléctrica | 1 |
| Esgoto | 0 |
| Pavimentação | 0 |
| Áreas de Lazer | 1 |
| Transporte | 1 |
| Creche | 0 |
| Centro de saude | 0 |
| Posto da policia | 0 |
| Regulação da propiedade | 0 |
| Correo | 0 |
| Centro de esporte | 0 |
| Iluminação das ruas | |
| Internet | 0 |
| Qualidade da agua | |
| Lixo | |
| Mercado | |
| Biblioteca | |
| Telefono público | |
| Farmacia | |
| Atividades de formação | |
| Escola | |

**Saude**

| | |
|---|---|
| Alguém na família deficiente | 0 |
| Alguém na família com enfermidade grave | |
| Alguém na família com enfermidade leve | 0 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Hipertensão | 0 |
| Problemas de visão | 0 |
| Problemas com os dentes | 0 |
| Problemas de respiração | |
| Colesterol | |
| Diabetes | |
| Outros | 0 |

Source: Simón Marti data collection

# B APPENDIX II: INHABITANTS INTERVIEWED, MAPS AND INFORMATION COLLECTED

The following table summarizes the participants of the semi-structured interviews, their social category according to section 6.1.2. and their role in the community and the date of the interview.

Table 6 - Summary of the participants of the semi-structured interviews, their social category according to section 6.1.2 and their role in the community and the date of the interview

| Interviewed | Social category | Role in the community | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deca | 1 | Financial director of the association | 10.06.13 |
| Eliani | 1 | Secretary of the association | 16.06.13 |
| Inacio | 2 | Responsible for the vegetable garden | 15.06.13 |
| Irene | 2 | Resonsible for the football field | 16.06.13 |
| Ivan | 4 | Responsible for waste management | 16.06.13 |
| Joao Leite | 1 | Substitute member of the association | 15.06.13 |
| Leila | 2 | Lia´s assistant | 15.06.13 |
| Lia | 1 | President of the association | 16.06.13 |
| Val | 2 | Responsible for visitors welcoming | 14.06.13 |
| Vanija | 3 | Liá´s assistant | 14.06.13 |

Source: in the field data collection

## B.1 MAPS AND BASIC INFORMATION FROM EACH INTERVIEW

### B.1.1 Deca



°Figure 8: Deca power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 7 -    Summary of actors identified by Deca

| Actor | Interest | Sources or power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Teto | provide decent homes | Money, Knowledge, | 2 |
| Marta simon | Give strength. Saw the necessities and decided to help | Money,  Knowledge, Speedup, | 2 |
| Liga solidaria | Help to stay. | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 5 |
| Vereadores | Interest in help. Have no support. | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 6 |
| Cdhu | Removed the comunity to build a bilding | Money,  Knowledge, Stop, | 10 |
| Lute | Stay near powerfull people | Money,  Knowledge, Stop, | 8 |
| Prefeitura de s.p | Want to help. Some people don´t agree. Poitic interest | Money,  Knowledge, Speedup, | 7 |
| Lia | Improve the comunity | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 3 |
| Eliani | Interest in improving | | 1 |
| Doctor Maciel | Help people to stay because saw the vulnerability | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 2 |

Source: in the field data collection

***B.1.2 Eliani***



Figure 9: Eliani power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 8 -   Summary of actors identified by Eliani

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lia | To stay here with decent houses | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 3 |
| Eliani | To stay here with decent houses | | 0 |
| Lute | Remove the community and make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 10 |
| Prefeitura de SP | No interest | Money, Knowledge, | 8 |
| Cdhu | To make money from the inhabitants and to sell apartments | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Legitimate | 10 |
| Subprefeituras | Do not want responsabilities. | Money, Knowledge, | 7 |
| Liga solidaria | Uninterested support | Money, Knowledge, | 6 |
| Rene | Support due to a personal relationship | | 0 |
| Teto | Help to the needy. Support | | 3 |
| Marta y Simon | The best   for the villa. With no personal interest | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Parque Tizzo | Removing because they are poor | | 0 |
| Umm | Help. With no too much intereset. | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Electropaulo | They do not want the process. | Money, | 4 |
| Sabest | Support. Money | | 0 |
| Advogado | Everyone to stay here and personal relationship | Knowledge, | 1 |
| Dr Alexander | Economical interest | Money, | 0 |

