

FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS  
ESCOLA DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DE EMPRESAS DE SÃO PAULO

ARNALDO MAUERBERG JUNIOR

**CABINET COMPOSITION AND ASSESSMENT OF A MULTIPARTY  
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM**

SÃO PAULO

2016

ARNALDO MAUERBERG JUNIOR

**CABINET COMPOSITION AND ASSESSMENT OF A MULTIPARTY  
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM**

*PhD dissertation presented to the Sao Paulo School of Business Administration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation as a requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration and Government.*

Tese de Doutorado apresentada para a Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas como requisito para obtenção do título de Doutor em Administração Pública e Governo.

Linha de Pesquisa:

Política e Economia do Setor Público

Supervisor: Professor Ciro Biderman

Co-Supervisor: Professor Carlos Pereira

*International Host Professor: Ben Ross Schneider*

SÃO PAULO

2016

Mauerberg, Arnaldo Jr.

Cabinet Composition and Assessment of a Multiparty Presidential System  
/ Arnaldo Mauerberg Junior - 2016.

152 f.

Orientadores: Ciro Biderman, Carlos Pereira

Tese (CDAPG) - Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo.

1. Presidencialismo. 2. Partidos políticos. 3. Brasil - Ministérios e departamentos. 4. Governos de coalizão. 5. Governo comparado. I. Biderman, Ciro. II. Pereira, Carlos. III. Tese (CDAPG) - Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo. IV. Título.

CDU 328

ARNALDO MAUERBERG JUNIOR

**CABINET COMPOSITION AND ASSESSMENT OF A MULTIPARTY  
PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM**

*PhD dissertation presented to the Sao Paulo School of Business Administration of the Getulio Vargas Foundation as a requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Administration and Government.*

Tese de Doutorado apresentada para a Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas como requisito para obtenção do título de Doutor em Administração Pública e Governo.

Linha de Pesquisa:

Política e Economia do Setor Público

Data da defesa: 22 de fevereiro de 2016

Banca Examinadora:

---

Professor Ciro Biderman (Supervisor), FGV-EAESP

---

Professor Carlos Pereira (Co-Supervisor), FGV-EBAPE

---

Professor Marcus André Melo, UFPE-DCP

---

Professor Octavio Amorim Neto, FGV-EBAPE

---

Professor Cláudio Gonçalves Couto, FGV-EAESP

---

Professor Fernando Luiz Abrúcio, FGV-EAESP

*Praise God, from Whom all blessings flow;  
Praise Him, all creatures here below;  
Praise Him above, ye heavenly host;  
Praise Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.  
Amen.*

*A Deus, supremo benfeitor,  
A Deus o Filho, a Deus o Pai,  
A Deus Espírito, entoai,  
Ó céus e terra, o seu louvor.  
Amém*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank the Almighty God: The Father, the Son Jesus Christ, and the Holy Spirit for this magnificent life achievement. Without His endless blessings and support I would have never gone so far.

I also thank my beloved family: My father Arnaldo Mauerberg, my mother Edna Bertin Mauerberg, and my sister Andreia Mauerberg for their support, love, and patience, as well as for the trust they showed in my work.

I thank my advisors in Brazil, Professors Ciro Biderman and Carlos Pereira, for their guidance and instruction that enabled me to fulfill this work. Thanks are also due to Professor Ben Ross Schneider, my host professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for accepting and receiving me in such a kind way in 2014 when I had the honor of being a Guest PhD Candidate at the Political Science Department of MIT.

I also thank the members of my dissertation committee, Professors Marcus André Melo, Octávio Amorim Neto, Cláudio Couto, and Fernando Abrúcio, as well as all the other professors I was able to learn from.

I am also grateful to my friends Caio Costa, Celso Costa, Clauri Gonçalves, Juarez Gonçalves, Julia Guerreiro, and Renato Lima for all the discussions we had and the help they gave.

In addition, I am grateful to Rosabelli Coelho-Keyssar, Tereza Conselmo, Marta Andrade, Maria DiMauro, Diane Gallagher, and all the others on the staff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Getulio Vargas Foundation, the MIT-Brazil Center, and the Center for Politics and Public Economics.

Finally, I express my gratitude to CAPES, the MIT-Brazil Center, and the Department of Political Science at MIT for funding this research, both in Brazil and in the United States of America.

## AGRADECIMENTOS

Primeiramente agradeço ao Todo Poderoso Deus Pai, Filho e Espírito Santo por esta maravilhosa realização pessoal e profissional. Sem Suas bênçãos sem fim eu certamente não chegaria tão longe.

Também agradeço a minha família: meu pai Arnaldo Mauerberg, minha mãe Edna Bertin Mauerberg e minha irmã Andreia Mauerberg pelo suporte, amor e paciência e por tanto acreditarem em meu trabalho.

Agradeço aos meus orientadores brasileiros, Professores Ciro Biderman e Carlos Pereira pelo aconselhamento e instrução que tanto ajudaram na confecção desta pesquisa. Agradeço também ao Professor Ben Ross Schneider que me recebeu no Departamento de Ciência Política do Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) durante o ano de 2014 quando tive a honra de lá atuar como Estudante de Doutorado Convidado.

Agradeço também a todos os membros da banca de defesa desta tese, Professores Marcus André Melo, Octávio Amorim Neto, Cláudio Couto e Fernando Abrúcio pelas excelentes sugestões, assim como a todos os outros professores de quem pude aprender ao longo destes quatro anos de doutorado.

Agradeço aos meus amigos Caio Costa, Celso Costa, Clauri Gonçalves, Juarez Gonçalvez, Julia Guerreiro e Renato Lima por todas as conversas e ajuda que me deram.

Adicionalmente agradeço a Rosabelli Coelho-Keyssar, Tereza Conselmo, Marta Andrade, Maria DiMauro, Diane Gallagher, e a todos os demais funcionários do Massachusetts Institute of Technology, da Fundação Getulio Vargas, do MIT-Brazil Center e do Centro de Política e Economia do Setor Público pela ajuda a mim oferecida.

Finalmente expresso minha gratidão para a CAPES, o MIT-Brazil Center e o Departamento de Ciência Política do MIT pelo financiamento desta pesquisa no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos da América.

## **ABSTRACT**

This doctoral dissertation provides a detailed analysis of the Brazilian cabinet according to the concepts of a multiparty presidential system. Appointing politicians as ministers is one of the most important coalition-building tools and has been widely used by minority presidents. This dissertation will therefore analyze the high-level Brazilian national bureaucracy between 1995 and 2015. It argues that the ministries are not equal, and that allied parties therefore take into account the different characteristics of a ministry when demanding positions as a patronage strategy or for use as other kinds of political assets. After reviewing the literature on the theme, followed by a comparative analysis of the Brazilian, Chilean, Mexican, and Guatemalan cabinets, all the Brazilian ministries will be weighed and ranked on a scale that is able to measure their political importance and attractiveness. This rank takes into account variables such as the budgetary power, the ability to spend money according to the ministers' will, the ability to hire new employees, the ministries' influence over other governmental agents such as companies, agencies, and so on, ministers' tenure in office, and the normative power a ministry may hold. All these characteristics will then be taken into account in considering Brazilian House stalwarts' opinion, thus helping to ascertain whether or not the cabinet appointment has been coalescent among the several parties that belong to the president's coalition.

**Keywords:** Multiparty presidential system – Cabinet analysis – Ministries rank – 1995 - 2015



## RESUMO

Esta tese de doutorado busca analisar os ministérios brasileiros de maneira detalhada e dentro do escopo do presidencialismo multipartidário. A concessão de cargos de ministros para partidos da base aliada é uma – senão a mais - importante ferramenta utilizada por presidentes minoritários para construir sua colisão de governo. Sendo assim, pretendemos analisar a burocracia do primeiro escalão do poder executivo federal no Brasil entre os anos de 1995 e 2015. Supomos que os ministérios não são iguais entre si, e que os partidos da base aliada levam em conta diferentes características que estes ministérios possuem na hora de realizar suas demandas por patronagem ou por demais tipos de ativos políticos que possam receber. Após uma revisão de literatura sobre o tema e uma análise comparada do gabinete brasileiro com os do Chile, do México e da Guatemala, os ministérios brasileiros serão classificados em um ranking de importância política que levará em conta sua capacidade orçamentária, sua capacidade de gasto discricionário, seu quadro de funcionários, e, dentro deste último a habilidade que certo ministro têm para indicar afilhados políticos seus para posições dentro do governo, o poder de influência que este ministério possui sobre outros órgãos do governo como agências e empresas estatais, a duração total de tempo que um titular permanece em uma dada pasta e, por fim, o poder de normatizar certos setores econômicos. As características serão ponderadas levando-se em consideração a opinião de deputados federais chaves no processo político nacional e uma vez criado, o ranking nos auxiliará a avaliar se a distribuição de pastas têm sido proporcional para os diversos partidos integrantes da base aliada do governo.

Palavras – chave: Presidencialismo Multipartidário - Análise de gabinete – Ranqueamento de ministérios – 1995 -2015

## FIGURES

Chart 1 – Average values for Brazil and Chile.	39
Chart 2 – Average values for Mexico and Guatemala.	44
Chart 3 Elite - What are the three most politically important ministries in Brazil?	87
Chart 4 Elite - What are the three least politically important ministries in Brazil?	89
Chart 5 Elite - Sort according to your preferences the characteristics that a ministry in a presidential system has, with one being the most important, two the second most important, and so on until number six which represents the least important:	90
Chart 6 Elite - The total budget of a ministry is:	91
Chart 7 Elite - The share of unrestricted expenses of a ministry is:	91
Chart 8 Elite - A ministry's influence over other agencies and public companies is:	92
Chart 9 Elite - The total number of civil servants in a ministry is:	92
Chart 10 Elite - The share of civil servants hired directly by the minister as <i>cargo de confiança</i> in a ministry is:	93
Chart 11 Elite - The normative power and its capacity to influence other economic fields of activities for a ministry is:	93
Chart 12 Elite - The length of a minister's tenure as chair of some ministry is:	94
Chart 13 Elite - The chance to be the link between his fellow party members and the executive for a minister is:	94
Chart 14 Elite - Who should be mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in multiparty presidential systems like Brazil?	140
Chart 15 Elite – Who is currently mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in Brazil?	140
Chart 16 Elite - The current layout of the cabinet in Brazil regarding the distribution of cabinet seats to allied parties is proportional.	141
Chart 17 Elite - The Brazilian president who best knew how to build and manage his or her coalition was:	141
Chart 18 Elite - An ordinary congressman in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil judges it is easier to influence public policy processes by being a member of the executive body than by being a member of the legislative body.	142

Chart 19 Elite - A minister in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil has more power to influence society than a congressman, with the exception of the House Speaker.	143
Chart 20 Experts - Who should be mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in multiparty presidential systems like Brazil?	144
Chart 21 Experts - Who is currently mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in Brazil?	145
Chart 22 Experts - The current layout of the cabinet in Brazil regarding the distribution of cabinet seats to allied parties is proportional.	145
Chart 23 Experts - The Brazilian president who best knew how to build and manage his or her coalition was:	146
Chart 24 Experts - An ordinary congressman in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil judges it is easier to influence public policy processes by being a member of the executive body than by being a member of the legislative body.	146
Chart 25 Experts - A minister in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil has more power to influence society than a congressman, with the exception of the House Speaker.	147
Chart 26 Experts - What are the three most politically important ministries in Brazil?	147
Chart 27 Experts - What are the three least politically important ministries in Brazil?	148
Chart 28 Experts - Sort according to your preferences the characteristics that a ministry in a presidential system has, with one being the most important, two the second most important, and so on until number six which represents the least important:	148
Chart 29 Experts - The total budget of a ministry is:	149
Chart 30 Experts - The share of unrestricted expenses of a ministry is:	149
Chart 31 Experts - A ministry's influence over other agencies and public companies is:	150
Chart 32 Experts - The total number of civil servants in a ministry is:	150
Chart 33 Experts - The share of civil servants hired directly by the minister as <i>cargo de confiança</i> in a ministry is:	151
Chart 34 Experts - The normative power and its capacity to influence other economic fields of activities for a ministry is:	151
Chart 35 Experts - The length of a minister's tenure as chair of some ministry is:	152

Chart 36 Experts - The chance to be the link between his fellow party members  
and the executive for a minister is:

152

## TABLES

Table 1 – Basic features of selected countries.	37
Table 2 – Ranking of ministries according to the variables – Brazil and Chile.	41
Table 3 – Party affiliation of the heads of the top three ministries.	42
Table 4 - Ranking of ministries according to the variables – Mexico and Guatemala.	46
Table 5 – Cabinet composition year-by-year.	48
Table 6 - Cabinet party share – 1995 – 2015.	50
Table 7 – Cabinet inauguration, termination, and length.	51
Table 8 – Share of cabinet positions and House seats – 1995-2015	53
Table 9 – Coalescence degree year-by-year – 1995-2015.	54
Table 10 – Annual evolution of budget size.	59
Table 11 – Ministries’ rank according to budget size.	61
Table 12 – Ministries’ rank according to unrestricted expenses.	64
Table 13 – Rank of ministries according to network capacity.	68
Table 14 – Annual cabinet evolution of number of civil servants.	71
Table 15 – Ministries’ rank in terms of number of civil servants.	73
Table 16 - Ministries’ rank of patronage.	76
Table 17 – Ministries holding normative power.	80
Table 18 – Rank of average tenure in months – 1995 – 2015.	83
Table 19 – Weighed ministries – 1995 – 2015.	99
Table 20 – Correlation between representatives’ ranking and dissertation ranking.	104
Table 21 – Weighted and unweighted parties’ share of cabinet positions – 1995 – 2015.	106
Table 22 – Weighted and unweighted coalescence – 1996 - 2015.	109
Table 23 - Table 23 - List of Brazilian ministries – 1995 – 2015.	123
Table 24 - Table 24 – List of Brazilian ministers 1995 – 2015.	125

## ACRONYMS

DAS - Senior management and advice  
IBGE - Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics  
IFE – Mexican Federal Electoral Institute  
INE - Mexican National Electoral Institute  
INEGI - Chilean National Institute of Statistics  
MC – Member of Congress  
MP – *Medidas provisórias* or provisional decree  
PAN - National Action Party  
PC do B – Communist Party of Brazil  
PDT – Democratic Labor Party  
PFL – Liberal Front Party  
PL – Liberal Party  
PMDB – Brazilian Democratic Movement Party  
PP – Progressive Party  
PPB – Brazilian Progressive Party  
PPS – Socialist Popular Party  
PR – Party of the Republic  
PRB – Brazilian Republican Party  
PRD - Democratic Party of the Revolution  
PRI - Institutional Revolutionary Party  
PSB – Brazilian Socialist Party  
PSD – Social Democratic Party  
PSDB – Brazilian Social Democratic Party  
PT – Labors’ Party  
PTB – Brazilian Labor Party  
PV – Green Party  
RN - National Renewal Party  
TSE - Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court  
UDI – Independent Democratic Union  
UNE - Hope National Unity Party

