

RESUMO

Esta pesquisa utilizou estudos clássicos sobre a presidência Americana para organizar um estudo da história, da organização, e da administração da presidência Brasileira. Uma resenha crítica da bibliografia sobre presidencialismo abre o relatório, seguida por uma discussão de pesquisas sobre as presidências Americana e Brasileira. O relatório termina com uma discussão preliminar da presidência durante o primeiro mandato do Presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso.

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Política; Governança; Presidência; Democracia.

ABSTRACT

This report on the Brazilian presidency uses classic studies of the American presidency to organize inquiry into the history, organization, and administration of the Brazilian presidency. This report reviews the international literature on presidentialism, research on the American presidency and the available secondary analyses of the Brazilian presidency. Initial survey of central issues in terms of policy and organization during President Cardoso's first term are also addressed.

KEY WORDS

Presidency; Democracy; Politics; Governance.

SUMMARY

I.	Presidencies in comparative political analysis	6
1.	Presidential v.s. parliamentary government	8
2.	Presidencies and political theory	11
3.	Presidencies and tensions between liberalism and democracy.....	14
4.	Presidencies and divided government	17
II.	The presidency in Brazilian history	20
1.	The Brazilian presidency and late party development	23
2.	The presidency in Brazilian history	26
2.1.	The presidency and mass politics, 1945-1964.....	29
2.2.	The Brazilian presidency, 1974-1998	35
2.3.	From the impeachment of Collor to the election of Cardoso	41
III.	The Brazilian presidency and the Cardoso administration.....	44
1.	New trends in electoral representation	50
2.	Organization of the Cardoso administration.....	57
3.	Economic policy and the Cardoso administration	62
3.1.	Privatizations.....	66
4.	Social policy during the Cardoso administration.....	69
4.1.	Agrarian reform.....	74
IV.	A note on primary sources	76

V. Interviews and acknowledgements.....	77
VI. Bibliography.....	79
VII. Appendices.....	102
Appendix 1.....	102
Appendix 2.....	122
Appendix 3.....	124
Appendix 4.....	128
Appendix 5.....	176

THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENCY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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“The President is not the presidency. The presidency is not the government. Ours is not a presidential system.” Charles O. Jones, *The Presidency in a Separated System*.

This report begins with Charles O. Jones’s paradigm shattering sentences on the American presidency and what he described as a separated system. The first sentence clarifies the object of inquiry: the Brazilian presidency as an institution or organization rather than a person or abstract construct such as presidentialism. The second sentence suggests that analysis of the Brazilian presidency requires placing presidential initiative and organization in the context of its relations with other branches and levels of government as well as social and political change generally. The third sentence introduces the shift in comparative perspective that informs this research on the Brazilian presidency; that of the American experience and the perception that the separation and diffusion of power is essential for effective representative and democratic government. Each of these three tasks loom large and will require sustained research to develop the implications of this initial period of inquiry. The goal of this report is to challenge the secondary literature on presidentialism, briefly review the historical development of the Brazilian presidency, and document the existing primary sources of information about the Brazilian presidency that provide the greatest potential for empirical research.

This report is organized in a manner that reflects this initial stage of research. The first section of the report presents a critical review of recent literature in political

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science on presidentialism and related issues of electoral representation and governance involved in cognate sub-fields such as electoral behavior, political parties and party systems, political economy, and executive-legislative relations. These sections required bibliographic review and criticism designed to develop better theoretical and conceptual foundations for empirical research into the Brazilian presidency. The abstract tone, broad scope, and biased character of debate about institutional design (or form of government) require a rather lengthy discussion of the vices and virtues of presidentialism. More importantly, the following review of theories and concepts about presidentialism argues that a shift away from abstract matters about parliamentarism or presidentialism is necessary to more open ended empirical and comparative analysis of the Brazilian presidency. Regarding the goals originally established for this initial six-month period, the primary goal of reviewing conceptual and theoretical foundations was achieved. Previous drafts of the following sections reviewing the international literature on presidentialism were presented at the first annual meeting of the ABCP and have been accepted for publication in the *Revista de Administração de Empresas da EAESP/FGV*.

The second part of this report presents the initial results of inquiry into the primary resources available for empirical analysis of the Brazilian presidency. In this respect, the comparative references are rich given the long tradition of empirical analysis into the American presidency. And a significant part of this initial period of research went into review of existing information sources on the Brazilian presidency that may provide reasonably comparable data on the organization, administration, and policy-making activities in American and Brazilian executive offices. The sheer volume and complexity of legislative initiatives, policy spheres, relations between branches of government, and organizational form and content suggest that, as expected, this research project will indeed be a long term effort.

I. PRESIDENCIES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS

The broader goal of this research is to shift the social sciences away from idealized models of the Northwest European experience as the benchmark for democracy.¹ Unfortunately, much comparative analysis takes on a critical tone of liberal-reformism, with research focusing on the vices of presidentialism, populism, patronage, and corruption rather than open-ended inquiry into new developments.² In this respect, Brazil has often been perceived as the worst case. Indeed, recent Brazilian realities of military rule, poverty, foreign debt, high inflation, negative per-capita growth, delayed transition, and episodes of populist presidentialism have often confirmed the worst fears of critics and reformers. However, since the impeachment of President Collor,³ the reduction of inflation without further impoverishment, the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency, and the collapse of Asian financial markets, a most unexpected development has occurred. Brazil has become a positive model for others building institutions of popular representation, market economies, and open societies in the new post-transition and post-Cold War world.

¹ Note O'Donnell's challenge to avert Euro- and ethno-centrism in the building of positive theories of political change in: "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, pp. 34-51.

² See: Valenzuela, Arturo & Juan Linz, eds. *The Failure of Presidential Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) and Kurt von Mettenheim, ed. *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

³ Kurt Weyland, "The Rise and Fall of President Collor and its impact on Brazilian Democracy." (*Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. Vol 35, No. 1, 1993. pp. 1-37).

To understand these new developments, this research analyzes the day-to-day work in the Brazilian presidency in comparative perspective. Instead of comparing the Brazilian presidency to idealized models of governance in Europe,⁴ new perspective are sought through comparison of similarities and differences among presidencies in the Americas.⁵ Like most novelties, this comparative perspective has classic precedents. Contrary to most recent scholarship, the American experience has been seen as an alternative trajectory of change from social science classics such as Weber and Bryce through the "new political historians" in the 1960s.⁶ For example, scholars of American democracy now emphasize the functionality of divided and separated government for presidential governance rather than the supposedly effective centralization of power in parliaments; they stress critical elections and realignments⁷ rather than party programs or European ideologies; they argue that patronage machines may be rapidly transformed into mass parties through political appointments rather than party discipline that apparently eases executive work; and they focus research on the electoral practices of party professionals rather than the ideal organizational characteristics associated with the Westminster model.⁸ A central goal of this study is to begin a similar conceptual shift away from euro-

⁴ See: Bolivar Lamounier, "Brazil: Towards Parliamentarism?" (in Valenzuela & Linz, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy in Latin America, pp. 179-219).

⁵ See: Kurt von Mettenheim, "Brazilian Presidentialism: Shifting Comparative Perspectives from Europe to the Americas." (in von Mettenheim, ed. Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics, pp. 136-158).

⁶ Max Weber notes: "That the plebiscitary 'machine' has developed so early in America is due to the fact that there, and there alone, the executive -- this is what mattered -- the chief office of patronage, was a president elected by plebiscite." ("Politics as a Vocation," Hans Gerth & C.W. Mills eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 108) What were the consequences? Weber is also unequivocal: "...the Germans perfected the rational, functional, and specialized bureaucratic organization of all forms of domination from factory to army and public administration. For the time being the Germans have been outdone only in the techniques of party organization, especially by the Americans." (ibid, p.108) See also: M.I. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties in the United States and Great Britain, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964 abridged) and James Bryce, The American Commonwealth, (New York: Macmillan, 1907). Among the political scientists and historians that changed perceptions of the American presidency and democracy in the 1960s, see the work of W.D. Burnham, Theodore Lowi, and William Chambers.

⁷ On critical elections and realignments in American politics, see: V.O. Key. "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics (Vol. 17, 1950, pp.3-18), William N. Chambers and W.D. Burnham, The American Party Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

⁸ In the United States the term party system "...relates primarily to what might be called voting systems or electoral politics rather than to organizational structures." Walter D. Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970, p. 11).

centrism and liberal-reformism⁹ by comparing the Brazilian and American experiences with presidential governance.¹⁰

1. PRESIDENTIAL V.S. PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

A central argument of this report is that presidential institutions and the American experience provide a more compelling comparative referent for post-transition politics in Brazil. Careful, open-ended analysis of presidential institutions and democratic politics is needed because recent critics of presidentialism focus on vices but not virtues, emphasizing risks but not opportunities. Beginning with Juan Linz's thought provoking work in 1984, scholars such as Fred Riggs, Alfred Stepan, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Arturo Valenzuela have attempted to draw direct causal links between presidentialism and problems of ungovernability, instability, and democratic breakdown.¹¹ Presidential institutions may indeed retain a greater burden of proof because they are fewer in number and can easily be confused with directly elected authoritarian executives. But recent advocates of parliamentarism misrepresent the American experience and its liberal-democratic tradition, fail to

⁹ Liberal-reformism has pervaded American political thought from Woodrow Wilson and progressive-era reformers, through calls for a more responsible two party system in the 1950s. And despite considerable evidence to the contrary, critics of presidentialism in post-transition contexts continue to cite presidential and divided government as a vice. See: Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1900), "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System." (Supplement, American Political Science Review. Vol. 44, 1950).

¹⁰ On the relevance of the American experience for comparative politics, see: Klaus von Beyme, America as a Model, New York: St. Martins, 1987 and Carl Friedrich, The Impact of American Constitutionalism Abroad. Boston: Boston University Press, 1967.

¹¹ Juan Linz began the recent round of criticism directed against presidential institutions in papers circulated during 1984 but first published: "The Perils of Presidentialism," Journal of Democracy, 1/1 (Winter 1990), pp. 51-69. See also: Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skatch. "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," World Politics (46/1 October 1993 pp. 1-22) and Arturo Valenzuela & Juan Linz, eds. The Failure of Presidential Democracy in Latin America. and selections in Arend Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

provide a positive account of political development within presidential institutions, and tend to overestimate the impact of broad institutional designs on political life.

The central characteristic of presidential government is the separate election of both executive and the legislature for fixed terms. This minimal definition¹² of presidential government excludes all other attributes associated with presidentialism so that they may be discussed in terms of empirical evidence or evaluated on the basis of liberal and/or democratic theory. Although minimal, this definition of presidential government is not without content. The separate election of executive and legislature has its origins in political theories from antiquity through the eighteenth century which saw the separation and diffusion of power rather than its concentration as the key to effective sovereignty. But presidential institutions not only embody a recurring position in the history of political ideas. They also remain vital today for reconciling core conflicts between liberal conceptions of indirect representative government and the realities of direct popular appeals in competitive mass politics.

In contrast to this minimal definition strategy, recent definitions of presidential systems in comparative politics tend to emphasize the direct election of executives and underestimate the separation of powers.¹³ This fails to distinguish between the direct elections of authoritarian executives and separate, competitive elections for legislature and executive. While Lijphart recognizes, for example, that presidential systems are based on Montesquieu's principle of the separation of powers, he nonetheless classifies democratic institutions according to whether executives are elected indirectly and remain dependent on the confidence of legislatures, or whether executives are elected directly.¹⁴ This classification effectively

¹² Giovanni Sartori discusses the role of minimal and descriptive definitions in linking complex problems to empirical research in his Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 62-3.

¹³ In a notable exception, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey analyze the prospects for balancing powers between executives and legislatures in their Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, 1992.

¹⁴ Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, pp. 2-6.

distinguishes cases of parliamentary government from all cases of directly elected executives. But it fails to differentiate between the direct election of authoritarian executives through plebiscites and the diffusion of power encouraged by separately electing legislatures and executives in presidential government.

Linz also argues that a basic characteristic of presidentialism "is the president's strong claim to democratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy."¹⁵ For Linz, separate elections in presidential government tend to produce a problematic "dual democratic legitimacy," while fixed terms tend to create institutional rigidity. Among the many important and ground-breaking aspects of Linz's work is his clarification of the real and imposing risks associated with presidential government such as inflammatory plebiscitarian appeals, unproductive conflict between legislature and executive, and risk of policy gridlock. But by characterizing these risks as vices inherent to presidentialism, Linz asserts a causal hypothesis about the consequences of presidentialist arrangements that is unrelievedly negative. This critical stance toward presidential institutions shifts attention away from viable causal hypotheses about the political opportunities that may also be generated by presidential institutions.¹⁶

While not blind to the risks of presidentialism identified by Linz and other recent critics, this research argues that presidential government provides significant opportunities for the development of liberal and democratic politics largely overlooked by both social scientists and writers of constitutions. Three types of argument provide informed grounds for this optimism. First, the core idea behind presidential government -- that liberty, the dispersion of power, and effective government are mutually reinforcing -- pervades political theory from antiquity

¹⁵ Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism." p. 53. Linz focuses on two additional characteristics of presidential systems which also tend to generate instability: The fact that both presidents and legislatures are directly elected and endowed with significant powers; and that both are elected for fixed terms in office.

¹⁶ On the importance of analyzing the specific risks and opportunities associated with different institutional arrangements, and specifically when analyzing presidential and parliamentary government, see: Kent Weaver & Bert Rockman, Do Institutions Matter?, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993, chapter one.

through contemporary liberalism and provides alternative solutions contrary to the Hobbesian style of concentrating power in parliaments. Second, since the extension of suffrage and the development of mass politics, separate executive and legislative elections have taken on greater importance because of the need to reconcile traditional liberal theories of representative government with the direct popular appeals typical of mass politics. Third, Charles Jones, David Mayhew, and other analysts of American politics provide strong evidence that legislatures remain productive when U.S. presidents lack legislative majorities.¹⁷ Contrary to recent critics of presidentialism, gridlock is far from necessary in situations where presidents lack legislative majorities. Although each of these responses merits careful analysis beyond the bounds of this report, brief explanations are in order.

2. PRESIDENCIES AND POLITICAL THEORY

Presidential institutions embody a position which appears throughout the history of political theory: That mixing, separating, diffusing, and dividing power not only tends to avert tyranny; it is also necessary to produce popular legitimacy and effective governance. Political theorists, from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, St. Thomas, and Machiavelli (of the Discourses), through Locke, Montesquieu, the American Federalists, and contemporary liberals, all argue along these lines in strikingly similar terms. Although the legacy of political theory is no substitute for empirical evidence, this core position toward liberty and power first appears in Greek conceptions of mixed constitutions, was reaffirmed by both medieval and renaissance observers of politics, and has been restated by liberal and democratic thinkers since the enlightenment.

¹⁷ See Charles Jones The Presidency in a Separated System and: Mayhew, David. Divided we Govern. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

Greek and Roman political theorists recognized the utility of dispersing power through diverse mechanisms, but their arguments in favor of what they called mixed constitutions are most relevant. Mixed constitutions referred to those that distributed power among institutions designed to represent monarchs, oligarchs, and citizens at large. Plato admired the mix of dual monarchs, elders, and ephors (elected representatives) in the Spartan constitution because he thought that dispersing power among these groups increased the effectiveness of sovereignty.¹⁸ Although subject to dispute, Polybius' comparative analysis of ancient Sparta and Rome also concluded that mixed constitutions were more likely to resist violent overthrow, facilitate imperial expansion, and protect the liberty of citizens.¹⁹ Even Machiavelli argued that ancient Rome achieved imperial greatness and secured liberty for its citizens because the separation of institutional powers caused persistent and productive conflict between the Senate and people.²⁰

After the displacement of monarchs diminished the utility of mixed constitutions, eighteenth century liberals modernized the idea that liberty, the dispersion of power, and effective government were mutually reinforcing with new theories such as the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism. Indeed, the desirability of separating legislative and executive powers first became a central theme in liberal thought during this new era of revolutions and democratic constitutions.²¹ From Locke and Montesquieu through the American Federalists, the separation of powers is defined primarily in terms of separating the executive and legislature. Locke first argued that the executive and legislature must be separate: "because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp for power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute

¹⁸ Plato, Republic, Book VI.

¹⁹ For a review of Polybius' theory and comparison with Hobbes' notion of sovereignty, see: Fritz, Kurt von. The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

²⁰ Machiavelli, Nicollo. The Discourses. Book 1, Chapters 2 & 4.

²¹ In this respect, presidential institutions are a product of eighteenth century revolutionary theory. Verny notes: "By abolishing the monarchy and substituting a president for the King and his government, the Americans showed themselves to be truly revolutionary in outlook." "Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government." in Lijphart, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. p. 41.

them."²² Montesquieu also argued that: "if there were no monarch and the executive power were entrusted to a certain number of persons drawn from the legislative body, there would no longer be liberty, because the two powers would be united."²³ Madison and the American Federalists advocated not only separate elections and institutional prerogatives for legislature and executive, but an additional dispersion of power through institutional checks and balances.²⁴ While the historical context and institutional solutions of Locke, Montesquieu, and the American federalists differ, they shared a concern about diffusing power in a new era of revolutionary governments.

This new generation of liberal-democratic theorists also defended dispersing power for a new reason; that of ensuring minority representation. American constitutional debates reveal not only a consistent fear of majority rule but also specific recommendations designed to ensure minority representation. The need to effectively represent minorities to avert tyranny and ensure effective government continued to be of concern in 19th century American political thought. For example, Calhoun argued that opposition was critical in American government and introduced the concept of concurrent majorities.²⁵ Indeed, contemporary American political theorists in the Liberal tradition still argue that increasing opportunities for the representation of minorities through separating and dispersing powers is critical.

²² John Locke, Second Treatise of Government Chapter 12, Paragraph 143.

²³ Montesquieu, Charles L.S. baron de. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press edition, 1989. Part 2, Book 11, Ch. 6.

²⁴ The central focus of Federalist Paper No. 51 is the separation of executive and legislative powers.

²⁵ John C. Calhoun. A Disquisition on Government and Selections from the Discourses. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

3. PRESIDENCIES AND TENSIONS BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND DEMOCRACY

Another virtue of presidential institutions is their ability to articulate and institutionalize core contradictions between liberalism and democracy in mass society. If eighteenth century political theories of the separation of powers attempted to reconcile conflicts between displaced monarchs and newly empowered parliaments, current debates about parliamentary and presidential systems can be said to tap core conflicts between traditional liberal notions of indirect representative government and new realities of direct popular appeals and democratic ideals in mass politics. Since plebiscites were used by Napoleon to confer imperial and consulate powers upon himself in 1799, direct appeals by authoritarian leaders to popular acclaim have shaken liberalism by providing alternative visions and formulas for national representation.²⁶ Both Marx and Tocqueville were horrified by Louis Bonaparte because they recognized that the extension of universal male suffrage and direct elections for executive office during the Second French Republic had produced unexpected and imposing new forms of mass power.²⁷ For Tocqueville, strong presidents in nineteenth century France would simply recreate a new type of absolute monarch.²⁸ For Marx, Louis Bonaparte asserted a new type of divine right to authoritarian rule by combining direct plebiscitarian acclaim and the militaristic mobilization of the lumpenproletariat.²⁹ This combination of plebiscitarianism and social leveling which Marx and Tocqueville abhorred in 1851 reappeared during the twentieth century as fascism,

²⁶ Notes Bergeron: "Plebiscitary democracy simply passed over representative institutions and inhibited the development of public opinion." Bergeron, Louis. France Under Napoleon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p. 9. On the history of plebiscitarianism in Europe, see: Charles S. Maier, "Fictitious bonds of wealth and law" on the theory and practice of interest representation." in Suzanne Berger, Organizing Interests in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 27-61.

²⁷ For comparison of these analyses by Marx and Tocqueville, see: Raymond Aron, "The Sociologists and the Revolution of 1848." in his Main Currents in Sociological Thought, I. New York: Doubleday, 1968.

²⁸ Alexis de Tocqueville, Recollections. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 p. 187? (Part 2, Chapter XI).

²⁹ Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.

whose direct popular appeals, mass mobilization, functional representation, terror, and genocide remain associated with strong executives until today.

However revolting these authoritarian abuses of direct popular appeals may be both to liberals and democrats alike, the tensions between liberalism and democracy which gave rise to these political outcomes must be recognized as an integral part of modern politics. Contemporary ideas that fuse liberalism and democracy into a single liberal-democratic tradition often fail to recognize that democracy means the transparent, immediate, and direct rule of the people. Tyranny and despotism troubled political theorists from Aristotle through Tocqueville precisely because of the frightening combination of popular support, powerful government, and social leveling. Since the extension of suffrage and the development of mass politics, a core task of liberal-democratic politics is to provide an institutional setting capable of balancing this recurrent and essential tension between the democratic content of direct plebiscitarian appeals to social and economic justice (in the sense of social leveling) and traditional liberal models of representative government.

How can presidential systems provide opportunities and institutional settings that articulate and institutionalize these tensions between direct democratic and indirect representative government? Verny suggests that: "In countless ways almost incomprehensible to those accustomed to parliamentarism, the presidential system exhibits the mutual independence of the executive and legislative branches of government."³⁰ Linz and other advocates of parliamentarism do not fully incorporate into their analysis the urgency of bringing the irreversible realities of direct appeals in the age of mass politics within the institutional procedures of direct competitive elections for executives. To be fair, Linz recognizes that: "presidential elections do offer the indisputable advantage of allowing the people to choose their chief executive openly, directly, and for a predictable span rather than leaving that

³⁰ Verny also notes that: "Equally important for the proper operation of the presidential system is the election of the president at the time of the assembly elections. This associates the two branches of government, encourages party unity, and clarifies the issues." Verny, Douglas. "Parliamentary Government and Presidential Government." reprinted in Lijphart, Arend. *Parliamentary Government versus Presidential Government*. p. 41.

decision to the backstage maneuvering of the politicians."³¹ But because critics of presidentialism focus on the risks of inflammatory populist and nationalist appeals and the zero-sum character of direct executive elections, they fail to consider the opportunities for ameliorating these risks. Presidential institutions can counterbalance demagoguery and democratic excesses by holding separate elections for legislatures and a series of other checks and balances.

Observers of American politics from Max Weber to Carl Friedrich saw this combination between direct plebiscitarian appeals and representative government as central to understanding presidential institutions and political development in the United States.³² Their work suggests that the direct election of executives is not only more democratic, it can also be functional for political development. Subsequent scholarship by V.O. Key, W.D. Burnham, William N. Chambers, Theodore Lowi, and others clearly demonstrate that precocious democratization occurred in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries largely because of critical elections and electoral realignments shaped by direct presidential elections (ameliorated by the electoral college).³³ America has been a model for newly democratizing states since its revolution.³⁴ A central goal of this research report is to use these social scientific accounts of American political development to provide new perspectives on the Brazilian presidency and universal problems of democratization.

³¹ Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism." pp. 56-7.

³² Weber, "Politics as a Vocation." Friedrich, The Impact of the American Constitution Abroad.

³³ On critical elections and realignments in American politics, see: V.O. Key. "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (1955 pp.3-18, William N. Chambers and W.D. Burnham, The American Party Systems, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, and Sundquist, James. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Washington: Brookings, 1983 (2nd edition).

³⁴ Beyme, America as a Model., Friedrich, The Impact of the American Constitution Abroad.

4. PRESIDENCIES AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT

A third response to the general question of whether the separation of powers can produce effective government can be found in recent debates about divided government in the United States. Mayhew's path-breaking book entitled Divided We Govern has provoked extensive reconsideration of American executive-legislative relations by suggesting that Republican presidents facing Democratic majorities in congress (and vice-versa) performed at least as well as Democratic presidents with secure legislative majorities.

Unfortunately, debate about divided government in American politics has yet to gain widespread influence among comparative political analysts. Instead, critics of presidentialism tend to rely on idealized views of European parliamentary systems. Indeed, a powerful strain in American political thought has long insisted that the U.S. should emulate the Westminster model of parliamentary government. From Woodrow Wilson's criticism of American politics at the turn of the century and progressive-era reformers, through calls for a more responsible two party system in the 1950s, and including proposals for reform of American political institutions during bicentennial celebrations, the quest for a system of concentrated power has continued.³⁵ And despite considerable evidence to the contrary, advocates of parliamentarism in Latin America and Eastern Europe continue to cite divided government as a vice of presidentialism, ignoring the more complex picture revealed by analysis in the United States.

Charles Jones deepens the contemporary debate about divided government by linking the ability of American political institutions to perform while presidents lack

³⁵ Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1900, Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Movement 1900-1915. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1963, American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System." American Political Science Review. 44 Supplement, 1950, and Sundquist, Constitutional Reform and Effective Government.

majorities in congress to classic assertions in liberal political thought about the functionality of establishing competing legitimacies. Jones notes:

In the Unites States the structure of government prescribed by the constitution, court decisions, and traditions vastly increases the amount of bargaining that must take place before policies can be made... The necessity for constant bargaining is... built into the very structure of American government.

And contrary to the generally accepted idea in comparative political analysis, this separation of powers designed to produce permanent conflict between contrasting principles of representation is at the center of American conceptions of effective government. Dahl and Lindblom link this separationist character of American institutions to the more open, muddling through, pluralistic policy making process that also differs dramatically from current analyses in comparative political analysis. While Euro-centric and liberal-reformist perspectives see the concentration of power as necessary to effectively implement policy, Dahl and Lindblom argue that:

The strategic consequence of this arrangement, as the Constitutional Convention evidently intended, has been that *no unified, cohesive, acknowledged, and legitimate representatives of the "national majority" exist in the United States*. Often the President claims to represent one national majority, and Congress (or a majority of both houses) another. The convention did its work so well that even when a Congressional majority is nominally of the same party as the president, ordinarily they do not speak with the same voice." (Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*. pp. 335-6 cited in Jones, *The Presidency in a Separated System*)

This separationist, pluralist, and muddling through view of the policy process differs considerably from those who seek to increase party government, introduce

political reforms, and increase governability through the centralization of power. Take for example the reform proposals of the American Political Science Association in 1950:

The party system that is needed must be democratic, responsible, and effective... An effective party system requires, first, that the parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out the programs... The fundamental requirement of such accountability is a two party system in which the opposition party acts as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining, and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions. (American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties*. New York: Rinehart, pp. 1-2)

The similarity of the liberal-reformist agenda fifty years ago in the United States with current assumptions about the Brazilian presidency and politics is striking.

Contrary to the liberal-reformism and euro-centrism that pervades comparative political and social analysis, this research takes inspiration and comparative referent from several generations of American scholars that focused on legislative initiatives and public policy as a contested process involving separate institutions in conflict over shared powers of government. This shift to a separationist definition of the American presidential system also differs in important respects from more commonly accepted legal-functional perceptions of the separation of powers that demarcates the executive, legislative, and judiciary as branches of government with different -- and separate -- functions. Contrary to this traditional view that the legislature legislates, the executive executes, and the judiciary adjudicates, recent work on politics in the United States federal government suggest that the initiation, debate, voting, implementation, and constitutional review of legislation involves a

series of complex moments permanently combining the presidency, congress, and the courts in political contestation.

Another characteristic of recent work on the American presidency applies to analysis of Brazilian politics. For some time, scholars in the United States have warned of a presidency fetish in media news coverage and popular perceptions. The person of the president often serves as an interpretive magnet, attracting explanation for a variety of economic, political, social and cultural phenomena. While the psychological and political aspects of this projection onto the president are of interest, it would take this research too far from its principal tasks. However, a note on the political consequences of this tendency to focus exclusively on the president as a person is necessary given the risk of authoritarian excesses in the current context of post-transition politics. A central argument in recent political analysis of presidencies in comparative perspective is that appeals to political will or presidential initiative to solve economic, political, or social challenges risks embracing a new type of plebiscitary authoritarianism.

II. THE PRESIDENCY IN BRAZILIAN HISTORY

The presidency has been critical for political development and democratization throughout modern Brazilian history. But to understand the historical development and current role of the Brazilian presidency, scholars must shift away from theories and concepts derived from European history such as parliamentary government, rigidly organized party systems, and associated patterns of polarization that produced democratic breakdown and fascism. In their stead, classic analyses of political development in the United States can provide fundamentally new perspectives. The U.S. experience, Brazilian history, and the recent events of transition from military rule suggest that Brazilian political institutions can reconcile the heady popular appeals of mass democracy with more sober liberal notions of indirect representation; that direct executive elections can generate

significant political change through critical elections and party realignments; and that, once elected, presidents can deftly renegotiate legislative coalitions because they are free to appoint professional politicians to administrative posts.