Source: in the field data collection

*B.1.3 Inacio*



Figure 10: Inacio power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 9 -   Summary of actors identified by Inacio

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lia | Keep people in their homes | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 9 |
| Lute | Remove people from the comunity. Make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Legitimate | 3 |
| Edilson | Stay in the comunity | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| umm | Help people | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Teto | improve the Vila | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Manacas | Help. Give Strength | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Lawyer Maciel | Want money from our hands | Money, Knowledge, | 2 |

Source: in the field data collection

***B.1.4 Irene***



Figure 11: Irene power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 10 -   Summary of actors identified by Irene

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Lia | To stay here with decent houses | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 3 |
| Teto | Help to make   a beatiful villa | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 7 |
| Umm | Decent houses | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 9 |
| Lucio | Help to not have poverty | | 2 |
| Laurent | Learn and teach to not be underestimated | Knowledge, Legitimate | 2 |
| Marta y Simon | Learn and teach to not be underestimated | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 3 |
| CDHU | To make money from the inhabitants | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 8 |
| Tiana | To make money from the inhabitants | | 0 |
| Advogado | To make commercial deal with Cdhu against inhabitants | Stop, | 2 |
| Eliane | To make money. She is manipulated | | 0 |
| Pastor | To make money. He is manipulated | | 0 |
| Deca | To make money. He is manipulated | | 0 |
| Prefeitura de SP | No interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, Legitimate | 9 |
| Electropaulo | No interest | Money, | 0 |
| Parque Tizzo | No interest | Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Prefeitura de TS | No interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, Legitimate | 8 |
| Governo | No interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, Legitimate | 10 |

Source: in the field data collection

***B.1.5 Ivan***



Figure 12: Ivan power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 11 -    Summary of actors identified by Ivan

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Lia | Everyone satay in the vila. No one knows any other interest | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 8 |
| Maria | Help | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| JB | Negative person. Allways says it is not gonna be right | Knowledge, | 4 |
| Vanija | Help | Knowledge, | 4 |
| Dona Zelda | Try to help | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Zeca | Help | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Delegado | Sceptic | Stop, | 4 |
| Isidio | People stay | Speed-up, | 4 |
| Tiana | Economic interest. Take advantage with the trial. | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 4 |
| Eliani | Economic interest. Take advantage with the trial. | | 0 |
| Deca | Economic interest. Take advantage with the trial. | | 0 |
| Marcelo | Economic interest. Take advantage with the trial. | | 0 |
| Lawyer Maciel | Economic interest. Take advantage with the trial. | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 3 |
| Umm | Help. Without economic interest | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 5 |
| Liga solidaria | Help | Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Marta simon | Help. Advance the situation. Learn and practice | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Lute | Harm. Economic interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 10 |
| CDHU | Sell the land and make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 8 |
| Prefeitura s.p. | Help. Stoped helping because of the legal problems | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, Legitimate | 8 |

Source: in the field data collection

**B.1.6. João leite**



Figure 13: Joao Leite power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 12 -   Summary of actors identified by Joao Leite

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Lia | 100% to help | Knowledge, Legitimate | 5 |
| Edilson | want to help | | 0 |
| Diana | collect money from Maciel Doctor | | 0 |
| Marcelo | | | 0 |
| Deca | | | 0 |
| Antonio | | | 0 |
| Eliani | want to satay | | 0 |
| Doctor Maciel | help the vila | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Amaralina | pass the problem | | 0 |
| Lute | Make money from important people | Money, | 0 |
| Estado | don´t have interest. Keep money | Money, Legitimate | 10 |
| Umm | | Knowledge, | 10 |
| Prefeitura T.S | Wanted to help but can´t | | 0 |
| Dito Juliana | help the vila | | 0 |