## EQUATIONS

Equation 1	52
Equation 2	56
Equation 3	56
Equation 4	84
Equation 5	96
Equation 6	97
Equation 7	97
Equation 8	97

## CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1 REVIEWING THE LITERATURE ABOUT MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS</b>	<b>18</b>
1.1 Negative conclusions about multiparty presidential systems	19
1.2 Cabinet appointment as a tool of coalition building	22
1.3 Pork barreling and coalition fine tuning	25
1.4 Institutions and the executive-legislative game	27
1.5 Party leadership and its place in bargain	30
1.6 Federalism in a multiparty presidential	32
<b>2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN, CHILEAN, MEXICAN, AND GUATEMALAN CABINETS</b>	<b>35</b>
2.1 Multiparty Cabinets and Congresses: Brazil and Chile	37
2.2 One-party Cabinets and fragmented Congresses: Guatemala and Mexico	42
<b>3 RANKING MINISTRIES AND CHECKING FOR COALESCENCE</b>	<b>47</b>
3.1 Descriptive analysis and the evolution of the Brazilian Cabinet	47
3.2 Variables that influence political attractiveness	57
3.2.1 Budgetary capacity	57
3.2.2 Networking capacity	66
3.2.3 Patronage capacity	70
3.2.4 Regulation capacity	78
3.2.5 Time capacity	82
3.3 The elite survey	84
3.4 Score of political attractiveness	95
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<b>111</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>113</b>
APPENDIX A - List of Brazilian ministries – 1995 - 2015	123
APPENDIX B – List of Brazilian ministers 1995 - 2015	125
APPENDIX C – Elite survey questions in Portuguese	133
APPENDIX D – Elite survey general questions	140
APPENDIX E – The expert survey	144



## INTRODUCTION

Cabinet management is widely known to be one of the most common and powerful tools for minority presidents who are seeking reasonable levels of governability, and its practice has been seen in many Latin American presidencies since the early 1990s.

This dissertation is primarily concerned with this issue and seeks a better understanding of how it applies for Brazil. Brazilian presidents have relied on this strategy since Cardoso's first tenure that was inaugurated on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1995, which is when this research begins. Much has been said about the way in which Brazilian presidents build and manage their coalitions, and especially about how Cardoso achieved a more proportional distribution of cabinet seats among allied parties in comparison to Lula and Rousseff. In this, he succeeded in making day-by-day political negotiations easier, especially if compared with Mrs. Rousseff tenure

One concern, however, is that the features of federal bureaucracy have sometimes not been taken into account when the distribution of Cabinet positions has been studied. Usually the instrument analyzed was the number of seats held by each coalitional party inside the cabinet, together with its percentage of House seats within the whole coalition. This dissertation's contribution to this literature is the assumption that that the ministries are not equal. Because of such differences, the level of proportionality between the House seats and cabinet positions of a coalitional party may differ from the level proposed by the standard coalescence degree.

The main objectives of this PhD dissertation are threefold: i) To carry out a thoroughgoing analysis of the Brazilian federal bureaucracy structure in order to discover the main differences among all the ministries from 1995 until 2015, ii) to establish a rank of political importance for all Brazilian ministries, discovering which are the "best" ones and which are the "worst" ones, and, iii) considering the rank results, to refine the coalescence degree checking if the proportionality among legislative and Cabinet shares for coalitional parties changes or not.

Chapter One performs a literature review that presents all the trends of studies about multiparty presidential systems. Like a first wave of bad conclusions, many streams can be observed that concern the survival of this kind of system. These are followed by several other analyses that consider the system's success and stability. They are mainly based on cabinet management,

pork barrel resources distribution, and the presence of a stable institutional framework. Of all these branches, the most important one for this dissertation is the one that deals with cabinet management.

Chapter Two presents a comparative analysis that comprises the cabinets of Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Guatemala. This is conducted in order to identify and present some of the differences in cabinet composition in multiparty presidencies (the former two) and one-party presidencies (the latter two).

Chapter Three moves the primary objective of this research project, namely, the analysis of the Brazilian case. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: What are the most important ministries in Brazil? And, what is the real distribution of political assets inside the Brazilian cabinet? It first presents the annual evolution of the cabinet and then the standard coalescence degree measured by the difference between the House seats a coalitional party has and the number of cabinet positions it is granted by the president. By refining this measure, a score is created that enables one to properly assess the weight each ministry has within the cabinet, as well as how this affects the proportionality regarding House seats and cabinet share.

In order to build this rank of ministries' political attractiveness, information was acquired concerning the variables that are considered important for any politician who is given the option of picking a ministry. These include budgetary resources, normative resources, network resources, time resources, and patronage resources. An elite survey was then conducted with Brazilian House stalwarts in order to discover the scale of importance of those variables to them. Their opinion, together with a statistical balanced approach, made it possible to finally give a weight to each ministry in each year. These weights enabled a final calculation of the proportionality degree, enabling one to check whether the consideration of all these variables affects the perceived adequate proportionality of Cardoso's administration and the lack of adequate proportionality observed for Lula's and Rousseff's administrations.

## **1 REVIEWING THE LITERATURE ABOUT MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS**

Since the late 1980s, many authors have published studies about Brazil and its political system. The 1988 Constitution created a presidential system with a highly fractionalized Congress. In this scenario, it is mandatory for the president to create a Congress coalition that can help him with his agenda. This dissertation deals mainly with cabinet issues under the domain of a multiparty presidential system. However, it is important to review the literature that deals with all the features of such a system in order to discover the cabinet's importance for the topic and also to provide the reader with a full guide to studies on the subject. The relevance of the theme means that its full bibliography is huge, which makes it impossible to analyze all of the papers concerned with multiparty presidential systems. It was therefore decided to select almost all of the works of the main authors who have worked in this area. In addition, some important papers were analyzed for the specific contribution of authors who do not primarily work with this theme.

Some papers sought to indicate the general characteristics of the system. Among these, Mainwaring (1990) can be noted for his comparison of the old institutionalism in Latin American politics with the fresh contributions of presidentialism and democratic stability. His work proposes a research agenda that focuses on the period when the executive power became stronger and affected political parties in Latin America.

Power (2010a) discusses some branches of research regarding the Brazilian political system after the 1988 Constitution. He sees that one of them, which considered the electoral system, led to negative conclusions concerning the future of democracy in Brazil. Another, based on the internal rules of Brazilian legislature, was optimistic about the future of the system. In another study (2010b), the same author sought to understand why Brazilians are among the most indifferent of people when it comes to systems of government, and concluded that phenomena such as high levels of corruption can provide some answers.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a synthesis of this literature, presenting a different approach from that observed in the previously-cited articles.<sup>1</sup> The chapter starts by analyzing the studies that were part of a first wave of publication. These emphasized the features of the system that would have prevented its endurance over an extended period of time. Because the predictions of these studies were not observed, other papers began to be published in order to explain how a system with such characteristics was surviving with a reasonable level of stability. In order to discuss this, the chapter is divided into the following sections: Section 1.1 will show studies that made negative predictions concerning the future of the system, while Section 1.2 will present the main features of coalition building in presidential systems. This will be followed by an analysis of the tools used to keep the coalition working, which will in turn be followed by a discussion of the importance of institutional design and the role played by the party leadership in executive-legislative relations in Brazil. Finally, the influence of federalism on Brazilian coalitional presidentialism will be considered.<sup>2</sup>

### **1.1 Negative conclusions about multiparty presidential systems**

Much has been said since 1988 about the institutional design created by the new Constitution. This includes discussion of the existence of a presidential system with plurality elections, a legislative branch elected according to open list proportional representation, federalism, the ease with which new political parties can be created, an executive that is totally independent from the legislature, and a presidential fixed term. If one follows a timeline, one can see a first wave of studies that focused on the debate of presidential systems *versus* parliamentary ones. Based on a supranational view, it was argued that all the above-mentioned factors would lead to the failure of the brand new Brazilian democracy. These forecasts were at their worst when researches defended the superiority of parliamentary systems over presidential systems. In the discussion below, the main studies that lead to such conclusions are presented.

Some years before the creation of the 1988 Constitution, Linz (1973) had presented arguments against presidential systems. For him, in contrast to parliamentary systems, in presidential systems the winner of the election takes all, or the party that wins the executive elections receives all the benefits of the job and does not have to share these benefits with any other party.

---

<sup>1</sup> This dissertation's focus is not far from that of Power (2010a), except it presents more branches of research on the theme.

<sup>2</sup> This dissertation considers multiparty presidentialism and coalitional presidentialism as synonyms.

Moreover, the impact of the president's personality (being elected only by the citizens) would make him less dependent on the help of partisan leadership. In a situation in which a party held the presidency without holding the majority of seats in Congress, the system would inevitably face some problems. Linz (1990) has presented additional arguments in favor of parliamentary systems, arguing that presidential systems contain a paradox. They create at a person with huge political power – the president – but also institutions that are responsible for removing these powers from him, such as auditing courts. Another problem in Linz's view is the internal conflict experienced by the president. He sees the president both acting as a politician within a party and being the executive chief of a nation as mutually exclusive options. In addition, a fixed term is an impediment to quick solutions in times of crisis, such as a case of corruption involving the president, for it is more difficult to implement impeachment processes for a president than to dissolve a parliamentary cabinet.

The first text that focuses only on a specifically Brazilian case came from Abranches. His 1988 work compared the Brazilian situation historically with consolidated democracies around the world and concluded that the main difference between Brazil and the other countries studied was related to their systems of government. At that time, there was no other consolidated example of a system with proportional representation, multiple political parties and presidentialism. This meant that Brazil was one of the few countries that organized its executive power with coalitions. In such a scenario, the president must choose whether to be a hostage to the many commitments that come with a large coalition, or whether to keep fine-tuning his own party in a small coalition. The main problem of this kind of system in Abranche's view lies in the fact that the stability of the whole system is fully dependent on a government's current performance.

Papers from late 1980s and early 1990s claim that the congressmen of center-right wing parties tend towards regional voting, that the deputies of left wing parties are more compliant with their leadership, and that the catch-all parties have undisciplined delegations. These assertions were based on the incentives to selfish behavior in the Brazilian electoral system, such as open-list proportional representation, the incumbent with guaranteed rights being able to run for re-election,<sup>3</sup> the possibility of a larger number of candidates than contested seats, and the

---

<sup>3</sup> The possessor of a particular political position had direct access to the party list in the upcoming elections. Suspended by the Supreme Court in 2002.

possibility for a House representative to change from one party to another without adverse consequences (there were 197 such changes from 1987 to 1990, and 262 cases from 1991 to 1995).<sup>4</sup> All these incentives created weaknesses in the party system, leading to the growth of the catch-all parties and resulting in subsequent legislative disciplinary problems (Mainwaring, 1991 & 1997; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 1997).

In their historical analysis of many democracies, Stepan and Skach (1993) argue that the correlation between democratic consolidation and type of regime is stronger in parliamentary systems than in presidentialism. The most susceptible point of presidential systems lies in the fact that the executive cannot be removed even when it is without legislative support, while in parliamentary systems it can be. In contrast to Abranches (1988), and without exploring their hypothesis in further depth, Stepan and Skach (1993) reckoned the hypothesis that presidential systems do not create incentives for coalition formation.

Open list proportional representation is once more claimed to cause the weakness of political parties and of the legislative power. Assuming that the president and party leaders are weak,<sup>5</sup> the legislative controls and the subsequent stability of the system are dependent on considerable factors. These include, among others, the profile of the representatives (those with greater dominance tend to give greater support to the executive); the political experience of the president when building his Cabinet (which former president José Sarney had and former president Fernando Collor did not have, for example); and the electoral strength of certain politicians who can judge themselves self-sufficient and are not party dependent. A consideration of these factors from this perspective does not leave one optimistic about the political system (Ames 2002a & 2002b).

According to Negretto (2006), the lion's share of analyzed presidential systems were composed by minority governments. Governmental crisis (not regime crisis) tends to occur in countries in which a party, which does not hold the presidency, controls the median legislator and also has veto power. The executive-legislative battle can be expected to become fiercer when a president with simple majority in Congress is succeeded by a coalition government, and reaches its peak when a minority government gets into office.

---

<sup>4</sup> Opportunity extinguished by the Supreme Electoral Court in 2007.

<sup>5</sup> This contradicts certain studies, as shall be seen below.

A less negative finding is the presumption of more accountability and identifiability created by a proportional legislature and a plural executive. Presidents with no absolute power can also be seen as beneficial for the system. However, representatives will have little incentive to follow party directives and will rather seek to further their personal reputation with the electorate if there is minimal control of list access by the party leadership, there is a nominal vote rather than a party vote, and if there is a high proportion of candidates in relation to the district magnitude. All of these factors can be found in Brazil, which means that seeking personal reputation weakens the bargaining process between the legislative parties and the executive (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997).

Shugart and Mainwaring (1997) discuss both the positive and negative features of the system. On the positive side, they point to the great power granted to the constituency, the freedom of Congress in legislative matters, and the mandate stability instead of Cabinet instability. On the negative side, they point to the fixed terms that tend to create minority governments, which, without the option of legislative dissolution, are unable to deal with crisis. In addition, there is the possibility of a rookie being elected simply because of his smooth talk and/or good looks.

As has been seen, many authors expected that some features would lead to the failure of the presidential system. However, this has not been observed over the course of time in Brazil. The following section will consider why the above theories appear to be incorrect.

## **1.2 Cabinet appointment as a tool of coalition building**

The theories discussed above did not consider the possibility of the president gaining support from other parties due to the resources he might have. The first way in which presidents gain such support from House representatives is by making use of the job offering within the federal bureaucracy. It is this branch of studies that this dissertation is most concerned with. Since cohesiveness can be observed within the created group, the support to the president will be effective (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999). Job offering exists within the entire bureaucracy, but cabinet positions are offered to a particular party in a ministry or to a particular expert. One possible way of defining when a new cabinet is formed could be when a new presidency is

inaugurated, when there is a change in party composition, or when more than 50 percent of the ministers are switched (Amorim Neto 1994).