This new comparative perspective is compelling because politics in Brazil are strikingly similar to the U.S. experience of precocious democratization and political reform a century ago.³⁶ During the rapidly shifting events of transition from military to civilian rule, the presidential and federal system of Brazil facilitated the rapid organization of mass politics by encouraging broad popular appeals during campaigns for executive office and because, once in office, executives were free to nominate party professionals to thousands of administrative posts. Far from exceptional, this pattern is typical of party development in presidential and federal systems throughout the Americas. Far from dysfunctional, this pattern produced a rapid and sweeping organization of political parties through a complex series of alliances between new national political elites and patronage machines. And although further analysis will be needed, the movements for the moralization of Brazilian public life which produced the impeachment of President Collor in late 1992 and the election of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso in 1994 suggest that comparisons between the United States and Brazil may be pushed forward. The Progressive-era reforms which reacted to the brazen corruption and political monopoly of party machines in early 20th century America may provide further points of reference for understanding political reform and democratization in Brazil.

In contrast to the widespread criticism of presidential institutions in Brazil, American scholars recognize that the rapid organization of mass parties in the nineteenth century U.S. occurred through the plebiscitarian appeals of direct presidential elections and the power of presidents to nominate party professionals to administrative posts (thereby creating alliances with the patronage systems of

³⁶ Of course, differences matter. A more in-depth analysis of Brazilian and U.S. presidentialism would have to consider more carefully; the legacies of military rule in Brazil, the lack of direct presidential elections until 1989, the interpenetrated character of Brazilian state and society, and the new role of mass media.

Senators).³⁷ Recent debate among political scientists and historians such as Burnham, Converse, Jensen, Kleppner, and Rusk has focused once again on the cultural, historical, social, and political dimensions of rapid democratization in nineteenth century America. But a fundamental theoretical shift has occurred: Debate among U.S. scholars now occurs within a new understanding of presidentialism in their country which rejects traditional theories based on European parliaments and well organized, ideological parties.

These analyses of the presidency also produced fundamentally new conceptions of American democracy. For scholars such as Chambers, Burnham, Lowi, Hays, and others, the populist appeals of direct presidential campaigns mattered more than party programs or ideologies. The electoral practices of party professionals mattered more than the formalities of party organizations.³⁸ And despite corruption in urban America, these scholars argued that the patronage machines of urban immigrants were linked to political parties through shifting alliances with executives. Burnham extended this perspective by arguing that V.O. Key's path breaking concept of critical elections not only provides a broad theory of political change in American history, but also that the wave of populism and party mobilization in the late nineteenth century (reversed by progressive-era legislation) was a lost opportunity for party building and popular inclusion.³⁹ Lowi argues that the peculiar combination of formal party continuity alongside substantive electoral and policy changes throughout American history is based on the powerful constituent function of direct presidential elections in the United States.⁴⁰ Finally, Hays noted that the classic sociological distinction between community and society was articulated

³⁷ Weber makes this argument in both "Politics as a Vocation" in From Max Weber. Gerth, H.H. & C.Wright Mills eds. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 and "Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany." in Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, Vol. 2, pp. 1381-1462. See also: Ostrogorski, M.I. Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties in the United States and Great Britain. Garden City: Doubleday, 1964 (abridged). And: Bryce, James. The American Commonwealth. New York: Macmillan, 1907.

³⁸ Chambers, William N. & Walter D. Burnham. The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development. New York: Oxford University Press.

³⁹ Burnham, The Current Crisis in American Politics.

⁴⁰ Lowi, Theodore J. "Party, Policy, and Constitution in America." in Chambers & Burnham. The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development.

within party-electoral politics in the United States. Citizens resisted northeastern liberal visions of modern capitalist society by reinforcing patronage machines in local communities.⁴¹ In sum, the American experience suggests that presidential institutions provide a series of opportunities for political development and democratization.

This section of the research report attempts to improve understanding of the presidency in Brazilian politics by clarifying the similarities and differences between the American and Brazilian experiences. Brief review of several differences between American and Brazilian presidentialism, and a sketch of the origins and development of party-electoral patronage and executive-centric federalism in Brazilian history preface the analysis of recent events of democratic transition. Significant evidence from the past and present suggests that the broad popular appeals of direct presidential elections can deepen democratic politics in Brazil, that presidents can deftly renegotiate legislative coalitions by directly nominating professional politicians to administrative posts, and that policy initiative and creativity is encouraged by the clarity and personalism of presidential leadership.

1. THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENCY AND LATE PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Perhaps the most important difference between the American and Brazilian political development is that emphasized by Daalder elsewhere: "it was of profound significance whether an articulated party system developed before, after, or concurrently with the rise of bureaucracy."⁴² This difference is less a question of

⁴¹ Hays, Samuel. "Political Parties and the Community-Society Continuum." in Chambers & Burnham. The American Party Systems; pp. 152-181.

⁴² Daalder, Hans. "Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe." in LaPalombara, Joseph & Weiner, Myron eds. Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966 pp.

state or party strength than timing. Mass parties emerged in the United States during the nineteenth century before the emergence of central government bureaucracies and state intervention into the economy in the 1930s. In Brazil, competitive mass politics first appeared during the 1945-1964 period, well after modern state bureaucracies were centralized and immediately following a period of extensive state intervention under the Estado Novo of Getulio Vargas (1937-1945).

For Daalder, the relative timing of party and bureaucratic development in Europe determined both the extent of party control over government and broader prospects for stability.⁴³ The differences between American and Brazilian politics confirm the first part of Daalder's argument. Precocious political development throughout 19th century America took the form of party empowerment over government bureaucracies (before Civil-service Reform and other Progressive-era measures weakened their grip). In comparison, both Sartori and Souza argue that Brazilian politics lack the characteristics associated with fully consolidated party systems because Brazilian party elites remain dependent upon state structures.⁴⁴ In sum, the first part of Daalder's argument holds. The late development of mass party politics in Brazil produced parties with less control over government bureaucracies.

The second part of Daalder's argument which suggests that late party development generates political instability requires greater attention. While Brazilian parties lack

43-78. On party building after the establishment of modern state bureaucracies, see: Shefter, Martin. "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy." Politics and Society 7/4 (1977) 403-451.

⁴³ Daalder argues: "In France and Germany powerful bureaucracies were built up as social control -mechanisms long before non-bureaucratic social groups had learned to use the weapon of political organization to secure influence. Ever since, parties have had difficulty in obtaining full control... In Britain, on the other hand, the build-up of the modern civil service occurred after non-official social groups were securely in political control; ever since, the civil service has loyally accepted control by party ministers. "Parties, Elites, and Political Developments in Western Europe." p. 46.

⁴⁴ See Sartori's preface to the Brazilian edition of his Parties and Party Systems: Sartori, Giovanni. Partidos e Sistemas Partidarios. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1982. Souza also argues that: "One cannot speak of party system institutionalization when the power of party groups emerges or is exercised exclusively through interaction with bureaucratic agencies, without an institutional site for parties to acquire a broader collective reality." Estado e Partidos Politicos no Brasil. p. 151.

the formal organization, parliamentary discipline, and ideological clarity of some European parties, one cannot thereby infer scenarios of instability. Instead, Chalmers argues that:

The aspects of parties often identified as faults -- absence of a solid, independent organizational network, presence of personalist leadership, weakness of ideological or programmatic content, rapid rise and fall of ad-hoc parties, lack of sharp identification with class or other specific interests – are clearly the product of the Latin American socio-political structure. More important is the fact that it is these characteristics which make parties functional within that structure.⁴⁵

Arguments that a dysfunctional or weak party system in Brazil (in other words, organizational fluidity, corruption, patronage, shifting electoral alliances and legislative coalitions, and poorly disciplined party elites) caused the crises which led to instability and democratic breakdown in 1964 are misleading because they fail to consider the alternative trajectory of party development within presidential institutions.

Scholars of the United States suggest that party-electoral change occurred in their country through a sequence of critical, realigning elections which produced new policy constellations.⁴⁶ The stakes of Brazilian elections are even higher because of the greater centralization of power in the central government and the executive-centric character of its federalism. Consequently, party systems in Brazilian history were not redefined by critical elections and policy realignments like the United States, but were reconstructed after matters of political inclusion/exclusion or policy change were redefined through other (usually military) means. Instead of a sequence

⁴⁵ Chalmers, Douglas. "Parties and Society in Latin America." in Schmidt, Steffen W. et. al. eds. Friends, Followers and Factions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 p. 418. Emphasis added.

⁴⁶ On the concept of realignment in American electoral history, see: Burnham, Walter D. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton, 1970 and Sundquist, James. Dynamics of the Party System Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983 (2nd ed.).

of electoral realignments as constituent political acts which redefine the political power of new and old groups, the succession of party systems in Brazil can be seen as a sequence of averted realignments: Refusals to include claimants, and the authoritarian reorganization of the party-electoral sphere.

Because of late party development, Brazilian populism also differs considerably from American populist movements of the 19th century. Unlike the social and agrarian character of American and European populist movements, populism emerged in Brazil as a political movement organized by state elites geared primarily toward urban groups.⁴⁷ The vision of the state as a multi-class national front against the domination of foreign capital and imperialist interests is a unique element of Latin American populism.⁴⁸ This different, more state-centric and urban-oriented character of Brazilian and Latin American populism is a widely recognized result of the greater role of the Latin American state in dependent economic development. In sum, late party development within Brazilian presidential institutions increased the stakes of electoral politics and contributed to this nations state-centric tradition of populism.

2. THE PRESIDENCY IN BRAZILIAN HISTORY

The central argument about the presidency in Brazilian history is that competitive politics after 1945 first embodied the elements of precocious political development outlined above. From 1945-1964, the broad popular appeals of direct executive elections and the ability of presidents, governors, and mayors to directly appoint

⁴⁷ Connif, Michael. Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-1945. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1982 and Germani, Gino. Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism. New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1978.

⁴⁸ The clearest statement of Latin American populism as a multi-class front against imperialism can be found in the works of Haya de la Torre. See: Haya de la Torre, Victor R. El Anti-Imperialismo y el APRA. Lima: Amauta, 1972 (4th edition). Cited and discussed in Cardoso, Fernando H. Autoritarismo e Democratizacão. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1975 pp. 167-171.

party politicians to administrative posts permitted the rapid reorganization of corporatist and patronage machines into competitive political parties (PSD, PTB, UDN). These three parties dominated electoral politics until military intervention in 1964. However, before turning to the 1945-1964 period, introductory remarks are in order about the origins of both party-electoral patronage during the Brazilian Empire (1822-1889) and the organization of the extremely executive-centric character of Brazilian federalism during the Old Republic (1889-1930).

Reviewing the origins of party-electoral patronage in 19th century Brazil helps clarify subsequent patterns of political development in the 20th century.⁴⁹ For, unlike the wars and discord which wracked the newly independent states of Hispanic Latin America, effective bureaucratic institutions, a prince and parliament, and powerful military forces were built at the center during the Brazilian Empire. Much of this exceptional trajectory of Brazil in Latin America is due to the manner in which the national political institutions of the Empire were built upon complex patterns of party-electoral patronage. Patronage linked central Imperial institutions to the variety of provincial and local institutions throughout the vast Brazilian territory.

Far from a static characteristic of social structure or Ibero-american culture, patronage during the Brazilian Empire is of interest because of its changing content in response to party-electoral politics. The work of Brazilian political analysts Oliveira Vianna and Paula Beiguelman suggest that three critical moments defined the organization of patronage during the sixty seven years of parliamentary monarchy. First, a grant of free-male suffrage with low income requirements by Dom Pedro I upon independence in 1822 quickly transformed the paternal clans which ruled the large farms (fazendas) and vast rural areas of Brazil into political clans. Second, once electoral resources were thereby established, the decentralizing

⁴⁹ Patronage is a classic theme in Brazilian political studies. See: Graham, Richard. Patronage and Politics in Nineteenth Century Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

Criminal Code of 1832 encouraged these newly empowered leaders of political clans to resolve conflicts with their counterparts and build institutions on the county level. Finally, when power was centralized once again (beginning with the Additional Act of 1836 and culminating in the 1841 Regency), political alliances for and against centralization emerged on the national level between existing county (Município) and provincial party-electoral machines. These national political alliances became the Liberal and Conservative parties which dominated Imperial politics until 1889. In sum, party-electoral patronage developed during the Brazilian Empire in a cumulative sequence of responses to the adoption of liberal and monarchic rules and procedures from abroad.⁵⁰

Executive-centric federalism is the second historical element of Brazilian politics which is critical for understanding its presidential institutions.⁵¹ The authors of Brazil's first republican Constitution in 1891 sought to reverse the centralization of state power during the Empire by establishing states rights to contract foreign loans, levy export taxes, write constitutional, criminal, and electoral law, and form autonomous military organizations.⁵² Unusual gubernatorial powers were grafted onto this constitutional design when President Campos Salles attempted to avert further civil wars between political factions within states by ruling that Federal Deputies would be seated only if they were approved by their respective state governor. Governors retained this legal prerogative to seat their congressional delegations throughout the Old Republic. Single parties thereby tended to predominate within states and governors dominated negotiations of electoral alliances and legislative coalitions between single state parties on the federal level.

⁵⁰ Their central works on this subject are: Vianna, Oliveira. Instituições Políticas Brasileiras Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nacional, 1954 and Beiguelman, Paula. Formação Política do Brasil. São Paulo: Pioneiro, 1973.

⁵¹ The current description of Old Republic politics as política dos governadores (governor's politics) focuses on the emergence of specific electoral and party practices which linked local and regional political machines with national politics. On the concept of Política dos Governadores, see: Beiguelman, Paula. "A Primeira Republica no Período de 1891 a 1909." appendix to Pequenos Estudos de Ciência Política. São Paulo: Pioneiro, 1967 and Souza, Maria C.C. "O Processo Político-Partidário na Primeira Republica." in Mota, Carlos G. ed. Brasil em Perspectiva. São Paulo: Difel, 1969.

⁵² On the influence of American federalism in the 1891 Brazilian constitution, see: Souza, "O Processo Político-Partidário na Primeira Republica."

Although Brazilian Governors lost the prerogative to seat congressional delegations in 1930 and never regained it, their influence in electoral and party politics on the state and federal levels remains critical until today.

2.1. The presidency and mass politics, 1945-1964

Despite the existence of innovative historical research on this period, political scientists still describe events from 1945-1964 by using concepts, theories, and models based on European experiences with parliamentary government, polarized pluralism, and democratic breakdown.⁵³ These comparisons misrepresent the causal place of presidential institutions and democratic politics in the crises of pre-1964 Brazil because they either cling to an idealized image of Westminster parliamentary government (and related models of ideological, well organized party systems and disciplined, effective parliamentary elites), or draw unfounded analogies with the polarization in European parliamentary systems which produced democratic breakdown and fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. If one compares Brazilian party-electoral politics from 1945-1964 to the American experience instead, one can better describe how popular pressures, machine politics, plebiscitarian appeals, and the constraints on change in capitalist society generated political crisis and military intervention by 1964.

Souza's path breaking work entitled Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil, 1930-1945 provides an explanation for the pre-1964 crisis which avoids problematic comparisons to European parliamentary systems. Souza focuses both on structural problems of pre-1964 party competition and the prospects for overcoming those problems through the mechanisms which drive politics in the Brazilian presidential

⁵³ See the following reviews of theories about democratic breakdown in 1964: Cohen, Youssef. "Democracy from Above: The Political Origins of Military Dictatorship in Brazil." World Politics 40 (1987): 30-54, Lamounier & Meneguello Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1986. and Reis, Fabio W. "O Econômico, o Institucional, e o Político na Literatura Brasileira Recente." Appendix to Política e Racionalidade. Belo Horizonte: Special Editions #37, Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos, 1984.

system: The popular appeals of direct executive elections and links between executives and the patronage machines which control local politics. Souza's central claim is that politics in the pre-1964 presidential system produced crisis and military intervention precisely because it had generated the outcomes normally associated with political development and democratization:

Our central hypothesis, ... is that the critical character of the (pre-1964) conjuncture derives from the simultaneous strengthening of the state and the party system, presenting in an immediate way the following dilemma: State without parties or party government.⁵⁴

Military intervention occurred in 1964 because the plebiscitarian appeals of presidential elections generated both popular expectations of political change and a conservative reaction typical of the constraints to change in capitalist society. Souza thereby offers a compelling account of how the Brazilian presidency shaped political development, democratization, and the crises which led to the breakdown of democracy in 1964.⁵⁵

Both electoral trends and data on party representation in Congress from 1945-1964 support this interpretation and refute analyses which explain military intervention in 1964 as a result of polarized pluralism or electoral fragmentation. At first glance, congressional elections from 1945-1962 appear to present evidence of an electoral decline in the fortune of the major parties PSD, UDN, and PTB which would support theories of fragmentation and/or polarization (see Table 1). Votes for the

⁵⁴ Souza, Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil. p. 140.

⁵⁵ Souza argues that party politicians were marginalized from state policies which deal with core questions of redistribution for much of the post-war period. Because Getulio Vargas' Estado Novo (1937-1945) centralized power in Ministries and Secretaries responsible only to executives on the federal and state level, legislators and party politicians dealt primarily with policies of regulation and distribution. This isolation of core questions of redistribution among centralized ministries in the executive meant that party elites gained little experience in core policy areas. Instead, they developed irresponsible populist discourses and patronage practices. Souza, Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil: 1930-1964.

PSD decline steadily from 42.6 percent in 1945 to 15 percent in 1962, while votes for the UDN decline from 26.5 percent in 1945 to 10.8 percent in 1962. After the PTB peaked at 18.6 percent of the vote in the 1950 election (when Getulio Vargas won the presidency), the party declined to 11.6 percent in the 1962 elections.

Table 1

Official Results for Federal Chamber Elections, 1945-1962

Political Party	1945	1950	1954	1958	1962
PSD	42.6	30.5	21.6	18.1	15.0
UDN	26.5	19.2	13.3	12.9	10.8
PTB	10.1	18.6	14.6	14.4	11.6
Party Alliances	--	22.9	25.2	32.6	39.7
Other Parties	17.2	21.7	18.5	12.6	4.9
Blank/Null	3.3	0.8	6.6	9.1	17.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	5,934,332	6,763,273	9,889,827	12,687,997	14,747,221

Source: Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990

But these trends fail to indicate polarization or fragmentation because votes were not displaced to minor parties. The percentage of votes obtained by minor parties running candidates in isolation fell from 17.2 percent in 1945 to 4.9 percent in 1962.⁵⁶ Instead, voters shifted their preferences to party alliances, which increased their share of the total congressional vote from 22.9 percent in 1950 to a full 39.7 percent. Hence, the argument about electoral trends shifts to the problem of an

⁵⁶ Both Souza and Brasil Jr. agree that the critical pre-1964 trend in elections is not a shift to minor parties, but to party alliances of the most diverse sort. See: Souza, Estado e Partidos Políticos no Brasil. Ch. 4. and Brasil Jr., "The Brazilian Multi-Party System: A Case for Contextual Rationality." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1980.

increasing number of electoral alliances among congressional candidates. For those intent on comparing the Brazilian experience with the electoral fragmentation and polarization which produced fascism in Europe, this increasing number of electoral alliances appears dysfunctional because it would impede the formation and maintenance of coalition governments. But if the comparative perspective is shifted away from Europe to the presidential and federal systems typical of the Americas, the increase in electoral alliances can be interpreted as a process of realignment among congressional, state, and local party elites responding to electoral change underway on the national level. And far from dysfunctional, the patronage, corruption, and ad-hoc character of party identities in pre-1964 Brazilian politics can be seen as facilitating this realignment.

Another apparent paradox for theories based on the rigid party organizations found in European parliamentary systems appears in the data on the partisan affinity of Brazilian Federal Deputies. Candidates for Federal Deputy did indeed enter into an increasingly number of party alliances during the 1945-1964 period. However, few deputies declared formal affiliation with minor parties after taking office. In 1945, Federal Deputies representing the three major parties (PSD, UDN, PTB) totaled 89.5 percent of the Chamber. In 1962, the three parties controlled 83.5 percent of the Federal Chamber. A decrease of six percent over seventeen years is hardly sufficient to suggest major party decline, electoral fragmentation, or polarized pluralism in Brazil before 1964.

Trends in presidential elections from 1945-1964 also support the idea of electoral realignment and fail to confirm theses of major party decline, electoral fractionalization, or polarized pluralism. The percent of direct popular vote for the PSD/PTB alliance which elected three successive presidents did indeed fall from 54.1 percent in 1945 to 28.5 percent in 1960. But the UDN, which polled roughly 30 percent of the popular vote in the first three presidential elections, won the presidency in 1960 with Janio Quadros receiving 41.7 percent of the vote. Perhaps more importantly, minor parties fared poorly in the 1960 election, reversing a peak

of 32.2 percent in 1955 and declining to 16.3 percent. Finally, the three major parties of the pre-1964 period together polled 75.0 percent in the 1950 presidential elections. By 1960 their hold on the presidential contest remained at 70.2 percent. This decrease of less than five percent in the total electoral vote for the PSD, PTB and UDN in presidential elections is insufficient to support theses of major party decline, fragmentation, or polarized pluralism.

Table 2

Official Results for Presidential Elections, 1945-1962

Presidential Vote	Percent of Total Vote			
	1945	1950	1955	1960
PSD/PTB Alliance	54.1	46.6	33.8	28.5
UDN	33.9	28.4	28.6	41.7
Other Parties	9.6	20.6	32.2	16.3
Blank/Null	2.2	4.3	5.2	6.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	6,003,209	8,254,979	9,097,014	12,586,354

Source: Estatísticas Históricas do Brasil Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1990

If the comparative perspective is shifted from Europe to the Americas, Brazil's experience with democratic politics from 1945-1964 can be interpreted in a very different light. Political crisis and democratic breakdown occurred by 1964 because the mechanisms of political development typical of presidential and federal systems threatened to, in Souza's words: "simultaneously strengthen the state and party system."⁵⁷ Indeed, the major populist party of the period (PTB) more than quadrupled its representation of Deputies in the Federal Chamber from 22 in 1945 to 116 by 1962. The representation of the PSD and UDN in the Federal Chamber did indeed fall from 52.8 to 30.3 percent, and 29.0 to 23.4 percent respectively. But this

⁵⁷ Souza, Estado e Partidos Politicos. p. 140.

realignment of Federal Deputies from the state-centric PSD and conservative UDN to the populist PTB cannot be considered a process of major party decline, fractionalization, or polarized pluralism. Instead, the process appears to be a significant realignment of party elites toward "a party with governing capacity."⁵⁸

Shifting comparative perspectives on party-electoral politics before 1964 also suggests that the prospects for governance were considerably greater than concepts of polarized pluralism and power vacuum which describe the European descent into fascism would suggest. First, the rapid reassertion of presidential authority by Goulart through a direct referendum in 1962 can be seen as similar in important respects to De Gaulle's statecraft in France (both his inauguration of the French Fifth Republic in 1958 and his call for introducing direct presidential elections through a national referendum also held in 1962). Second, by recognizing the tendency of state and local party elites to respond to political change on the national level by forming electoral alliances and legislative coalitions through the spoils system, the increasing number of party alliances during the early 1960s is also consistent with the claim that a major party-electoral realignment was underway. Finally, by recognizing the rapid deterioration of relations between the Goulart administration and both foreign and domestic business after May 1963, military intervention in 1964 can be usefully described a means of averting realignment. Military intervention averted populist-led political change.

While analysts differ about the content of populist mobilization in both the U.S. and Brazil, the demobilization and exclusion which followed the periods in question may indicate the degree of change underway. In the United States, the period of precocious political development in the late 19th century was followed by Progressive-era reforms designed to weaken parties, defeat new mass party elites, and demobilize popular participation. Electoral redistricting attempted to weaken party machines by dividing immigrant voting patterns in urban areas. Poll taxes, literacy tests, and other restrictions on voting were imposed. The Australian Ballot

⁵⁸ Lamounier & Meneguello. Partidos Políticos e Consolidação Democrática: O Caso Brasileiro.

was introduced to deprive parties of the right to distribute ballots. The direct primary system was introduced to weaken the control of party-elites over candidate nominations. Finally, by reducing the number of presidential appointments, Civil Service Reform attempted to weaken the grip of parties on state agencies, depoliticize government, and exclude popular sectors.⁵⁹ Popular demobilization and the disorganization of parties in America was inspired by the progressive movement and achieved through legislation. In Brazil, popular demobilization, the weakening of parties, and the defeat of party elites occurred only after military intervention in 1964.

In sum, electoral trends, the composition of legislatures, and the course of events which led to military intervention in 1964 are inconsistent with arguments which insist on comparing the Brazilian experience to the decline of centrist parties, ideological radicalization, and the descent of European parliamentary systems into fascism after World War I. Concepts based on these experiences in Europe such as polarized pluralism and major party decline fail to explain the place of complex electoral alliances in Brazil, the constant share of major parties in both presidential elections and the Federal Chamber from 1945-1964, and unexpected events such as the UDN victory in the 1960 Presidential election. New concepts based on experiences in presidential and federal systems such as critical elections and party realignment provide a better point of departure for developing new perspectives on the escalating political conflict which led to military intervention in 1964.

2.2. The Brazilian presidency, 1974-1998

Further analysis of the Brazilian presidency is needed to complete this historical review, especially developments during the period of military government that

⁵⁹ On the impact of progressive-era reforms on the organization of American parties, see: Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. pp. 74-90.

sought to reorganize the presidency around select superministries. Analysis of these changes during 1964-1974, as well as discussion of the organizational changes after the 1930 revolution will be presented in subsequent research reports. For the purposes of the present overview, jumping directly to discussion of the transition period will have to suffice. The rapidly changing circumstances of political transition after 1974 set widely different contexts for presidential action. Nonetheless, both the popular appeals of direct executive elections and fluid alliances among electoral machines still appear to drive Brazilian politics. For example, broad patterns of opposition to (and support of) military government first emerged once military rulers liberalized legislative elections in 1974.⁶⁰ In the beginning, political change was plebiscitarian. However, like the preceding periods of democratic politics discussed above, winning elections after 1974 also required alliances with patronage machines. By 1986, the PMDB (party of opposition under military rule and member of the Democratic Alliance which brought civilian Jose Sarney to power through indirect elections in 1985) won 21 of 22 contested Governorships, and majorities in the Constitutional Congress as well as virtually all State Assemblies. This landslide (short-lived as it turned out to be) was caused, not by a surge of opposition, but because professional politicians on the regional and local levels allied with the party in expectation of the estimated 130,000 administrative nominations which it would come to control after transition to civilian rule.⁶¹

Scholars who emphasized the empowerment of civil-society in opposition to military rule or advocated parliamentary institutions to stabilize Brazil's new democracy perceived the rapid organization of mass politics through these mechanisms only tangentially. For example, theories of civil-society empowerment led scholars to emphasize the plebiscitarian character of opposition to military rule

⁶⁰ On debates in Brazilian electoral sociology, see: Mettenheim, Kurt von. The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995.

⁶¹ See coverage in Veja, 1985.

in Brazil.⁶² But the concept of plebiscitarianism refers not only to patterns of opposition, but also to patterns of support. Indeed, support for the military government and party through direct appeals and marketing campaigns based in the presidency (despite the lack of direct presidential elections). Theories of civil-society empowerment also suggested that local demands and the national struggle against authoritarianism could go hand in hand. But the organization of local opposition leadership and competitive elections in a country with over 82 million voters are two very different contexts for collective action. Indeed, subsequent analysis suggests that local problems were linked to the national issues of the day during the transition period -- not by opposition groups -- but by the patronage practices of professional politicians.⁶³

It must be recognized that linkages between direct popular appeals and patronage machines first emerged under military rule, then developed during an often ambiguous, prolonged, and elite-centric transition from 1974-1985, and suffered from the legacies of authoritarianism, the lack of executive elections before 1982 (except select mayorships), and the unfortunate separation of executive from legislative elections during critical moments of transition in 1985 and 1989. Consequently, local and legislative elections from 1974-1982 served largely as mechanisms of transition still controlled by military elites.⁶⁴ The direct election of governors in 1982 (while the federal executive remained under military control) also failed to fully reproduce the traditional outcomes associated with Brazilian presidentialism. Juan Linz insightfully describes the consequence of this situation

⁶² On civil society empowerment, see: Stepan, Alfred. "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America." in Evans, Peter. et. al. eds. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 pp. 317-346.