Source: in the field data collection

### B.1.7 Leila



Figure 14: Leila power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 13 -    Summary of actors identified by Leila

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Lia | To stay here with dignity houses | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 6 |
| Vanija | People to stay in the villa | Speed-up, | 2 |
| Ciclopack | Promotion | Knowledge, | 0 |
| Teto | Stay here, promotion | Knowledge, | 3 |
| Marta y Simon | Support and to be recognized the work | Knowledge, | 3 |
| Umm | Help, to show there is hope, decent houses | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 8 |
| Caçamba verde | Ecological education. | | 0 |
| Lute | To remove the community to make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 7 |
| Cdhu | To remove the community to make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 5 |
| Jeanette | To stay here with decent   houses | | 0 |
| Rosa | To stay here with decent   houses | | 0 |
| Maria | To stay here with decent   houses | | 0 |
| Marcelo | To make money from the regulation process | Knowledge, | 0 |
| Tiana | To make money from the regulation process | | 0 |
| El pastor | To make money from the regulation process | Knowledge, | 0 |
| Joel | To make money from the regulation process | | 0 |
| Antonio | To make money from the regulation process | | 0 |
| Advogado | To make money from the regulation process | Knowledge, Legitimate | 0 |
| Governo Federal | No interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, | 10 |
| Estado | No interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Speed-up, | 9 |
| Pids | Promotion. Political power | Knowledge, | 1 |
| Laurent | Promotion of his company. Reduce the taxes | Money, Knowledge, | 4 |

Source: in the field data collection

*B.1.9 Lia*



Figure 15: Lia power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 14 -  Summary of actors identified by Lia

| Actor | Interest | Source of power | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sabesp | Help and bring improvements | Money, Speed-up, | 3 |
| Electropaulo | Bring improvements. Loose less money | Money, Speed-up, | 6 |
| Folha | Interest in help. Personal relationship | | 3 |
| Liga solidaria | Grew. Make contacts | Knowledge, | 4 |
| Umm | Help the neighbours. Improve homes | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, | 10 |
| Cmp | hHlp the neighbours. Improve homes | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Moisses São Paulo | Social interst | Money, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Marcelo | Make money. Sell the land | | 0 |
| Antonio | Make money. Sell the land | | 0 |
| Florisvaldo | Make money. Sell the land | | 0 |
| Pastor | Make money. Sell the land | | 0 |
| Lute | Do what cdhu wants. Real state speculation | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 3 |
| Prefeitura s.p. | Listen Lute because give them work | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 1 |
| Cdhu | Remove the population | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 1 |
| Prefeitura de t.s. | Remove the population and transform it in luxury buildings | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 1 |
| Advogago | Get money from inhabitants. To be recognized in the vila | Knowledge, | 0 |
| Marcel | Help and bring improvements | Knowledge, | 3 |
| Candelaria | The good of the villa | | 5 |
| Soraia | Help and to be happy helping | Knowledge, | 2 |
| Mario | Help and to be happy helping | Knowledge, | 2 |
| Ciclopack | Promotion and to be known | Knowledge, | 1 |
| Marta y Simon | Grow up   proffesionally and help | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 7 |
| Ingrid | Help and personal relationship | Knowledge, | 2 |
| Teto | Help . Finish poverty. Promotion | Knowledge, | 8 |
| Maria | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Vanija | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Ivan | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Wagner | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Leila | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Valmirete | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Inacio | Keep her house. Help | | 0 |
| Lia | Happiness of the people,Houses for all the inhabitants. Recognition of her work | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 9 |

Source: in the field data collection

### B.1.9 Valmirete



Figure 16: Valmirete power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 15 -    Summary of actors identified by Valmirete