Research into cabinet building in Europe (Amorim Neto & Strom, 2006; Amorim Neto & Samuels, 2010) indicates that the proportion of independent ministers inside a cabinet is a positive function of electoral volatility, semi-presidential systems, minority governments, and the legislative powers of the president.<sup>6</sup> It is also negatively related to Congress fragmentation. Figueiredo et al. (2010) claim that in many countries in Latin America, including Brazil, 67 percent of presidents without an electoral majority have built government coalitions<sup>7</sup> by means of cabinet offers. Arretche and Rodden (2004) argued that their high transaction costs would make legislative coalitions impossible. Therefore, government coalitions are preferred in which the ministers act as bridges between the Federal Executive and the House of Representatives, thus decreasing these transactional costs. For Raile et al. (2011), cabinet is a means of coalition building, while resources for pork barrel are considered coalitional term fine-tuning in order for the executive to get its agenda approved. They also claim that the bigger the share of a presidential party inside the House, and the bigger the president's popularity, the smaller the number of ministries shared with other parties. Finally, presidents choose cabinet appointments when they find their other available tools too costly, and forming a cabinet can also help them to implement their policy agenda. The stability of such a cabinet will then be negatively related to the president's power, to minority governments, and to a low presidential approval score (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011a & 2011b).

Concerning Brazil, analysis comparing the 1946-1964 period with the post-1985 years concluded that different factors are responsible for different kinds of cabinets. Party indiscipline and legislative fragmentation tend to create coalitional cabinets (those based on party criteria), while a president with strong legislative powers creates cooption cabinets (ministers with party ties but who do not act as party agents within the cabinet). In both periods, the greater the job offering, the greater the legislative discipline. It can also be seen that a high number of representatives and senators were appointed as minister, with the largest number coming from

---

<sup>6</sup> These are considered valuable results, but Shin (2013) assumes that cabinets should be treated differently in a parliamentary systems compared to a presidential one.

<sup>7</sup> Coalition governments are dependent on the supply of executive positions in order for the president to receive permanent parliamentary support. Legislative coalitions involve *ad hoc* negotiations with congressmen treated on a case by case basis.



the South and Southeast regions<sup>8</sup> (Amorim Neto, 1994; Amorim Neto & Santos, 2001; Amorim Neto et al., 2003; Figueiredo, 2007).

Since the cabinet has been built, one can analyze it according to various criteria. One criteria is related to proportionality, i.e., the ratio between ministries offered to a particular party and its share within the coalition, which is called coalescence degree.<sup>9</sup> This measure allows one to observe whether a party with few seats is receiving more ministries than it is supposed to, or whether a party with many seats is receiving fewer ministries than it should. Coalescence and legislative submission can be empirically shown to have a positive relationship. However, a negative correlation can also be shown by the number of decrees<sup>10</sup> issued by the president. Moreover, it is supposed that weak executive-legislative relations are a by-product of a low degree of coalescence that is stimulated by a higher number of decrees issued by the executive (Amorim Neto, 2000 & 2002; Amorim Neto & Tafner, 2002; Amorim Neto et al., 2003).

However, this measure raises the question of whether all ministries are equal, particularly when their budgets are considered. Ministries are clearly different, and some are more valuable to one kind of party, while others are preferred by other kinds of parties. Their differences relate to their normative power, budgetary capacity, their share of unrestricted expenditure of the budget, patronage efficiency, and the time accumulated by a particular party as head of a ministry. These variables mean that each party may pay particular attention to a particular ministry, and prefer one to another. Figueiredo (2007) says that, in addition to other characteristics, the cooption strategy must be taken into account. An initial study that included some sources of differences in ministries was carried out by Meneguello (1998) when she classified them as belonging to the economic, political or social fields. In that study, which compared the presidencies of José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, only Fernando Collor de Mello had a nonpartisan cabinet. The main objective of this dissertation is to create an index that is able to consider all these characteristics and re-calculate the levels of proportionality among House seats and cabinet positions for a coalitional party.

---

<sup>8</sup> In other countries, such as Belgium, the main criteria for the distribution of ministries is geographical.

<sup>9</sup>  $Cabinet = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (|S_i - M_i|)$ , where:  $M_i$  is the percentage of ministries received by party  $i$  when the cabinet was appointed and  $S_i$  is the percentage of seats held by party  $i$  in the total number of seats in the House controlled by the allied parties.

<sup>10</sup> In Portuguese they are called *medidas provisórias* (MP) and must be countersigned by the Congress at some time or else be re-launched by the executive.

Finally, the cabinet is a powerful weapon for restricting public spending. Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004) found that cabinet stability creates an increase in public spending and a decrease in government savings in order to pay public loans. They also discovered that right wing cabinets are more fiscally responsible.

After this explanation of the characteristics of cabinets as a governability tool, the next section will explore the literature that analyzed how the executive undertakes coalition fine-tuning during the term.

### **1.3 Pork barreling and coalition fine tuning**

Another resource that the president has that was also not considered among the negative considerations of multiparty presidential systems, is the money in the federal budget that is given to representatives for pork barreling. A considerable number of studies on this topic provide research that focused primarily on econometric analysis, and showed the process of budget amendment from its proposition until its execution as a vital component of executive-legislative relations. In such a process, representatives can amend the annual budget that the president sends to Congress in order to gain their approval for the following year. This effectively means that representatives can request some of the money of the annual budget for pork barreling. The executive can authorize the amount requested, or it can refuse to do so. Moreover, if it is authorized, it does not necessarily need to free it up. In addition, the president can authorize the money expecting the support from House members in return in  $time_0$ , releasing or not the amount of authorized money in  $time_1$ . This means that he has bargaining power over this process between  $time_0$  and  $time_1$ ; first by authorizing the money, and second by effectively giving it to the representatives for pork barreling.

Amorim Neto and Santos (2003) showed that representatives have more interest in local legislation, and this interest is even greater for those with a concentrated voting pattern who belong to the government coalition. By contrast, Figueiredo and Limongi (2007) claim that legislators cannot even get resources to benefit their constituencies for pork because the biggest part of it is targeted at collective and institutional use.<sup>11</sup> Despite this last claim this dissertation

---

<sup>11</sup>A question that arises and is not presented by the authors deals with the transmission mechanism of these collective amendments that are adopted and implemented. Nominally, they lack the recipient of the funds, but to whom do leaders send these values? One can find a possible answer in Pereira and Orellana (2009) who argue that

nevertheless seeks to present ideas about the topic as a control mechanism over allied parties who are also able to influence House electoral outcomes.

Budget amendments can be interpreted as a political instrument capable of influencing representatives' electoral ambitions. When Ames (1995a) tried to explain the spatial patterns of the 1990 Brazilian House election, he found that in 1989 and 1990 candidates had sought safe strongholds in vulnerable cities, thus solving in some ways their electoral weaknesses by offering pork. Candidates running for mayor at local level politics who had previous experience in their early years as representatives allocated more pork resources to the city in which they later ran for mayor. Moreover, those who sought a higher-level job (such as senator or governor) but who had also been representatives in their early years, allocated more money for their states compared to those who did not run for those jobs. However, incumbents seeking re-election seem to have had a similar performance in implementing their budget amendments than those who were running for higher jobs (Samuels, 2002; Leoni et al., 2003). Both national and local characteristics influenced the likelihood of winning seats for the House in 1998, but pork had a more positive effect on the results than purely legislative activities such as the proposition of bills and so on. Even when representatives performed national activities, they were driven by the ambition of more resources for pork (Pereira & Rennó, 2002 and 2003; Pereira & Mueller, 2003).

The studies discussed in what follows consider pork as a coalition maintenance instrument. The previous paragraphs provided evidence that this is a highly valued good for Congressional representatives. Given this, the president uses it as a currency in dealing with his Congress coalition. He also uses the approval or execution of budget amendments to gain *ad hoc* support from outside of his coalition representatives (i.e. from those who belong to opposition parties).

An analysis to determine representatives' support for both Congress' bills and for executive ones indicates that dominant-concentrated elected representatives give more support to presidential bills than to their own. The same trend can also be observed among representatives with large amounts of money received from budget amendments (Ames, 1995b; Pereira & Mueller, 2002). Pereira and Mueller (2004) have pointed out that money for pork is a very low-

---

Lula realized that unruly parliamentarians were making use of collective amendments to feed their constituency without supporting the president.

cost coalition maintenance tool. They have also argued that budget amendments provide a link between individual electoral incentives and the centralized internal rules of Congress. The number of individual budget amendments executed in 1998 was a direct consequence of the same instrument having also a positive relationship with, and support of, the executive in 1997. Individual and collective amendments cannot be considered as substitute goods as the former have a positive relation with the approval of executive bills in the House, while the latter have an inverse relationship with the success of executive propositions on the floor (Alston & Mueller, 2005; Pereira & Orellana, 2009).

Refining the thought about the mechanisms used by the executive in order to gain support, Raile et al. (2011), as already cited, have argued that jobs in the federal bureaucracy are used in order to build the coalition, while budget amendments are used as a maintenance tool that also serves to aggregate some representatives from opposition parties in a few cases. This last feature was observed in the 2003 Pension Reform, when members of the government coalition who already had jobs in ministries observed the execution of many amendments proposed by colleagues belonging to opposition parties. Nevertheless, observations from 1997 to 2005 indicate that the larger the government coalition, the less the amendments freed up money to outside or opposition parties. The approval and execution of amendments to the opposition are obviously not the rule, but they can sometimes be used as a powerful tool.

#### **1.4 Institutions and the executive-legislative game**

This section is intended to show the main contributions of an institutionalist approach. This perspective allows many characteristics to emerge, including studies that view institutions as a kind of government, those that focus on electoral issues, those that prioritize the legislative powers of the president, and others.<sup>12</sup> In almost all cases, these institutional executive powers and strengths were not considered in the first wave of studies on the theme.

The first studies to be considered are those on constitutionalism, especially those dealing with the organization and functioning of republican powers. According to Melo (1998), national

---

<sup>12</sup> The focus relies on formal institutions, but one cannot neglect the role played by informal institutions. This approach has few analysts. As an example, Desposato (2006), based on São Paulo and Piauí States, argues that clientelism as an informal institution shrinks cohesion, making it more difficult to achieve reasonable governance levels.

constitutions reduce transactional costs when they stipulate the role played by each party in electoral and governmental processes. When politicians tie their own hands for future actions, this could be interpreted as them making a forecast in order to avoid their own future irrational behavior. In a documented analysis, Cheibub et al. (2011) argued that the number of Latin American constitutions that allow for parliamentary dissolution is very small. This also grants more power (proposition and urgency request for their bills) to the lion's share of executives in this region than is awarded to executives in other geographical regions. However, this strength does not occur at the expense of congressional power in all cases and the authors stated that Latin American legislatures have greater power to keep tabs on their executives in comparison to other continents.

The 1988 Brazilian Constitution gave the president huge legislative powers, such as partial veto power, decree power, urgency requests in his bills and the right to develop the annual budget. Nevertheless, strong presidents have not been considered dangerous to presidential democracies (Cheibub & Limongi, 2010). In contrast to this view, another perspective argues that there is an inverse relation between policy stability and the legislative powers of the president. In this case, Brazil is an exception because of the possibility that its judiciary has to constrain the president. Other institutions, such as the media and Congress, which are able to check the executive are more frequently seen in countries with higher governance scores. In addition, there are also independent institutions that have arisen that act as a counterweight to the superpowers of the executive. These include public prosecutors (*Ministério Público*), courts of accounts, etc. They are all referred to by the literature as checks and balances institutions.<sup>13</sup> (Melo 2009, Melo et al. 2009, Pereira et al. 2011).

Concerning government or regime institutions (both parliamentary and presidential), Przeworski et al. (1996), using data from 135 nations from 1950 to 1990, concluded that parliamentary systems tend to last longer. In their review of the literature on the topic, Cheibub and Limongi (2002) found that cooperation incentives are greater in parliamentary systems, but that the probability of coalition formation is equal in both systems when any party has more than one third of the seats in the legislative. Cheibub et al. (2004) also showed that

---

<sup>13</sup> Another interesting point is that partisan fragmentation is seen as beneficial, while increasing transaction costs between parties for a joint attack on the judiciary or any other restriction agencies (Melo, 2009).

parliamentary systems have more coalitions than presidential ones, but that coalitions are far unusual in the latter.

With regard to electoral rules, their permissiveness and the heterogeneity of the Brazilian population have been leading to high rates of party fragmentation. Multiparty systems have a statistically significant relationship to the rise of minority parties. Notwithstanding this fragmentation couldn't avoid political stability among the five biggest Brazilian political parties (the Workers' Party – PT; the Brazilian Social Democrat Party – PSDB; the Liberal Front Party – PFL,<sup>14</sup> the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party – PMDB, and the Progressive Party – PP) (Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, Cheibub 2002, Santos 2008). For Colomer (2005), the best electoral rules are proportional representation for legislative elections and two round pluralism for executive positions. This would keep parties closer to the median voter, unified governments would not exist and the president would be elected with broad support that included the median voter.

Two of the president's legislative powers must be highlighted. The first is his power of partial and full veto against Congressional bills and the second is his agenda power. Santos (1997), comparing the period of 1946-1964 to the post-1988 years, found that some presidential powers have been reduced. In the first period only two thirds of the Congress were needed to pull down a presidential veto, while today only an absolute majority is needed.

A documentary analysis shows that Colombia, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Equator have presidents who are able to initiate legislation. One can interpret the provisional decrees (or *Medida Provisória*, the 62<sup>nd</sup> article of 1988 Brazilian Constitution) as a delegation of powers from the legislative to the executive. The extent to which representatives benefit from such a delegation will vary according their capacities to control the executive's activities. In the 1980s, one of the aims of the National Constituent Assembly was to make the legislative process more agile therefore the provisional decree had sought to implement modernization and administrative action (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1997). This hypothesis was tested by Pereira et al. (2005a) who assessed to what extent delegation theory<sup>15</sup> and unilateral action<sup>16</sup> were

---

<sup>14</sup> Currently called Democratics – DEM.

<sup>15</sup> Increasing the number of provisional decrees in situations of high presidential popularity.

<sup>16</sup> Increasing the number of provisional decrees during periods of low indexes of presidential approval and less support of Congress for his bills.

observed in Brazil from 1988 to 1998. They showed that there was not a unique situation; unilateral action fits well in the whole period, while delegation theory was only observed during Cardoso's first tenure, thanks to the Real Plan.<sup>17</sup>

According to Figueiredo and Limongi's (1995), after 1988 the Brazilian federal executive proposed 88 percent of all the federal laws in the country. Presidents who are supported by coalitions can be expected to rule less drastically, and to propose constitutional amendments and complementary laws rather than using provisional decrees, which would yield to the Congress a large part of responsibility for the approval of legislation (Amorim Neto et al., 2003). The constant reissuing of provisional decrees can fit into a situation in which every new reissue creates new bargaining scenarios between Congressional representatives and the executive. Armijo et al. (2006) called this theory a "recurrent bargain", and argued that neither the propensity to political chaos, nor governance created by sacrificing representatives, mayors, and governors in favor of the executive, can be applied to Brazil. Instead, they saw all the governments from Sarney until the first tenure of Lula as based on this cooperative system in which a strong president gains support through the participation of other political agents.