⁶³ See: Diniz, Eli. Voto e Maquina Política: Patronagem e Clientelismo no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982, Kinzo, Maria D. An Opposition Party in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of the MDB (Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) in Brazil, 1966-1979. New York: St. Martins, 1989, and Caldeira, Tereza. "Electoral Struggles in a Neighborhood on the Periphery of São Paulo." Politics and Society. (Fall, 1986).

⁶⁴ See: Lamounier, Bolivar. "Authoritarian Brazil Revisited: The Impact of Elections on the Abertura." in Stepan, Alfred. ed. Democratizing Brazil. New York: Oxford, 1989, pp. 43-79.

from 1982-1985 as one of dual power or diarchy.⁶⁵ Military control of the presidency diminished the capacity of new governors to negotiate with local politicians and implement policies. This lack of resolution continued when the 1984 presidential succession occurred within the rules and procedures set by the military and proceeded as negotiations among party elites in a restricted electoral college while mass demonstrations of unprecedented magnitude took place. Military elites, party politicians, social activists, and spontaneous popular opposition all influenced the course of events during 1984. However, after congress defeated legislation calling for direct presidential elections, traditional politicians emerged from the electoral college with their electoral, bureaucratic, and party organizational positions strengthened while social movements and independent political groups were, by and large, weakened.

Civilian rule also failed to fully reintroduce the traditional mechanisms of Brazilian presidentialism. Instead of responding to popular demands for direct presidential elections, Brazil's first civilian government under President Jose Sarney called elections in 1985 to replace the nominated mayors from capitals and other cities declared national security zones by the authoritarian government.⁶⁶ The 1985 elections were considerably outside the historical norm. Since 1932, the Brazilian electoral system has been designed to balance the popular appeals of direct elections for executive offices by placing proportional representation elections for legislatures on the same ballot.⁶⁷ The 1985 mayoral elections failed to do so because they lacked accompanying slates for Municipal Chambers.

Despite this lack of resolution, links between national party elites and state and local patronage machines were renegotiated rapidly during the Brazilian transition.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Linz, Juan. "The Transition from an Authoritarian Regime to Democracy in Spain: Some Thoughts for Brazilians." Memo: Yale University, 1983.

⁶⁶ On the 1985 elections, see: Lamounier, Bolivar. ed. *1985: O Voto em São Paulo*. São Paulo: Idesp, 1986.

⁶⁷ The 1932 Electoral Code was based on Assis Brasil's *Democracia Representativa* (originally published 1897).

⁶⁸ In comparison to this rapid realignment of party elites during transition from military to civilian rule, the concept of realignment suggests that electoral change in the U.S. trickles down from presidential elections through state and local politics over decades. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*. p. 11.

First, after legislation calling for direct presidential elections was defeated in 1984, several national leaders of the government party (PDS) resigned to form the Democratic Alliance with the opposition party (PMDB) in the restricted electoral college designed by the military. Then, during 1985 and 1986, local and regional politicians rapidly realigned from government parties to the PMDB: First in expectation of the 130,000 federal administrative nominations after President Sarney's inauguration on January 15; later during 1986 in expectation of perhaps five-fold that number of state-level administrative appointments to be distributed by Governors after the 1986 elections.⁶⁹ By 1986, many of the mayors and municipal representatives of towns across Brazil which had delivered votes under military rule for the government party had negotiated their affiliation with the PMDB. Direct popular appeals, party elite realignments, and the formation of party alliances through the distribution of administrative appointment to professional politicians explain much of electoral politics through 1986.

But these developments failed to fully impact national politics after transition to civilian rule because direct elections for president were not held until 1989. The 1989 presidential election brought mass participation and modern media techniques to the contest after a thirty year hiatus. Suffrage had expanded over five-fold under military rule, from 18 million in 1960 to over 82 million in 1989. However, like the 1985 mayoral elections, the 1989 presidential election was held in isolation from other legislative and gubernatorial contests (once again outside the Brazilian historical norm of holding executive elections with proportional representation contests for legislatures). Because elections for governor, as well as federal, state, and municipal legislatures were scheduled for November 1990, party alliances and machine politics mattered little in 1989. The careers of politicians were not directly at stake in the presidential election.

⁶⁹ See discussion, The Brazilian Voter. Chapter 5.

Consequently, instead of being forced to negotiate diverse electoral alliances across Brazil, the 1989 presidential campaign occurred almost exclusively on television.⁷⁰ A relatively unknown governor from the small northeast state of Alagoas, Fernando Collor de Mello, dominated the first six months of the campaign through television appearances and denunciations of bureaucratic abuse. After Collor reached over 45 percent in preference polls by June, he refused to participate in the live television debates of the first round (accurately reflecting the damaging prospects of sustained attacks from adversaries). While Collor's popularity fell steadily after July, endorsement by media personality Silvio Santos reinforced Collor's image after Santos' own last minute bid for the presidency was rejected by the Supreme Electoral Court (STE). Collor won over 28 percent in first round voting, with Inacio da Silva (Lula), the candidate for Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party, PT) entering the runoff election with 16 percent. While Lula dominated the first television debate of the second round and surged in the polls to tie Collor only ten days before the December 15 vote, the Worker's Party candidate failed to dominate the second debate as he did the first and was unable to counter the damaging effect of negative advertising in the final days of the campaign. Collor convinced voters that a victory of Luiz Inacio da Silva and the PT would destabilize society and turn Brazil away from the liberalizing world by mounting a series of personal and political attacks seven days before the final election. On December 15, Collor received 35,089,998 votes (42.7 percent), defeating Lula with 31,076,364 votes (37.8 percent).

The logic of party and electoral politics after Collor's election confirms that presidential initiative, direct appeals, and fluid alliances are still critical in Brazil. Brazil's first directly-elected president after military rule took office in March 1990 as hyperinflation loomed and the country ended its first decade of negative per-

⁷⁰ Over 85 percent of registered voters viewed four televised debates, while two hours of party campaign programs were broadcast every day on prime-time television and radio for two months prior to November 15, and for two for weeks preceeding the December 15 runoff election.

capita growth since 1945. Nine months later, few doubted the ability of directly elected presidents to initiate and implement policy in Brazil. President Collor reasserted executive authority and shocked investors on 16 March 1990 (the day after inauguration) with a comprehensive plan to reduce inflation, lower the federal deficit, liberalize trade, and modernize the economy. Despite his party's controlling only five percent of the Federal Chamber upon inauguration, President Collor temporarily confiscated an estimated 80 percent of Brazil's liquid financial assets and unveiled a dramatic package of economic reforms. The Collor administration quickly achieved its short-term economic policy goals, producing government surpluses, reducing interest rates, extending the terms for government paper, and stabilizing the exchange rate. Throughout 1990, the new administration received strong support from the media and public (confiscated savings were returned), faced virtually no congressional and little social opposition, and overrode governors who were more concerned with consolidating the support of state and local machines for the 1990 elections than organizing national opposition at the end of their term.

2.3. From the impeachment of Collor to the election of Cardoso

The impeachment of Fernando Collor and the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the presidency in 1994 have reaffirmed the centrality of presidential institutions in shaping and deepening democratic politics in Brazil. In late 1992, Brazil's first directly-elected president after transition from military rule was impeached through constitutional means on corruption charges. In April 1993, Brazilians voted in favor of retaining their presidential form of government in a plebiscite held on 21 April 1993. And the 1994 presidential campaign brought to the fore two of the most important new independent political leaders who first emerged as opponents to military rule. The impeachment of Collor, the popular vote to retain presidential government, and the political clarity of the choice between the Worker's Party candidate Lula and Social Democratic (PSDB) candidate Fernando Henrique

Cardoso in the 1994 presidential contest suggest that significant political change will continue to occur within Brazilian presidential institutions.

On 29 September 1992 the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies voted 441 to 38 to suspend President Fernando Collor de Mello from office and initiate a formal trial in the Senate, 76 of 81 of whom subsequently voted on December 29-30 for impeachment.⁷¹ This unprecedented removal of a Brazilian president began in May 1992 when Collor's brother accused the president of extensive involvement in corruption, use of campaign funds for private ends, and participation in the extensive influence peddling organized by his 1989 campaign finance manager. The impeachment of Collor in late December 1992 effectively neutralized campaigns for the adoption of parliamentary government in the plebiscite to be held on 21 April 1993. Instead, 55.4 percent of voters chose to maintain the presidential form of government, while 66.0 percent chose to maintain a Republic.

Soon after the national plebiscite on the form of government, President Itamar Franco (Collor's Vice President) called on Fernando Henrique Cardoso to accept the key economic ministry, the Ministerio da Fazenda, on 21 May 1993, a post he retained until assuming campaign duties full-time in May 1994. Far from proposing dramatic initiatives or unveiling economic packages, Cardoso sought to assure business leaders and the public that their lives and investments would no longer be submitted to a sequence of government plans which tend to radically alter prices, incomes, savings, currency exchange rates, and investment returns. Indeed, by 1993 Brazilians appear to have tired of dramatic initiatives. Since transition to civilian rule in 1985, seven major policy packages and innumerable intermediate adjustments were introduced unexpectedly by the federal government.

⁷¹ For analyses of the impeachment process, see: Weyland, Kurt. "The Rise and Fall of President Collor and its impact on Brazilian Democracy." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol 35, No. 1, 1993. pp. 1-37.

Instead, Cardoso adopted a gradualist approach focusing on fiscal reform, monetary restraint, and the need for more transparent public view of the economic policy process. Repeated ministerial appearances in the media assured Brazilians that inflation was high but stable, that the government was not going to freeze wages and prices or confiscate savings, that draconian adjustment policies would be averted, and that extensive interventions into financial or currency exchange markets would be avoided. Indeed, the achievements of Cardoso as economic minister were piecemeal, even minor if compared to the dramatic sequence of economic packages preceding his tenure. For example, progress on the fiscal front was secured through legislative support for a 15 percent reduction of constitutionally mandated transfers from the federal government to states and municipalities in late February. Cardoso subsequently sought to unify the profusion of financial instruments used as de-facto currencies because they index against inflation. The Unidade de Valor Real (Real Value Unit, UVR) was designed to become a single measure of inflation which could be readjusted daily by the government.

Focusing the attention of investors and the public on a single government index permitted Minister Cardoso and his economic team to gradually ratchet down inflationary expectations by setting and subsequently meeting realistic fiscal and monetary performance targets. By May 9, Minister Cardoso was able to accompany the announcement that a new currency would be launched on July 1 (made by his successor at the Ministry of Fazenda). This demonstrated once again that the administration was determined to publicize policy measures well ahead of time rather than attempting to shock inflation out of the economy by unexpectedly unveiling secret economic packages. The stabilization of the new currency, the Real, quickly began to symbolize the success of this gradualist approach in reducing inflation and projected Cardoso into the presidential race. Not only did inflation fall, but real wages increased an estimated 20 percent during the first six months after the plan (June 1994-January 1995). Furthermore, the real income of poor Brazilians

increased an estimated 50 percent during this period because of government efforts to secure the prices of subsistence goods.⁷²

III. THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENCY AND THE CARDOSO ADMINISTRATION

The preceding sections of this report review the international literature on presidentialism, research on the American presidency and the separation of powers, and the secondary literature on the place of the presidency in Brazilian political history. This final section presents ideas about future paths of analysis into the history and current organization of the presidency, as well as a preliminary overview of public policies and the organization of the presidency during the Cardoso administration. The first six months of research were dedicated primarily to review of the secondary literatures presented in the preceding sections. What follows is a much more preliminary review of primary sources and the assessment of research strategies to be developed in the future. Further analysis of policy initiatives and strategies of governance during the first term of the Cardoso administration will be included in forthcoming research reports.

The most notable characteristic of the Cardoso administration has been the ability to sustain the redistribution of wealth to popular sectors during the reduction of inflation and measures of economic liberalization from 1995 through 1997. This peculiar combination of popular consumption during a period of economic adjustment and liberalization differs significantly from the increasing poverty during periods of neo-liberal economic policy, whether in advanced economies like England and the United States or neighbors such as Chile and Argentina. The 1990s

⁷² Estimates from the Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas da Universidade de São Paulo and DIEESE (Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Estudos Socioeconomicos) reported in Folha de S. Paulo, March 26, 1995 Section 2, p. 5.

in Brazil present a novel sequence of economic development: first trade liberalization beginning in 1991-1992; then a period of disinflation-led growth from 1994-1996; and finally a period of capital-investment led growth during 1996-1997. This particular sequence appears to have occurred because of the unusual combination of first forcing firms to increase productivity, second providing a period of gains providing the resources to modernize plants, and finally a period of capital goods intensive growth suggesting the implementation of productive investments. Even in the midst of the third economic crisis to wrack Brazil during the Cardoso administration, economists such as Antonio Castro de Barros argued that the recovery from crisis would be quicker and more sustained given the dramatic renovation of industrial parks that produced gains in productivity across Brazil since the liberalization of the economy first began in 1992.⁷³

The Cardoso administration had the good fortune to govern during strong economic growth that differed from preceding patterns of Brazilian economic development. From 1993-1997, the Brazilian GNP grew 22.7 percent, an average of X percent per year. Furthermore, the terms of economic growth differed in several important respects. First, growth during the two years following the Real Plan (July 1994-June 1996) was driven primarily by strong demand from popular sector wage increases. Decreasing inflation ended the systematic erosion of wages and produced strong demand for consumer goods. Second, the determinants of economic growth appear to have shifted during in 1996. Instead of demand driven growth, a significant increase in capital goods investments appear be primarily responsible for the continued increase in GNP during 1996 and 1997. Indeed, these cycles of demand-led and capital investment-led growth suggest that significant structural changes have occurred since the liberalization of the Brazilian economy first began in 1992.

⁷³ Professor Anonio Castro de Barros, interview in Folha de S.Paulo, 1999.

The unprecedented redistributive and social dimensions of economic growth were even more marked during Cardoso's first term. From the beginning of the Real Plan in July 1994 to October 1997, salaries (measured in 6 metropolitan areas) increased an estimated thirty percent. The reduction of losses to inflation, worst among the poor, caused a significant redistribution of wealth during this period. Although Brazil retains one of the worst distributions of income in the world, the poor in Brazil achieved significant wage gains during Cardoso's first term according to a variety of measures from a variety of government and independent sources. And despite three successive crises in the international economy during President Cardoso's first term (Mexico in December 1995, Russia in October 1997, and Asia in 1998), domestic firms continued to modernize productive facilities in response to the more open competitive environment.

From 1995-1998 the Cardoso administration passed the necessary constitutional amendments to end government monopolies and create a new regime relying on market forces and regulatory agencies that marked a profound change in important economic sectors such as petroleum and gas, telecommunications, electric power, mining, and transportation. Ordinary and complementary legislation also redefined these and other sectors with the privatization of public services, private production of electric energy, cable television, the delegation to states or privatization of highways, rail service, ports, and mineral production. New government agencies were founded to oversee the new regulatory regime in the areas of electric energy (ANEEL) petroleum (ANP) and telecommunications (ANATEL).

Another set of policies reinforced the new regulatory framework for a more open economy. Legislation defined procedures for anti-dumping protection, reduced taxes on exports and capital goods, redesigned corporate tax law, provided new mechanisms for securing agricultural debt, regional development incentives, and a series of measures designed to sustain a more competitive regime for automotive production. These measures, along with traditional sources of credit, subsidies, and

concession maintained the federal government's traditionally active role in determining the course of economic development.

While the most important developments in terms of social policy during Cardoso's first term can best be described as the positive consequences of economic policy, two areas of presidential initiative also produced change. First, the *Comunidade Solidária* (Community Solidarity) program mobilized both existing government activities across a variety of ministries and sectors of Brazilian society to achieve gains in terms of selected indicators of social development. Second, the Ministry of Education implemented a series of initiatives in primary and secondary education that have significantly improved basic education.

In broader terms, organizational changes in the Brazilian presidency during the Cardoso administration have been described in terms of a third wave of administrative reform. The Ministry of Federal Administration and Government Reform (MARE, *Ministerio de Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado*) under Minister Bresser Pereira attempted to redefine the traditional bureaucratic methods of the Brazilian federal government by incorporating innovative methods of public administration. This third wave of administrative reform follows previous critical junctures in Brazilian politics that refashioned patterns of governance in the presidency.

From this perspective, the first wave of administrative reform in Brazil occurred after the 1930 revolution and involved the establishment and expansion of central government bureaucracies. The design of the *Estado Novo* involved a series of new departments, ministries, agencies, technical councils, and administrative organizations directly linked to the presidency under Getulio Vargas. The expansion of central government bureaucracies and the redefinition of the presidency during this period is clearly linked to a series of broader developments in terms of political, social, and economic modernization of Brazil. The second wave of administrative reform of the presidency occurred after military intervention in 1964 and is

epitomized by the 1967 Decree no. 200. This decree also attempted to reorganize governance and administration of the presidency by delegating policy initiation and implementation to a series of intermediate organizations such as state firms, autarkies, and local political authorities. In addition to the unfortunate combination of military rule, political repression, and administrative reform, recent scholarship suggests that, far from the stated goals of rationalizing government, a series of unexpected consequences emerged in the wake of this second attempt at administrative reform.⁷⁴

The current efforts of administrative reform then are seen as a third wave of such attempts to reorganize governance and administration in the presidency. However, this time administrative reform efforts have taken place in a climate of post-transition politics and in terms of democratization as well as increased effectiveness and the rationalization of policy implementation. President Cardoso's Minister of Administration and State Reform (MARE, *Ministerio de Administração e Reforma do Estado*) proposed a series of administrative reform goals early in the first term that seek to recast federal government by using contemporary administrative methods that devolve policy to state and local governments as well as involving social organizations and citizens.

Evaluating the impact of this third wave of administrative on the Brazilian presidency is possible from a variety of theoretical perspectives. In terms of economics, the third wave of administrative reform responds to the pressures of globalization and an increasingly competitive international context by attempting to reduce the cost of government while increasing both the efficiency of policy implementation and the empowerment of citizens. In terms of sociology, the central role of social organizations clearly links the current round of administrative reform to the burgeoning literature and policy communities that focus on civil society,

⁷⁴ Bresser Pereira, Luiz C. & Peter Spink eds., *Reforma do Estado e Administração Pública Gerencial*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1998, p. 244.

social capital, and the social dimensions of democratization.⁷⁵ While these perspectives certainly have and shall continue to contribute to understanding administrative reform and problems of presidential governance, this research shall focus on a more traditionally political perspective to evaluate developments.

This research will attempt to understand the impact of administrative reform in terms of the traditional place of the presidency in Brazilian politics. From this perspective, several initial observations shall provide the basis for further inquiry into administrative reform and governance during the Cardoso presidency. Perhaps the most important observation in this respect is that types of governance, politics, and public administration tend to cumulate and combine in unexpected ways. Administrative reform has indeed fundamentally changed federal policies in areas such as education and health services by devolving resources and responsibilities to state and local authorities as well as independent social organizations. However, other policy areas such as telecommunications, petroleum, electric energy, and other sectors of infrastructure, devolution has been to private initiative, market mechanisms and a new regulatory regime. Finally, in a series of policy areas traditional patterns of politics and public administration involving distributive practices appear to continue, while core issues of economic policy remain under control of traditional centralized bureaucracies.

In sum, far from expecting waves of administrative reform to replace previous methods of governance, current developments appear to confirm Oliveira Vianna's classic metaphor for Brazilian politics as a living museum. The cumulative effect of administrative reforms then is best seen as a variety of styles and legacies combining elements of traditional patronage and clientelism, classic modern bureaucracies, and the recent adoption of managerial methods that devolve policies and power to local authorities and independent social organizations. A central goal

⁷⁵ See recent works such as Robert Putnam, *Tradições Cívicas*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fundação Getulio Vargas, 1996 and Thomas Farer, ed. *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

in subsequent stages of this research will be to review more carefully the considerable secondary literature on administrative reform in Brazil. After this literature review it will be possible to more carefully disaggregate the types of governance, politics, and administration that appear to predominate across the diverse ministries, agencies, and secretariats of the Brazilian presidency.

1. NEW TRENDS IN ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION

The power of direct appeals to voters by presidential candidates has been the most important phenomena of electoral representation in post-transition Brazil. Indeed, recent presidents have won office across Latin America by bypassing traditional partisan attachments and appealing directly to voters. In Argentina, both Presidents Alfonsín and Menem won by cross-cutting the traditional Peronista/Anti-Peronista cleavage which had dominated politics since the 1940s.⁷⁶ In Mexico, after the monolithic PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) was shaken by electoral challenges on the left and right in the 1988 and 1994 presidential elections, Presidents Salinas and Zedillo convinced political elites to pursue new vote-getting strategies through a National Program of Solidarity (PRONASOL) that appealed directly to voters.⁷⁷ In perhaps the most troubling example, Alberto Fujimori came from outside traditional party organizations to unexpectedly win the Peruvian presidency in November 1991, only to close congress and impose a state of emergence in February 1992.⁷⁸ The recent election of Hugo Chavez to the

⁷⁶ On party-electoral politics in post-transition Argentina, see: Edgardo Catterberg, *Argentina Confronts Politics: Political Culture and Public Opinion in the Argentine Transition to Democracy*, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1991) and Edward L. Gibson, *Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

⁷⁷ Robert Kaufman, "Regionalism, Regime Transformation, and PRONASOL: The Politics of the National Solidarity Program in Four Mexican States," (New York: Columbia University Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies Working Papers, 1996) and Roderic Camp, ed. *Polling for Democracy: Public Opinion and Political Liberalization in Mexico*, (Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 1996).

⁷⁸ Catherine Conaghan, "Public Life in the Times of Alberto Fujimori," (Washington, D.C.: Latin American Program Papers, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1996) and Julio Carrion, "Partisan Decline

Venezuelan presidency (former leader of attempted military coups) is another compelling example that direct appeals can bypass traditionally well organized parties.

Further consideration of direct popular appeals during presidential elections is also needed because existing conceptions of electoral representation from Western Europe and North America are seriously impaired.⁷⁹ Classic ideas such as mandate, authorization, accountability, and virtual representation fail to adequately describe how representation works in mass democracies.⁸⁰ Theories of geographical and demographic representation are insufficient because public perceptions now cross-cut traditional cleavages of class and region.⁸¹ Political parties no longer retain the near monopoly on governance typical of competitive party systems for much of the post-war period.⁸² And popular identifications with parties no longer provide the strong links they once did because both direct appeals during elections and the traffic of interests afterward bypass these partisan attachments. Finally, studies of public opinion in North America and Europe now emphasize the importance of top-down appeals, the reality of feedback mechanisms that make those in power popular, and the existence of other reciprocal patterns among voters. All of these developments are at odds with formal liberal views of electoral representation as the unilateral articulation of preferences from the bottom up.

Scholars of advanced democratic electorates tend to explain top-down influences by referring to elite leadership, to irrational psychological processes among voters, or

and Presidential Popularity: The Politics and Economics of Representation in Peru, 1980-1993," in von Mettenheim & Malloy, *Deepening Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit.

⁷⁹ Since the dealignment of class and party cleavages in the 1960s, scholars of European public opinion have struggled to develop new concepts and theories. See: Dalton, Russell. et.al. *Electoral Change in the Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

⁸⁰ Hanna Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1968).

⁸¹ On change and transparency in public opinion, see: Inglehart, Ronald. "Aggregate Stability and Individual Level Flux in Mass Belief Systems: The Level of Analysis Paradox," (*American Political Science Review* Vol. 79, 1985, pp. 97-116).

⁸² Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, op. cit.

to the manipulation of public opinion through techniques of marketing, public relations, and polling. Competitive theories of democracy are accurately labeled elite theories because scholars believe that elites must form public opinion and influence voter alignment.⁸³ Landmark contributions from Adorno, Lane, and Noelle-Neumann suggest that the excessive influence of elites and other top-down realities in public opinion are caused by irrationalities among voters, whether low ego-strength, repression, displacement, or other underlying psychological mechanisms.⁸⁴ Recent critical accounts of public opinion argue that party elites in centralized campaign organizations increasingly manipulate voters through improved technologies of political marketing.⁸⁵ While these perspectives are certainly insightful and relevant in the Brazilian case, emphasis on elite leadership, mass psychology, and technologies of manipulation fails to fully develop the implications of immediate and personalistic conceptions of politics among Brazilian voters, and the reality of direct popular appeals and patronage machines in Brazilian party-electoral politics.

As first noted in my previous work, most measures of political sophistication in electoral behavior studies fail to describe changes among Brazilian voters because they are designed to tap European ideologies or American notions of group-interest.⁸⁶ According to existing (and widely debated) levels of conceptualization scales, the cognitive content of Brazilian survey respondents can only be described by placing responses in residual categories such as "nature of the times" or "no content." However, if one unpacks the immediate and personalistic conceptions of

⁸³ On Deutch's rather bucolic model of elite influence as a series of cascading pools and other theories of elite influence according to competitive theories of democracy, see: Sartori, Giovanni. Theory of Democracy Revisited. Vol I, op. cit. pp. 92-102. and Deutsch, Karl. The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1968 pp. 101-110.

⁸⁴ Adorno, Theodore. et. al The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper & Row, 1950. Lane, Robert. Political Ideology. New York: Free Press, 1962. Noelle-Neumann, Elizabeth. The Spiral of Silence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

⁸⁵ For example: Margolis, Michael., & Mauser, Gary. Manipulating Public Opinion: Essays on Public Opinion as a Dependent Variable. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1989., Ginsberg, Benjamin. The Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power. New York: Basic Papers, 1986.

⁸⁶ Mettenheim, Kurt von. The Brazilian Voter. Chapter 1.

politics which predominate among Brazilian voters from within these residual categories, recent empirical research reveals a fundamentally new causal sequence in Brazil: Voter choice is organized by perceptions of executive performance and positions on the national issues of the day, and grounded in conceptions of substantive justice rather than determined by long-term factors such as political socialization, class identity, or party identification.⁸⁷ New concepts about electoral representation and democracy are needed to describe the implications of this sequence. And the problem cannot be disregarded as Brazilian exceptionalism. Complex reciprocal effects, top-down appeals, and feedback mechanisms of power are also emphasized in recent empirical studies of electoral behavior.⁸⁸

The concept of executive-led representation attempts to capture the reality that perceptions and preferences among Brazilian voters are direct, unmediated, complex, changing, populist, and personalistic, but nonetheless linked to matters traditionally associated with democracy such as direct popular appeals and conceptions of substantive justice. Indeed, the Brazilian experience may be of considerable relevance elsewhere, given the inability of social scientists to fully describe politics after the dealignment of modern, class based cleavages. In Brazil, short-term perceptions of voters directly judge parties, national issues, and executive performance, without the moderating influence of civic culture, long-term political socialization, deep class identities, traditional political ideologies, or party identification.

In terms of generating new political leadership, presidential elections have also been essential to post-transition politics. Indeed, the 1994 presidential campaign brought

⁸⁷ The traditional model of public opinion and voter choice in advanced democracies relies on the following causal sequence: Long-term factors such as political socialization, class-based identities, and party identification mediate (moderate) short-term shifts in public opinion caused by perceptions of economic performance, candidate personality, and new political issues. See: Campbell, et.al. *The American Voter*. On the continued influence of this traditional model in current research, see: Asher, "Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s."

⁸⁸ See Kinder, "Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion." A critical contribution toward capturing causal complexity is: Page, Benjamin. and Calvin Jones. "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties, and the Vote." *American Political Science Review* 73 (1979): 1071-1089.

to the fore two of the most important new independent leaders of opposition to military rule in Brazil. After first confronting the military regime by leading metalworker strikes in São Paulo's industrial suburbs in the late 1970s, Luiz Inacio da Silva founded and helped lead the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) into the principal force on the left in Brazilian politics during the 1980s and 1990s.⁸⁹ Fernando Henrique Cardoso's trajectory is no less innovative. An internationally recognized academic, Cardoso first stepped from sociology to the Senate in 1982 and became a central figure negotiating transition from military rule (1985) and writing the 1988 Constitution. After machine politicians led by Orestes Quercia (São Paulo Governor 1986-1990) asserted control over the national directorship of the PMDB in 1988 (in expectation of dominating the 1989 presidential race), Cardoso split to found the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) along with other PMDB center-left dissidents. In comparative and historical perspective, the emergence of a reform president and an independent-left Worker's party as loyal opposition as the two central political forces in Brazil after transition from military rule are notable developments. The consagrations of Lula and Cardoso in the 1994 election suggests that the traditional mechanisms of party-electoral politics in Brazil may provide the setting for the emergence of new leaders and the implementation of economic and political reforms.