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|-------|----------|------------------|-------------|
| Ciclopack | Clean enviroment and help to stay | | 0 |
| Lucio | To make a social project | | 0 |
| Pato | To be a boss in Teto and good thing for the vila | | 0 |
| Teto | House imporvements and improvements of life quality | | 0 |
| Soraia | Help the neighbours. Help to stay in the villa | | 0 |
| Liga Solidaria | Help making donations and help to the stay in the villa | | 0 |
| Ingrid | People to stay in the villa Personal relationship with the community | | 0 |
| Marta y Simon | Help people, they like people | Knowledge | 5 |
| Manacas | Help to people and enviroment. | | 0 |
| Defesoria publica | To remove the community to make money | Money, Knowledge, | 6 |
| Habitacao de São Paulo | Urbanism | Money, Knowledge, Legitimate | 10 |
| Cdhu | Make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, | 10 |
| Lute | Make money | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Legitimate | 10 |
| Rene | Help to stay here and respect to the habitants | Knowledge, | 4 |
| Subprefeitura de Butanta | Make money | | 6 |
| Electropaulo | Help, make money and to avoid the damame | Speed-up, | 4 |
| Lia | Help to everybody | | 6 |
| Delegada | Nothing | | 0 |
| Tiana | To get benefits from the   inhabitants | | 0 |
| Ruben | Make money from Cdhu | | 0 |
| Fau | Help | Knowledge, | 1 |
| Umm | All inhabitant with a dignity home | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, | 5 |
| Escola | To protect the enviroment | | 0 |
| Amaralina | Remove the villa becouse is ugly | | 0 |
| Parque Tizzo | Remove the villa becouse is ugly. Economical interest | Money, Knowledge, | 4 |
| Laurent | To help with projects | | 0 |
| Advogado | Make money from people | | 3 |
| Prefeitura de TS | Make money | Money, Stop, Legitimate | 5 |

Source: in the field data collection

*B.1.10 Vanija*



Figure 17: Vanija power map

Source: in the field data collection

Table 15 -    Summary of actors identified by Vanija

| Actor | Interest | Sources of power | Power tower |
|---|---|---|---|
| Manacas | They grew as a organization. Becoming famous | | 0 |
| Teto | Help to removed people from dirty | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Marta simon | Help people. Grew as a professionals | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 4 |
| Ciclopack | promotion. Help people | | 0 |
| Liga solidaria | Help | | 0 |
| Fau | help to saty. Learn | Knowledge, Speed-up, | 2 |
| Electropaulo | economic interest | | 0 |
| Sabesp | economic interest | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, | 4 |
| Lute | Destroy. Economic interest | Money, Knowledge, Stop, Legitimate | 10 |
| Defesoria publica | protect | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, Legitimate | 6 |
| Governo do Estado | economic interest | Money, Knowledge, Speedup, Legitimate | 10 |
| Umm | Defend people | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 4 |
| Doctor Maciel | Make money from people | Knowledge, Stop, | 4 |
| Lia | See the improvements in the comunity. Her own home | Knowledge, Speed-up, Legitimate | 6 |
| neighbours in the protected area | Make money. Build to move after selling | | 0 |
| inhabitants that critics | econoomic interest | | 0 |
| inhabitants that not critics | Stay | | 0 |
| Marcelo | make money | | 0 |
| Tiana | make money | | 0 |
| Pastor | make money | | 0 |