Finally, Pereira et al. (2005b) raised this question within the context of the Brazilian federal government. Their study appears to indicate that a larger or smaller number of provisional decrees does not affect presidential approval.

### **1.5 Party leadership and its place in bargain**

Party leadership plays an important role in executive-legislative relations. The greatest amount of research uses an econometric approach to dealing with the problems posed. During a voting procedure on the floor in Brazil, a party leader can give the following instructions to his delegation: Vote positively, contrary, or put the party in obstruction (taking away his delegation denying the minimum number of representatives required to vote the bill); decontrol the delegation, allowing it to vote as it wants or; not take any position (the last two situations are rare). Between 1988 and 1998 party delegations were seen as very disciplined, following their leaders and enabling easy forecasts about their future behavior on roll calls. However, this view

---

<sup>17</sup> An economic stabilization plan carried out by Cardoso while Finance Minister during the Franco Presidency. After this, Cardoso was elected president in 1994 and re-elected in 1998.

of discipline delegates overlooks the first wave of theories that had expected the Brazilian system to collapse at any time. The key point here is that the party leader acts as a link between the representative and the executive, which is why such levels of discipline can be observed (Limongi & Figueiredo, 1995; Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999).

With regard to this link position, the Brazilian system gives wide powers to the political parties within Congress. The role played by the leadership is important. While there is no difference between representatives regarding voting rights and other common matters, differences do exist regarding the distribution of pork resources<sup>18</sup> and nominations for important positions inside the House. The leadership is in charge of these distributions, so it is to be expected that a rational representative will follow his leader, thus making possible his future demands. At the same time, it is not common for a leader to act as an autocrat with his delegation because he is elected by his party fellow-representatives who may rebel and elect a new leader. We can therefore expect cooperation between the delegation and the leadership (Limongi & Figueiredo, 1998).

A representative's bargaining power against the federal executive is very little when he acts alone, which is one of the reasons why we do not observe isolated negotiations between a president's emissaries and individual representatives. In order to get what they want, Congressional representatives need to cluster in a political party with higher-profile representatives who conduct the bargaining process with the executive on their behalf. This role is played by the party leader. Therefore, the assumption of a president who is very independent of the legislative and of a blind opposition that is able to undermine a government's desires does not make sense. The executive needs to have its agenda approved and not all parties will be able to compete in future elections as an opposition. This makes it more enticing for them to join the government coalition rather than to disconnect from it (Limongi & Figueiredo, 1998, 2002; Figueiredo & Limongi 2000; Pereira & Mueller, 2003).

One can therefore see that a healthy delegation-leadership relationship would be useless if the leadership-executive relationship did not follow the same pattern. Given the emergence of a new fact, one can argue that an analysis of the interactions the present party-leadership and the President Rousseff's negotiators may be interesting. According to a famous Brazilian newspaper, *Folha de São Paulo* (2013), President Rousseff's coalition is the least disciplined

---

<sup>18</sup> Key decisions on parliamentary amendments are made by the rapporteurs with the party leaders.



since 1989, and coalition members are protesting that they do not receive any attention from the executive. Another problem arises when one looks at the president's team in charge of the political relations with Congress, who have often been judged as unskilled for the job. The studies covered in this review were based on analysis of presidents with good political skills (Sarney, Cardoso, and Lula). Other presidents, such as Collor and Franco, did not have the same level of political ability, but neither of them experienced such a low level of party discipline during their terms. What can be the cause of this phenomenon? Is it due to Rousseff's centralizing and authoritarian style, her low profile and the awkward political team charged with bargaining with Congress, or is it due to the overall fall of the political popularity indexes in Brazil?

The committee of leaders (called *colégio de líderes*) usually acts on the executive's behalf when the latter asks for urgency in some bill. This is allowed by the 64<sup>th</sup> article of the Brazilian Constitution, which seeks to avoid the interference by minority groups seeking to overthrow some presidential proposition. Usually the executive's agenda is more easily approved than that of the legislative (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995).

Another important feature of leadership, according Figueiredo et al. (1999), is related to their ability to appoint and remove colleagues from standing committees at any point. Pereira and Mueller (2000) discussed this question and concluded that, thanks to the urgency request, the Brazilian House standing committee system is totally dominated by the executive. If it were not for the urgency request committees would be able to gain access to and reveal House members' preferences, thus decreasing the uncertainty that might arise during floor voting procedures. However, urgency requests are made because of the high waiting cost created by the assessment of the bill in all Congressional bodies.

## **1.6 Federalism in a multiparty presidential systems**

This final section addresses a variable that indirectly affects the relationship between the president and Congress. There are two streams of study regarding federalism. The first one looks at the weaknesses of individual states and at the strength of the federal executive branch. The second stream argues the opposite, namely, that issues of individual states are more important to the representatives than the partisan and federal ones.

The first stream has sought to assess the power exercised by state governors over national party cohesion, questioning what party leaders do as governors compete against each other. In this case, the delegations would tend to take the party leaders' side. Carey and Reinhardt (2003) argued that the governors' actions were not statistically significant to party cohesion in the Brazilian House of Representatives between 1986 and 1991. Arretche and Rodden (2004) also sought evidence of state power on the federal level and concluded that the fact of a governing party belonging to the federal party coalition is not significant for voluntary financial transfers from the national executive, but that over-representation and a higher turnout tends to favor the states. Cheibub et al. (2009) also claim that belonging to a state in which the governor is opposed to the national executive does not influence the likelihood of a congressman voting in accordance with the recommendations of the national government. The outcome remains the same when controlling for exclusive voting interests of states, when members of the governing coalition keep following the direction of the national government and their leaders.

By contrast, the other wave of studies analyzing the same question has reached conclusions standing up for governors and states strength and for the weakness of national party leaders. These conclusions are influenced by: i) The state power of partisan leadership that defines whose name will be on the party list in the next election and whose will not, and also determines the destination of campaign money among the candidates; ii) the electoral power created by a governor being personally side by side with some House candidate in a neighborhood or town during the campaign; iii) the office resources held by a governor;<sup>19</sup> iv) the ambition of some politician to gain a higher position in the state bureaucracy in the future; and v) the weakness of party leaders.<sup>20</sup> According to this view, candidates don't have campaign funds, the power to advertise on television, nor the power to appoint their friends to positions within the federal bureaucracy. Studies have shown that a House candidate can gain more electoral profit by attaching his image to that of the governor candidate than to that of the presidential candidate. Statistics have also shown that candidates for state offices (senator, governor and vice-governor) who had been representatives in the past had amended the budget in favor of their home states. Moreover, an analysis found that all of the representatives affiliated to PSDB,

---

<sup>19</sup> An example of the control over office resources by governors can be seen in Melo et al. (2010) where the authors performed a detailed study about how a governor determines the degree of autonomy of state regulatory agencies based on their expectations of keeping their power.

<sup>20</sup> Contrary to what was exposed in the previous section.

PMDB, Brazilian Progressive Party<sup>21</sup> – PPB, and Democratic Labor Party – PDT had a greater tendency to follow the state governor rather than the party leader<sup>22</sup> (Samuels, 2000, 2002; Desposato, 2004). In the same way Abrúcio (1998) argues for the governors’ strength over and against others primarily because the House elections used to obey a state logic rather than a national one, and also because representatives are encouraged to perform according to selfish behavior rather than partisan behavior.

Finally, the unusual power that the 1988 Constitution gave to all Brazilian municipalities must be emphasized. Since then, they have formed an independent federal unity, just like the states. Many contracts have been signed directly between the federal executive and the local level executives. One example is the Brazilian public health system, in which a mayor decides whether his city will join a policy-program or not. If so, he must inform the federal executive of this, without any interference of the state governor. One may assume that the strengthening of the mayors may have occurred due to the decay of the governors’ power. However, no studies were found that investigated this together with the relations between the executive and legislative powers at the national level.

This chapter has provided evidence that there are many branches of study regarding multiparty presidential systems, and that many papers and books have been published about Brazil. One important characteristic that has been noted is that almost all of them considered only one variable while analyzing these interactions. It is important to note that a new approach to the theme has begun to emerge, as can be seen in Pereira and Melo (2012) and Chaisty et al. (2014), whose work proposes an analysis that deals with more than one variable or characteristic at the same time. These authors see the stability of a government as derived from the legislative powers of the president, the existence of trading currencies for bargaining (such as money for pork and patronage resources), and from strong institutions of checks and balances (an active judiciary, a legislative watchdog, an independent media, courts of account, etc.). All of these are to be considered simultaneously, and form a kind of a “toolbox” that is available to the president.

---

<sup>21</sup> Current Progressive Party.

<sup>22</sup> Even with such a claim, we note that the coefficients used to determine this level of state and local cohesion of these four parties are very close to the two found to be the most cohesive (PT and Brazilian Labor Party - PTB).

## **2 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE BRAZILIAN, CHILEAN, MEXICAN, AND GUATEMALAN CABINETS**

As can be seen in the previous chapter, much has been said about the kind of political systems chosen by Latin American countries during their last wave of democratization. The choice for a presidential systems is evident and the importance of cabinet building and management has been clarified. This chapter undertakes a comparative analysis of four Latin American cabinets: the Brazilian, the Chilean, the Mexican, and the Guatemalan.

Chasquetti (2001) argues that in many cases in Latin America,<sup>23</sup> the creation of government coalitions are mandatory and that one way of gaining political support is through cabinet management (Cox & Morgenstern, 2001). That is why, according Figueiredo et al. (2012), between 1979 and 2011 three percent of Latin American cabinets were supermajority unitary cabinets, seven percent were majority unitary cabinets, eight percent were majority coalitions, 17 percent were minority unitary ones, 30 percent were minority coalitions, and 36 percent were supermajority coalitions. Foweraker (1998) states that in countries where the executive power was able to create a majority coalition within Congress (such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay) higher levels of governability were observed than in those countries where it could not do so (such as Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). Altman and Castiglioni (2008) declare that the more inclusive a cabinet is in Latin America, the greater the chances are of structural changes being carried out. Finally, the proportion of ministers with some kind of party affiliation in Latin America can be seen as influenced by the size of the president's party, his decree powers, and his term limit (Amorim Neto, 2006).

The question therefore arises of whether coalitional parties are indifferent among all the ministries within the cabinet? And the deeper question is whether the parties are even interested in holding cabinet positions, or whether they prefer to receive political assets other than cabinet positions? Countries with fragmented congresses and minority presidents do not always have multiparty cabinets. In such cases, one can assume that the president chooses another governability tool other than cabinet management. Alternatively, in the case of a fragmented Congress or one-party cabinet, it may not be advantageous for allied parties be part of the cabinet as the ministries are not politically attractive enough.

---

<sup>23</sup> President with fixed term and fragmented congress.

Assuming that parties are interested in resources in order to keep their power and influence, and to gain a good share of votes in upcoming elections, cabinets with features that can help them to achieve these goals will be more attractive to them than cabinets without such features. These are cabinets with higher levels of budgetary capacity, unrestricted expenses, the ability to hire civil servants and retain influence over those already hired, the number of companies, agencies, and others directly linked to the minister; and the tenure as the chairman of some ministry would all increase the power and the future electoral outcomes of a party holding the control of a ministry, making more interesting to hold a position inside the cabinet, finally leading it to be a multiparty instead of a one-party kind.

The intention of this chapter is to present a broad descriptive analysis of four examples of Latin American countries during 2011. This is done in order to introduce the reader to the subject and to the propositions that are made here, which will be analyzed more deeply in the following chapter when only the Brazilian case for the past 20 years will be considered.

These countries were chosen because they all had minority presidents and fragmented Congresses, but two (Brazil and Chile) had multiparty cabinets, while the other two (Guatemala and Mexico) had one-party cabinets.<sup>24</sup> If one supposes that the first two rely on cabinet management as a governability tool, one will be able to show whether their cabinets differ at some level from the latter two, which should make them more interesting to allied parties compared to the ones from Guatemala and Mexico. Some of the basic features of these four countries can be seen in the following table:

---

<sup>24</sup> Another important variable that led to the choice of these four countries is that of data availability for all of them.

Table 1 – Basic features of selected countries

Country	Population (in millions)	Voters (in millions)	GDP per capita (USD)	Electoral system to the House	Effective number of parties in the House	Share of the president's party in the House
<b>Brazil</b>	190.7	135.8	10,978	OLPR	10.42	17 percent
<b>Chile</b>	17.3	8.3	12,682	Binomial	5.3	14.2 percent
<b>Mexico</b>	112.3	77.8	8,921	CLPR and relative majority	3	28.4 percent
<b>Guatemala</b>	14.7	5.9	2,882	CLPR	4.9	32.3 percent

Brazilian and Mexican population in 2010, Chilean and Guatemalan in 2011.

Brazilian voters in 2010, Mexican and Chilean in 2009 and Guatemalan in 2008.

The other variables are from 2011.

Effective number of parties according to Laakso e Taagepera (1979).

Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), Datosmacro, Chilean National Institute of Statistics (INEGI), Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (TSE), TCEC, Mexican National Electoral Institute (INE), World Bank, Political Database of the Americas, Houses of Representatives and federal executives governments of Brazil, Chile, Mexico e Guatemala, 2014.

Table One shows the division between multiparty and one-party cabinets for the selected sample. It brings together countries with a large number of voters on the one side and countries with a small number of voters on the other side. With the exception of Guatemala, the economic performances are quite similar. Despite the difference between the number of effective parties in Brazil compared to other countries, they all indicate that the president's party never had a congressional majority. The impossibility of creating a legislative majority may be the only common feature provided by the four different electoral systems.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.1 Multiparty Cabinets and Congresses: Brazil and Chile

In several Latin American countries, including Brazil, 67 percent of minority presidents used cabinet management in order to gain a majority in Congress. In many cases high transactional costs make *ad hoc* negotiations impossible, making it easy for the president to use government coalitions instead of legislative coalitions. In the first case, ministerial positions would act as a substitute for money, with jobs being given by the executive (Figueiredo et al., 2010; Arretche & Rodden, 2004).