In 1994, the traditional mechanisms of party-electoral politics in Brazil -- direct popular appeals and alliances with patronage machines -- accurately describe Fernando Henrique Cardoso's ability to win the presidency in first-round voting on November 15. Both the electoral alliance and governing coalition between Cardoso's PSDB (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) and the conservative PFL (Partido da Frente Liberal) have received significant criticism from partisans, journalists, and Brazilian intellectuals. Even Cardoso's 1994 campaign manager feared that because of the traditional conservative character of the PFL, core supporters from southeast urban areas would shift to the Worker's Party if the

⁸⁹ On the Worker's Party, see: Margaret Keck, *The Workers' party and Democratization in Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

campaign had gone into a second round.⁹⁰ However, these concerns in June 1994 soon gave way due to the successful reduction of inflation, the immense popularity of the newly stabilized currency (Real), and the significant redistribution of wealth secured by government policies.

The lack of political resolution before 1994 arose in great part because the 1989 presidential contest was held outside the historical norm and in isolation from legislative and gubernatorial elections. The central principle behind Assis Brasil's formula for electoral representation is to counter the plebiscitarian tendencies of direct executive elections by combining separate election of legislators through quite liberal rules of proportional representation.⁹¹ Fernando Collor de Mello (a relatively unknown governor from the small northeast state of Alagoas) was thereby able to dominate the first six months of the campaign through television appearances and denunciations of bureaucratic abuse. After Collor reached over 45 percent in preference polls by June, he refused to participate in the live television debates of the first round (accurately reflecting the damaging prospects of sustained attacks from adversaries). Collor won over 28 percent in first round voting, with Inacio da Silva (Lula), the candidate for Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker's Party, PT) entering the runoff election with 16 percent. While Lula dominated the first television debate of the second round and surged in the polls to tie Collor only ten days before the December 15 vote, the Worker's Party candidate failed to dominate the second debate as he did the first and was unable to counter the damaging effect of negative advertising in the final days of the campaign. Collor convinced voters that a victory of Luiz Inacio da Silva and the PT would destabilize society and turn Brazil away from a liberalizing world by mounting a series of personal and political attacks seven days before the final election. On December 15, Collor received

⁹⁰ According to Brazilian electoral legislation, executive contests require a second round unless a candidate wins over 50 percent plus one of valid votes (not including blank/null ballots), or unless the votes received by a candidate exceed the sum of votes for all other candidates.

⁹¹ Since 1932, the Brazilian electoral code has used this mechanism first proposed by Assis Brasil in 1897 (Democracia Representativa, Rio de Janeiro; Imprensa Nacional, 1931 ed.).

35,089,998 votes (42.7 percent), defeating Lula with 31,076,364 votes (37.8 percent).

The sheer velocity and range of fluctuations among voter's intentions during recent presidential campaigns suggest the more volatile, plebiscitarian, executive-centric character of electoral representation in Brazil. During the 1989 contest, Fernando Collor de Mello's ratings in the polls rose rapidly to 45 percent, then fell to 28 percent in the first round. In 1994, Worker's Party candidate Luiz Inacio da Silva fell from a high point of 42 percent in polls taken on 1 May to 22 percent in a poll on 30 September, accurately reflecting his final share of the vote. Fernando Henrique Cardoso's trajectory in opinion polls from 16 percent of voters preferences on 3 May to 48 percent on 30 September is even greater. During the 1998 contest, Fernando Henrique Cardoso started at 41 percent of voters preferences in late April, dropped to 33 percent in late May, and increased steadily thereafter until receiving 55 percent of votes in the first round on October 3. This velocity and range of change among voters intentions in Brazil is considerably greater than the glacial shifts of between 3 to 5 percent which traditionally occur during national electoral campaigns in Europe.⁹²

In sum, electoral representation in Brazil is more direct, unmediated, fluid, centered around presidential contests, and both tied to political personalities and underlying conceptions of substantive justice. While the populist tradition endowed Brazilian state-society relations with this greater transparency and immediacy, these characteristics are not simply a consequence of the nations past. Recent universal trends toward direct popular appeals by executives and media-oriented electioneering means that voters now tend to judge candidates, issues, economic performance, and political parties directly, without the moderating influences so important in the past such as political ideologies, notions of group interest, or other

⁹² On electoral stability and change in Europe, See: S. Bartolini, and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

long-term identifications with party or class.⁹³ The liberal and democratic tradition needs to consider more carefully the implications of direct popular appeals for conceptions of electoral representation.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE CARDOSO ADMINISTRATION

Initial review of primary sources on the organization of the Brazilian presidency suggests that this perspective can generate significant new insights into problems of governance and democracy in Brazil. Instead of deriving abstract characteristics or assuming general tendencies that determine politics in the presidency, the organizational perspective takes a more open-ended approach to the structure of offices and administration in the executive. Three brief comments are presented in this section to suggest future lines of research. First, a historical analysis of the Brazilian presidency as an organization is needed. This report presents a review of the evolution and founding legal statutes that define the current structure of ministries and cabinet level posts in the Brazilian presidency. Second, a comparison of the first and second Cardoso administrations in terms of ministerial and cabinet posts is needed. While a schematic view of these differences is presented here, further analysis into the partisan, regional, and ideological characteristics of ministerial nominations will be presented in future reports. Finally, brief discussion

⁹³ Caveats are in order. First, far from a single pattern throughout Latin America, differences matter. Educated publics in Argentina and Chile may be closer to European voters. See: J. Samuel Valenzuela & Timothy Scully, "Electoral Choices and the Party System in Chile: Continuities and Changes at the Recovery of Democracy." (*Comparative Politics*, 29/4, July 1997). More established party systems such as Colombia and Venezuela may retain have produced strong party identification among voters. See: Enrique Baloyra, "Deepening Democracy with Dominant Parties and Presidentialism: The Venezuelan Regime in a Period of Turbulence," (in von Mettenheim & Malloy, *Deepening Democracy in Latin America*, op. cit.) and Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. And electoral politics in Central America appears to depend less on media images and other patterns typical of mass society (Jorge I. Domínguez & Marc Lindenberg, *Democratic Transitions in Central America* (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1997) Nonetheless, direct popular appeals through the media appear to increasingly influence voters in the region. See: Thomas Skidmore, ed., *Television, Politics, and the Transition to Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

of the administrative reform agenda of the Cardoso administration attempts to place the organizational characteristics of presidential governance in a broader theoretical and historical context.

Brief historical review of the legal founding and nature of cabinet posts since the beginning of the Republic in 1891 suggest that change over time in presidential organization was not a linear process of evolution, but occurred during the major periods of regime change in Brazilian political history. Initial review of the secondary literature and selected primary sources suggest that the number and character of ministries changed in response to the general political transformation of the Brazilian federal government. Recent scholarship in comparative historical analysis emphasizes the importance of political moments in the trajectory of institutional change,⁹⁴ while analyses of the American presidency also argues that periods of policy regime change explain the particular trajectory of administrative evolution.⁹⁵

The Brazilian presidency expanded in terms of organizational complexity and diversity primarily: during the *Estado Novo* of Getulio Vargas; after the military intervention of 1964; and during the period of transition from military to civilian rule in 1985. Preliminary analysis of the number, character, and timing of organizational innovation suggests that a political explanation is required in addition to the importance of ideological foundations and visions of administrative-reform behind these periods of change. The organizational expansion of the Brazilian presidency appears to have occurred largely during critical moments in Brazilian political history in response to the administrative nominations required to sustain political alliances. The number of cabinet level posts increased in terms consistent with this interpretation. In numerical terms, the founding of ministries appears greatest during times of regime change and least during periods of political

⁹⁴ Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth. *Structuring Politics*. Cambridge 1992.

⁹⁵ Skowronek, Stephen. *The Politics Presidents Make*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993 and Lowi, Theodore. *The Personal President*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

continuity. The ideological inflections that have marked Brazilian political history provide the most obvious hypothesis to explain these periods of organizational innovation in the presidency. The ideological foundations and administrative vision of the *Estado Novo* clearly implies expanding the number and function of ministries and posts directly responsible to the presidency. Less obvious is the substantial increase of ministries and executive agencies during the period of military rule after 1964, given the ideology of national security and development and the apparent abandonment of traditional state-led traditions dating from national populism. Finally, the increase in ministerial posts and agencies directly responsible to the president during and after the transition from military rule in 1985 suggests that contrary to new views that seek to reduce the federal government (whether neo-liberal ideology, proposals for administrative reform, or the implementation of new regulatory agencies in the place of existing ministries), these calls for reducing and remodeling the federal government have apparently not yet translated into the reorganization of the presidency in terms of the number and function of cabinet posts.

In sum, during two of the three major periods of regime change that have marked Brazilian politics during the twentieth century the general political and ideological climate appeared conducive to the reduction of administrative functions of the federal government. Yet the contrary occurred. Both the military presidents during the late 1960s and the first civilian presidents after transition from military rule in 1985 increased the number of ministries significantly. The initial explanation to be pursued in future research is that the logic of political alliances and the use of presidential nominations of politicians to ministerial and administrative posts during periods of political change are central to cement new regimes during periods of flux.

Table 3**Number of Ministries during Presidential Terms**-----
OLD REPUBLIC

8	Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca
8	Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca
9	Floriano Vieira Peixoto
6	Prudente José de Moraes e Barros
6	Manoel Ferraz de Campos Salles
9	Francisco de Paula Rodrigues Alves
9	Afonso Augusto Moreira Penna
8	Nilo Procópio Peçanha
9	Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca
9	Wenceslão Braz Pereira Gomes
9	Delfim Moreira da Costa Ribeiro
9	Epitácio da Silva Pessoa
9	Arthur da Silva Bernardes
9	Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa
7	Augusto Tasso Fragoso

ESTADO NOVO

13	Getúlio Dornelles Vargas
12	Getúlio Dornelles Vargas
13	Getúlio Dornelles Vargas
14	José Linhares

POST-WAR REPUBLIC

16	Eurico Gaspar Dutra
17	Getúlio Dornelles Vargas
16	João Fernandes Campos Café Filho
16	Nereu de Oliveira Ramos
18	Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliveira
18	Jânio da Silva Quadros
18	Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli
19	João Belchior Marques Goulart

MILITARY GOVERNMENT

- 19 Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli
- 21 Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco
- 22 Arthur da Costa e Silva
- 22 Governo Provisório
- 22 Emílio Garrastazu Médici
- 22 Ernesto Geisel
- 26 João Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo

POST-TRANSITION GOVERNMENTS

- 37 José Sarney
- 35 Fernando Affonso Collor de Mello
- 31 Itamar Augusto Cautiero Franco
- 37 Fernando Henrique Cardoso

Note: Column of numbers refers simply to the number of cabinet level posts during each presidential administration. Source: Presidência da República, *Governos da República*. Brasília: Presidência da República, Casa Civil, Departamento de Administração, Biblioteca. 1997 (3ª edição)

In sum, administrative redesign of the presidency appears to have occurred during periods of regime change in Brazilian history. However, rather than the product of ideological visions and reform proposals, the end result of organizational expansion in terms of ministries and cabinet level posts directly responsible to the presidency appears to have more to do with the pattern of political alliances that are solidified through presidential nominations.

A second organizational perspective on the Brazilian presidency to be pursued further in this research is a comparison of ministers and cabinet level appointments at the beginning of President Cardoso's first term in 1995 and the beginning of his second term in 1999. Although further analysis of the changes in governance and administration will be required, initial review of ministerial changes suggest that President Cardoso's second term will very much continue the patterns of policy making pursued from 1995-1999. The reorganization of ministries appears to result from a variety of factors having to do with partisan demands, attempts to increase

administrative efficiency, regional political pressures, and relocation of ministers to critical policy areas. (See Appendices 2 & 3)

3. ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE CARDOSO ADMINISTRATION

The particular sequence of liberalization, adjustment, and economic growth that occurred during the 1990s has altered the fundamental characteristics of the Brazilian economy. Broad initiatives of liberalization and privatization that began under President Collor in 1992 proceeded throughout the first term of President Cardoso despite a succession of international economic crises. With trade liberalization underway, the Real Plan (July 1994) reduced inflation and created a period of growth led by popular consumption due to the end of salary erosion under inflation. Then, after liberalization and a period of consumer-led growth, the Brazilian economy shifted during 1996-1997 to a new period in which capital investments led growth. Given the sustained difficulties of high inflation and negative per-capita growth throughout the 1980s in Brazil, this particular sequence during the 1990s appears to have fundamentally altered the basic structure of the Brazilian economy. The increased competition from imports, a boom of consumer spending among popular classes (brief as it may have been), and a subsequent period of capital investments appear to have significantly modernized Brazilian industry and commerce, while the volatility of the international economy raised the social costs of adjustment and periodically disrupted capital flows.

In a broader sense, economic policy during President Cardoso's first term can be described as a shift away from the traditional Brazilian model of state-led development to a new regime that relies on market forces and government regulation. The legislation necessary for this new regime based on regulatory agencies was completed from 1995-1998, involving a variety of Constitutional Amendments with two thirds in successive votes in both Senate and Federal

Assembly, and a series of complementary legislation designed to complete the mandated privatizations and secure market competition thereafter. New federal agencies have been created to regulate providers of electric energy (ANEEL) and telecommunications (ANATEL), while the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) has conducted extensive analysis and negotiations to end the monopoly of Petrobras through concessions, privatizations, and joint ventures. The auction of concessions to explore and develop petroleum in areas previously reserved for PETROBRAS is scheduled for June 15 & 16, 1999, a sale that will provide another dramatic change in the basic structure of the Brazilian economy. Instead of the traditional regime of central planning and directed investment through state firms, the new regime consists of regulatory agencies that seek to ensure competitive markets in these previously reserved sectors.

In terms of fiscal and monetary policies, the central goal of the Cardoso administration from 1995-1998 was to transform the successful reduction of inflation during 1994 into macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth. Initiatives of fiscal and monetary reform as well as redesign of the budgetary process succeeded in keeping inflation low and staved capital flight. And although the costs of confronting three successive crises in the international economy during President Cardoso's first term, economic policies maintained economic growth until late 1997 while deepening Brazil's insertion into the international economy. This combination of a more open domestic economy and a more volatile international economy during the 1990s has both altered the basic structure of the Brazilian economy and the basic assumptions about economic policy in the country.

For example, instead of seeking to protect domestic industry and labor from international pressures, the liberalization of the economy was seen as critical for reducing inflation through increased competition from imports. And instead of insisting on wage austerity to keep inflation low, real wage increases permitted significant domestic growth while inflation levels continued to drop from 5,161.7 percent during the twelve months preceding the Real Plan (July 1993-June 1994),

to 28.3 percent during the twelve months after the Real Plan. During the following years inflation continued to decline, totaling 16.3 percent during 1996, 5.8 percent during 1997, and an estimated 1.8 percent during 1998 (See Charts on Inflation in Appendix 5).

As noted above, the reduction of inflation without further impoverishment remains the most notable achievement of economic policy during the first term of President Cardoso. A variety of independent and government institutes reveal significant increases in real wages concentrated among Brazil's poor during the first three years of President Cardoso's first term. For example, from 1995-1998, the number of Brazilians falling below the absolute poverty line used by the IBGE (45 R per month) fell from over 36 percent to 25 percent of the total population. Measurements of the purchasing power of the minimum wage also indicate substantial wage increases to poor Brazilians during the first years of the Cardoso administration (See Charts on wage levels). Standard indicators of the distribution of wealth such as the GINI index also measure significant change since the Real Plan, while a recent report by the Economic Commission on Latin America of the United Nations notes the significant redistributive content of the period during which inflation fell in Brazil.⁹⁶ In sum, perhaps the central legacy of President Cardoso's first term arose from the significant redistributive effects of falling inflation (See Charts on wage levels in Appendix 5). Estimates of the redistributive effects of falling inflation vary and most analysts appear to agree that wage gains began in June 1994 and ended largely by August 1997. This suggests that the indirect social benefits of economic policy shall most likely not be repeated during the second term.

Regarding the pattern of growth during the first Cardoso administration, the evidence suggests that the particular sequence of first opening the Brazilian economy, then reducing inflation while increasing wages of poor Brazilians made possible the completion of an equally unique cycle of domestic growth: one based

⁹⁶ See Economic Commission on Latin America, reported in Folha de S.Paulo, 1999.

first on consumer demand then on investments in capital goods. Regarding the first period of consumer led growth, a variety of indicators such as electrodomestic goods and cement consumption suggest that popular sectors used real wage gains to purchase consumer goods or build homes (See Chart on cement sales in Appendix 5). And while this period of consumer goods consumption ended along with the end of the redistributive effects of falling inflation during 1996, the Brazilian economy continued to grow due to strong demand for capital goods during the second semester 1996 and throughout 1997.

In terms of fiscal policy during the first Cardoso term, programs designed to produce structural change were supplemented by additional measures necessary to confront periods of capital flight and reach accords with the international financial community. Programs designed to alter the basic structure of federal spending include initiatives of administrative reform, renegotiations of state-debt, regulation of state-banks, and reform of the federal budget process, proposing three year plans and policy targets open to public scrutiny and participation. The creation of a Fiscal Stabilization Fund (FEF), a new provisional tax on financial transactions (CPMF), a program for renegotiations of state debt (PROER?) and the approval of additional measures of fiscal restraint in the wake of the Russian currency exchange crisis completed a series of legislation that reduced the nominal deficit from 6.0 percent during 1996 to 4.9 during 1997. The Asian economic crisis required an additional series of spending reductions to stave off capital flight. However, instead of relying on provisional measures of presidential decrees, the onus of an additional spending reduction of approximately 20 Billion reais was approved in Congress during a rapid series of votes during early 1998.

In terms of reforming the budgetary process, the Cardoso administration proposed a new mechanism for proposing, debating, and implementing the federal budget on a three year basis.⁹⁷ The first triannual plan was proposed in 1996 and is now entering

⁹⁷ On the budget process and political change, see: Serra, José. *Orçamento no Brasil: Razões da Crise*. São Paulo: Atual Editora, 1994 and Santos, Maria Helena de Castro. et.al. "O Jogo Orçamentário da União: Relações

its final year. The objectives of the administration were to open the policy process to public view and mobilize social groups and political authorities on the local and state level to increase the effectiveness of government spending. Although I have yet to review the secondary literature or investigate independent primary sources on the new budget process, this combination of decentralization and social mobilization appears to provide a significant departure from previous mechanisms used in the federal budget.

Provisional Measure (Medida Provisória) 1550 first set the new procedures for the Federal Planning and Budget System (Sistema de Planejamento e Orçamento Federal) in 1995. Congress currently is considering ordinary legislation designed to complete the new budget regime, including new procedures for planning, budget design, finance and internal control, measures taken as a whole that will open the budget process to media review and public participation in an effort to decentralize, democratize, and increase government efficiency. Review mechanisms have also been created by the Cardoso administration, involving a new Triannual Budget Tracking System designed to monitor government spending and provide accurate and current information to budget review commissions in the executive and legislative branches. These new budget procedures are designed to complement administrative reform initiatives, a link that the next Triennial Plan for 2000-2003 will attempt to encourage through specific measures.

3.1. Privatizations

The Cardoso administration sold an unprecedented number of state firms from 1995-1998 with the intent to complete the transition from past policies of state-led development to the new regime of regulatory agencies. Privatizations from 1995-1998 dwarf preceding sales in Brazil and have reshaped the basic relation between

Executivo-Legislativo na Terra do Pork Barrel." In Diniz, Eli. & Azevedo, Sérgio de. Eds. *Reforma do Estado e Democracia no Brasil*. Brasília: Editora UNB, 1997 pp. 83-124.

the government and economy. Instead of state monopolies and central bureaucracies designing and implementing strategies of growth, markets previously reserved for state monopolies have been split and sold in ways designed to maximize competition and ensure price reductions and increased service. Sales of state firms and concessions have occurred on the basis of contracts specifying performance targets that private firms must meet. The ability of the new federal agencies to regulate firms and ensure the achievement of performance targets set in privatization contracts will be closely watched in the coming years.

During the first term of President Cardoso 22 state firms were auctioned at a total value of over \$36 billion dollars. The sale of TELBRAS on July 30, 1998 exemplifies this shift in economic policy during the Cardoso administration. The auction of four fixed line phone companies and eight cellular markets all split from the state monopoly firm TELEBRAS occurred on July 30 1998 for a total of \$22.058 billion dollars, over 63 percent above the minimum bid set by the government. The sale of TELEBRAS surpassed the revenue generated by the sale of 21 firms during the first term of President Cardoso, while additional sales of concessions to compete in critical telephone markets were rescheduled due to the poor climate during the international crises of October 1998 and January 1999. The sale of TELEBRAS culminated the redesign of presidential governance from state monopolies in strategic sectors to a new regime relying on regulatory agencies. The new National Telecommunications Agency (ANATEL, Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações) is now responsible for regulating private firms in terms of a series of performance and investment criteria that were included in the privatization accords. This shift from the direct administration of government monopolies to the regulation of private firms and market mechanisms is designed to reduce federal spending, decrease the cost of basic services, and modernize the infrastructure of Brazil in sectors that have experienced remarkable gains in technology during the last years. And while consumer complaints and media criticism have risen in the wake of privatizations, it remains to be seen if the targets of price reduction and

service expansion will be met by the private firms that now dominate markets previously reserved to state monopolies.

A series of presidential initiatives also focused on infrastructure development designed to maximize the macroeconomic gains from privatizations. The Cardoso administration has consolidated infrastructure investments in a program entitled Brazil in Action (Brasil em Ação), coordinating projects to maximize their impact in terms of economic and social development. In this regard, the Cardoso administration diverges from traditional neo-liberal styles of governance in the continuation of direct state investment, subsidies, and incentives that seek to direct economic development. A critical institution in this respect is the National Bank for Social and Economic Development (BNDES, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social) that has increased lending and adopted new strategies to ensure adequate financing and competitive markets among newly privatized firms and newly sold concessions. The significant increase in government investments suggest that policies are far from a type of neo-liberal reduction of the state. For example, total investments by the BNDES increased four-fold during the Cardoso administration reaching an estimated 25.5 billion in 1997, far greater than investments by international financial institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund. Investments by the BNDES are designed to sustain competition in newly privatized sectors by providing finance to newly acquired rights to set up “mirror” firms in markets previously monopolized by state firms. The state development bank also has provided credit to achieve the government's goal of infrastructure expansion, currently financing over 30 hydroelectric dams that were abandoned due to cost overruns by state firms or contracts.

The variety of programs designed to promote exports developed during President Cardoso's first term failed to produce significant results in terms of national accounts. The traditional source for export financing, FINAMEX, was transferred to BNDES and redesigned to function as an export/import bank along the lines of the EXIMBANK of the United States. Funding levels have indeed increased, fourfold

from FINAMEX loans in 1994 to BNDES EXIM in 1997. Furthermore, the PROEX program also increased lending from 3.4 Billion Reals in 1996 to 8.1 Billion Reals in 1997. The commercial balance fails to reflect this increased investment, given the adverse international environment and periods of significant capital flight during 1997 and 1998.

4. SOCIAL POLICY DURING THE CARDOSO ADMINISTRATION

This research also conducted an initial review of social policies during the first term President Cardoso. In general terms, social policy initiatives have been described in terms of the new role of the federal government envisioned in the administrative reform that seeks to decentralize the implementation of policies and mobilize independent social organizations to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and empower citizen groups. Based on an initial review of publications by the presidency and ministries, it appears that changes have been greatest in the policy areas of education and health services, while the new program of Comunidade Solidária (Community Solidarity) has attempted to mobilize a variety of existing government programs and social groups to alleviate poverty and improve social conditions in the poorest municipalities in Brazil. Although further analysis of these initiatives in the area of social policy will be needed, this section discusses what appear to be the principal developments in social policy during President Cardoso's first term.

The Community Solidarity program was announced in 1995 as an effort to mobilize both social organizations and existing government resources in a variety of federal programs to target severe social problems and improve life in the poorest municipalities of Brazil. The distinct character of these two tasks led to the separation of Community Solidarity into two increasingly separate programs: The Executive Secretariat that attempts to link federal programs and the Council that seeks to mobilize and strengthen civil society. The Executive-Secretariat has

attempted to improve poverty in Brazil by targeting municipalities (1,369 in 1997) with the worst social indicators in IBGE surveys and linking a variety of existing federal programs (primarily basic education, sanitation, housing, and infant mortality). The Community Solidarity Council has focused on mobilizing volunteers in civil society and social organizations to implement a series of new programs designed to address illiteracy, provide employment training, organizing the participation of university students in anti-poverty programs, and strengthen civil society by clarifying the legal parameters for non-profit and non-governmental organizations in Brazil. The Community Solidarity program is supported by financing from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the Banco de Brasil Foundation, UNESCO, and a series of voluntary contributions from business groups and individuals.

Given the recent development of Community Solidarity programs, independent evaluation and review has been commissioned and some preliminary information was published in newspapers. A central goal during the next stages of research will be to consult the results of the United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) review of Community Solidarity programs led by Universidade de Campinas sociologist Sonia Draibe.

Basic education has received a series of significant initiatives that appear to have increased funding, provided new teaching and administrative guidelines, and improved student attendance and examination performance across Brazil. To this observer, targeting primary and secondary education appears to be informed by two considerations. First, a perception among Brazilian policy elites appears to have emerged that economic growth in Brazil cannot be sustained without a better educated workforce. Second, the distributive bias of public university education also appears to inform the emphasis on primary and secondary education. Interviews with specialists in the areas, as well as public statements by government officials suggest that that free public university education is now perceived as an unwarranted subsidy to the middle class rather than a basic right that increases

equity. In sum, the different class structures and class biases of educational policy in Brazil suggests that the Cardoso Administration differs significantly from the neo-liberal experiences of North Atlantic and neighboring countries such as Chile and Argentina that all began with higher education levels but suffered significant reductions in terms of basic education. While further review of primary sources and secondary analysis of education policy will be needed, the following observations emerge from this initial period of research.

Three programs targeting basic education during the first Cardoso administration appear to be of special interest and will require further research. First, legislation created the Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education (FUNDEF) based on 15 percent of ICMS receipts and IPI based measures of export and quotients in existing funds that are distributed directly to states and municipalities (FPE and FPM). Funds are now distributed directly to over 4,000 municipalities according to the number of students enrolled in the preceding year (based on the new School Census developed by the Ministry of Education). The federal government provides an additional guarantee to supplement these funding sources to ensure a minimum financing level of 300 reals per student. These measures suggest a dramatic delegation of primary education from the federal and state level directly to municipalities and social organizations.

The Programa Escola Pública - Gestão Eficiente was designed to regulate this release of funds directly to schools and mobilize social organizations rather than depending on traditional political institutions on the state and municipal level. The number of secondary schools receiving funds directly from the Ministry of Education increased from 6 percent in 1996 to 45 percent in 1997. This means that in these cases local and social organizations such as parent-teacher associations, school counsels, or local school foundations existed and funds were dispersed directly rather than through state or municipal secretaries of education. Further research will be requires to assess the impact of this decentralization and social mobilization on the quality of secondary education.

In addition to existing programs such as the Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar (serving an estimated 31.3 million students) and the Programa de Transporte Escolar, the Comunidade Solidária program encouraged the formation of rural schools that cross district boundaries to participate in these federal as well as other state and municipal educational programs.

A new national School Census has permitted the creation of statistical data bases measuring a variety of academic criteria in the Sistema Estatístico da Educação and the Sistema Integrado de Informações Educacionais. The school census includes 250 thousand public schools and over 44,5 million students, while the Sistema Nacional de Avaliação da Educação Básica (SAEB) provides analysis of over 220 thousand students in 1997, up from 90.5 thousand in 1995. The development of information about primary and secondary education has been combined with efforts to unify and improve basic curricula. Additional educational programs include Núcleos de Tecnologia Educacional organized in approximately six thousand schools nationwide and the Projeto de Educação Básica para o Nordeste that includes training of educators and physical plant improvements. Although the Projeto Nordeste ended in 1998, significant new resources will become available through the new Programa de Fortalecimento da Escola (FUNDASCOLA) funded by the World Bank over the next six years.