Source: in the field data colection

# C   APPENDIX III: COMPLETE LIST OF ACTORS, POWER AND SHORT DESCRIPTION

Table 16 -   Complete list of actors, power and short description

| Actorr | Columna1 | Power tower |
|---|---|---|
| Lute (MP) | Public environmental prosecutor | 61 |
| Lia | Community leader | 58 |
| UMM | Current lawyers. National housing movements associations that gives technical and legal support to communities. | 57 |
| CDHU | Nacional institution in charge of favela´s urbanizations | 54 |
| Prefeitura de SP | Tawnhall of São Paulo | 43 |
| State governor | The state government | 39 |
| Teto | International NGO that makes wooden houses to the needes | 30 |
| Marta and Simon | Civil engineerings making a urbanization project | 29 |
| Liga Solidaria | National NOG that works coordinating others NGOs | 18 |
| Lawyer Maciel | Previous lawyer. 84 years old retired judge. | 16 |
| Eletropaulo | Company responsable for the electrical infrastructure | 14 |
| Prefeitura de TS | Tawnhall of Taboao | 14 |
| Subprefeitura de Butanta | Neighbourhood department of the city of São Paulo in Butanta | 13 |
| Defesoria Pública | Public defender | 12 |
| Federal government | Federal government | 10 |
| Sabesp | Company responsable for the suply water | 7 |
| Vereadores | City councilour | 6 |
| Candelaria | Public worker of the housing secretary of the city of São Paulo townhall | 5 |
| Parque Tizzo | Institution created for to manage everithing in relation with Parque Tizzo | 4 |
| Rene (MA) | Public worker in the environmental secretary of the city of São Paulo town hall | 4 |
| Delegado | Inhabitant | 4 |
| Edilson | Inhabitant | 4 |
| Nossa São Paulo | As the UMM. Another housing movement | 4 |
| Nené | Inhabitant | 4 |
| JB | Inhabitant | 4 |
| Bahía | Inhabitant | 4 |
| Dona Zelda | Inhabitant | 4 |

Table 17 - Complete list of actors, power and short description (continued)

| Zeca | Inhabitant | 4 |
|---|---|---|
| Isidio | Inhabitant | 4 |
| FAU | Public architecture University | 3 |
| Folha de São Paulo | Newspaper | 3 |
| Marcel | Inhabitant that supports lawyer Maciel | 3 |
| Lorran | Director in a risk advisory french company with interest on investing social projects | 2 |
| Manacás | NGO working with the vegetable garden | 2 |
| Lucio | Teto director of the social project | 2 |
| Vanija | Inhabitant | 2 |
| Soraya | A volunteer working with social projects | 2 |
| CMP | As the UMM. Another housing movement | 2 |
| Mario | Inhabitant | 2 |
| Eliani | Inhabitant that support lawyer Maciel | 1 |
| Ciclopack | NGO that focuses on environemnt protection and recicling | 1 |
| PIDS | Sustainables developement and integrated projects associations of the neighbourhood of Butanta | 1 |
| Tiana | Inhabitant that support lawyer Maciel | 0 |
| Marcelo | Inhabitant that support lawyer Maciel | 0 |
| Pastor | Inhabitant that support lawyer Maciel | 0 |
| Deca | Inhabitant that supports lawyer Maciel | 0 |
| Antonio | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Ingrid | Previous Teto volunteer who work now as Soraya | 0 |
| Amaralina | Nearest neighborhood where there is all the services | 0 |
| Lawyer Alexandre | Lawyer after lawyer Maciel | 0 |
| Floresta Urbana | environmental organization | 0 |
| Joel | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Pato | Director of TETO | 0 |
| Rubeni | Former inhabitant | 0 |
| Escola | Public school | 0 |
| Florisvaldo | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Maria | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Wagner | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Inacio | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Leila | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Ivan | Inhabitant | 0 |
| Val | Inhabitant | 0 |
| People in the forest | People living inside the natural protected area | 0 |
| Inhabitants that critic | - | 0 |
| Joao Leite | Inhabitant | 0 |

Source: in the field data collection

# D APPENDIX IV: SUPPORTIVE GRAPHIC MATERIAL



Figure 18: Meeting of local leaders with external NGOs

Source: in the field data collection

Figure 19: House classified as A in the socioeconomic study

Source: in the field data collection

Figure 20: House classified as B in the socioeconomic study

Source: in the field data collection



Figure 21: House classified as C in the socioeconomic study

Source: in the field data collection

Figure 22: Armed policeman asking inhabitants to leave the settlement

Source: in the field data collection