Chapter One has already provided an extensive analysis of cabinet management and its importance and wide usage in Brazil. It is therefore not necessary to repeat this discussion in this chapter.

<sup>25</sup> The fact cannot be ignored that the Mexican and Guatemalan presidents had a larger share of congressional seats than the Brazilian and Chilean presidents. However, even given this difference, it is expected that with a share of 30 percent of the total seats, those presidents would not be able to govern without the support of other parties.

With regards to Chile, its president is considered to be one of the most powerful when considered in constitutional terms. Nevertheless, despite this strength, many studies have shown that the Chilean Congress is not a subservient actor (Alemán & Navia, 2009; Siavelis 1997, 2002).

According to Carey (2002), Londregan (2002), and Huneus (2005), the Chilean legislature is disciplined because of its high degree of ideological commitment and also because of the strong whip powers exercised by the party leadership. Nevertheless, left wing politicians seem to experience more unity than in right wing parties. Calvert (2004) claims that ideology enables Congress to counterbalance the huge powers of the president.

With regards to cabinet, even if it were not allowed, one could see the indication of congressmen's allies for jobs in the federal executive bureaucracy. Those who get these jobs act as informants to representatives about the steps taken by the president and his ministers. In addition, there is also a formal connection in which the Congress committees' chairmen meet with ministers on a regular basis to deal with policy and political issues (Ferraro, 2008).

One interesting fact concerning Chile is that in order to avoid a particular party taking control of an entire ministry (and making it a kind of party agency), the chairman and the co-chair of that ministry must never be from the same party. According to Dávila (2011) and Dávila et al. (2013), the percentage of ministers without party affiliation is not so large, and even the few technocrats that are found have some kind of party activity in their past.<sup>26</sup> Only 6.7 percent of all ministers belonging to the four governments after Pinochet had no political connection. The Finance Ministry has the most technocrats, having had only one minister who followed a political path. Avedaño and Dávila (2012) analyzed the extent of job turnover among ministers and concluded that it does not create instability. On the contrary, job turnover creates political stability because it provides an opportunity to fulfill the desires of all the allied parties.

Nolte (2003) points to the following factors as essential for the success of Chilean multiparty presidentialism: The turning of electoral agreements into government agreements and


---

<sup>26</sup> One should not confuse technocrats -or experts- with independent ministers. The first have a specific skill in the ministry policy area, while the second refer to somebody who does not represent a specific political party in the cabinet.

coalitions; job offering from the executive to its allies in the federal bureaucracy; the good relationship between congressmen who belong to the same coalition; the impossibility of a minister and vice-minister of the same ministry being from the same party; and the role played by the Presidency Secretariat in coordinating the executive and legislative demands.

In 2011, Brazil and Chile each had 38 and 20 ministries respectively. Chart One shows from left to right the average number of agencies, companies, and so on directly linked to each ministry; the average percentage of unrestricted expenses within the budget for each ministry in 2011 (*unres\_exp*); the percentage of the total cabinet budget in relation to the country's GDP in 2011 (*budg\_gdp*); the average percentage of temporary civil servants in relation to the total number of civil servants from each ministry in 2011 (*unres\_emplo*); and the chair's average tenure in months from 1990 until 2014.

Chart 1 – Average values for Brazil and Chile



Source: The authors based on Brazilian Disclosure Website, *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Brazilian Presidency, Brazilian Ministries' websites, Brazilian Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, the Brazilian Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, and Chilean Active Transparency Directory, 2014.

This graph shows that both of these countries with multiparty cabinets have a huge amount of their GDP spent by their ministries: 18.84 percent in Brazil and 20.98 percent in Chile. The average unrestricted expenditure is 6.90 percent in the Brazilian case and 26.96 percent in the Chilean case.

The largest flaw of the measures reported in this chapter may be that the average proportion of civil servants with *cargos de confiança* in Brazil and with *a contracta* in Chile turned out to be



very different. However, in neither case is it very small. This difference is caused by the way in which the data are available from these countries. The Brazilian database makes a distinction between tenured professionals (over whom the minister has no influence at all), contracted ones (who come privately from a company to do a specific job), and those who are engaged as senior management and advice (called *DAS* in Brazil, they are the ones who are selected directly by the minister in keeping with his personal and political preferences; these are the ones referred here). The database kept by Chile does not provide the same level of detail. It only distinguishes tenured professionals and *a contracta* professionals (the latter is used for the analysis gathering people chosen directly by the minister, as well as for those contracted temporarily; although, even they are hired with some lack of restriction). That explains why a larger proportion of this variable had been expected for Chile.

In both cases, the ministers acted on average as chairmen for more than 20 months since 1990. This shows that when a party gains a ministry, it will have a reasonable amount of time to implement its wishes. It can be expected that the more tenure time there is in a ministry, the more political value that ministry has.

The number of agencies and companies linked on average to each ministry is no more than seven in both countries<sup>27</sup> being considered as a reasonable level of activity by the ministry beyond its own boundaries.

Observing the three ministries with the highest score in each variable, one sees that the first three in total budget never gained one of the three first positions in terms of unrestricted expenditures. Of all the 38 ministries in Brazil, only one appeared twice in the ranking files, namely, the Secretariat for Human Rights.

Because the size of the Chilean cabinet is much smaller than that of Brazil, various Chilean ministries came up in top positions for more than one characteristic. These were the Ministry for Health (size of budget and unrestricted processes to hire employees), the Finance Ministry (attached agencies and tenure), the Ministry for Labor and Social Security (total budget and attached agencies), the Ministry for Public Works (unrestricted expenses and linked agencies), and the Ministry for the Environment (unrestricted processes to hire civil servants and tenure).

---

<sup>27</sup> With a huge outlier in Brazil, the Ministry of Education.

None of the ministries appeared more than twice in the rankings. All this information can be seen in Table 2:

Table 2 – Ranking of ministries according to the variables – Brazil and Chile

Country	Budget	Unrestricted expenditure	Patronage ability	Tenure	Linked agencies
Brazil	Social Security	National Integration	Institutional Relations	Secret Service	Education
	Labor	Human Rights	President's Advertisement	Social Development	Defense
	Health	Women's Rights	Human Rights	General Secretariat	Justice
Chile	Labor and Social Security	Public Works	Environment	Finance	Public Works
	Education	Housing and Urban Planning	Health	Foreign Affairs	Finance
	Health	Interior and Public Safety	Transportation and Communications	Environment	Economy, Development and Tourism/Labor and Social Security

Source: The authors based on Brazilian Disclosure Website, *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Brazilian Presidency, Brazilian Ministries' websites, Brazilian Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, the Brazilian Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, and Chilean Active Transparency Directory, 2014.

Using the same ranking but changing the names of the ministries according to the name of the party at the top of the ranked ministries in 2011, one can see the large number of ministries in the hands of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's party, the PT. One can likewise see the predominance of independent ministers in President Sebastián Piñera's cabinet (from the National Renewal Party – RN).

The fact that the PT does not share the top ranked ministries with other parties coincides with the lack of confidence found between the Brazilian president and her political team and the party leadership within the House. This provides a hint towards a better understanding of the Congress' current dissatisfaction with Mrs. Rousseff. The previous party analysis can be checked in Table 3 below.

Table 3 – Party affiliation of the heads of the top three ministries

Country	Budget	Unrestricted expenditure	Patronage ability	Tenure	Linked agencies
Brazil	PMDB	PSB <sup>28</sup>	PT	Expert	PT
	PDT	PT	Expert	PT	PMDB
	PT	PT	PT	PT	PT
Chile	Expert	Expert	UDI	Expert	Expert
	UDI <sup>29</sup>	UDI	Expert	Expert	Expert
	Expert	RN	Expert	UDI	Expert/ Expert

Source: The authors based on Brazilian Disclosure Website, *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Legislação*, Brazilian Ministries' websites, Brazilian Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, the Brazilian Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, and Chilean Active Transparency Directory, 2014.

## 2.2 One-party Cabinets and fragmented Congresses: Guatemala and Mexico

After a violent electoral campaign (in which 56 people with political connections were murdered), Álvaro Cólom (Hope National Unity Party – UNE) was elected president of Guatemala in 2008, beating 13 other candidates, while fifteen parties offered candidates in the legislative elections. Guatemalan parties have a low level of ideological commitment, which is why elections are run around candidates rather than around parties (Azpuru 2005, 2008).

Usually parties become fragmented over a short period due to a lack of organizational institutionalization. They tend to disappear, thus inducing politicians to find another political affiliation. One of the consequences of this problem is a low level of confidence in the democratic regime (Azpuru 2008, 2009).

This situation forced the elected president to deal with a largely unproductive and fragmented Congress that was organized according to the distribution of positions within committees according to the share of seats each party had in Congress. With strong powers as head of state and government, the Guatemalan president can be constrained by the military and the legislature but, fortunately for him, Congress does not traditionally use its surveillance power against the executive (Azpuru & Blanco, 2008; Briscoe, 2007; Center for Systemic Peace, 2011).

In constitutional terms Mexico has one of the weakest presidents in Latin America. Until 1997, the main characteristic of Mexican politics was that it had the same dominant party in the executive and legislative, namely, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Other political

<sup>28</sup> Brazilian Socialist Party.

<sup>29</sup> Independent Democratic Union.

features circumvented the so-called presidential constitutional weakness. These included strong party discipline that was created by a centralized party control with considerable authority over job indication;<sup>30</sup> the national president and the party president being the same person; the forbidding of reelections; and unitary government which was understood as a situation in which the same party controls the presidency and the Congress. Given these conditions, the president did not experience many governability problems (Casar, 1999, 2002; Nacif, 2002; Weldon, 1997, 2002).

In 1996, the PRI placed the electoral surveillance in the hands of a neutral institution,<sup>31</sup> the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)<sup>32</sup>, believing that such an institution would not affect its electoral outcomes. However, in 1997 after 68 years of dominance, the PRI lost its majority in Congress. According to Diaz (2004), electoral competition led to the party members no longer fearing the party's national leadership, which led to indiscipline. Political competitiveness obliged the PRI's national heads to give power to regional party organizations, appointing candidates and party affiliates to jobs within the bureaucracy. Another fundamental characteristic, namely, the accumulation of the positions of the country's and the party's president by the same person was not observed during the terms of Vicente Fox (2000-2006), Felipe Calderón (2007-2012), or the current incumbent, Enrique Peña Nieto. Finally, reelections for representatives were allowed in 2014.

According to Nacif (2004) and Casar (2002), the president holds a lower profile position in this scenario in terms of his relationship to Congress. Fewer bills are sent by him and there is an increased need for negotiation between him, his party, and other political actors inside Congress.

The 1997-2000 legislature was characterized by several coalitions,<sup>33</sup> with the most remarkable being some joint votes of the PAN (National Action Party) and the PRI, which approved many bills. In these roll calls, the support from PAN came because of its ideological alignment with

---

<sup>30</sup> Carey (2003) says that party leadership cannot easily whip the representatives elected by majority vote.

<sup>31</sup> The neutrality of the institute is questioned by Estévez et al. (2008) who observed the counselors' political choices. Because they got the job from an indication of a political party, they tended to take a position that favored that party's wishes.

<sup>32</sup> In 2014, the IFE became the National Electoral Institute.


<sup>33</sup> Understood in Mexico when more than 50 percent of a party delegation votes in the same way as more than 50 percent of another party delegation.

the bills proposed and because the federal executive released a considerable amount of money from the federal budget for cities governed by PAN affiliates (Lujambio 2001).

After the tragic results of PRI's strategy during Vicente Fox's term (when the party blocked the maximum amount of bills sent by the president inside Congress, which resulted in its shameful third place in the following presidential elections), it changed its approach. During President Calderón's term the PRI was much more collaborative, working together with the PAN's representatives on bills that came from the executive to Congress.<sup>34</sup> With good popularity and a centralized profile, Calderón only experienced minor political problems during his various terms, such as some trouble with the Capital's mayor from the Democratic Party of the Revolution (PRD) (Magar & Romero, 2008). Because Calderón had more affinity with his party than Fox had, he knew how to promote a more harmonious relationship between the executive and the legislative. In addition, Fox underrepresented his party in his cabinet and had to face many problems with the PAN's congressmen (Samuels & Shugart; 2010).

Of all four situations, the smaller cabinets are the one-party type ones. In 2011, Guatemala had nine ministries and Mexico 19. One can gain a general overview in Chart Two.

Chart 2 – Average values for Mexico and Guatemala



Source: The authors based on Open Wolf and Informex, 2014.

<sup>34</sup> Some are very important, such as electoral and social security reforms.

The size of the total budget as a proportion of the GDP (*budg\_gdp*) is much smaller when compared with the two multiparty cases – 6.26 percent in Mexico and 5.04 percent in Guatemala.<sup>35</sup> Nevertheless, the ability to spend that budget unrestrictedly (*unres\_exp*) in Guatemala is quite similar to Chile and much larger than it is in Brazil. This evidence needs to be carefully interpreted because if the total budget is absolutely smaller, then the total unrestricted expenses will also be smaller, even if the percentage is similar or greater.

The Guatemalan tenure is not that different from the multiparty cases and lies in the interval between 20 and 30 months, while the Mexican is around 35 months on average. Because the largest proportion of ministers come from the same party, it is naturally the high value of this variable. One-party cabinets were expected to be more stable than multiparty ones.<sup>36</sup>

The average number of linked agencies and companies is higher in Mexico and Guatemala in comparison to Brazil and especially to Chile. This is interpreted as a larger outside ministry action in one-party cabinet countries.

The numbers do not show a clear difference in all variables between the two cases, but they do show a huge difference between multiparty and one-party cabinets with regards to issues of budgetary resources. This suggests that this may be the most important political asset for a cabinet to hold, making it attractive for other parties to join.

With regard to ranking, because there are fewer ministries inside the cabinet in comparison to the other case, one could expect many ministries to appear in more than one category. Party analysis does not make sense here as both cabinets can be described as one-party cabinets.

---

<sup>35</sup> In Guatemala, the number is higher than 5.04 percent because there are missing data from the Education and Defense ministries.

<sup>36</sup> In fact, the tenure has a positive effect in both cases. In multiparty cabinets because it is good for a party to have more time to carry out their intentions, and in the one-party cabinets because of the explanation on the previous paragraph.