The Cardoso administration also developed several initiatives in health policy, including measures that attempted to increase and improve universal services, increase access to basic services in rural areas and less developed regions, and specific programs targeting particular health problems. First, the Minimum Basic Assistance (Piso Assistencial Básico) law determined per person minimum spending levels to be implemented across Brazilian municipalities. Second, to create the infrastructure and services necessary to spend this quota, a series of initiatives were designed to decentralize spending, mobilize social groups, and link isolated municipalities. A new Norms of Basic Operation (Norma Operacional Básica) altered regulations of the National Health System (Sistema Única de Saude) by

delegating responsibility and spending to state and municipal authorities with conditionality in terms of social participation and budget allocation. As of 1998, the per-person spending quotas of the National Health Fund (Fundo Nacional de Saúde) were disbursed to 4,554 municipalities during 1998.

In addition to the structural changes of decentralization and social mobilization, health policy during the first term of President Cardoso sought to shift spending from hospital treatment to preventive medicine and health care. The Community Solidarity Program directed significant efforts to train community health agents, local medical teams trained in family health procedures, and the implementation of maternal and infant care measures in the poorest municipalities of Brazil (See Charts on health indicators in Appendix 5).

Further analysis of the secondary literature on health policies during the Cardoso administration will be needed to evaluate the impact of these measures. Initial review of health policies in terms of the broader initiatives of government reform suggest that decentralization of health services to municipal and state governments along with increased roles of social and health-service community organizations have dramatically altered the provision of health services in Brazil, presenting a series of new achievements and problems.

In sum, significant changes in social policy during President Cardoso's first term have occurred, both regarding the terms of universal coverage, the decentralization and delegation of social policy to state and municipal authorities as well as independent social organizations. The Community Solidarity Program also appears to have both increased the effectiveness of existing federal programs against poverty by linking programs dispersed throughout 9 ministries, and organizing significant initiatives to mobilize civil society and social organizations. A central goal in future research is to review the secondary literature on areas such as education and health policy, analyze independent reviews commissioned by government agencies, and

acquire government publications on social policies during the Cardoso administration.

4.1. Agrarian reform

The sheer number, size, and complexity of agrarian reform programs suggest that major changes in policy occurred during the first presidential term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Initial review of journalistic coverage, interviews with state-level agencies in São Paulo, and federal government publications provide the basis for this preliminary analysis of what is a highly contested policy area. Government documents claim that over 287 thousand families were settled in 2,356 agrarian reform settlements during the four years of the Cardoso Presidency (1995-1998). The area involved surpasses seven million hectares of expropriated for being unproductive, with another two million hectares from additional sources totaling over nine million hectares. In terms of investment, credit, and crop guarantees, the federal government contributed 1,243 billion reais, with additional investments of 35 million destined to areas of drought emergency in the northeast.

By linking a variety of existing federal programs, the Cardoso administration also attempted to increase infrastructure investments in areas of agrarian reform. A total of 419 million reais were used to install electricity (9,275 km wired), rural highways (27,000 km), over 1,200 artesian wells, storage facilities and sheds, rural schools (323) and health centers (366). Over 115 thousand families in areas of agrarian reform also participated in a credit program (Programa de Crédito Especial para a Reforma Agrária, PROCERA) that finances home construction of up to 2,500 reais per family at reduced interest rates.

Furthermore, legislation regulating the terms of expropriation and judicial evaluation of contested areas was created through provisional measures and later passed by Congress during 1996. The Law of Summary Rites (Lei do Rito Sumário)

was designed to increase the speed of land expropriation, adjudication, and settlement. This legislation has reduced the average settlement time from 467 days in 1995 to 131 days during 1998. Law 9,415/96 also granted federal rights to intervene in land disputes and supervise the devolution or distribution of land after judicial decisions. These laws simplified, speeded, and pacified the disappropriation of land by redefining the criteria for unproductive land, limiting to 15 days delays through failure to receive notice, increasing taxes on land in dispute, and prohibiting disappropriation procedures for land unilaterally occupied by rural movements. Decree 2,250/97 also permitted rural workers organizations to indicate areas for possible expropriation, while new regulations set tight timetables for government notice to land-owners, judicial review and decision, and settlement of landless once areas are demarcated.

Agrarian reform initiatives during the Cardoso administration have also expanded to include financing through the World Bank and decentralized implementation through the involvement of local authorities and social movements. Pilot programs such as Projeto Roda Viva were used to organize expanded programs such as the Cédula de Terra that reached funding levels of 150 million reais with additional financing from the World Bank that will provide an additional \$90 million USD. During 1998 a new funding source expanded financing available to agrarian reform settlements. The Banco da Terra extended an estimate 1 billion reais to finance sem terra and small producers, a source that also is currently used to negotiate increased project financing from the World Bank.

Like reform initiatives in the area of health services, the decentralization of agrarian reform has been central goal during the Cardoso administration. Legal changes in 1996 and 1997 delegated to states the registry, inspection, and evaluation of rural property on the condition that social organizations participate in each stage. And as mentioned above, representative associations of rural workers and farmers may indicate property for possible expropriation, requiring review by state or federal Agrarian Reform agencies within 120 days. Finally, the first agrarian reform census

provides new information through interviewing up to 80 percent of families relocated during the last years.

In sum, the politics of agrarian reform across Brazil involves a complex mixture of social and agrarian movements such as the MST (Movimento Sem Terra), municipal, state and federal government representatives and administrative agencies, as well as a series of Brazilian and international agencies and actors that support agrarian reform settlements. Indeed, the secondary literature on agrarian reform in Brazil has itself grown to considerable levels, with working groups in most social science associations, research programs in universities, independent research agencies, and political parties. Even a cursory evaluation of initiatives in terms of organization and policy during the first Cardoso term suggest that agrarian reform has been a central area of social, political, and economic concern. The founding of a special ministry (Ministerio Extraordinário de Política Fundiária) and insitute (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA), suggest that significant political and legislative initiative has been taken in this area. A central goal for this research is place the claims of the Cardoso administration in the context of the secondary literature on agrarian reform.

IV. A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES

A final note regarding the availability of information for scholarly analysis of the presidency is in order. In terms of policy initiatives, President Cardoso announced the formation of a new Integrated System of Organizational Information (Sistema Integrado de Informações Organizacionais - SIORG), designed to link the principal information sources of the federal government and make them available to the public via internet. Goals of system are to increase transparency by making information available to the public for the evaluation of public administration, to organize information in federal ministries and agencies so it can be made available to the public via web sites, and to implement the Módulo Histórico de Dados that

will include information on the federal government since the beginning of the republic, including plans to incorporate the Sistema do Arquivo Nacional. This researcher applauds the initiatives of the Cardoso administration that seek to provide greater public transparency and scholarly access to government documents and data. A central goal in future research will be to promote and make available to the public and academic community information about the Brazilian presidency, its secretariats and ministries, and the relation between the executive, legislature, and judiciary.

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VII. APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

FOUNDING LAWS FOR FEDERAL MINISTRIES

MINISTÉRIO DA JUSTIÇA

Alvará de 29.11.1643, assinado por D. João IV, cria a Secretaria de Estado das Mercês, juntamente com a Secretaria de Estado do Expediente, a que depois se acrescentou a da Assinatura. A Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios Interiores do Reino, criada por Alvará de 28.07.1736, inclui a maior parte das atribuições da Secretaria de Estado das Mercês. No decorrer dos anos, teve outras denominações, voltando à de Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Reino pela Carta de lei de 16.12.1815. Lei de 23.08.1821 e Decreto de 03.07.1822 determinam que se distribuam por duas Secretarias os assuntos afetos à Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Reino, ficando uma com a mesma denominação e a outra com o nome de Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Justiça. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, muda a denominação para Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores. Pelo Decreto-Lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 200, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Justiça. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item XI, trata da área de competência. Decreto nº 1.796, de 24.01.1996, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA MARINHA

Alvará de 28.07.1736, assinado por D. João V, cria, juntamente com duas outras, a Secretaria de Estado da Marinha e Domínios Ultramarinos (chamada, também, no mesmo Alvará, de Secretaria de Estado da Marinha e Conquistas). Decreto de

08.11.1821, assinado pelo Príncipe Regente D. Pedro, determina que os negócios de Ultramar sejam expedidos por outras Secretarias, dando competência específica à Secretaria de Estado da Marinha. Decreto nº 114, de 04.01.1842, determina reformas na Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Marinha. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, e Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 35, confirmam a denominação de Ministério da Marinha. Decreto nº 967, de 29.10.1993, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item XII, constitui área de competência.

MINISTÉRIO DO EXÉRCITO

Alvará de 28.07.1736, assinado por D. João V, cria, juntamente com duas outras, a Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Guerra. O Príncipe Regente D. João, pela Carta Régia de 06.01.1801, desmembra-a em duas e, por Aviso de 23.07.1801, restabelece a situação anterior. Decreto de 02.05.1822, do Príncipe Regente D. Pedro, volta a dividi-la em Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Reino e Estrangeiros e Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Guerra. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, reorganiza os serviços da Administração Federal, distribuindo-os por seis Ministérios, sendo um deles o Ministério da Guerra. Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 202, altera a denominação para Ministério do Exército. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item VIII, constitui área de competência.

MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES

Alvará de 28.07.1736, assinado por D. João V, cria, juntamente com duas outras, a Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros e da Guerra. O Príncipe Regente D. João, pela Carta Régia de 06.01.1801, desmembra-a em duas e, por Aviso de 23.07.1801, restabelece a situação anterior. Decreto de 02.05.1822, do Príncipe Regente D. Pedro, volta a dividi-la em Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Guerra

e Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Reino e Estrangeiros. Com o advento do Império, passou a chamar-se Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Império e Estrangeiros. Decreto de 13.11.1823, do Imperador D. Pedro I, desmembra-a da Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Império e Estrangeiros, passando a chamar-se simplesmente Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, muda a denominação para Ministério das Relações Exteriores. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item XVII, constitui área de competência e o Decreto nº 1.756, de 22.12.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA FAZENDA

Carta de lei de 22.12.1761, assinada por D. José I, cria o Tesouro Real e Público para tratar dos Assuntos da Real Fazenda no Continente e Domínios Ultramarinos. Decreto de 11.03.1808, do Príncipe Regente D. João, nomeia D. Fernando José, de Portugal, para o cargo de Assistente ao Despacho de seu Gabinete e Presidente do Real Erário e Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios do Brasil e da Fazenda. Decreto de 06.03.1821, de D. João VI, nomeia D. Diogo de Menezes, Presidente do Real Erário, para o cargo de Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios da Fazenda. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, reorganiza os serviços da Administração Federal, distribuindo-os por seis Ministérios, sendo um deles o Ministério da Fazenda. A Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério da Fazenda; e o art. 17, item VIII, cria o Ministério da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento, estabelecida pela MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990. A Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 20, transforma o Ministério da Economia, Fazenda e Planejamento em Ministério da Fazenda, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item IX, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item IX, constitui área de competência; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.745, de 13.12.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DOS TRANSPORTES

Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, dispõe sobre os serviços da Administração Federal, distribuindo-os por seis Ministérios, sendo um deles o Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas. Pelo Decreto nº 1.606, de 29.12.1906, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Viação e Obras Públicas. Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, altera a denominação para Ministério dos Transportes. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério dos Transportes. Lei nº 8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 1º, cria o Ministério dos Transportes e das Comunicações, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item XX, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item, XX, trata da área de competência; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 18.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.642, de 25.09.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA, ABASTECIMENTO E REFORMA AGRÁRIA

Decreto nº.1.606, de 29.12.1906, cria o Ministério dos Negócios da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio. Pelo Decreto nº 19.448, de 03.12.1930, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Agricultura. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 1.067, de 28.07.1860, criara a Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Agricultura, Comércio e Obras Públicas, cujas atribuições passaram, depois, para o Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas, por força da Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério da Agricultura; e o art. 17 cria o Ministério da Agricultura e Reforma Agrária, estabelecida pela MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990, art. 24 altera a denominação para Ministério da Agricultura. Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 20, transforma o Ministério da Agricultura e Reforma Agrária em Ministério da Agricultura, do Abastecimento e da Reforma Agrária, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item III,

ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item III, trata da área de competência; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.784, de 11.01.1996, aprova a Estrutura Regimental.

MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO E DO DESPORTO

Decreto nº 19.402, de 14.11.1930, cria o Ministério dos Negócios da Educação e Saúde Pública, que, por força da Lei nº 378, de 13.01.1937, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Educação e Saúde. Lei nº 1.920, de 25.07.1953, altera a denominação para Ministério da Educação e Cultura. Pelo Decreto nº 91.144, de 15.03.1985, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Educação. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 346, de 19.04.1890, criara a Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Instrução Pública, Correios e Telégrafos, cujas atribuições passaram, depois, para o Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores, em virtude da Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, transfere para a Secretaria dos Desportos da Presidência da República, as competência e atribuições do Ministério da Educação, estabelecida pela MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990 - constantes nas Leis nºs 6.251, de 08.10.1975, Lei nº 6.269, de 24.11.1975, e Lei nº 7.752, de 14.04.1989. A Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 20, transforma o Ministério da Educação em Ministério da Educação e do Desporto, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item VII, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item VII, trata da área de competência; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto 1.917, de 27.05.1996, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DO TRABALHO

Decreto nº 19.433, de 26.11.1930, cria o Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio. Lei nº 3.782, de 22.07.1960, determina que, a partir de 1º.02.1961, passe a denominar-se Ministério do Trabalho e Previdência Social. Finalmente, a Lei nº 6.036, de 1º.05.1974, desdobra-o em dois, sendo um deles Ministério do Trabalho. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério do Trabalho. Lei nº 8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 1º, cria o Ministério do Trabalho e da Administração, estabelecida pela MPV nº 302, de 10.04.1992. A Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 20, transforma o Ministério do Trabalho e da Administração em Ministério do Trabalho, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A Lei nº 8.844, de 20.01.1994, art. 1º, amplia a competência do Ministério do Trabalho, estabelecida pela MPV nº 393, de 27.12.1993. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13 item, XIX, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item XIX, trata da área de competência; e no art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.643, de 25.09.95, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA AERONÁUTICA

Decreto nº 2.961, de 20.01.1941, cria o Ministério da Aeronáutica. Anteriormente, os assuntos de aeronáutica eram de competência do Ministério da Marinha e dos ex-Ministérios da Guerra e da Viação e Obras Públicas. Decreto nº 60.521, de 31.03.1967, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. MPV nº 813 de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item II, trata da área de competência.

MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE

Lei nº 1.920, de 25.07.1953, art. 2º, cria o Ministério da Saúde. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 19.402, de 14.11.1930, criara o Ministério dos Negócios da Educação e Saúde Pública, que, por força da Lei nº 378, de 13.01.1937, passou a denominar-se Ministério da Educação e Saúde. Decreto nº 109, de 02.05.1991, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 14, item XVIII, constitui área de competência.

MINISTÉRIO DA INDÚSTRIA, DO COMÉRCIO E DO TURISMO

Lei nº 3.782, de 22.07.1960, cria o Ministério da Indústria e do Comércio. Anteriormente, os assuntos da indústria e do comércio estiveram a cargo dos seguintes órgãos: Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Agricultura, Comércio e Obras Públicas, criado pelo Decreto nº 1.067, de 28.07.1860; Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas, previsto na Lei n.º; 23, de 30.10.1891; Ministério dos Negócios da Agricultura, Indústria e Comércio, criado pelo Decreto nº 1.606, de 29.12.1906; e Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio, criado pelo Decreto nº 19.433, de 26.11.1930. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério do Desenvolvimento da Indústria e do Comércio. Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 22, cria o Ministério da Indústria, do Comércio e do Turismo, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item X, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item X, trata da área de competência; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.757, de 22.12.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DAS MINAS E ENERGIA

Lei nº 3.782, de 22.07.1960, art. 6º, cria o Ministério das Minas e Energia. Anteriormente, os assuntos de minas e energia eram da competência do Ministério da Agricultura. A MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990, convertida na Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério. A Lei nº 8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 1º, cria o Ministério de Minas e Energia, estabelecida pela MPV nº 302, de 10.04.1992. Decreto nº 507, de 23.04.1992, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 13, item XIV, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; e no art. 14, item XIV, constitui área de competência.

MINISTÉRIO DA INTEGRAÇÃO REGIONAL

A MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992, convertida na Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 21, transforma a Secretaria de Desenvolvimento Regional em Ministério da Integração Regional. A MPV 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 19, item III, extingue o Ministério; no art. 22 extingue o cargo de Ministro de Estado da Integração Regional, revogando no art. 45 as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992.

MINISTÉRIO DO INTERIOR

Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 199, item II, cria, por desdobramento do Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores, o Ministério do Interior. Este, além de atividades de antigas Secretarias de Estado, absorveu os órgãos e as atribuições antes sob a responsabilidade do Ministro Extraordinário para Coordenação dos Organismos Regionais, cargo criado pela Lei nº 4.344, de 21.06.1964. Anteriormente, o Alvará de 28.07.1736, assinado por D. João V, criara, juntamente com duas outras, a Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios Interiores do Reino. Com o

advento do Império e da República, passou a denominar-se, sucessivamente, Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Império e Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Interior. Decreto nº 366, de 26.04.1890, deu nova distribuição aos serviços da Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios do Interior. Lei nº 23, de 30.10.1891, reorganizou os serviços da Administração Federal, distribuindo-os em seis Ministérios, sendo um deles o Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério do Interior.

MINISTÉRIO DAS COMUNICAÇÕES

Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 199, item II, cria o Ministério das Comunicações. Anteriormente, os assuntos de comunicações eram de competência da antiga Secretaria de Estado dos Negócios da Instrução Pública, Correios e Telégrafos e do ex-Ministério da Indústria, Viação e Obras Públicas. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério das Comunicações. MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992, convertida na Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 22, cria o Ministério das Comunicações. A MPV 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item V, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item V, constitui área de competência do Ministério; e no art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992.

MINISTÉRIO DA PREVIDÊNCIA E ASSISTÊNCIA SOCIAL

Lei nº 6.036, de 1º.05.1974, por desdobramento do Ministério do Trabalho e Previdência Social, cria o Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social. Anteriormente, a Lei nº 3.782, de 22.07.1960, determinara que o Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio passasse a denominar-se, a partir de 1º.02.1961, Ministério do Trabalho e Previdência Social. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério. A MPV nº 302, de 10.04.1992, convertida na Lei nº

8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 1º, cria o Ministério da Previdência Social; e no art. 7º, item II, extingue o Ministério do Trabalho e Previdência Social. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 14, item XVI, constitui área de competência; e no art. 17 item V, transforma o Ministério da Previdência Social em Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social. Decreto nº 1.644, de 25.09.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA CULTURA

Decreto nº 91.144 de 15.03.1985, cria o Ministério da Cultura, por desdobramento do Ministério da Educação e Cultura. A Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 1º, parágrafo único, cria a Secretaria da Cultura da Presidência da República; e no art. 27, item V, extingue o Ministério da Cultura, estabelecida pela MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990. Por força da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 21, volta a denominar-se Ministério da Cultura, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. Decreto nº 1.673, de 11.10.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DA HABITAÇÃO E DO BEM-ESTAR SOCIAL

Decreto nº 91.145, de 15.03.1985, cria o Ministério do Desenvolvimento Urbano e Meio Ambiente, que, por força do Decreto nº 95.075, de 22.10.1987, passa a denominar-se Ministério da Habitação, Urbanismo e Meio Ambiente. Decreto nº 96.634, de 02.09.1988, altera a denominação para Ministério da Habitação e do Bem-Estar Social. A MPV nº 39, de 15.02.1989, convertida na Lei nº 7.739, de 16.03.1989, art. 5º, extingue o Ministério. MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 19, item II, e art. 23, confirma, respectivamente, a extinção do Ministério e do cargo de Ministro de Estado do Bem-Estar Social.

MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA

Decreto nº 91.146, de 15.03.1985, cria o Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia. Lei nº 7.739, de 16.03.1989, transfere as atribuições do Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia para o Ministério do Desenvolvimento Industrial, Ciência e Tecnologia e extingue o cargo de Ministro da Ciência e Tecnologia. Por força da Lei nº 7.740, de 16.03.1989, cria-se, como órgão integrante da Presidência da República, a Secretaria Especial da Ciência e Tecnologia, que passou a absorver os assuntos competentes ao extinto Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia. A Lei nº 7.927, de 14.12.1989, art. 4º, § 1º, extingue a Secretaria Especial de Ciência e Tecnologia da Presidência da República, criando novamente o Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, que também torna-se extinto pela Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, a qual é revogada com a edição da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, item IV, ratifica o Ministério com a mesma denominação; no art. 14, item IV, constitui área de competência; e no art. 45, ficam revogadas as disposições em contrário, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.753, de 20.12.1995, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DO MEIO AMBIENTE, DOS RECURSOS HÍDRICOS E DA AMAZÔNIA LEGAL

Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 21, por conversão da MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992, transforma a Secretaria do Meio Ambiente da Presidência da República em Ministério do Meio Ambiente. A MPV nº 350, de 14.09.1993, reeditada sob o nº 370, em 11.11.1993, e transformada na Lei 8.746, de 10.12.1993, art. 1º, cria, mediante transformação, o Ministério do Meio Ambiente e da Amazônia Legal. A MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 17, item IV, transforma o Ministério do Meio Ambiente e da Amazônia Legal, em Ministério do Meio Ambiente, dos Recursos Hídricos e da Amazônia Legal; e o art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias,

especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.205, de 1º;.08.1994, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério.

MINISTÉRIO DO PLANEJAMENTO E ORÇAMENTO

Lei nº 6.036, de 1º;.05.1974, art. 1º, transforma o Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação-Geral, em Secretaria de Planejamento da Presidência da República; art. 7º, estabelece competência; e art. 9º, revoga o item I do art. 199 do Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967. Pelo Decreto nº 94.159, de 31.03.1987, art. 1º, passa a denominar-se Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República. Lei nº 7.739, de 16.03.1989, art. 1º, parágrafo único— altera a denominação, para Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação; e no art. 6º, o cargo de Ministro-Chefe da Secretaria passa a denominar-se Ministro de Estado do Planejamento, por conversão da MPV nº 039, de 15.02.1989. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item III, extingue a Secretaria de Planejamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República. Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 22, cria a Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação da Presidência da República - SEPLAN, por determinação da MPV nº 309, de 16.10.92. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 17, item II, transforma a Secretaria de Planejamento, Orçamento e Coordenação em Ministério do Planejamento e Orçamento; o art. 45 revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 1.792, de 15.01.1996, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 38.744, de 1º;.02.1956, criara o Conselho do Desenvolvimento, com atribuições de coordenação e planejamento da política econômica. Decreto nº 51.152, de 05.08.1961, criou a Comissão Nacional de Planejamento, diretamente subordinada ao Presidente da República. Decreto nº 1.422, de 27.09.1962, dispôs sobre as atribuições do Ministro de Estado Extraordinário responsável pelo Planejamento, cargo criado pela Lei Delegada nº 1, de 25.09.1962, ao qual se subordinaram órgãos do Conselho do Desenvolvimento e da Comissão Nacional do Planejamento. Decreto nº 52.256, de 11.07.1963, instituiu a Coordenação do

Planejamento Nacional. Decreto nº 53.890, de 20.04.1964, dispôs sobre as atribuições do Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para o Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica. Decreto nº 55.722, de 02.02.1965, criou o Conselho Consultivo do Planejamento (CONSPLAN), como órgão de consulta do governo junto ao Ministro Extraordinário para o Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica. Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, arts. 32, 35 e 199, criou o Ministério do Planejamento e Coordenação Geral, com absorção dos órgãos subordinados ao Ministro Extraordinário para o Planejamento e Coordenação Econômica.

MINISTÉRIO DA ADMINISTRAÇÃO FEDERAL E REFORMA DO ESTADO

Pela Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 1º, parágrafo único, letra c, item 6, surge a Secretaria de Administração Federal, como órgão de assistência direta e imediata ao Presidente da República, estabelecido pela MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990. Por força da Lei nº 8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 8º, transfere o acervo patrimonial, o quadro de pessoal e as dotações orçamentárias da Secretaria de Administração Federal para o Ministério do Trabalho e da Administração, a qual passa a fazer parte da estrutura (estabelecido pela MPV nº 302, de 10.04.1992). Com a edição da MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 13, surge por transformação da Secretaria de Administração Federal, conforme art. 17, item III, da mesma Lei, o Ministério da Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado, e o art. 14, item I, constitui área de competência. Decreto nº 1.825, de 29.02.1996, aprova a Estrutura Regimental do Ministério. Anteriormente, a Lei nº 284, de 08.10.1936, instituiu o Conselho Federal do Serviço Público Civil, diretamente e imediatamente subordinado ao Presidente da República. Constituição de 10.11.1937, art. 67, prevê a existência, junto à Presidência da República, de um Departamento Administrativo. Decreto-lei nº 579, de 30.07.1938, cria, junto à Presidência da República, o Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público (DASP). Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 212, altera a denominação para Departamento Administrativo do Pessoal Civil, mantida a sigla DASP. Lei nº

6.036, de 1º.05.1974, classifica o DASP como órgão de assessoramento imediato do Presidente da República. Lei nº 6.228, de 15.07.1975, determina que o órgão volte a denominar-se Departamento Administrativo do Serviço Público. Pelo Decreto nº 91.147, de 15.03.1985, o DASP passa a ter como titular um Ministro de Estado (Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para Assuntos de Administração). Decreto nº 93.211, de 03.09.1986, extingue o DASP e cria a Secretaria de Administração Pública da Presidência da República (SEDAP), cujo titular continuará sendo o Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para Assuntos de Administração, enquanto não for criado o cargo de Ministro Chefe (art. 27). A MPV nº 039, de 15.02.1989, convertida na Lei nº 7.739, de 16.03.1989, art. 5º, extingue o cargo de Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para Assuntos de Administração.

MINISTÉRIO DA REFORMA E DE DESENVOLVIMENTO AGRÁRIO

Decreto nº 91.214, de 30.04.1985, cria o Ministério da Reforma e do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MIRAD). Decreto de 30.04.1985, designa o Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para Assuntos Fundiários para responder pelas funções de Ministro de Estado do MIRAD. Lei nº 7.319, de 11.06.1985, cria o cargo de Ministro de Estado da Reforma e do Desenvolvimento Agrário e extingue o cargo de Ministro de Estado Extraordinário para Assuntos Fundiários. Decreto nº 95.074, de 21.10.1987, dispõe sobre a Estrutura Básica do Ministério da Reforma e do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MIRAD). A Lei nº 7.739, de 16.03.1989, torna extinto o referido Ministério, e transfere os assuntos pertinentes a reforma e desenvolvimento agrário para a competência do Ministério da Agricultura.

ADDITIONAL CABINET POSTS

CASA CIVIL

Decreto-lei nº 920, de 1º.12.1938, dispõe sobre os serviços da Presidência da República, criando o Gabinete Militar e o Gabinete Civil, este chefiado pelo Secretário da Presidência da República. Lei nº 3.780, de 12.07.1960, dispõe sobre a Classificação de Cargos, prevendo na Secretaria da Presidência da República o cargo de Chefe do Gabinete Civil, símbolo 1-C. Decreto nº 53.876, de 02.04.1964, atribui a Chefia do Gabinete Civil a um Ministro de Estado Extraordinário. Lei nº 6.036, de 1º.05.1974, dá ao Chefe do Gabinete Civil a condição de Ministro de Estado. Decreto nº 92.614, de 02.05.1986, consolida e aprova o Regimento dos Gabinetes da Presidência da República, em que se inclui o Gabinete Civil. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item I, extingue o Gabinete Civil da Presidência da República. A Lei nº 8.410, de 17.03.1992, cria a Secretaria de Governo. Por força da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, é transformada a Secretaria de Governo da Presidência da República em Casa Civil da Presidência da República. Decreto nº 820, de 13.05.1993, aprova a Estrutura Regimental. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 1º, ratifica a Casa Civil na Estrutura da Presidência da República; e no art. 2º, estabelece competência. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 232, de 07.12.1894, determinara que o Presidente da República teria um Secretário. Decreto nº 2.049, de 22.07.1895, transferiu para a Secretaria da Presidência da República a incumbência do registro e numeração das leis e decretos. Decreto nº 24.796, de 14.07.1934, criou na Secretaria da Presidência da República o Serviço de Expediente (depois Diretoria de Expediente, hoje, Divisão de Documentação). Decreto nº 1, de 1º.01.1935, aprovou o Regulamento do Serviço do Expediente da Secretaria da Presidência da República.

SECRETARIA-GERAL

A MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990, convertida na Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 1º, institui a Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República. Lei nº 8.410, de 27.03.1992, art. 2º, altera a estrutura e finalidade. MPV nº 302, de 10.04.1992, convertida na Lei nº 8.422, de 13.05.1992, art. 15, transfere as atribuições do Gabinete Pessoal do Presidente da República para Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República. Decreto nº 820, de 13.05.1993, aprova Estrutura Regimental da Secretaria. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 3º, estabelece estrutura e competência, e no art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992.