Table 4 - Ranking of ministries according to the variables – Mexico and Guatemala

Country	Budget	Unrestricted expenditure	Patronage ability	Tenure	Linked agencies
Guatemala	Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing	Environment and Natural Resources	Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing	Labor and Social Welfare	Culture and Sports
	Public Health and Social Services	Energy and Mines	Culture and Sports	Public Health and Social Services	Communication, Infrastructure, and Housing
	Chief of Staff	Culture and Sports	Environment and Natural Resources	Culture and Sports	Chief of Staff
Mexico	Public Education	Communication and Transportation	Public Functions	Defense	Health
	Health	Economy	Labor and Social Security	Navy	Public Education
	Communication and Transportation	Environment and Social Resources	Energy	Health	Chief of Staff

Source: The authors based on Open Wolf and Informex, 2014.

Based on the assumption that all four minority presidents have more than one tool with which they achieve a reasonable level of governability, this chapter has discussed each of their options.

According chapter One, in Brazil, one may see as options picked up by the president to manage his coalition the use of cabinet management, institutions, and pork barrel. The literature reviewed in this chapter indicated that in Chile, in addition to the help of a high-level of ideological cohesion, the president also uses cabinet management in order to gain support from Congress. The Mexican president, whose powers are derived from party strength, had to learn how to make *ad hoc* negotiations with opposition parties, and also use some resources for pork that are delivered to opposition mayors. According to this chapter's analysis, cabinet management is not a tool chosen by the Guatemalan president and he may require a smaller number of tools than those used by his fellow presidents due to the low level of surveillance performed against him by the Guatemalan Congress.

The main objective of this chapter was to establish whether our examples of multiparty cabinets hold more political value than the examples of one-party cabinets. In general, the variables indicated some large differences in favor of multiparty cabinets with regards to budgetary powers, and it appears that ministers from Brazil and Chile have more money to spend.

### **3 RANKING MINISTRIES AND CHECKING FOR COALESCENCE**

This chapter focuses on the main objective of the dissertation, i.e., to create a score with which we measure the political prestige of all Brazilian ministries, and also to investigate whether the distribution of cabinet seats among coalition parties has followed proportional criteria. In this way, this research seeks to collaborate with the literature on cabinet management published primarily about Brazil by Amorim Neto. However, it is not the intention to identify what leads the president to designate a politician from Party A to be head of Ministry Z. Rather, the intention is simply to establish whether Party A is receiving the truly proportional number of cabinet seats that its number of Houses seats would suggest. The chapter begins by describing the cabinets from 1995 to 2015. It then proceeds to explain all the variables that are considered appropriate to include in such a rank. It then formulates a score and once more analyzes the proportionality of distribution to check whether some party received more ministries than it was supposed to even after the important variables had been weighed.

#### **3.1 Descriptive analysis and the evolution of the Brazilian Cabinet**

The 1995 – 2015 period includes five presidential terms: Fernando Henrique Cardoso's two terms (January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1995 to January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1999 and January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1999 to January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two terms (January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003 to January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007 and January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2007 to January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2011), and Dilma Rousseff's first term (January 1, 2011 to January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015).

In these 20 years, Brazil had 48 ministries that were directly attached to the presidents who composed their Cabinets. Some of them no longer exist or have had their names changed.<sup>37</sup> The full list of all Brazilian ministries can be seen in Appendix A, followed by the full list of all Brazilian ministers from 1995 to 2015 in Appendix B.

---

<sup>37</sup> For the purpose of this dissertation, the current name is used for those ministries that have had their names changed but have been keeping the same powers. In the case of those that have had their powers or tasks changed, we use the current names at the time of their existence.



Table 5 – Cabinet composition year-by-year

Year	Presidential term	Number of ministries	Parties holding departments*	Percentage of ministers with no party affiliation*
1995	Cardoso I	23	PFL - PMDB - PSDB - PTB	50
1996	Cardoso I	24	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS <sup>38</sup> - PSDB	46
1997	Cardoso I	24	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS - PSDB	42
1998	Cardoso I	24	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS - PSDB	46
1999	Cardoso II	26	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS - PSDB - PV	31
2000	Cardoso II	22	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS - PSDB - PV	32
2001	Cardoso II	22	PFL - PMDB - PPB - PPS - PSDB - PV	32
2002	Cardoso II	22	PMDB - PPB - PSDB	55
2003	Lula I	30	PDT - PL <sup>39</sup> - PPS - PSB - PT - PV	23
2004	Lula I	32	PL - PMDB - PPS - PSB - PT - PV	25
2005	Lula I	33	PL - PMDB - PPS - PSB - PT - PV	21
2006	Lula I	33	PC do B <sup>40</sup> - PDT - PL - PMDB - PP - PSB - PT - PTB - PV	21
2007	Lula II	33	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR <sup>41</sup> - PSB - PT - PTB - PV	18
2008	Lula II	36	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PT - PTB - PV	17
2009	Lula II	37	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PT - PTB - PV	16
2010	Lula II	37	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PT - PV	22
2011	Rousseff I	38	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PSB - PT	21
2012	Rousseff I	38	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB <sup>42</sup> - PSB - PT	26
2013	Rousseff I	39	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PSB - PSD <sup>43</sup> - PT	23
2014	Rousseff I	39	PC do B - PDT - PMDB - PP - PR - PRB - PSD - PT	26

\*Data refers to the party that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

Table Five reveals that Cardoso was the president with the smallest cabinet, starting his first term with 23 ministries and ending his second one with 22 ministries. Another interesting feature is that the percentage of ministers with no party affiliation (or expert ministers) was highest during his two terms (especially during the first one) in comparison to Lula and Rousseff. In addition, his coalition was smaller and more cohesive than the others.

<sup>38</sup> Socialist Popular Party. This party show a contradictory pattern of presidential approval. It was inserted here because Mr. Raul Jungmann (the Minister for the Agrarian Development) was affiliated to it.

<sup>39</sup> Liberal Party.

<sup>40</sup> Communist Party of Brazil.

<sup>41</sup> Party of the Republic (former PL).

<sup>42</sup> Brazilian Republican Party.

<sup>43</sup> Social Democratic Party.

With a totally different pattern of cabinet management to that of his predecessor, Lula created eight new cabinet positions in just his first year as president. He ended his second term having created a striking number of 15 new ministries. He also invited more parties to take up position in his cabinet and appointed a considerably smaller percentage of ministers with no party attachment.

Having receiving a cabinet with 37 positions to fill, Rousseff's ability to create new ministries was not expected to be greater than her former colleagues. During the four years of her first term she created two new ministries. The percentage of expert ministers in her cabinet throughout the years resembles Lula's first term, as does the number of invited parties that hold a chairmanship in some ministry. The number of ministries that each party received year-by-year, together with its share in the whole cabinet, is presented in Table Six.<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> The Central Bank has been formally part of the presidential cabinet since 2004. However, it will not be considered for coalescence purposes in Tables Six, Eight, Nine, 21, and 22 because its head is the only member inside the cabinet who needs congressional approval to take office. Nevertheless, its characteristics were considered in the analysis of the future variables of political attractiveness.

Table 6 - Cabinet party share – 1995 – 2015

Party	Cardoso first term								Cardoso second term							
	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per
Expert	10	43.5	11	45.8	10	41.7	11	45.8	8	30.8	7	31.8	7	31.8	12	54.5
PFL	3	13.0	3	12.5	3	12.5	3	12.5	3	11.5	3	13.6	3	13.6	-	-
PSDB	4	17.4	5	20.8	6	25.0	5	20.8	7	26.9	6	27.3	6	27.3	6	27.3
PTB	1	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMDB	2	8.7	3	12.5	3	12.5	2	8.3	4	15.4	2	9.1	2	9.1	2	9.1
PPB	-	-	1	4.2	1	4.2	2	8.3	2	7.7	2	9.1	2	9.1	2	9.1
PPS	-	-	1	4.2	1	4.2	1	4.2	1	3.8	1	4.5	1	4.5	-	-
PV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3.8	1	4.5	1	4.5	-	-
NA	3	13.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Party	Lula first term						Lula second term									
	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per
Expert	7	23.3	6	20.0	6	18.8	6	18.8	4	11.8	5	14.3	5	13.9	7	18.9
PTB	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3.1	1	2.9	1	2.9	1	2.8	-	-
PMDB	-	-	2	6.7	3	9.4	2	6.3	6	17.6	6	17.1	6	16.7	6	16.2
PPS	1	3.3	1	3.3	1	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PV	1	3.3	1	3.3	1	3.1	1	3.1	1	2.9	1	2.9	1	2.8	1	2.7
PDT	2	6.7	-	-	-	-	1	3.1	2	5.9	2	5.7	2	5.6	2	5.4
PL	1	3.3	1	3.3	2	6.3	1	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSB	2	6.7	2	6.7	2	6.3	3	9.4	2	5.9	2	5.7	2	5.6	2	5.4
PT	16	53.3	17	56.7	17	53.1	15	46.9	15	44.1	15	42.9	16	44.4	15	40.5
PC do B	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3.1	1	2.9	1	2.9	1	2.8	1	2.7
PP	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3.1	1	2.9	1	2.9	1	2.8	1	2.7
PR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.9	1	2.9	1	2.8	1	2.7

Party	Rousseff first term							
	2011		2012		2013		2014	
	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per	Pos	Per
Expert	7	18.9	9	24.3	8	21.1	9	23.7
PMDB	6	16.2	5	13.5	5	13.2	5	13.2
PDT	2	5.4	2	5.4	2	5.3	2	5.3
PSB	2	5.4	2	5.4	2	5.3	-	-
PT	17	45.9	15	40.5	16	42.1	16	42.1
PC do B	1	2.7	1	2.7	1	2.6	1	2.6
PP	1	2.7	1	2.7	1	2.6	1	2.6
PR	1	2.7	1	2.7	1	2.6	1	2.6
PRB	-	-	1	2.7	1	2.6	2	5.3
PSD	-	-	-	-	1	2.6	1	2.6

“Pos” means number of Cabinets seats held by each party in that year and “Per” means the percentage of the Cabinet held by some party in that year.

Data refers to the party or minister profile that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers’ websites, and ministries’ websites.

In addition to the year-by-year evolution, it may also be interesting to indicate some features by means of Amorim Neto's (1994) criteria of classifying and dividing cabinets. According to his classification, a new cabinet is created i) on the inauguration day of a new presidency, ii) when there is a change in the party composition of the cabinet, or iii) when more than 50 percent of the ministers are displaced, even though the party composition remains unchanged.

According to such criteria, Cardoso and Lula each had four cabinets during their two terms. Mrs. Rousseff has had the same number of cabinets, bearing in mind that she has had four years less in the sample as the analysis stops in 2015. Cardoso's and Lula's average cabinet lengths are 24 months each, while Rousseff's are only half of that. This information can be found in Table Seven below.

Table 7 – Cabinet inauguration, termination, and length

<b>Cabinet</b>	<b>Inauguration</b>	<b>Termination</b>	<b>Length (months)</b>
Cardoso I	January, 1995	May, 1996	16
Cardoso II	May, 1996	January, 1999	32
Cardoso III	January, 1999	March, 2002	38
Cardoso IV	March, 2002	January, 2003	10
Lula I	January, 2003	January, 2004	12
Lula II	January, 2004	June, 2006	29
Lula III	June, 2006	September, 2009	39
Lula IV	September, 2009	January, 2011	16
Rousseff I	January, 2011	February, 2012	13
Rousseff II	February, 2012	April, 2013	14
Rousseff III	April, 2013	October, 2013	6
Rousseff IV	October, 2013	January, 2015	15

Source: *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

It is important to state that from this point on the analysis will be grounded on an annual basis. This is because, as one can see in the following sections, some variables that are used to classify the ministries in a rank of political attractiveness, such as the budget, the number of civil servants, and the number of agencies attached to them, need to be considered in such a way and must not be fractionalized. All types of fractionalization (whether by cabinets or annually) may have flaws. In order to avoid losing any information concerning the variables that are discussed below, it was decided to follow the annual fractionalization, which allows one to use as much information as possible from them. If one opted for cabinet fractionalization rather than annual fractionalization, then it would be impossible to split the corresponding value of the budget, the number of civil servants, and the agencies for periods that are not annually year based in a

suitable way.<sup>45</sup> It is recognized that the annually-based standard has its flaws, as a ministry chairmanship is attributed in some years to a specific party that held this position for the longest period of time in that year. Fortunately, cases in which a tight division can be observed with two different parties gaining the chairmanship of the same ministry in the same year for a close number of days are very rare in the database.

Moving towards the widely studied relationship between the distribution of cabinet seats and the percentage of House seats that each allied party has within the government coalition, the coalescence degree indicated by Amorim Neto (2000) as calculated according Equation One is as follows:

$$Coalescence = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^n (|S_i - M_i|) \quad (1)$$

Here  $M_i$  is the percentage of ministries received by party  $i$  inside the Cabinet, and  $S_i$  is the percentage of seats held by party  $i$  in relation to the total number of seats the whole government coalition holds within the House.

Tables Eight and Nine respectively present these percentages and the coalescence degree that is calculated in two ways, both by including the experts and independent ministers and then by ruling them out.<sup>46</sup> According to the information presented, and following Amorim Neto's (2000) criteria, one can classify the entire 20 years of analysis of coalition cabinets.

---

<sup>45</sup> As we have seen in Amorim Neto's (1994) cabinet definition, this occurs because they do not necessarily start or end at the beginning of a year.

<sup>46</sup> See Footnote 44.