SECRETARIA DE COMUNICAÇÃO SOCIAL

Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 1º, § 1º, alínea b, cria a Assessoria de Comunicação Institucional da Presidência da República, estabelecida pela MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 17, transforma a Assessoria de Comunicação Institucional em Secretaria de Comunicação Social da Presidência da República, revogando no art. 45, as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992.

SECRETARIA DE ASSUNTOS ESTRATÉGICOS

A MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990, convertida na Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 1º, parágrafo único, item 7, cria como órgão de assistência direta e imediata ao Presidente da República, a Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos. Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 10, estabelece estrutura e finalidade, e revoga a Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 5º, estabelece estrutura e competência da Secretaria e no art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias,

especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992. Decreto nº 782, de 25.03.1993, aprova a Estrutura Regimental da Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos.

CASA MILITAR

Decreto-lei nº 920, de 1º.12.1938, art. 1º, dispõe sobre os serviços da Presidência da República, criando o Gabinete Civil e o Gabinete Militar. Decreto-lei nº 1.135, de 1º.12.1970, estabelece que o Secretário-Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional é o Chefe do Gabinete Militar e tem honras, direitos e prerrogativas de Ministro de Estado. Lei nº 6.036, de 1º.05.1974, dá ao Chefe do Gabinete Militar a condição de Ministro de Estado. Decreto nº 92.614, de 02.05.1986, consolida e aprova o Regimento dos Gabinetes da Presidência da República, em que se inclui o Gabinete Militar. Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 27, item I, alínea d, extingue o cargo de Ministro de Estado Chefe; e no art. 26, item II, é criado o cargo de natureza especial de Chefe do Gabinete Militar. Por força da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 1º, é alterada a denominação do Gabinete Militar para Casa Militar. Decreto nº 820, de 13.05.1993, aprova a Estrutura Regimental e o Quadro Distributivo de cargos em comissão da Casa Militar. MPV nº 813, de 1º.01.1995, art. 1º, ratifica a Casa Militar na Estrutura da Presidência da República; no art. 6º, estabelece competência e estrutura básica; e art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente a da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1990. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 232, de 07.12.1894, organizara o Estado-Maior do Presidente da República.

CONSELHO DE GOVERNO

A MPV nº 150, de 15.03.1990, convertida na Lei nº 8.028, de 12.04.1990, art. 1º, parágrafo único, alínea b, institui o Conselho de Governo como órgão de assessoramento imediato ao Presidente da República. MPV nº 309, de 16.10.1992,

convertida na Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992, art. 1º, § 1º, alínea d, ratifica o Conselho na Estrutura da Presidência da República; art. 6º, composição e finalidade. MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 7º, dispõe que o Conselho tem como competência assessorar o Presidente da República na formulação de diretrizes da ação governamental; e no art. 45, revoga as disposições contrárias, especialmente as da Lei nº 8.490, de 19.11.1992.

ADVOCACIA-GERAL DA UNIÃO

A Advocacia-Geral da União, prevista na Constituição de 1988, art. 131, tem sua Lei Orgânica instituída pela Lei Complementar nº 73, de 10.02.1993, onde no art. 53 extingue o cargo de Consultor-Geral da República; no art. 54, cria com natureza especial, o cargo de Advogado-Geral da União; e no art. 63, os cargos efetivos das atividades-meio da Consultoria-Geral da República e seus titulares passam a integrar o quadro da Advocacia-Geral da União. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 1º, <185 1º, ratifica a Advocacia, na Estrutura da Presidência da República, como órgão de assessoramento imediato ao Presidente da República; e no art. 8º, estabelece competência. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 967, de 02.01.1903, criara o cargo de Consultor-Geral da República, junto ao Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores. Decreto nº 41.249, de 05.04.1957, aprova o Regulamento do Gabinete do Consultor-Geral da República. O Regulamento determina que o Consultor-Geral da República terá, para efeitos protocolares e de correspondência, o tratamento devido aos Ministros de Estado. Decreto nº 51.530, de 07.08.1962, determina que a Consultoria-Geral da República é órgão superior de consultas e de assessoramento do Poder Executivo, vinculando-a diretamente à Presidência da República e à Presidência do Conselho de Ministros. Decreto nº 51.991, de 06.05.1963, revoga o Decreto nº 51.530, de 07.08.1962, restabelecendo as disposições do Decreto nº 41.249, de 05.04.1957. Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 32, inclui a Consultoria-Geral da República entre os órgãos de assessoramento imediato da Presidência da República. Decreto nº 92.889, de 07.07.1986, considera a

Consultoria-Geral da República como o mais elevado órgão de assessoramento jurídico do Presidente da República.

ALTO COMANDO DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS

Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 47, dispõe sobre o Alto Comando das Forças Armadas, como órgão de assessoramento imediato do Presidente da República, secretariado pelo Chefe do Gabinete Militar da Presidência da República. A MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, § 1º, ratifica o referido órgão na estrutura da Presidência da República.

ESTADO-MAIOR DAS FORÇAS ARMADAS

Decreto-lei nº 200, de 25.02.1967, art. 50, incluiu o Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas entre os órgãos de assessoramento imediato do Presidente da República, chefiado por um Oficial-General do mais alto posto. Lei nº 5.590, de 14.07.1970, dá ao Chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas honras, direitos e prerrogativas de Ministro de Estado. Lei nº 6.036, de 1º;.05.1974, dá ao Chefe do Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas a condição de Ministro de Estado. Anteriormente, o Decreto-lei nº 9.107, de 1º;.04.1946, criara, como órgão consultivo do Presidente da República, o Estado-Maior Geral, com a atribuição de preparar as decisões relacionadas com o emprego conjunto das Forças Armadas. Pela Lei nº 600-A, de 24.12.1948, passou a denominar-se Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas.

CONSELHO DA REPÚBLICA

O Conselho da República, com a composição e atribuições previstas na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 05.10.1988, arts. 89 e 90, como órgão superior de consulta do Presidente da República, tem a organização e o funcionamento regulado pela Lei nº 8.041, de 05.06.1990. MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 1º, § 2º, ratifica na estrutura da Presidência da República o Conselho como órgão consultivo; e no parágrafo único do art. 11, diz que o Conselho da República terá como Secretário-Executivo o Ministro Chefe da Casa Civil da Presidência da República.

CONSELHO DE DEFESA NACIONAL

O Conselho de Defesa Nacional, com a composição e as atribuições previstas na Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 05.10.1988, art. 91, como órgão de consulta do Presidente da República nos assuntos relacionados com a soberania nacional e a defesa do Estado Democrático. Lei nº 8.183, de 11.04.1991, estabelece a organização e funcionamento. MPV nº 813, de 1º;.01.1995, art. 1º, § 2º, ratifica na estrutura da Presidência da República o Conselho como órgão consultivo; e no parágrafo único do art. 11, diz que o Conselho de Defesa Nacional terá como Secretário-Executivo o Secretário de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República. Anteriormente, o Decreto nº 17.999, de 29.11.1927, instituíra o Conselho de Defesa Nacional. Decreto nº 7, de 03.08.1934, modifica a denominação para Conselho Superior de Segurança Nacional. Decreto-lei nº 4.783, de 05.10.1942, organiza o Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Decreto-lei nº 5.163, de 31.12.1942, dispõe sobre a organização do Conselho de Segurança Nacional, determinando que este terá uma Secretaria Geral, cujo titular é o Chefe do Gabinete Militar da Presidência da República. Decreto-lei nº 1.135, de 03.12.1970, determina que o Secretário-Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional tenha honras, direitos e prerrogativas de Ministro de Estado. Lei nº 6.036, de 1º;.05.1974, classifica o CSN como órgão de assessoramento imediato do Presidente da República. Pelo Decreto-

lei nº 1.954, de 16.08.1982, o Secretário-Geral do Conselho de Segurança Nacional passa a ser um dos Ministros de Estado, designado pelo Presidente da República.

APPENDIX 2

PRESIDENT CARDOSO'S CABINET, 1995

SECRETARIAS

Secretaria da Comunicação Social da Presidência da República, Robert Muylaert.

Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República, Eduardo Jorge Caldas Pereira.

Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos, Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg.

Chefe da Casa Militar da Presidência da República, Alberto Mendes Cardoso.

MINISTÉRIOS

Marinha, Mauro César Rodrigues Pereira.

Exército, Zenildo Gonzaga Zoroastro de Lucena.

Agricultura, do Abastecimento e da Reforma Agrária, José Eduardo de Andrade Vieira.

Aeronáutica, Mauro José Miranda Gandra.

Indústria, do Comércio e do Turismo, Dorothea Fonseca Furquin Werneck.

Fazenda, Pedro Malan.

Administração Federal e Reforma do Estado, Luís Carlos Bresser Pereira.

Educação e do Desporto, Paulo Renato Souza.

Saúde, Adib Domingos Jatene.

Comunicações, Sergio Roberto Vieira da Motta.

Ciência e Tecnologia, José Israel Vargas.

Minas e Energia, Raimundo Mendes de Brito.

Previdência e Assistência Social, Reinhold Stephanes.

Extraordinário dos Esportes, Edson Arantes do Nascimento.

Meio Ambiente, dos Recursos Hídricos e da Amazônia Legal, Gustavo Krause Gonçalves Sobrinho.

Transportes, Odacir Klein.

Justiça, Nelson Azevedo Jobim.

Trabalho, Paulo de Tarso Alemeida Paiva.

Relações Exteriores, Luis Felipe Lampreia.

Planejamento e Orçamento, José Serra.

Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas, Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel.

Cultura, Francisco Correia Weffort.

Casa Civil da Presidência da República, Clóvis de Barros Carvalho.

APPENDIX 3

FERNANDO HENRIQUE CARDOSO'S CABINET, 1999

SECRETARIAS

Casa Civil, Clóvis Carvalho, 60 anos. É ministro da Casa Civil. Foi secretário-executivo do Ministério da Fazenda, vice-presidente do grupo Villares e secretário do governo Franco Montoro(83-87).

Casa Militar, Alberto Cardoso, 58 anos. Militar de carreira, foi escolhido por FHC para chefiar a Casa Militar da Presidência desde o início de seu primeiro mandato.

Secretaria de Planejamento e Avaliação, Edward Amadeo, 42 anos. Professor da PUC do Rio, assumiu o Ministério do Trabalho em abril deste ano. Ficarão subordinados à secretaria o IBGE e o Ipea.

Câmara do Comércio Exterior, José Botafogo Gonçalves, 63 anos, diplomata. Ministro da Indústria, do Comércio e do Turismo desde abril. É ligado ao deputado Delfim Netto (PPB-SP) – com que já trabalhou no Ministério do Planejamento.

Secretaria das Relações Institucionais, Eduardo Graeff, 49 anos, sociólogo. É secretário-geral da Presidência desde abril deste ano. Foi assessor parlamentar da Presidência da República e ghost-writer de FHC.

Secretaria da Comunicação de Governo, Andrea Matarazzo, PSDB – São Paulo, 42 anos, empresário.. Ex-secretário de Energia de SP no governo de Mário Covas, ex-secretário de Política Industrial do Ministério da Indústria de 92 e 93 e ex-coordenador da campanha de FHC em São Paulo.

MINISTÉRIOS

Fazenda, Pedro Malan, 55 anos, economista. Ministro da Fazenda desde janeiro de 95. Foi presidente do Banco Central no governo Itamar Franco, negociador da dívida externa e diretor da Bird e BID.

Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio, Celso Lafer, 57 anos, PSDB –São Paulo, cientista político e advogado. Foi ministro das Relações Exteriores do governo Fernando Collor (90-92). Atualmente, é chefe da delegação brasileira junto aos organismos internacionais com sede em Genebra.

Educação, Paulo Renato Souza, PSDB –São Paulo, 53 anos, economista. Foi reitor da Unicamp e secretário de Educação de SP no governo Franco Montoro (83-87), antes de assumir o Ministério da Educação de FHC, em 1995.

Saúde, José Serra, PSDB - São Paulo, 56 anos, economista. Ex-líder estudantil, foi deputado federal por duas vezes elegeu-se senador em 94; assumiu Ministério do Planejamento em 95; deixou o cargo em 96 e assumiu a Saúde em 98.

Comunicações, Pimenta da Veiga, PSDB - Minas, 50 anos, advogado. Foi deputado federal em 82 e 86 e prefeito de Belo Horizonte, eleito em 88. Em 90, saiu para se candidatar a governador de MG, mas perdeu. Foi presidente do PSDB.

Ciência e Tecnologia, Luís Carlos Bresser Pereira, PSDB - São Paulo, 64 anos economista. Ministro da Administração, deixou o cargo para ser tesoureiro da campanha FHC. Ex-ministro da Fazenda (87), ex-secretário de Estado de SP (85-87).

Minas e Energia, Rodolpho Tourinho, PFL - Bahia, 56 anos, economista. Foi secretário da Fazenda de Antonio Carlos Magalhães e Paulo Souto no governo de BA. Antes, foi vice-presidente do Banco Econômico.

Previdência e Assistência Social, Waldeck Ornélas, PFL - Bahia, 53 anos, advogado. Deputado Federal por duas vezes, elegeu-se senador em 94, e, em abril deste ano, foi indicado para o Ministério da Previdência. É afilhado político de ACM.

Esporte e Turismo, Rafael Grecca, PFL - Paraná, 42 anos, engenheiro. Prefeito de Curitiba entre 93 e 96, foi o deputado federal mais votado do Paraná nas eleições de outubro.

Meio Ambiente, José Sarney Filho, PFL - Maranhão, 41 anos, advogado. Membro da Comissão de Defesa do Consumidor, Meio Ambiente e Minorias, foi eleito deputado deputado federal pela Quinta vez.

Transportes, Eliseu Padilha, PMDB - Rio Grande do Sul, 52 anos, advogado. Foi prefeito de Tramandaí, de 89 a 92, e elegeu-se deputado federal em 94. Está no ministério desde maio de 97.

Justiça, Renan Calheiros, PMDB - Alagoas, 43 anos, advogado. Ministro desde abril deste ano. Deputado federal de 83 a 91, foi líder do governo Collor na Câmara, em 90, quando era do PRN, e elegeu-se senador em 94 pelo PMDB.

Políticas Regionais, Ovídio de Ângelis, PMDB - Goiás, 54 anos, advogado. Ocupou diversos cargos no governo de Goiás, nas gestões Íris Resende (PMDB) e Maguito Vilela (PMDB), como a Secretaria de Planejamento deste último, antes de chegar ao governo federal.

Agricultura, Francisco Turra, PPB - Rio Grande do Sul, 56 anos, advogado. Ex-presidente da Conab (Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento).

Trabalho e Emprego, Francisco Dornelles, PPB - Rio de Janeiro, 63 anos, advogado. Formado em direito, foi secretário da Receita Federal entre 1979 e 1985 e ministro da Fazenda entre março e agosto de 85. Elegeu-se deputado federal pela primeira vez em 1986, reelegendo-se desde então.

Relações Exteriores, Luis Felipe Lampreia, 57 anos, diplomata. Ocupa o cargo desde o início do governo. Foi representante permanente do Brasil junto aos organismos internacionais sediados em Genebra e embaixador em Lisboa (Portugal).

Orçamento e Gestão, Paulo Paiva, PTB - Minas Gerais, 58 anos, geógrafo. É ministro do Planejamento desde abril de 98. Foi ministro do Trabalho (95-98). Secretário estadual em Minas (91-94).

Política Fundiária, Raul Jungmann, 46 anos, psicólogo. Ocupa o cargo desde abril de 96. Foi secretário-executivo do Ministério de Planejamento no governo Itamar Franco (92-95). Foi presidente do Ibama de 1995 a 96.

Cultura, Francisco Weffort, 61 anos, sociólogo. Já ocupa p cargo desde o início do primeiro mandato de FHC. Foi chefe de Departamento de Ciência Políticas as USP.

Defesa, Élcio Alvares, PFL - Espírito Santo, 66 anos, advogado. Governador de Espírito Santo de 75 a 79. Líder do governo no Senado, não conseguiu se reeleger em outubro. É do PFL, mas vai se desfiliar do partido e assumir o ministério.

Projetos Especiais, Ronaldo Sardenberg, 58 anos, diplomata, foi embaixador em Moscou, em Madri e na ONU, em Nova York, antes de se recolhido por FHC para SAE em 95.

APPENDIX 4

LAWS PASSED BY CONGRESS

DURING PRESIDENT CARDOSO'S FIRST TERM

1995

Nº da LeiEmenta

9.253, de 28.12.95 Dispõe sobre a alienação de bens imóveis da União a Estados e Municípios. (Revogada pela Lei nº 9.636, de 15.05.98)

9.246, de 26.12.95 Autoriza a reversão, ao Município de Além Paraíba, Estado de Minas Gerais, do imóvel que menciona.

9.240, de 22.12.95 Ratifica o Fundo de Imprensa Nacional, o Fundo de Prevenção, Recuperação e de Combate às Drogas de Abuso e o Fundo de Defesa dos Direitos Difusos.

9.192, de 21.12.95 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 5.540, de 28 de novembro de 1968, que regulamentam o processo de escolha dos dirigentes universitários.

9.131, de 24.11.95 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 4.024, de 20 de dezembro de 1961, e dá outras providências.

9.100, de 29.09.95 Estabelece normas para a realização das eleições municipais de 3 de outubro de 1996, e dá outras providências.

9.099, de 26.09.95 Dispõe sobre os Juizados Especiais Cíveis e Criminais e dá outras providências.

9.097, de 19.09.95 Inclui o Município de São Bento do Sapucaí, Estado de São Paulo, na Área de Proteção Ambiental da Serra da Mantiqueira. 9.096, de 19.09.95 Dispõe sobre partidos políticos, regulamenta os arts. 17 e 14, § 3º, inciso V, da Constituição Federal.

9.095, de 15.09.95 Dispõe sobre a criação de cargos efetivos de Agente Penitenciário na Carreira Policial Civil do Distrito Federal e dá outras providências.

9.094, de 14.09.95 Dispõe sobre o resgate de quotas da União pelo Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento - FND, e dá outras providências.

9.093, de 12.09.95 Dispõe sobre feriados.

9.092, de 12.09.95 Destina a renda líquida de um teste da Loteria Esportiva Federal à Federação Nacional das APAEs e determina outras providências.

9.089, de 31.08.95 Dispõe sobre o ressarcimento ao Banco do Brasil S.A. das despesas com o Programa do Imposto de Renda, exercícios de 1990 e 1991.

9.088, de 21.08.95 Dispõe sobre a transferência do controle acionário da Companhia Siderúrgica da Amazônia - SIDERAMA e dá outras providências.

9.082, de 25.07.95 Dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária de 1996 e dá outras providências.

9.081, de 19.07.95 Altera a redação do art. 4º da Lei nº 8.197, de 27 de junho de 1991.

9.080, de 19.07.95 Acrescenta dispositivos às Leis nºs 7.492, de 16 de junho de 1986, e 8.137, de 27 de dezembro de 1990.

9.079, de 14.07.95 Altera dispositivos do Código de Processo Civil, com a adoção da ação monitória.

9.078, de 11.07.95 Introduce modificação no Plano Nacional de Viação, incluindo o trecho rodoviário que especifica.

9.077, de 10.07.95 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a utilizar estoques públicos de alimentos no combate à fome e à miséria.

9.076, de 10.07.95 Altera a redação do art. 12 e suprime o art. 53 da Lei nº 6.815, de 19 de agosto de 1980, com as alterações introduzidas pela Lei nº 6.964, de 10 de dezembro de 1981, que define a situação jurídica do estrangeiro no Brasil.

9.075, de 07.07.95 Revoga o art. 4º da Lei nº 2.410, de 29 de janeiro de 1955, que proíbe a importação de automóveis e barcos de passeio de luxo.

9.074, de 07.07.95 Estabelece normas para outorga e prorrogações das concessões e permissões de serviços públicos e dá outras providências. Texto Consolidado.

9.070, de 30.06.95 Dispõe sobre a transferência de Junta de Conciliação e Julgamento criada pela Lei nº 7.729, de 16 de janeiro de 1989, da 11ª Região da Justiça do Trabalho, Estado do Amazonas, define jurisdições e dá outras providências.

9.069, de 29.06.95 Dispõe sobre o Plano Real, o Sistema Monetário Nacional, estabelece as regras e condições de emissão do REAL e os critérios para conversão das obrigações para o REAL, e dá outras providências.

9.068, de 26.06.95 Cria, na 3ª Região da Justiça do Trabalho, em Belo Horizonte, no Estado de Minas Gerais, no âmbito do Ministério Público do Trabalho, cargos de Procuradores do Trabalho de 2ª Categoria, cargos em comissão e dá outras providências.

9.067, de 26.06.95 Cria, na 8ª Região da Justiça do Trabalho, em Belém, no Estado do Pará, no âmbito do Ministério Público do Trabalho, cargos de Procuradores do Trabalho de 2ª Categoria, cargos em comissão e dá outras providências.

9.066, de 20.06.95 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a contratar com a ITAIPU Binacional pagamento de débito junto ao Tesouro Nacional com títulos da dívida externa brasileira, denominados "BRAZIL INVESTMENT BOND - BIB", em valor correspondente a até US\$ 92,800,000.00 (noventa e dois milhões e oitocentos mil dólares dos Estados Unidos da América).

9.065, de 20.06.95 Dá nova redação a dispositivos da Lei nº 8.981, de 20 de janeiro de 1995, que altera a legislação tributária federal, e dá outras providências.

9.064, de 20.06.95 Dá nova redação a dispositivos das Leis nºs 8.849, de 28 de janeiro de 1994, e 8.541, de 23 de dezembro de 1992, que alteram a legislação do imposto sobre a renda e proventos de qualquer natureza, e dá outras providências.

9.063, de 14.06.95 Dispõe sobre o valor do salário mínimo, altera disposições das Leis nº 8.212 e nº 8.213, ambas de 24 de julho de 1991, e dá outras providências.

9.061, de 14.06.95 Altera a redação do art. 809 do Código de Processo Penal, referente à estatística judiciária criminal.

9.060, de 14.06.95 Inclui ligações ferroviárias na Relação Descritiva das Ferrovias do Plano Nacional de Viação, instituído pela Lei nº 5.917, de 10 de setembro de 1973.

9.059, de 13.06.95 Introduce alterações no Decreto-Lei nº 221, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, que dispõe sobre proteção e estímulo à pesca.9.058, de 13.06.95 Concede Pensão Especial a Valda Lisboa Gomes da Silva e dá outras providências.

9.057, de 06.06.95 Dá nova redação ao caput do art. 29, e ao seu § 4º, da Lei nº 8.931, de 22 de setembro de 1994, que dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária anual de 1995, e dá outras providências.

9.055, de 01.06.95 Disciplina a extração, industrialização, utilização, comercialização e transporte do asbesto/amianto e dos produtos que o

contenham, bem como das fibras naturais e artificiais, de qualquer origem, utilizadas para o mesmo fim e dá outras providências.

9.054, de 29.05.95 Altera a redação dos arts. 9º e 14 da Lei nº 6.450, de 14 de outubro de 1977, que dispõe sobre a Organização Básica da Polícia Militar do Distrito Federal.

9.053, de 25.05.95 Altera a redação do art. 50 da Lei nº 6.015, de 31 de dezembro de 1973, que dispõe sobre os registros públicos, e dá outras providências.

9.052, de 25.05.95 Autoriza a reversão ao Estado de Goiás do terreno que menciona.

9.051, de 18.05.95 Dispõe sobre a expedição de certidões para a defesa de direitos e esclarecimentos de situações.

9.050, de 18.05.95 Converte em Memorial da Medicina Brasileira o Memorial da Medicina, instalado no prédio da antiga Faculdade de Medicina do Terreiro de Jesus, na cidade de Salvador, Bahia.

9.049, de 18.05.95 Faculta o registro, nos documentos pessoais de identificação, das informações que especifica.

9.048, de 18.05.95 Torna obrigatória a existência de instrumentos de medição de peso nos postos de revenda de gás liquefeito de petróleo para uso doméstico.

9.047, de 18.05.95 Altera a redação do § 1º do art. 10 do Decreto-Lei nº 4.657, de 1942 - Lei de Introdução ao Código Civil, que dispõe sobre a sucessão de bens de estrangeiros situados no Brasil.

9.046, de 18.05.95 Acrescenta parágrafos ao art. 83 da Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984 - Lei de Execução Penal.

9.045, de 18.05.95 Autoriza o Ministério da Educação e do Desporto e o Ministério da Cultura a disciplinarem a obrigatoriedade de reprodução, pelas editoras de todo o País, em regime de proporcionalidade, de obras em caracteres braille, e a permitir a reprodução, sem finalidade lucrativa, de obras já divulgadas, para uso exclusivo de cegos.

9.044, de 17.05.95 Autoriza o Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (Incra) a doar o imóvel que menciona.

9.043, de 09.05.95 Altera a redação do caput do art. 4º do Decreto-Lei nº 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941 - Código de Processo Penal.

9.042, de 09.05.95 Dispensa a publicação de atos constitutivos de pessoa jurídica, para efeito de registro público.

9.041, de 09.05.95 Dispõe sobre dispensa da multa referente ao alistamento eleitoral intempestivo, acrescentando parágrafo único ao art. 8º da Lei nº 4.737, de 15 de junho de 1965 (Código Eleitoral).

9.040, de 09.05.95 Acrescenta alínea ao inciso II do art. 275 do Código de Processo Civil.

9.039, de 09.05.95 Dá nova redação ao § 2º do art. 213 da Lei nº 6.015, de 31 de dezembro de 1973.

9.038, de 09.05.95 Autoriza a reversão ao Município de São Paulo do Potengi, Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, do terreno que menciona.

9.037, de 05.05.95 Dispõe sobre a criação de Procuradorias da República em Municípios do Interior, e dá outras providências.

9.036, de 05.05.95 Dá nova redação ao art. 14 da Lei nº 8.177, de 1º de março de 1991, que "estabelece regras para a desindexação da economia e dá outras providências".

9.035, de 03.05.95 Dispõe sobre a criação de Procuradorias da República em Municípios e dá outras providências.

9.034, de 03.05.95 Dispõe sobre a utilização de meios operacionais para a prevenção e repressão de ações praticadas por organizações criminosas.

9.033, de 02.05.95 Dá nova redação ao § 1º do art. 408 do Código de Processo Penal.

9.032, de 28.04.95 Dispõe sobre o valor do salário mínimo, altera dispositivos das Leis nº 8.212 e nº 8.213, ambas de 24 de julho de 1991, e dá outras providências.

9.031, de 13.04.95 Dispõe sobre os vencimentos dos membros do Ministério Público da União e dá outras providências.

9.030, de 13.04.95 Fixa a remuneração dos cargos em comissão e de Natureza Especial e das funções de direção, chefia ou assessoramento que menciona, e dá outras providências.

9.029, de 13.04.95 Proíbe a exigência de atestados de gravidez e esterilização, e outras práticas discriminatórias, para efeitos admissionais ou de permanência da relação jurídica de trabalho, e dá outras providências.

9.028, de 12.04.95 Dispõe sobre o exercício das atribuições institucionais da Advocacia-Geral da União, em caráter emergencial e provisório, e dá outras providências.

9.027, de 12.04.95 Altera o art. 5º da Lei nº 7.862, de 30 de outubro de 1989, que dispõe sobre a remuneração das disponibilidades do Tesouro Nacional.

9.026, de 10.04.95 Dispõe sobre a vinculação da Fundação Osório, e dá outras providências.

9.025, de 10.04.95 Dispõe sobre a assunção, pela União, de crédito da Export Development Corporation (EDC) e de debêntures emitidas pela Embraer - Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A., bem como sobre a utilização de créditos da União junto à Embraer - Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.

9.023, de 05.04.95 Veda a destinação de recursos públicos às instituições que especifica.

9.022, de 05.04.95 Altera os arts. 846, 847 e 848, caput, da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), que dispõem sobre procedimentos a serem adotados na audiência inaugural das Juntas de Conciliação e Julgamento.

9.021, de 30.03.95 Dispõe sobre a implementação da autarquia Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), criada pela Lei nº 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, e dá outras providências.

9.020, de 30.03.95 Dispõe sobre a implantação, em caráter emergencial e provisório, da Defensoria Pública da União e dá outras providências.

9.019, de 30.03.95 Dispõe sobre a aplicação dos direitos previstos no Acordo Antidumping e no Acordo de Subsídios e Direitos Compensatórios, e dá outras providências.

9.018, de 30.03.95 Dispõe sobre o número de cargos de Natureza Especial, de cargos do Grupo-Direção e Assessoramento Superiores e de Funções Gratificadas existentes nos órgãos da Administração Federal direta, autárquica e fundacional, e dá outras providências. (Revogada pela MP nº 1.767-47, de 08.04.99)

9.017, de 30.03.95 Estabelece normas de controle e fiscalização sobre produtos e insumos químicos que possam ser destinados à elaboração da cocaína em suas diversas formas e de outras substâncias entorpecentes ou que determinem dependência física ou psíquica, e altera dispositivos da Lei nº 7.102, de 20 de junho de 1983, que dispõe sobre segurança para estabelecimentos financeiros, estabelece normas para constituição e funcionamento de empresas particulares que explorem serviços de vigilância e de transporte de valores, e dá outras providências.

9.016, de 30.03.95 Acrescenta parágrafos ao art. 133 da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho.

9.015, de 30.03.95 Institui a "Retribuição Variável da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (RVCVM) e a Retribuição Variável da Superintendência de Seguros Privados (RVSUSEP), atribuídas aos titulares de cargos efetivos da CVM e da SUSEP, e dá outras providências.

9.014, de 30.03.95 Cria Gratificação Temporária devida a integrantes da Carreira Policial Federal, e dá outras providências. (Revogada pela Lei nº 9.266, de 15.03.96)

9.013, de 30.03.95 Altera o art. 322 da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho.

9.012, de 30.03.95 Proíbe as instituições oficiais de crédito de conceder empréstimos, financiamentos e outros benefícios a pessoas jurídicas em débito com o FGTS.

9.011, de 30.03.95 Acrescenta dispositivo ao art. 1º da Lei nº 4.090, de 13 de julho de 1962.

9.010, de 29.03.95 Dispõe sobre a terminologia oficial relativa à hanseníase e dá outras providências.

9.009, de 29.03.95 Dispõe sobre a distribuição de efetivo da Aeronáutica em tempo de paz.

9.008, de 21.03.95 Cria, na estrutura organizacional do Ministério da Justiça, o Conselho Federal de que trata o art. 13 da Lei nº 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985, altera os arts. 4º, 39, 82, 91 e 98 da Lei nº 8.078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, e dá outras providências.

9.007, de 17.03.95 Dispõe sobre a criação dos cargos em comissão que menciona e dá outras providências.

9.006, de 17.03.95 Dispõe sobre a remuneração dos recursos do Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento (FND) repassados, sob a forma de empréstimo, à Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (Finep).

9.005, de 16.03.95 Altera disposições das Leis nºs 6.150, de 3 de dezembro de 1974, e 6.437, de 20 de agosto de 1977, que dispõem sobre a obrigatoriedade da iodação do sal destinado ao consumo humano, seu controle pelos órgãos sanitários e dá outras providências.

9.004, de 16.03.95 Dispõe sobre as contribuições para o Programa de Integração Social (PIS) e para o Programa de Formação do Patrimônio do Servidor Público (Pasep), incidentes sobre receitas de exportação e dá outras providências.

9.003, de 16.03.95 Dispõe sobre a reestruturação da Secretaria da Receita Federal, e dá outras providências.

9.002, de 16.03.95 Altera o art. 60 da Lei nº 8.694, de 12 de agosto de 1993, que dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração e execução da lei Orçamentária Anual de 1994.

9.001, de 16.03.95 Dispõe sobre alteração do Decreto-Lei nº 1.804, de 3 de setembro de 1980.

9.000, de 16.03.95 Concede isenção do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (IPI) na aquisição de equipamentos, máquinas, aparelhos e instrumentos.

8.999, de 24.02.95 Dispõe sobre a alocação, em depósitos especiais remunerados, de recursos da disponibilidade financeira do Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador (FAT), no Banco do Brasil S.A., e dá outras providências.

8.998, de 24.02.95 Autoriza a utilização de recursos do Fundo da Marinha Mercante (FMM), em favor da Companhia de Navegação Lloyd Brasileiro (Lloydbrás).

8.997, de 24.02.95 Dispõe sobre a criação dos cargos que menciona.

8.995, de 24.02.95 Autoriza o Ministério dos Transportes, por intermédio da Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos (CBTU), a transferir à Companhia

Fluminense de Trens Urbanos (Flumitrens), recursos para o pagamento de pessoal.

8.994, de 24.02.95 Altera dispositivo da Lei nº 8.620, de 5 de janeiro de 1993.

8.993, de 24.02.95 Concede novo prazo para conclusão do inventário do Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (Inamps), extinto pela Lei nº 8.689, de 27 de julho de 1993.

8.992, de 24.02.95 Dispõe sobre o prazo previsto no § 4º do art. 2º da Lei nº 8.352, de 28 de dezembro de 1991.

8.991, de 24.02.95 Dispõe sobre suspensão, em caráter excepcional e durante o ano de 1995, da prestação do serviço militar para fins de permitir o exercício temporário de atividade policial militar.

8.989, de 24.02.95 Dispõe sobre isenção do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados (IPI) na aquisição de automóveis para utilização no transporte autônomo de passageiros, bem como por pessoas portadoras de deficiência física e aos destinados ao transporte escolar, e dá outras providências.

8.988, de 24.02.95 Altera a redação do art. 2º do Decreto-Lei nº 2.236, de 23 de janeiro de 1985, que dispõe sobre a tabela de emolumentos e taxas aprovada pelo art. 131 da Lei nº 6.815, de 19 de agosto de 1980.

8.987, de 13.02.95 Dispõe sobre o regime de concessão e permissão da prestação de serviços públicos previsto no art. 175 da Constituição Federal, e dá outras providências. Texto Consolidado.

8.986, de 07.02.95 Denomina Antônio José Teixeira a Escola Agrotécnica Federal de Guanambi, no Estado da Bahia.

8.985, de 07.02.95 Concede, na forma do inciso VIII do art. 48 da Constituição Federal, anistia aos candidatos às eleições de 1994, processados ou condenados com fundamento na legislação eleitoral em vigor, nos casos que especifica.

8.984, de 07.02.95 Estende a competência da Justiça do Trabalho (art. 114 da Constituição Federal).

8.983, de 02.02.95 Cria e transforma, no Quadro Permanente de Pessoal da Secretaria do Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 6ª Região, os cargos que menciona e dá outras providências.

8.982, de 24.01.95 Dá nova redação ao art. 1º da Lei nº 6.567, de 24 de setembro de 1978, alterado pela Lei nº 7.312, de 16 de maio de 1985.

8.981, de 20.01.95 Altera a legislação tributária Federal e dá outras providências.

8.980, de 19.01.95 Estima a Receita e fixa a Despesa da União para o exercício financeiro de 1995.

8.979, de 13.01.95 Altera a redação do art. 1º da Lei nº 6.463, de 9 de novembro de 1977.

8.978, de 09.01.95 Dispõe sobre a construção de creches e estabelecimentos de pré-escola.

8.977, de 06.01.95 Dispõe sobre o Serviço de TV a Cabo e dá outras providências.

8.976, de 06.01.95 Denomina "Luís Fausto de Medeiros" o Porto-Ilha de Areia Branca, situado no município do mesmo nome, Estado do Rio Grande do Norte.

8.975, de 06.01.95 Dispõe sobre a transformação de cargos da carreira do Ministério Público Militar e dá outras providências.

8.974, de 05.01.95 Regulamenta os incisos II e V do § 1º do art. 225 da Constituição Federal, estabelece normas para o uso das técnicas de engenharia genética e liberação no meio ambiente de organismos geneticamente modificados, autoriza o Poder Executivo a criar, no âmbito da Presidência da República, a Comissão Técnica Nacional de Biossegurança, e dá outras providências.

8.973, de 04.01.95 Institui o Dia do Petroquímico.

1996

Nº da Lei Ementa

9.430, de 27.12.96 Dispõe sobre a legislação tributária federal, as contribuições para a seguridade social, o processo administrativo de consulta e dá outras providências.

9.429, de 26.12.96 Dispõe sobre prorrogação de prazo para renovação de Certificado de Entidades de Fins Filantrópicos e de recadastramento junto ao Conselho Nacional de Assistência Social - CNAS e anulação de atos emanados do Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social - INSS contra instituições

que gozavam de isenção da contribuição social, pela não apresentação do pedido de renovação do certificado em tempo hábil.

9.427, de 26.12.96 Institui a Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica - ANEEL, disciplina o regime das concessões de serviços públicos de energia elétrica e dá outras providências. Texto Consolidado.

9.426, de 24.12.96 Altera dispositivos do Decreto-lei n° 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 - Código Penal - Parte Especial.

9.425, de 24.12.96 Dispõe sobre a concessão de pensão especial às vítimas do acidente nuclear ocorrido em Goiânia, Goiás.

9.424, de 24.12.96 Dispõe sobre o Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério, na forma prevista no art. 60, § 7º, do Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias, e dá outras providências.

9.423, de 24.12.96 Autoriza a Telecomunicações Brasileiras S.A. - TELEBRÁS a participar do capital social de empresa privada com sede no exterior, e dá outras providências.

9.422, de 24.12.96 Dispõe sobre a concessão de pensão especial aos dependentes que especifica e dá outras providências.

9.421, de 24.12.96 Cria as carreiras dos servidores do Poder Judiciário, fixa os valores de sua remuneração e dá outras providências.

9.415, de 23.12.96 Dá nova redação ao inciso III do art. 82 da Lei n° 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973 - Código de Processo Civil.

9.394, de 20.12.96 Estabelece as diretrizes e bases da educação nacional.

9.393, de 19.12.96 Dispõe sobre o Imposto sobre a Propriedade Territorial Rural - ITR, sobre pagamento da dívida representada por Títulos da Dívida Agrária e dá outras providências.

9.392, de 19.12.96 Disciplina a remuneração e demais vantagens devidas a funcionários das carreiras do Serviço Exterior, casados entre si, servindo juntos no exterior.

9.367, de 16.12.96 Fixa critérios para a progressiva unificação das tabelas de vencimentos dos servidores, altera o Anexo II da Lei no 8.237, de 30 de setembro de 1991, para implementação da isonomia a que se refere o § 1o do art. 39 da Constituição, e dá outras providências.

9.366, de 16.12.96 Dispõe sobre os quadros de cargos do Grupo-Direção e Assessoramento Superiores - DAS da Advocacia-Geral da União, do Ministério da Fazenda, e dá outras providências.

9.365, de 16.12.96 Institui a Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo - TJLP, dispõe sobre a remuneração dos recursos do Fundo de Participação PIS-PASEP, do Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador, do Fundo da Marinha Mercante, e dá outras providências.

9.364, de 16.12.96 Dispõe sobre o pagamento com sub-rogação, pela União, de dívidas da Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. - RFFSA junto ao Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social - INSS e à Fundação Rede Ferroviária de Seguridade Social - REFER, e dá outras providências.

9.363, de 16.12.96 Dispõe sobre a instituição de crédito presumido do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados, para ressarcimento do valor do PIS/PASEP e COFINS nos casos que especifica, e dá outras providências.

9.362, de 13.12.96 Dispõe sobre medidas reguladoras do abastecimento do mercado interno de produtos do setor sucroalcooleiro.

9.360, de 13.12.96 Dá nova redação ao parágrafo único do art. 1º da Lei nº 8.995, de 24 de fevereiro de 1995, que autoriza o Ministério dos Transportes, por intermédio da Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos - CBTU, a transferir à Companhia Fluminense de Trens Urbanos - FLUMITRENS, recursos para pagamento de pessoal.

9.359, de 12.12.96 Isenta do Imposto de Importação e do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados bens de informática adquiridos pelo Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

9.358, de 12.12.96 Dispõe sobre a absorção, pela União, dos custos excedentes decorrentes da construção e operação de usinas nucleoeletricas pela empresa FURNAS - Centrais Elétricas - S.A.

9.335, de 10.12.96 Altera a Lei nº 9.093, de 12 de setembro de 1995, que dispõe sobre feriados.

9.331, de 10.12.96 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a contratar com a ITAIPU pagamento de débito junto ao Tesouro Nacional com títulos da dívida externa brasileira, no valor correspondente a até US\$ 140,000,000.00 (cento e quarenta milhões de dólares dos Estados Unidos da América).

9.327, de 09.12.96 Dispõe sobre a condução de veículo oficial.

9.323, de 05.12.96 Altera o limite de dedução de que trata o § 2º do art. 1º da Lei no 8.685, de 20 de julho de 1993, que cria mecanismos de fomento à atividade audiovisual, e dá outras providências.

9.322, de 05.12.96 Dispõe sobre a alocação, em depósitos especiais, remunerados, de recursos das disponibilidades financeiras do Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador - FAT.

9.321, de 05.12.96 Dispensa a comprovação de regularidade do recolhimento do Imposto sobre a Propriedade Territorial Rural (ITR) para fins de financiamento ao amparo do Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar - PRONAF e dá outras providências.

9.318, de 05.12.96 Altera a alínea h do inciso II do art. 61 do Código Penal.

9.317, de 05.12.96 Dispõe sobre o regime tributário das microempresas e das empresas de pequeno porte, institui o Sistema Integrado de Pagamento de Impostos e Contribuições das Microempresas e das Empresas de Pequeno Porte - SIMPLES e dá outras providências.

9.316, de 22.11.96 Altera a legislação do imposto de renda e da contribuição social sobre o lucro líquido.

9.315, de 20.11.96 Inscreve o nome de Zumbi dos Palmares no "Livro dos Heróis da Pátria".

9.314, de 14.11.96 Altera dispositivos do Decreto-lei nº 227, de 28 de fevereiro de 1967, e dá outras providências.

9.313, de 13.11.96 Dispõe sobre a distribuição gratuita de medicamentos aos portadores do HIV e doentes de AIDS.

9.312, de 05.11.96 Altera o art. 5º da Lei nº 8.313, de 23 de dezembro de 1991, que "restabelece princípios da Lei nº 7.505, de 2 de julho de 1986, institui o Programa Nacional de Apoio à Cultura - PRONAC e dá outras providências".

9.311, de 24.10.96 Institui a Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos e Direitos de Natureza Financeira - CPMF, e dá outras providências.

9.309, de 02.10.96 Revoga a Lei nº 7.700, de 21 de dezembro de 1988, que cria o Adicional de Tarifa Portuária - ATP, e dá outras providências.

9.307, de 23.09.96 Dispõe sobre a arbitragem.

9.305, de 12.09.96 Concede, a título de indenização decorrente de responsabilidade civil da União, pensão especial aos dependentes de José Ivanildo Sampaio de Souza.

9.304, de 06.09.96 Autoriza a reversão ao Município de São Pedro dos Ferros, Estado de Minas Gerais, do terreno que menciona.

9.303, de 05.09.96 Altera a redação do art. 8º da Lei nº 9.034, de 3 de maio de 1995, que "dispõe sobre a utilização de meios operacionais para a prevenção e repressão de ações praticadas por organizações criminosas".

9.302, de 04.09.96 Autoriza o Banco Central do Brasil, autarquia vinculada ao Ministério da Fazenda, a doar o imóvel que menciona, no Município do Rio de Janeiro, Estado do Rio de Janeiro.

9.301, de 29.08.96 Revoga o art. 75 da Lei nº 9.100, de 29 de setembro de 1995, que estabelece normas para a realização das eleições municipais de 3 de outubro de 1996, e dá outras providências.

9.300, de 29.08.96 Acrescenta parágrafo ao art. 9º da Lei nº 5.889, de 8 de junho de 1973, que estatui normas reguladoras do trabalho rural e dá outras providências.

9.299, de 07.08.96 Altera dispositivos dos Decretos-leis nº s 1.001 e 1.002, de 21 de outubro de 1969, Códigos Penal Militar e de Processo Penal Militar, respectivamente.

9.298, de 01.08.96 Altera a redação do § 1º do art. 52 da Lei nº 8.078, de 11 de setembro de 1990, que "dispõe sobre a proteção do consumidor e dá outras providências".

9.297, de 25.07.96 Dá nova redação a dispositivos da Lei nº 6.880, de 9 de dezembro de 1980, que dispõe sobre o Estatuto dos Militares.

9.296, de 24.07.96 Regulamenta o inciso XII, parte final, do art. 5º da Constituição Federal.

9.295, de 19.07.96 Dispõe sobre os serviços de telecomunicações e sua organização, sobre o órgão regulador e dá outras providências.

9.294, de 15.07.96 Dispõe sobre as restrições ao uso e à propaganda de produtos fumíferos, bebidas alcoólicas, medicamentos, terapias e defensivos agrícolas, nos termos do § 4º do art. 220 da Constituição Federal.

9.293, de 15.07.96 Dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária para o exercício de 1997 e dá outras providências.

9.292, de 12.07.96 Dispõe sobre a remuneração dos membros dos conselhos de administração e fiscal das entidades que menciona e dá outras providências.

9.290, de 08.07.96 Modifica o valor da pensão especial de que trata o art. 1º da Lei nº 7.099, de 13 de junho de 1983, e dá outras providências.

9.289, de 04.07.96 Dispõe sobre as custas devidas à União, na Justiça Federal de primeiro e segundo graus e dá outras providências.

9.288, de 01.07.96 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 8.436, de 25 de junho de 1992, que institucionaliza o Programa de Crédito Educativo para estudantes carentes.

9.286, de 19.06.96 Acrescenta parágrafo ao art. 2º da Lei nº 9.114, de 17 de outubro de 1995, que dispõe sobre a transferência de Oficiais entre os diversos Corpos e Quadros de Oficiais da Marinha e dá outras providências. (Revogada pela Lei nº 9.519, de 26.11.97)

9.285, de 13.06.96 Concede pensão especial a Helena Santos Cabral, viúva de João da Silva Ribeiro.

9.284, de 13.06.96 Concede pensão especial a Mariana Olimpio Granja, filha menor de Deise Lima Olimpio Granja.

9.283, de 13.06.96 Altera a Lei nº 8.457, de 4 de setembro de 1992.

9.282, de 13.06.96 Reajusta a pensão especial concedida pela Lei nº 3.233, de 29 de julho de 1957, a Rosália Maria de Almeida da Conceição, viúva do ex-servidor federal Vital da Conceição.

9.281, de 04.06.96 Revoga os parágrafos únicos dos arts. 213 e 214 do Decreto-lei n° 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 - Código Penal.

9.280, de 30.05.96 Acrescenta um § 2° ao art. 1.031 do Código de Processo Civil, transformando o atual parágrafo único em § 1°.

9.279, de 14.05.96 Regula direitos e obrigações relativos à propriedade industrial.

9.278, de 10.05.96 Regula o § 3° do art. 226 da Constituição Federal.

9.277, de 10.05.96 Autoriza a União a delegar aos municípios, estados da Federação e ao Distrito Federal a administração e exploração de rodovias e portos federais.

9.276, de 09.05.96 Dispõe sobre o Plano Plurianual para o período de 1996/1999 e dá outras providências.

9.275, de 09.05.96 Estima a Receita e fixa a Despesa da União para o exercício financeiro de 1996.

9.274, de 07.05.96 Dispõe sobre anistia relativamente às eleições de 3 de outubro e de 15 de novembro dos anos de 1992 e 1994.

9.273, de 03.05.96 Torna obrigatória a inclusão de dispositivo de segurança que impeça a reutilização das seringas descartáveis.

9.272, de 03.05.96 Acrescenta incisos ao art. 30 da Lei n° 8.171, de 17 de janeiro de 1991, que dispõe sobre a política agrícola.

9.271, de 17.04.96 Altera os arts. 366, 367, 368, 369 e 370 do Decreto-lei nº 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941 - Código de Processo Penal.

9.270, de 17.04.96 Acrescenta inciso ao art. 659 da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho.

9.269, de 02.04.96 Dá nova redação ao § 4º do art. 159 do Código Penal.

9.268, de 01.04.96 Altera dispositivos do Decreto-lei nº 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 - Código Penal - Parte Geral.

9.267, de 25.03.96 Altera a redação do § 4º do art. 24 da Lei nº 4.591, de 16 de dezembro de 1964, que dispõe sobre o condomínio em edificações e as incorporações imobiliárias.

9.266, de 15.03.96 Reorganiza as classes da Carreira Policial Federal, fixa a remuneração dos cargos que as integram e dá outras providências.

9.265, de 12.02.96 Regulamenta o inciso LXXVII do art. 5º da Constituição, dispondo sobre a gratuidade dos atos necessários ao exercício da cidadania.

9.264, de 07.02.96 Dispõe sobre o desmembramento e a reorganização da Carreira Policial Civil do Distrito Federal, fixa remuneração de seus cargos e dá outras providências.

9.263, de 12.01.96 Regula o § 7º do art. 226 da Constituição Federal, que trata do planejamento familiar, estabelece penalidades e dá outras providências.

9.262, de 12.01.96 Dispõe sobre a administração da Área de Proteção Ambiental (APA) da Bacia do Rio São Bartolomeu, localizada no Distrito Federal, e dá outras providências.

9.261, de 10.01.96 Altera a redação dos incisos I e II do art. 2º, o caput do art. 3º, o inciso VI do art. 4º e o parágrafo único do art. 6º da Lei nº 7.377, de 30 de setembro de 1985.

9.260, de 10.01.96 Concede pensão especial a Ayres Câmara Cunha.

9.259, de 09.01.96 Acrescenta parágrafo único ao art. 10, dispõe sobre a aplicação dos arts. 49, 56, incisos III e IV, e 57, inciso III, da Lei nº 9.096, de 19 de setembro de 1995, e dá nova redação ao § 1º do art. 1º da Lei nº 1.533, de 31 de dezembro de 1951.

9.258, de 09.01.96 Autoriza a reversão ao Município de Mamboré, Estado do Paraná, dos imóveis que menciona.

9.257, de 09.01.96 Dispõe sobre o Conselho Nacional de Ciência e Tecnologia.

9.256, de 09.01.96 Altera o caput do art. 53 e o § 3º do art. 63 da Lei nº 8.245, de 18 de outubro de 1991, que dispõe sobre as locações dos imóveis urbanos e os procedimentos a elas pertinentes.

9.255, de 03.01.96 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a conceder pensão especial a LÚCIA DE OLIVEIRA MENEZES, tetraneta de Joaquim José da Silva Xavier, o Tiradentes.

9.254, de 03.01.96 Altera a redação do art. 12 da Lei nº 7.520, de 15 de julho de 1986.

1997

Nº da Lei Ementa

9.599, de 30.12.97 Concede pensão especial a Gelson José Braz.

9.598, de 30.12.97 Estima a Receita e fixa a Despesa da União para o exercício financeiro de 1998.

9.578, ed 19.12.97 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 2.180, de 5 de fevereiro de 1954, que dispõe sobre o Tribunal Marítimo.

9.558, de 17.12.97 Dispõe sobre a absorção, pela União, de obrigação do Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem - DNER.

9.557, de 17.12.97 Acrescenta incisos ao § 1º do art. 1º da Lei nº 8.691, de 28 de julho de 1993.

9.539, de 12.12.97 Dispõe sobre a Contribuição Provisória sobre Movimentação ou Transmissão de Valores e de Créditos e Direitos de Natureza Financeira - CPMF.

9.537, de 11.12.97 Dispõe sobre a segurança do tráfego aquaviário em águas sob jurisdição nacional e dá outras providências.

9.536, de 11.12.97 Regulamenta o parágrafo único do art. 49 da Lei nº 9.394, de 20 de dezembro de 1996.

9.534, de 10.12.97 Dá nova redação ao art. 30 da Lei nº 6.015, de 31 de dezembro de 1973, que dispõe sobre os registros públicos; acrescenta inciso ao art. 1º da Lei nº 9.265, de 12 de fevereiro de 1996, que trata da gratuidade dos atos necessários ao exercício da cidadania; e altera os arts. 30 e 45 da Lei

nº 8.935, de 18 de novembro de 1994, que dispõe sobre os serviços notariais e de registro.

9.533, de 10.12.97 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a conceder apoio financeiro aos Municípios que instituírem programas de garantia de renda mínima associados a ações socioeducativas.

9.532, de 10.12.97 Altera a legislação tributária federal e dá outras providências.

9.531, de 10.12.97 Cria o Fundo de Garantia para Promoção da Competitividade - FGPC, e dá outras providências.

9.530, de 10.12.97 Dispõe sobre a utilização dos dividendos e do superávit financeiro de fundos e de entidades da Administração Pública Federal indireta, e dá outras providências.

9.529, de 10.12.97 Dispõe sobre exportação indireta e dá outras providências.

9.528, de 10.12.97 Altera dispositivos das Leis nºs 8.212 e 8.213, ambas de 24 de julho de 1991, e dá outras providências.

9.527, de 10.12.97 Altera dispositivos das Leis nºs 8.112, de 11 de dezembro de 1990, 8.460, de 17 de setembro de 1992, e 2.180, de 5 de fevereiro de 1954, e dá outras providências.

9.526, de 08.12.97 Dispõe sobre recursos não reclamados correspondentes às contas de depósitos não recadastrados, e dá outras providências.

9.525, de 02.12.97Dispõe sobre as férias dos servidores públicos civis da União, das autarquias e das fundações públicas federais, e dá outras providências.

9.521, de 27.11.97Revoga o art. 27 do Decreto-lei nº 3.688, de 3 de outubro de 1941 - Lei das Contravenções Penais.

9.520, de 27.11.97Revoga dispositivos do Decreto-lei nº 3.689, de 3 de outubro de 1941 - Código de Processo Penal, referentes ao exercício do direito de queixa pela mulher.

9.519, de 26.11.97Dispõe sobre a reestruturação dos Corpos e Quadros de Oficiais e de Praças da Marinha.

9.515, de 20.11.97Dispõe sobre a admissão de professores, técnicos e cientistas estrangeiros pelas universidades e pelas instituições de pesquisa científica e tecnológica federais.

9.514, de 20.11.97Dispõe sobre o Sistema de Financiamento Imobiliário, institui a alienação fiduciária de coisa imóvel e dá outras providências.

9.513, de 20.11.97Amplia os limites do Parque Nacional do Superagui, criado pelo Decreto nº 97.688, de 25 de abril de 1989.

9.507, de 12.11.97Regula o direito de acesso a informações e disciplina o rito processual do habeas data.

9.506, de 30.10.97Extingue o Instituto de Previdência dos Congressistas - IPC, e dá outras providências.

9.505, de 15.10.97 Acrescenta parágrafo ao art. 2º do Decreto-lei nº 2.236, de 23 de janeiro de 1985, que altera a tabela de emolumentos e taxas aprovada pelo art. 131 de Lei nº 6.815, de 19 de agosto de 1980.

9.504, de 30.09.97 Estabelece normas para as eleições.

9.503, de 23.09.97 Institui o Código de Trânsito Brasileiro.

9.497, de 11.09.97 Dispõe sobre a implantação e a gestão do Parque Histórico Nacional dos Guararapes.

9.496, de 11.09.97 Estabelece critérios para a consolidação, a assunção e o refinanciamento, pela União, da dívida pública mobiliária e outras que especifica, de responsabilidade dos Estados e do Distrito Federal.

9.494, de 10.09.97 Disciplina a aplicação da tutela antecipada contra a Fazenda Pública, altera a Lei nº 7.347, de 24 de julho de 1985, e dá outras providências.

9.493, de 10.09.97 Concede isenção do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados - IPI na aquisição de equipamentos, máquinas, aparelhos e instrumentos, dispõe sobre período de apuração e prazo de recolhimento do referido imposto para as microempresas e empresas de pequeno porte, e estabelece suspensão do IPI na saída de bebidas alcoólicas, acondicionadas para venda a granel, dos estabelecimentos produtores e dos estabelecimentos equiparados a industrial.

9.492, de 10.09.97 Define competência, regulamenta os serviços concernentes ao protesto de títulos e outros documentos de dívida e dá outras providências.

9.491, de 09.09.97 Altera procedimentos relativos ao Programa Nacional de Desestatização, revoga a Lei nº 8.031, de 12 de abril de 1990, e dá outras providências.

9.484, de 27.08.97 Dispõe sobre a transferência da Escola de Enfermagem de Manaus, unidade organizacional descentralizada da Fundação Nacional de Saúde, para a Fundação Universidade do Amazonas, e dá outras providências.

9.483, de 25.08.97 Autoriza o Presidente da República a proceder à restituição dos bens de que trata o Decreto nº 65.157, de 15 de setembro de 1969, e dá outras providências.