Table 8 – Share of cabinet positions and House seats – 1995-2015

Party	Cardoso's first term								Cardoso's second term							
	1995		1996		1997		1998		1999		2000		2001		2002	
	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M
Expert	-	43.5	-	45.8	-	41.7	-	45.8	-	30.8	-	31.8	-	31.8	-	54.5
PFL	33.4	13.0	28.3	12.5	28.3	12.5	28.3	12.5	29.8	11.5	29.8	13.6	29.8	13.6	-	-
PSDB	29.7	17.4	25.1	20.8	25.1	25.0	25.1	20.8	28.1	26.9	28.1	27.3	28.1	27.3	40.7	27.3
PTB	7.3	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMDB	29.7	8.7	25.1	12.5	25.1	12.5	25.1	8.3	23.9	15.4	23.9	9.1	23.9	9.1	34.6	9.1
PPB	-	-	21.1	4.2	21.1	4.2	21.1	8.3	17.0	7.7	17.0	9.1	17.0	9.1	24.7	9.1
PPS	-	-	-	-	0.5	4.2	0.5	4.2	0.9	3.8	0.9	4.5	0.9	4.5	-	-
PV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	3.8	0.3	4.5	0.3	4.5	-	-
NA	-	13.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Party	Lula's first term						Lula's second term									
	2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M
Expert	-	23.3	-	20.0	-	18.8	-	18.8	-	11.8	-	14.3	-	13.9	-	18.9
PTB	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.1	3.1	6.1	2.9	6.1	2.9	6.1	2.8	-	-
PMDB	-	-	27.9	6.7	27.9	9.4	20.4	6.3	26.0	17.6	26.0	17.1	26.0	16.7	27.7	16.2
PPS	10.8	3.3	8.5	3.3	8.5	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PV	3.1	3.3	2.4	3.3	2.4	3.1	1.8	3.1	3.8	2.9	3.8	2.9	3.8	2.8	4.0	2.7
PDT	8.7	6.7	-	-	-	-	5.0	3.1	6.6	5.9	6.6	5.7	6.6	5.6	7.1	5.4
PL	16.9	3.3	13.4	3.3	13.4	6.3	9.7	3.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSB	14.4	6.7	11.3	6.7	11.3	6.3	8.3	9.4	8.1	5.9	8.1	5.7	8.1	5.6	8.6	5.4
PT	46.2	53.3	36.4	56.7	36.4	53.1	26.5	46.9	24.0	44.1	24.0	42.9	24.0	44.4	25.5	40.5
PC do B	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.5	3.1	3.8	2.9	3.8	2.9	3.8	2.8	4.0	2.7
PP	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.7	3.1	11.8	2.9	11.8	2.9	11.8	2.8	12.6	2.7
PR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.8	2.9	9.8	2.9	9.8	2.8	10.5	2.7

Party	Rousseff's first term							
	2011		2012		2013		2014	
	S	M	S	M	S	M	S	M
Expert	-	18.9	-	24.3	-	21.1	-	23.7
PMDB	24.1	16.2	23.5	13.5	20.4	13.2	22.3	13.2
PDT	8.0	5.4	7.8	5.4	6.8	5.3	7.4	5.3
PSB	10.5	5.4	10.2	5.4	8.9	5.3	-	-
PT	26.9	45.9	26.2	40.5	22.7	42.1	24.9	42.1
PC do B	4.6	2.7	4.5	2.7	3.9	2.6	4.3	2.6
PP	13.6	2.7	13.3	2.7	11.5	2.6	12.6	2.6
PR	12.3	2.7	12.0	2.7	10.4	2.6	11.5	2.6
PRB	-	-	2.4	2.7	2.1	2.6	2.3	5.3
PSD	-	-	-	-	13.3	2.6	14.6	2.6

S means the share of House seats each party holds inside the coalition and M means the percentage of ministries' chairmanship each party has inside the Cabinet.

S for 1995 until 1998 refers to the beginning of July of each year. For the rest of the period it refers to the inauguration day of each term.

M data refers to the party that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: The authors based on the Brazilian House of Representatives, Nicolau (2000), *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

Table 9 – Coalescence degree year-by-year – 1995-2015

		Coalescence with experts	Coalescence without experts
Cardoso's first term	1995	0.434	0.652
	1996	0.523	0.752
	1997	0.546	0.755
	1998	0.504	0.733
	avg.	0.502	0.723
Cardoso's second term	1999	0.626	0.780
	2000	0.602	0.761
	2001	0.602	0.761
	2002	0.454	0.727
	avg.	0.571	0.757
Lula's first term	2003	0.692	0.809
	2004	0.588	0.701
	2005	0.639	0.737
	2006	0.634	0.684
	avg.	0.639	0.732
Lula's second term	2007	0.763	0.719
	2008	0.752	0.740
	2009	0.658	0.726
	2010	0.714	0.742
	avg.	0.721	0.731
Rousseff's first term	2011	0.620	0.717
	2012	0.611	0.733
	2013	0.590	0.697
	2014	0.562	0.682
	avg.	0.596	0.707

Data refers to the party that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: The authors based on the Brazilian House of Representatives, Nicolau (2000), *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

An initial look at the previous tables indicates that the coalescence degree's lowest score is when the experts are included in the account, which is the case in Cardoso's first year. An important observation must be made here concerning the economically chaotic scenario during Cardoso's two terms. He inherited from his predecessor a country with one of the highest inflation rates in the world, an acute fiscal crisis, and some not negligible currency and external debt issues. The appointment of as many experts as possible to run the federal bureaucracy was therefore to be expected. A closer look at Table Eight reveals that the main source of disproportionality in his cabinet lies in the considerable number of ministries chaired by ministers with such profiles. By matching this information with the observations presented in Appendix B, one can see that experts were appointed to run key ministries that were attached in one way or another to the main reforms that President Cardoso sought to implement. These

included the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for Labor, the Ministry for Social Security, and the Ministry for Mining and Energy. It is also important to note that if one does not consider the experts in the coalescence degree, the proportionality of all the parties holding a cabinet position to their share of House seats within the coalition reaches its peak during all of Cardoso's years.

During the PT era, the dominance of party-affiliated ministers is evident. The lowest number of expert ministers is found during the first year of Lula's second term, when only 11.8 percent of all ministers did not have any kind of party affiliation.

Another interesting comparison can be made by looking at the percentage of cabinet positions held by the party that held the presidency. During the 1995-2002 years (Cardoso's two terms), the PSDB received a smaller percentage of ministerial positions than its percentage of House seats within the coalition during all the years. After 2003 a change in the pattern is clearly evident; every year from 2003 to 2014 (the Lula and Rousseff terms), the party holding the presidency (the PT) was over-rewarded and given a larger number of cabinet positions than would be expected if one were to consider its share of House seats within the coalition. The lowest difference in this ratio occurred in 2003 when the PT was in charge of 53.3 percent of the cabinet while having 46.2 percent of all the coalition seats in the House, and it reached its peak in 2006 and 2009.

If PT presidents did not exert considerable effort into appointing experts and over-rewarding their fellow party members, then some coalitional parties were – to use the same terminology – also under-rewarded. During Lula's two terms of office, the PTB, PMDB, PPS,<sup>47</sup> PP, and PL (renamed afterwards as PR) received many less ministries than they would have been expected to. During Rousseff's term, the PMDB, PP, PR, and PSD received a miniscule number of cabinet chairmanships in the same chart, in contrast to what their position within the coalition would have suggested. However, it is evident that this non-proportional distribution of cabinet seats may be one of the causes of the dissatisfaction within the government coalition, with the executive having been challenged in many press releases such as *Folha de São Paulo* (2013) and *O Estado de São Paulo* (2011, 2012, & 2014). It is also important to state that some of the under-represented parties in cabinet included the leading men in some huge corruption

---

<sup>47</sup> This one might be considered an outlier because after three years of alignment to the president it quit the coalition and joined the opposition side.



bombshells that took place during the PT presidencies, with the largest being *Mensalão* and *Petrolão*.<sup>4849</sup>

The main concern regarding Tables Eight and Nine is that they do not account for any difference among ministries, i.e., according to them all ministries have the same importance and level of attractiveness. However, consider, for example, what it would mean for a coalitional party to hold the chairmanship of the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture in contrast to the Finance Ministry.<sup>50</sup> This leads to the main intention of this research, which is to create a score of political importance for the ministries by re-building Tables Eight and Nine by weighing all the ministries according to the features that they have. The score for each ministry in a particular year would then be described as in Equation 2:

$$PA_{\alpha}^y = \sum_{i=1}^7 v_i w_i \quad (2)$$

Here  $PA_{\alpha}^y$  is the score of political attractiveness of ministry  $\alpha$  during year  $y$ ,  $v_i$  is the value of variable  $i$  of political interest, and  $w_i$  the expected weight or share of variable  $i$  of political interest.

Once one finds the political attractiveness score for each ministry one is able to compute the real share of a particular party within the whole cabinet, considering the different characteristics that the ministries controlled by this party might have. This real party share will be obtained by the following expression:

$$PS_{\theta}^y = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^n PA_{h\theta}^y}{\sum_{h=1}^n PA_{all_{cab}}^y} \quad (3)$$

Here  $PS_{\theta}^y$  is the party's  $\theta$  real share in relation to the whole real cabinet political value during year  $y$ ,  $\sum_{h=1}^n PA_{h\theta}^y$  is the sum of the weighed values of all  $h$  ministries headed by all party  $\theta$

---

<sup>48</sup> *Mensalão* was a bribe scam led by some PT stalwarts that used public money to pay a monthly rent to congressmen of the PP, PL (PR), and PTB to vote according the executive's will.

<sup>49</sup> The *Petrolão* scandal was a corruption scheme in which contracts of the state-owned Brazilian Oil and Gas Company (Petrobrás) were overpriced. When the contractors received the money they were obliged to give part of the contract profits to politicians affiliated to some coalitional parties such as the PT, PP, and PMDB.

<sup>50</sup> The former is one of the least important, while the latter may be the most important of all of them.

politicians in year  $y$ , and  $\sum_{h=1}^n PA_{all_{cab}}^y$  is the sum of the weighed or real values of *all* ministries that compose the presidential cabinet during year  $y$ .

With the real level of participation score calculated one can finally check among other things whether the over-representation of the PT remains or whether it vanishes. The following section describes the variables chosen for analysis, based on the assumption that they have some kind of political importance for ordinary politicians.

### **3.2 Variables that influence political attractiveness**

This section seeks to integrate the variables chosen into the rank of political importance (the  $v_i$ s in Equation Two). These variables are budgetary, network, patronage, normative, and time resources.<sup>51</sup>

#### **3.2.1 Budgetary capacity**

The first kind of monetary resources to discuss concerns the budgets of the ministries. This data for all ministries can easily be found in the Brazilian Annual Budgetary Laws.

Pereira and Mueller (2004) offer a good explanation of the whole budgetary process in Brazil in which, after being amended by the Congress, the budgetary proposal comes back to the executive to be signed as a law, partially vetoed, or fully vetoed. They state:

the Annual Budgetary Law is made of three different budgets: Fiscal, social security, and investment. The fiscal budget embodies revenues that will be collected by taxation as well as expenditures for all public administration, including the legislature, judiciary, executive, and foundations maintained by the state. The social security budget corresponds to government action in three segments: health, pensions, and social aid. Finally, the investment budget is

---

<sup>51</sup> One other variable could be part of the index, namely, the ministry's prestige. It was decided to not consider it because of its high level of endogeneity. One way to measure it would be to count the number of results a Google search would bring up if the ministry name was typed. Endogeneity exists because one cannot distinguish whether a ministry name returns many results because it is really important, or whether a stalwart or a famous politician assumed as its head is making the ministry more important by influencing the search results.

responsible for the total amount of (non-fiscal) capital revenue that will be invested by state-owned companies (Pereira & Mueller, 2004: p.787).

For the purposes of this dissertation, it was decided to analyze only the fiscal and social security budgets for each ministry. They were considered separately because, as seen in the previous paragraph and in keeping with the Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management (2013), the investment budget concerns the acquisition of machinery and other long-term assets by state-owned companies as long as all kinds of maintenance done by these companies in buildings belonging to the government. Based on such definitions, the only traceable money that is directly attached to each ministry is that which comes from the fiscal and social security budgets.

The evolution of the budget size of the whole cabinet can be found in Table Ten below. After a small period of contraction, the total budget of the cabinet has expanded positively in every year since 2001. A widely known fact about Brazilian politics concerns this expansion in electoral years, which seems to occur in some years in our analysis in 1998 and 2014, although Cardoso and Rousseff expanded their cabinets' budgets, they did not do that in a large scale, in contrast to Cardoso and Lula in 2002 and 2006 when one can see astonishing rates of budget expansion.

Table 10 – Annual evolution of budget size

Year	Presidential term	Cabinet budget*	Budget annual percent variation
1995	Cardoso's I	88,079,884,779.23	-
1996	Cardoso's I	98,983,025,285.52	12.38
1997	Cardoso's I	93,592,741,141.50	-5.45
1998	Cardoso's I	97,143,589,894.08	3.79
1999	Cardoso's II	104,861,409,948.48	7.94
2000	Cardoso's II	104,189,535,396.25	-0.64
2001	Cardoso's II	116,834,315,945.74	12.14
2002	Cardoso's II	133,987,080,352.09	14.68
2003	Lula's I	123,690,896,380.81	-7.68
2004	Lula's I	130,873,558,884.82	5.81
2005	Lula's I	135,397,099,022.35	3.46
2006	Lula's I	150,391,200,573.69	11.07
2007	Lula's II	164,756,980,684.44	9.55
2008	Lula's II	177,489,304,833.35	7.73
2009	Lula's II	195,664,685,560.77	10.24
2010	Lula's II	209,224,817,975.14	6.93
2011	Rousseff's I	233,053,670,523.89	11.39
2012	Rousseff's I	233,491,194,179.93	0.19
2013	Rousseff's I	242,557,909,186.88	3.88
2014	Rousseff's I	249,635,270,020.11	2.92

\*Deflated values in using IBGE's IPCA index (basis 2014). Values in US Dollars based on the October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2015 exchange rate (4.00 reais/1.00 US\$).

Source: The authors based on Portal da Transparência, Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, and Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014.

The following table (Table 11) presents all the ministries and their positions in a budgetary rank. The rank was built simply by ordering the ministries according to the ratio in the budget (the fiscal budget combined with the social security budget and divided by the whole cabinet budget), and classifying them for every year of the analysis, with the largest being accorded the first position, the second largest the second position and so on.<sup>52</sup>

A brief analysis of the budgetary rank allows one to state that some ministries have always filled top positions during almost the entire period analyzed. The Ministry for the Social Security, the Ministry for Labor, the Ministry for Health, the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for Defense, and the Finance Ministry appeared in those positions that concentrated the largest share of the total budget, while the bottom positions were mainly occupied by federal

<sup>52</sup> A few missing values for budget show up because a ministrie's budget does not appear in the previous budgetary law in the year of its foundation. More recently (only for values after 2004) a proxy could be found looking for the values of their total expenses at *Portal da Transparência*.

ministries inaugurated after 2003, such as the Secretariat for Harbor Maintenance, the Secretariat for Human Rights, the Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality, the Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development, the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, and the Secretariat for Women's Rights. An interesting fact is that the lion's share of these ministries (for both the top and bottom positions) have recently been chaired by PT politicians. An initial glance would therefore suggest, when one looks at budgetary capacity, that the party was in charge of two totally differently characterized kinds of ministries.