9.482, de 13.08.97 Dispõe sobre a administração do Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil - IRB, sobre a transferência e a transformação de suas ações, e dá outras providências.

9.481, de 13.08.97 Dispõe sobre a incidência de imposto de renda na fonte sobre rendimentos de beneficiários residentes ou domiciliados no exterior, e dá outras providências.

9.480, de 13.08.97 Excepciona o contrato celebrado entre o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social e a Companhia Docas do Rio de Janeiro de exigências fixadas em lei, ou ato dela decorrente.

9.479, de 12.08.97 Dispõe sobre a concessão de subvenção econômica a produtores de borracha natural e dá outras providências.

9.478, de 06.08.97 Dispõe sobre a política energética nacional, as atividades relativas ao monopólio do petróleo, institui o Conselho Nacional de Política Energética e a Agência Nacional do Petróleo e dá outras providências.

9.477, de 24.07.97 Institui o Fundo de Aposentadoria Programada Individual - FAPI e o Plano de Incentivo à Aposentadoria Programada Individual, e dá outras providências.

9.476, de 23.07.97 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 8.212, de 24 de julho de 1991, que dispõe sobre a organização da Seguridade Social, institui o Plano de Custeio e dá outras providências.

9.475, de 22.07.97 Dá nova redação ao art. 33 da Lei nº 9.394, de 20 de dezembro de 1996, que estabelece as diretrizes e bases da educação nacional.

9.474, de 22.07.97 Define mecanismos para a implementação do Estatuto dos Refugiados de 1951, e determina outras providências.

9.473, de 22.07.97 Dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária de 1998 e dá outras providências.

9.472, de 16.07.97 Dispõe sobre a organização dos serviços de telecomunicações, a criação e funcionamento de um órgão regulador e outros aspectos institucionais, nos termos da Emenda Constitucional nº 8, de 1995.

9.471, de 14.07.97 Acrescenta inciso ao art. 473 da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho - CLT.

9.470, de 10.07.97 Acrescenta § 5º ao art. 4º da Lei nº 8.884, de 11 de junho de 1994, e dá outras providências.

9.469, de 10.07.97 Regulamente o disposto no inciso VI do art. 4º da Lei Complementar nº 73, de 10 de fevereiro de 1993; dispõe sobre a intervenção da União nas causas em que figurarem, como autores ou réus, entes da administração indireta; regula os pagamentos devidos pela Fazenda Pública em

virtude de sentença judiciária; revoga a Lei nº 8.197, de 27 de junho de 1991, e a Lei nº 9.081, de 19 de julho de 1995, e dá outras providências.

9.468, de 10.07.97 Institui o Programa de Desligamento Voluntário de servidores civis do Poder Executivo Federal e dá outras providências.

9.467, de 10.07.97Dá nova redação aos arts. 9º da Lei nº 8.036, de 11 de maio de, 1990 e 2º da Lei nº 8.844, de 20 de janeiro de 1994. 9.466, de 09.07.97Dá nova redação ao § 3º do art. 52 da Lei nº 8.931, de 22 de setembro de 1994, que dispõe sobre a amortização, juros e outros encargos decorrentes da extinção ou dissolução de entidades da Administração Pública Federal, e dá outras providências.

9.465, de 07.07.97Dispõe sobre fornecimento gratuito de registro extemporâneo de nascimento.

9.462, de 19.06.97Determina seja dada maior publicidade aos editais, avisos, anúncios e quadro geral de credores na falência, na concordata e na insolvência civil.

9.461, de 13.06.97Autoriza o Poder Executivo a doar estoques públicos de alimentos, nas condições que menciona.

9.460, de 04.06.97Altera o art. 82 da Lei nº 7.210, de 11 de julho de 1984, que institui a Lei de Execução Penal.

9.459, de 13.05.97Altera os arts. 1º e 20 da Lei nº 7.716, de 5 de janeiro de 1989, que define os crimes resultantes de preconceito de raça ou de cor, e acrescenta parágrafo ao art. 140 do Decreto-lei nº 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940.

9.458, de 09.05.97Dá nova redação ao inciso I do art. 22 da Lei nº 8.829, de 22 de dezembro de 1993, que cria, no Serviço Exterior Brasileiro, as Carreiras de Oficial de Chancelaria e de Assistente de Chancelaria.

9.457, de 05.05.97Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976, que dispõe sobre as sociedades por ações e da Lei nº 6.385, de 7 de dezembro de 1976, que dispõe sobre o mercado de valores mobiliários e cria a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários.

9.456, de 25.04.97Institui a Lei de Proteção de Cultivares e dá outras providências.

9.455, de 07.04.97Define os crimes de tortura e dá outras providências.

9.454, de 07.04.97Institui o número único de Registro de Identidade Civil e dá outras providências.

9.453, de 20.03.97Acrescenta parágrafo ao art. 2º da Lei nº 5.553, de 6 de dezembro de 1968, que dispõe sobre a apresentação e uso de documentos de identificação pessoal.

9.452, de 20.03.97Determina que as Câmaras Municipais sejam obrigatoriamente notificadas da liberação de recursos federais para os respectivos Municípios e dá outras providências.

9.450, de 14.03.97Acrescenta parágrafos ao art. 75 da Lei no 4.728, de 14 de julho de 1965.

9.449, de 14.03.97Reduz o imposto de importação para os produtos que especifica e dá outras providências.

9.448, de 14.03.97 Transforma o Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais - INEP em Autarquia Federal, e dá outras providências.

9.447, de 14.03.97 Dispõe sobre a responsabilidade solidária de controladores de instituições submetidas aos regimes de que tratam a Lei nº 6.024, de 13 de março de 1974, e o Decreto-lei nº 2.321, de 25 de fevereiro de 1987; sobre a indisponibilidade de seus bens; sobre a responsabilização das empresas de auditoria contábil ou dos auditores contábeis independentes; sobre privatização de instituições cujas ações sejam desapropriadas, na forma do Decreto-lei nº 2.321, de 1987, e dá outras providências.

9.445, de 14.03.97 Concede subvenção econômica ao preço do óleo diesel consumido por embarcações pesqueiras nacionais.

9.443, de 14.03.97 Dispõe sobre os fundos que especifica e dá outras providências.

9.442, de 14.03.97 Cria a Gratificação de Condição, Especial de Trabalho - GCET para os servidores militares federais das Forças Armadas, altera dispositivos das Leis nºs 6.880, de 9 de dezembro de 1980, e 8.237, de 30 de setembro de 1991, dispõe sobre o Auxílio-Funeral a ex-Combatentes, e dá outras providências.

9.441, de 14.03.97 Extingue créditos oriundos de contribuições arrecadadas pelo Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social - INSS, no valor e condições que especifica, e dá outras providências.

9.440, de 14.03.97 Estabelece incentivos fiscais para o desenvolvimento regional e dá outras providências.

9.439, de 07.03.97 Altera para 285% o limite máximo da Gratificação Extraordinária devida aos servidores da categoria funcional de Técnico do Ministério Público da União.

9.438, de 26.02.97 Estima a Receita e fixa a Despesa da União para o exercício financeiro de 1997.

9.437, de 20.02.97 Institui o Sistema Nacional de Armas - SINARM, estabelece condições para o registro e para o porte de arma de fogo, define crimes e dá outras providências.

9.436, de 05.02.97 Dispõe sobre a jornada de trabalho de Médico, Médico de Saúde Pública, Médico do Trabalho e Médico Veterinário, da Administração Pública Federal direta, das autarquias e das fundações públicas federais, e dá outras providências.

9.434, de 04.02.97 Dispõe sobre a remoção de órgãos, tecidos e partes do corpo humano para fins de transplante e tratamento e dá outras providências.

9.433, de 08.01.97 Institui a Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos, cria o Sistema Nacional de Gerenciamento de Recursos Hídricos, regulamenta o inciso XIX do art. 21 da Constituição Federal, e altera o art. 1º da Lei nº 8.001, de 13 de março de 1990, que modificou a Lei nº 7.990, de 28 de dezembro de 1989.

9.432, de 08.01.97 Dispõe sobre a ordenação do transporte aquaviário e dá outras providências.'

9.431, de 06.01.97 Dispõe sobre a obrigatoriedade da manutenção de programa de controle de infecções hospitalares pelos hospitais do País.

1998

9.777, de 29.12.98 Altera os arts. 132, 203 e 207 do Decreto-Lei nº 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 - Código Penal.

9.775, de 21.12.98 Altera dispositivos da Lei no 9.620, de 2 de abril de 1998, e dá outras providências.

9.774, de 21.12.98 Altera a Lei no 7.652, de 3 de fevereiro de 1988, que dispõe sobre o Registro da Propriedade Marítima.

9.766, de 18.12.98 Altera a legislação que rege o Salário-Educação, e dá outras providências.

9.765, de 17.12.98 Institui taxa de licenciamento, controle e fiscalização de materiais nucleares e radioativos e suas instalações.

9.764, de 17.12.98 Altera a redação do art. 190 do Decreto-Lei no 1.001, de 21 de outubro de 1969 - Código Penal Militar.

9.756, de 17.12.98 Dispõe sobre o processamento de recursos no âmbito dos tribunais.

9.755, de 16.12.98 Dispõe sobre a criação de "homepage" na "Internet", pelo Tribunal de Contas da União, para divulgação dos dados e informações que especifica, e dá outras providências.

9.745, de 15.12.98 Institui o Programa Emergencial de Frentes Produtivas e dá outras providências.

9.732, de 11.12.98 Altera dispositivos das Leis nos 8.212 e 8.213, ambas de 24 de julho de 1991, da Lei no 9.317, de 5 de dezembro de 1996, e dá outras providências.

9.724, de 01.12.98 Dispõe sobre a autonomia de gestão das Organizações Militares Prestadoras de Serviços da Marinha e dá outras providências.

9.720, de 30.11.98 Dá nova redação a dispositivos da Lei no 8.742, de 7 de dezembro de 1993, que dispõe sobre a organização da Assistência Social, e dá outras providências.

9.719, de 27.11.98 Dispõe sobre normas e condições gerais de proteção ao trabalho portuário, institui multas pela inobservância de seus preceitos, e dá outras providências.

9.718, de 27.11.98 Altera a Legislação Tributária Federal.

9.717, de 27.11.98 Dispõe sobre regras gerais para a organização e o funcionamento dos regimes próprios de previdência social dos servidores públicos da União, dos Estados, do Distrito Federal e dos Municípios, dos militares dos Estados e do Distrito Federal e dá outras providências.

9.716, de 26.11.98 Dá nova redação aos arts. 1º, 2º, 3º e 4º do Decreto-Lei no 1.578, de 11 de outubro de 1977, que dispõe sobre o imposto de exportação, e dá outras providências.

9.715, de 25.11.98 Dispõe sobre as contribuições para os Programas de Integração Social e de Formação do Patrimônio do Servidor Público - PIS/PASEP, e dá outras providências.

9.714, de 25.11.98 Altera dispositivos do Decreto-Lei no 2.848, de 7 de dezembro de 1940 - Código Penal. Mensagem de Veto nº 1.447.

9.713, de 25.11.98 Altera dispositivo da Lei no 6.450, de 14 de outubro de 1977, e dá outras providências.

9.712, de 20.11.98 Altera a Lei no 8.171, de 17 de janeiro de 1991, acrescentando-lhe dispositivos referentes à defesa agropecuária.

9.711, de 20.11.98 Dispõe sobre a recuperação de haveres do Tesouro Nacional e do Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social - INSS, a utilização de Títulos da Dívida Pública, de responsabilidade do Tesouro Nacional, na quitação de débitos com o INSS, altera dispositivos das Leis nos 7.986, de 28 de dezembro de 1989, 8.036, de 11 de maio de 1990, 8.212, de 24 de julho de 1991, 8.213, de 24 de julho de 1991, 8.742, de 7 de dezembro de 1993, e 9.639, de 25 de maio de 1998, e dá outras providências.

9.710, de 19.11.98 Dispõe sobre medidas de fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional e dá outras providências.

9.709, de 18.11.98 Regulamenta a execução do disposto nos incisos I, II e III do art. 14 da Constituição Federal.

9.708, de 18.11.98 Altera o art. 58 da Lei no 6.015, de 31 de dezembro de 1973, que dispõe sobre Registros Públicos, para possibilitar a substituição do prenome por apelidos públicos notórios.

9.704, de 17.11.98 Institui normas relativas ao exercício, pelo Advogado-Geral da União, de orientação normativa e de supervisão técnica sobre os órgãos jurídicos das autarquias federais e das fundações instituídas e mantidas pela União.

9.703, de 17.11.98 Dispõe sobre os depósitos judiciais e extrajudiciais de tributos e contribuições federais.

9.702, de 17.11.98 Dispõe sobre critérios especiais para alienação de imóveis de propriedade do Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social - INSS e dá outras providências.

9.701, de 17.11.98 Dispõe sobre a base de cálculo da Contribuição para o Programa de Integração Social - PIS devida pelas pessoas jurídicas a que se refere o § 1o do art. 22 da Lei no 8.212, de 24 de julho de 1991, e dá outras providências.

9.700, de 12.11.98 Modifica dispositivo da Lei no 9.491, de 9 de setembro de 1997, que "altera procedimentos relativos ao Programa Nacional de Desestatização, revoga a Lei no 8.031, de 12 de abril de 1990, e dá outras providências".

9.699, de 08.09.98 Altera a Lei no 8.185, de 14 de maio de 1991, alterada pela Lei no 8.407, de 10 de janeiro de 1992, que dispõe sobre a Organização Judiciária do Distrito Federal e Territórios e cria os Juizados Especiais Cíveis e Criminais.

9.698, de 02.09.98 Dispõe sobre a criação de Juntas de Conciliação e Julgamento na 15ª Região da Justiça do Trabalho, define jurisdições e dá outras providências.

9.697, de 02.09.98 Cria Juntas de Conciliação e Julgamento na 2ª Região da Justiça do Trabalho, define jurisdição e dá outras providências.

9.696, de 01.09.98 Dispõe sobre a regulamentação da Profissão de Educação Física e cria os respectivos Conselho Federal e Conselhos Regionais de Educação Física.

9.695, de 20.08.98 Acrescenta incisos ao art. 1º da Lei no 8.072, de 25 de julho de 1990, que dispõe sobre os crimes hediondos, e altera os arts. 2º, 5º e 10 da Lei no 6.437, de 20 de agosto de 1977, e dá outras providências.

9.694, de 10.08.98 Autoriza a promoção post mortem do Procurador da República Pedro Jorge de Melo e Silva.

9.693, de 27.07.98 Modifica a Lei nº 9.096, de 19 de setembro de 1995 (Lei dos Partidos Políticos), para tratar de punição ao partido político mediante suspensão de cotas do Fundo Partidário.

9.692, de 27.07.98 Dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária de 1999 e dá outras providências.

9.691, de 22.07.98 Altera a Tabela de Valores da Taxa de Fiscalização da Instalação por Estação, objeto do ANEXO III da Lei no 9.472, de 16 de julho de 1997, que dispõe sobre a organização dos serviços de telecomunicações, a criação e o funcionamento de um órgão regulador e outros aspectos institucionais, nos termos da Emenda Constitucional no 8, de 1995.

9.690, de 15.07.98 Dispõe sobre a inclusão do Vale do Jequitinhonha do Estado de Minas Gerais e de Municípios da região norte do Estado do Espírito Santo na área de atuação da Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste-SUDENE.

9.689, de 14.07.98 Concede anistia de multas cominadas pelo Tribunal Superior do Trabalho a entidades sindicais representativas dos empregados da

Empresa Petróleo Brasileiro S/A – PETROBRÁS, no período em que menciona.

9.688, de 06.07.98 Dispõe sobre a extinção dos cargos de Censor Federal e sobre o enquadramento de seus atuais ocupantes e dá outras providências.

9.687, de 06.07.98 Dispõe sobre a aplicação da Gratificação de Condição Especial de Trabalho – GCET, criada pela Lei no 9.442, de 14 de março de 1997, aos militares do Distrito Federal.

9.686, de 06.07.98 Concede pensão especial a Elysiário Távora Filho.

9.678, de 03.07.98 Institui a Gratificação de Estímulo à Docência no Magistério Superior, e dá outras providências. Mensagem de Veto nº 834.

9.677, de 02.07.98 Altera dispositivos do Capítulo III do Título VIII do Código Penal, incluindo na classificação dos delitos considerados hediondos crimes contra a saúde pública, e dá outras providências.

9.676, de 30.06.98 Dispõe sobre a periodicidade de recolhimento das contribuições previdenciárias arrecadadas pelo Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social – INSS.

9.675, de 29.06.98 Amplia, para o estrangeiro em situação ilegal no território nacional, o prazo para requerer registro provisório.

9.674, de 25.06.98 Dispõe sobre o exercício da profissão de Bibliotecário e determina outras providências. Mensagem de Veto nº 749.

9.668, de 23.06.98 Altera os arts. 17 e 18 da Lei no 5.869, de 11 de janeiro de 1973, que institui o Código de Processo Civil.

9.665, de 19.06.98 Autoriza o Poder Executivo a conceder remissão parcial de créditos externos, em consonância com parâmetros estabelecidos nas Atas de Entendimentos originárias do chamado "Clube de Paris" ou em Memorandos de Entendimentos decorrentes de negociações bilaterais, negociar títulos referentes a créditos externos a valor de mercado e receber títulos da dívida do Brasil e de outros países em pagamento e dá outras providências.

9.664, de 19.06.98 Dispõe sobre a reestruturação da Justiça Federal de Primeiro Grau da 4a Região e dá outras providências.

9.661, de 16.06.98 Denomina "Aeroporto Internacional de Salvador - Deputado Luís Eduardo Magalhães" ao aeroporto da cidade de Salvador, Estado da Bahia.

9.660, de 16.06.98 Dispõe sobre a substituição gradual da frota oficial de veículos e dá outras providências.

9.659, de 09.06.98 Dispõe sobre a criação de cargos efetivos de Agente Penitenciário na Carreira Policial Civil do Distrito Federal e dá outras providências.

9.658, de 05.06.98 Dá nova redação ao art. 11 da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho e determina outras providências.

9.657, de 03.06.98 Cria, no âmbito das Forças Armadas, a Carreira de Tecnologia Militar, a Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade de Tecnologia Militar, os cargos que menciona, e dá outras providências.

9.656, de 03.06.98 Dispõe sobre os planos e seguros privados de assistência à saúde.

9.655, de 02.06.98 Altera o percentual de diferença entre a remuneração dos cargos de Ministros do Superior Tribunal de Justiça e dos Juízes da Justiça Federal de Primeiro e Segundo Graus.

9.654, de 02.06.98 Cria a carreira de Policial Rodoviário Federal e dá outras providências.

9.651, de 27.05.98 Institui as Gratificações de Desempenho de Função Essencial à Justiça - GFJ, de Atividade de Informações Estratégicas - GDI, de Atividade Fundiária - GAF e Provisória - GP, e dá outras providências.

9.650, de 27.05.98 Dispõe sobre o Plano de Carreira dos servidores do Banco Central do Brasil e dá outras providências.

9.649, de 27.05.98 Dispõe sobre a organização da Presidência da República e dos Ministérios, e dá outras providências. Texto Consolidado.

9.648, de 27.05.98 Altera dispositivos das Leis no 3.890-A, de 25 de abril de 1961, no 8.666, de 21 de junho de 1993, no 8.987, de 13 de fevereiro de 1995, no 9.074, de 7 de julho de 1995, no 9.427, de 26 de dezembro de 1996, e autoriza o Poder Executivo a promover a reestruturação das Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras - ELETROBRÁS e de suas subsidiárias e dá outras providências.

9.647, de 26.05.98 Cria a Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade de Ciência e Tecnologia - GDCT para os ocupantes dos cargos efetivos de nível intermediário da carreira de Gestão, Planejamento e Infra-Estrutura em Ciência e Tecnologia, e dá outras providências.

9.644, de 26.05.98 Autoriza a utilização de recursos do Fundo da Marinha Mercante - FMM, em favor da Companhia de Navegação Lloyd Brasileiro - LLOYDBRAS, e dá outras providências.

9.643, de 26.05.98 Isenta do Imposto de Importação e do Imposto sobre Produtos Industrializados partes e peças destinadas industrialização de bens de informática a serem adquiridos pelo Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE.

9.642, de 25.05.98 Dispõe sobre a reestruturação da Justiça Federal de Primeiro Grau da 1ª Região, e dá outras providências.

9.641, de 25.05.98 Cria a Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade de Fiscalização - GDAF, a Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade de Proteção ao Vôo - GDACTA, e dá outras providências.

9.640, de 25.05.98 Dispõe sobre o número de Cargos de Direção e Funções Gratificadas das Instituições Federais de Ensino Superior, dos Centros Federais de Educação Tecnológica, das Escolas Agrotécnicas Federais, das Escolas Técnicas Federais, das Instituições Federais de Ensino Militar, e dá outras providências.

9.639, de 25.05.98 Dispõe sobre amortização e parcelamento de dívidas oriundas de contribuições sociais e outras importâncias devidas ao Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social – INSS, altera dispositivos das Leis nos 8.212 e 8.213, ambas de 24 de julho de 1991, e dá outras providências.

9.638, de 20.05.98 Cria a Gratificação de Desempenho de Atividade de Ciência e Tecnologia - GDCT, e dá outras providências.

9.637, de 15.05.98 Dispõe sobre a qualificação de entidades como organizações sociais, a criação do Programa Nacional de Publicização, a extinção dos órgãos e entidades que menciona e a absorção de suas atividades por organizações sociais, e dá outras providências.

9.636, de 15.05.98 Dispõe sobre a regularização, administração, aforamento e alienação de bens imóveis de domínio da União, altera dispositivos dos Decretos-Leis nos 9.760, de 5 de setembro de 1946, e 2.398, de 21 de dezembro de 1987, regulamenta o § 2º do art. 49 do Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias, e dá outras providências.

9.635, de 15.05.98 Altera procedimentos relativos ao Programa Nacional de Desestatização de que trata a Lei no 9.491, de 9 de setembro de 1997, e dá outras providências.

9.633, de 12.05.98 Altera o Anexo III da Lei nº 9.442, de 14 de março de 1997, que dispõe sobre a tabela de cálculo da Gratificação de Condição Especial de Trabalho - GCET.

9.632, de 07.05.98 Dispõe sobre a extinção de cargos no âmbito da Administração Pública Federal direta, autárquica e fundacional, e dá outras providências.

9.631, de 28.04.98 Transforma cargo em comissão do Grupo-Direção e Assessoramento Superiores - DAS - Secretaria do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

9.630, de 23.04.98 Dispõe sobre as alíquotas de contribuição para o Plano de Seguridade Social do servidor público civil ativo e inativo dos Poderes da União, das autarquias e das fundações públicas, e dá outras providências. (Revogada pela Lei nº 9.783, de 28.01.99)

9.629, de 22.04.98 Transforma cargo em comissão do Grupo-Direção e Assessoramento Superiores - DAS na Secretaria do Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

9.628, de 14.04.98 Dispõe sobre a criação da Escola Superior do Ministério Público da União e dá outras providências.

9.627, de 13.04.98 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 9.473, de 22 de julho de 1997, que dispõe sobre as diretrizes para a elaboração da lei orçamentária de 1998 e dá outras providências.

9.626, de 08.04.98 Dispõe e sobre a inclusão no rito processual da Lei nº 8.029, de 12 de abril de 1990, das liquidações do Banco de Roraima S.A. - BANRORAIMA e da Companhia Usinas Nacionais - CUN, e dá outras providências.

9.625, de 07.04.98 Cria a Gratificação de Desempenho e Produtividade - GDP das atividades de finanças, controle, orçamento e planejamento, de Desempenho Diplomático - GDD, de Desempenho de Atividade de Chancelaria - GDC e de Desempenho de Atividade de Ciência e Tecnologia - GDCT, e dá outras providências.

9.624, de 02.04.98 Altera dispositivos da Lei nº 8.911, de 11 de julho de 1994, e dá outras providências.

9.620, de 02.04.98 Cria carreiras no âmbito do Poder Executivo Federal, cria as Gratificações de Desempenho e Eficiência - GDE e de Desempenho de Atividade de Defesa Agropecuária - GDA e dá outras providências.

9.619, de 02.04.98 Autoriza a Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A - ELETROBRÁS e a União adquirirem ações da Companhia Energética de Alagoas CEAL, da Companhia Energética do Piauí CEPISA, da Centrais Elétricas de Rondônia S.A. - CERON e da Companhia de Eletricidade do Acre - ELETROACRE, para efeito de inclusão dessas empresas no Programa Nacional de Desestatização - PND, bem como o aumento do capital social das

Companhias Docas do Rio de Janeiro - CDRJ e Docas do Estado de São Paulo - CODESP, e dá outras providências.

9.618, de 02.04.98 Dispõe sobre a extinção dos órgãos que menciona e dá outras providências.

9.617, de 02.04.98 Extingue a Companhia de Navegação Lloyd Brasileiros - LLOYDBRAS e dá outras providências.

9.615, de 24.03.98 Institui normas gerais sobre desporto e dá outras providências.

9.614, de 05.03.98 Altera a Lei nº 7.565, de 19 de dezembro de 1986, para incluir hipótese destruição de aeronave.

9.613, de 03.03.98 Dispõe sobre os crimes de "lavagem" ou ocultação de bens, direitos e valores; a prevenção da utilização do sistema financeiro para os ilícitos previstos nesta Lei; cria o Conselho de Controle de Atividades Financeiras - COAF, e dá outras providências.

9.612, de 19.02.98 Institui o Serviço de Radiodifusão Comunitária e dá outras providências.

9.611, de 19.02.98 Dispõe sobre o Transporte Multimodal de Cargas e dá outras providências.

9.610, de 19.02.98 Altera, atualiza e consolida a legislação sobre direitos autorais e dá outras providências.

9.609, de 19.02.98 Dispõe sobre a proteção da propriedade intelectual de programa de computador, sua comercialização no País, e dá outras providências.

9.608, de 18.02.98 Dispõe sobre o serviço voluntário e dá outras providências.

9.607, de 18.02.98 Cria, transforma e extingue cargos e funções no Quadro de Pessoal da Secretaria do Supremo Tribunal Federal, e dá outras providências sobre a criação e extinção de cargos no Instituto Nacional de Metrologia, Normalização e Qualidade Industrial e no Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Industrial.

9.605, de 12.02.98 Dispõe sobre as sanções penais e administrativas derivadas de condutas e atividades lesivas ao meio ambiente, e dá outras providências.

9.604, de 05.02.98 Dispõe sobre a prestação de contas de aplicação de recursos a que se refere a Lei nº 8.742, de 7 de dezembro de 1993, e dá outras providências.

9.603, de 22.01.98 Autoriza o Ministério dos Transportes, por intermédio da Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos - CBTU, a repassar à Companhia Cearense de Transportes Metropolitanos - METROFOR recursos para pagamento de pessoal.

9.602, de 21.01.98 Dispõe sobre legislação de trânsito e dá outras providências.


9.601, de 21.01.98 Dispõe sobre o contrato de trabalho por prazo determinado e dá outras providências.

9.600, de 19.01.98 Autoriza o Ministério dos Transportes, por intermédio da Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos - CBTU, a repassar à Companhia de Trens Metropolitanos de Pernambuco COPERTRENS recursos para pagamento de pessoal.

APPENDIX 5


CHARTS

BASIC CONSUMER BASKET AND THE MINIMUM WAGE




Source: PROCON/DIEESE

MONTHLY INFLATION RATE (%)
Comparison with previous stabilization plans




Based on the IPC-FIPE monthly index, January 1985 to May 1998

NATIONAL CONSUMPTION OF CEMENT
(1,000 tons)



Source: Sinduscon/SP


**PURCHASING POWER OF THE MINIMUM WAGE
(as a percent of the Basic Consumer Basket)**



* June/97 through May/98
Source: PROCÓN/DIEESE, DOU and BACEN


Period Average

**COMMUNITY HEALTH AGENTS
Number of agents**




Source: COSAC/MS

INFANT MORTALITY CHILDREN UNDER ONE YEAR OF AGE MONITORED BY "PASTORAL DA CRIANÇA"




Source: PASTORAL DA CRIANÇA

TREND IN THE NUMBER OF FAMILIES SETTLED UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM



Source: Ministério Extraordinário de Política Fundiária

COMMUNITY HEALTH AGENTS Number of municipalities served



Source: COSAC/MS