Table 11 – Ministries' rank according to budget size

Ministry	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Air Force	9	10	10	11	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Army	7	6	6	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attorney General	21	22	23	23	22	21	21	21	20	26	22	25	25	22	20	23	22	23	25	23
Central Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	20	20	21	21	21	21	21	22	24	21
Chief of Staff	22	23	24	24	23	22	22	-	21	31	31	31	32	35	37	36	37	38	39	39
Finance Ministry	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	8	8
General Inspector of the Union	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	26	27	26	27	27	28	27	27	28	28
General Secretariat of the Presidency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	25	26	27	28	28	29	29	30	32	30
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	14	13	9	9	10	9	11	9	9	9	10	11	10	12	13	12	12	11	13	13
Ministry for Communication Systems	17	15	16	12	16	15	12	12	15	16	15	15	16	16	15	19	17	16	17	11
Ministry for Culture	19	18	19	19	19	20	20	20	19	23	23	24	24	24	25	20	24	24	20	19
Ministry for Defense	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	4	4
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	-	-	-	-	21	14	16	17	17	21	21	22	22	23	23	24	25	19	22	22
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	-	8	11	10	12	13	14	11	11	11	14	8	11	10	10	8	10	13	10	10
Ministry for Education	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	3	3	3
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	27	28	28	29	29
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	15	16	17	17	18	18	19	18	18	19	19	19	19	20	22	22	23	25	26	24
Ministry for Health	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	2	2	2
Ministry for Industry, Trade and Tourism	20	21	22	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Labor	5	4	5	4	6	6	6	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	2	5	5	6
Ministry for Mining and Energy	16	17	18	18	17	16	17	16	13	14	12	14	13	15	14	14	14	14	12	17
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	11	12	14	15	4	12	9	13	12	13	11	13	14	14	16	13	13	12	14	14
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5
Ministry for Sports	-	20	20	21	-	-	-	-	-	24	27	23	23	25	24	25	20	21	21	25
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	19	18	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	-	-	12	14	15	11	13	14	14	17	16	17	17	17	17	16	16	17	16	16

Ministry for the Cities' Care	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	17	16	15	13	11	10	7	8	7	7
Ministry for the Environment	18	14	15	16	14	17	15	15	16	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	19	18	18	20
Ministry for the Justice	13	11	13	13	13	10	10	10	10	12	9	12	9	11	12	11	11	10	11	12
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	8	8	10	13	10	12	9	9	15	15	15	15	15
Ministry for the Regional Integration	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	24	21	20	19	19	17	18	20	23	26
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	19	21	20	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	6	7	7	7	8	7	7	7	6	7	8	9	8	8	8	9	8	7	9	9
Navy	8	9	8	8	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	26	26	26	26	26	27	27
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	28	28	29	29	30	30	30	29	30	32
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	37	37	38
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	30	29	31	32	33	33	33	34	35	36
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	35
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	36	35	35	36	31	31
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	33	19	18
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	29	31	31	31	33	33
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	29	30	30	31	32	32	32	32	34	34
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	34	34	34	35	36	37

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

Source: The authors based on *Portal da Transparência*, Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, and Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014.

The second variable of political attractiveness refers to a minister's ability to spend the budget of the ministry he is in charge of as he wishes. This refers to intergovernmental transfers, a type of grant called *convênios* which are:

Contracts signed by the federal government with public and private bodies ... used by the federal government to implement decentralized policies, where the funding is from the federal government (with or without a local counterpart) and a local partner does the execution. The interesting fact about these contracts is that they give to the minister an unrestricted power over which actions are implemented. The public administration laws mandate that the chairman must make a deal with the lowest bidder, but he can make a choice about what *convênio* he wants to implement first. Therefore, he can accept some and deny his permission to others (Lima de Oliveira et al., 2015: p. 6).

The Brazilian Freedom of Information Law and the *convênios* website enable one to compile a list of all the *convênios* signed from 1995 to 2014. This enabled the collection of information about the ministries, including which ones disbursed the money, the total amount of money authorized in the contract, and the total amount of money that was indeed freed up by the ministry.<sup>53</sup>

A rank was built in the following table in which Number One depicts the ministry with the largest ratio of monetary resources freed up by means of a *convênios* for this specific ministry in relation to the total number of *convênios* freed up by the whole cabinet, Number Two depicts the ministry with the second largest ratio, and so on.

---

<sup>53</sup> Unfortunately this is the variable with the largest number of missing values concentrated in just one year. Indeed, it will jeopardize the analysis for 1995 when we were not able to find its values for 11 ministries. In addition, the values for the Ministry for Union Administration and State Reform were not ever available.



Table 12 – Ministries' rank according to unrestricted expenses

Ministry	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Air Force	6	17	17	20	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Army	4	16	16	19	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attorney General	11	21	22	22	23	21	21	20	29	31	26	26	29	30	32	33	34	34	35	35
Central Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	29	29	31	32	34	35	36	36	37	37
Chief of Staff	12	22	23	23	24	22	22	22	30	32	33	33	35	35	37	37	38	38	39	39
Finance Ministry	3	1	14	1	7	1	9	1	20	8	15	12	24	16	27	19	27	30	31	32
General Inspector of the Union	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	28	30	30	32	33	35	36	37	37	38	38
General Secretariat of the Presidency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	29	31	31	33	34	36	27	28	25	29	24
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	-	10	5	5	6	12	12	9	10	16	16	14	13	12	13	8	7	7	9	6
Ministry for Communication Systems	10	19	21	16	22	20	13	12	23	15	17	18	25	23	24	17	22	18	22	30
Ministry for Culture	9	13	13	15	12	15	16	14	15	18	19	16	17	11	15	14	16	6	18	11
Ministry for Defense	-	-	-	-	-	16	15	16	17	19	18	15	14	15	14	16	14	14	12	17
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	-	-	-	-	13	14	7	11	16	17	4	17	15	17	17	7	19	23	6	16
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	-	11	6	8	11	18	18	17	18	25	23	20	27	25	25	26	24	29	25	31
Ministry for Education	1	2	1	3	4	3	2	4	1	2	2	3	3	4	3	1	4	5	7	3
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	20	21	21	24	20
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	-	20	20	21	21	19	17	19	21	21	25	25	26	26	26	28	29	26	15	28
Ministry for Health	2	5	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	1	1	2	5	3	1	2	2	1	1	1
Ministry for Industry, Trade and Tourism	-	9	8	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Labor	5	3	9	10	3	9	8	13	9	12	12	7	12	13	10	15	8	15	16	13
Ministry for Mining and Energy	-	14	19	13	15	10	11	15	19	14	14	19	20	18	21	24	25	22	20	25
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	-	6	4	7	10	6	5	6	3	3	3	4	4	6	7	6	6	4	8	7
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	13	8	14	6	9	5	10	5	2
Ministry for Sports	-	12	12	12	-	-	-	-	11	13	11	10	10	10	12	11	10	13	3	8
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	-	-	-	-	14	13	20	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	-	-	11	11	8	8	10	8	8	7	8	9	9	9	9	10	13	12	10	9

Ministry for the Cities' Care	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	5	1	1	1	4	4	1	3	4	4
Ministry for the Environment	8	8	7	6	9	11	6	10	14	20	20	21	19	20	20	21	18	16	21	21
Ministry for the Justice	-	7	10	14	16	5	4	7	4	10	13	11	11	8	11	13	9	8	11	10
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	5	4	3	3	6	9	7	6	7	5	2	3	3	2	2	5
Ministry for the Regional Integration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	-	18	18	17	20	17	19	18	24	26	28	28	23	28	30	31	32	32	33	34
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11	10	5	6	7	8	5	11	11	13	14
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	7	4	3	4	1	7	14	5	5	6	9	8	2	2	5	12	12	9	14	12
Navy	-	15	15	18	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	21	16	25	15	17	28	15
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	22	21	22	18	19	18	18	17	19	17	18
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	27	30	31	33	34	35	35	36	36
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	24	24	24	22	24	23	23	23	24	26	23
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	22
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	29	30	31	27	30	27
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	28	19	29
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	29	31	32	33	33	34	26
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	23	22	23	21	22	19	22	20	20	23	19
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	30	32	32	34	-	28	29	30	31	32	33

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

Air Force, Army, and Navy values of unrestricted expenses for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 we use the value reported for the Ministry for Defense at *Portal dos Convênios* split by three

Source: The authors based on *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Transparência*, Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011.

This kind of analysis of unrestricted expenses is necessary because if one only looks at the total budget, then a very important political asset might be obscured by something else. That is, a large of money would not be that interesting in itself if the minister cannot spend it as he wishes, which is exactly what appears to happen in the Ministry for the Social Security, for example. While it was ranked number one in terms of total budget size from 1995 until 2015, in terms of unrestricted expenditure it only came in a humble 17<sup>th</sup> position. The same thing occurred, although less intensely, with other stalwarts of our previous analysis, such as the Ministry for Labor, the Ministry for Defense, and the Finance Ministry, especially during the PT years.

In terms of the ranking according to unrestricted expenses, the ministries in the top positions are the Ministry for Health, the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for the Cities' Care, the Ministry for National Integration, the Ministry for Transportation, the Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply, and the Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation. The ministries with the lowest ranking according to this criterion are the Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management, the office of the Chief of Staff and almost all of the secretariats that came to hold a ministry status after 2003.

### **3.2.2 Networking capacity**

Having discussed the budgetary variables, this section focuses on characteristics that concern the ministries' networking capacity. This is considered to be a valuable political asset, based on the assumption that the greater a politician's influence over other governmental agencies, companies, bodies, and so on, the greater his political influence. The chosen measure of analysis is the number of agencies, companies, and other branches whose heads are in some way attached to the minister. They are often appointed by the minister, or are attached in a budgetary way when the minister has the power to decide when to free up budgetary resources for them, although these agencies also have a certain level of independence when it comes to performing their tasks.<sup>5455</sup> It was decided to deal with ministries that are directly attached to companies,

---

<sup>54</sup> Not considering the ministries' secretariats and the other bureaucratic bodies that all ministries have within their structures.

<sup>55</sup> The values showed in this variable may contain some state-owned companies. These kind of companies play an important role in coalition management, with many allied parties appointing fellows to be part of their boards. It must be considered, however, that not all of them are directly attached to a ministry. The non-attached ones, such as Petrobras and the Post Office chairmen (*segundo escalão* or *administração indireta* so-called jobs in Brazil), are not reflected here. While not denying their importance for allied parties, we understand that these kind of

agencies, and so on through the Annual Budgetary Law. This law archives report every authorized budget, which is summed under the code of each ministry and then split over all ministry's bodies, agencies, and other bodies similar to those targeted here. This makes it easy to count how many of these companies, agencies, and other bodies are attached to a specific ministry. Because any judgement concerning the importance of each of these bodies would be misleading, the rank in Table 13 considers the gross number of bodies each minister was attached to in a particular year. This means that Number One is the ministry with the largest ratio of agencies, companies, and other bodies in relation to the total number of these bodies within the whole cabinet in a given year, Number Two is the ministry with the second largest share of such bodies in the same year, and so on.<sup>56</sup>

Many ministries appear in the same position, particularly those with a lower rank as in most cases they had no agencies attached to them in that year. The Ministry for Education occupied the first position from the beginning to the end of the analysis. Indeed, it can be considered as an outlier as the number of agencies it holds is considerably larger than any other ministry. This occurs because all federal state-owned schools, universities, and educational foundations in Brazil fall under the minister of education. Appearing in high positions and with a noteworthy level of stability are the Ministry for Culture, the Ministry for Defense, the Ministry for Health, the Ministry for the Justice, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation. In the lower ranks one finds the office of the Attorney General, the Central Bank, the office of the Chief of Staff, the General Inspector of the Union, the General Secretariat of the Presidency, the Secretariat for Harbor Maintenance, the Secretariat for Humans' Rights, the Secretariat for Institutional Relations, the Secretariat for Promotion of Racial Equality, the Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development, the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, the Secretariat for the President's Advertisement, the Secretariat for Women's Rights, and the Secret Service. Almost all of these lower-ranked ministries are headed by PT politicians.

---

appointments would demand considerable research in themselves and here we are trying to focus only on the power possessed by the *primeiro escalão* or *administração direta* jobs.

<sup>56</sup> Making clear that the numbers placed inside the table do not represent the number of companies and agencies each ministry had.



Ministry for the Cities' Care	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	7	10	8	8	8	8	8	9	8	8	7
Ministry for the Environment	10	7	7	6	6	9	7	8	7	6	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5
Ministry for the Justice	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	3	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	3	5	8	9	7	7	6
Ministry for the Regional Integration	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	10	9	10	9	9	10	8	9	9	9	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	11	9	9	8
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	12	11	11	10
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	10	11	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	4	4	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	8
Navy	7	8	8	7	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	12	12	12	13	12	11	10
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	11	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	10	9
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	11
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	11
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	12	13	12	11	10
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	12	10	9
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	11
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	11
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	11	12	12	13	12	12	12	13	12	12	11

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the department did not exist in that year.

The Ministries for Sports and Tourism and for the National Integration 1999 values, General Inspector of the Union, General Secretariat of the Presidency, Ministries for Sports, for Cities' Care, for the Tourism, the Secretaries for Human Rights, for Promotion of Racial Equality, for Women's Rights, and the Secret Service 2003 values, and the Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation 2011 values we used as a proxy their values of the ensuing year.

Source: The authors based on the Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, and Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014.

### 3.2.3 Patronage capacity

Many articles have been published about patronage and its relation to public policy and politics. Schneider (1993) carried out a comparative analysis that sought to discover the level of bureaucratic insulation in the United States, Brazil, Mexico, France, and Japan in order to build a standard framework in which

bureaucratic autonomy will be greater if top bureaucrats train at a small number of prestigious universities (merit elite), follow predominantly public careers (state elite), circulate rapidly through many different agencies, advance through impersonal merit promotion, and do not retire to positions in the private firms they used to regulate (Schneider, 1993: p. 342 and 343).

He concluded that the level of bureaucratic insulation in Brazil is not so great. However, the extensive powers of the president mean that he is able to magnify or shrink the insulation level at any given time, making this a direct function of the president's will. Lapuente and Nistotskaya (2009) argue that even in exceptional situations such as an autocracy, one may be able to see a reasonable level of merit procedures in bureaucratic appointments. These occur because the autocrat makes his political analysis based on long-term foundations, ensuring the best future scenario in order to avoid possible reasons for coups and riots. Barberia and Praça (2014) show that neither patronage, nor the meritocracy hypothesis, are themselves sufficient to explain the phenomenon in Brazil. Instead they found out that the level of expertise matters as much as the fact of being affiliated to the president's party.

To proceed with this analysis, one can identify two measures of influence that a minister may be interested in. The first is the total number of civil servants a ministry has. While this is not a proper patronage strategy, in running ministries it may be in a politician's interests to take actions that are favorable to all his employees in the hope that he would receive some sort of consideration back from them, for example, at a future election. The evolution of this variable can be seen in Table 14. In contrast to the absence of a clear pattern of budget evolution (Table 10), the total number of civil servants in the whole cabinet indicates a shrinking pattern during Cardoso's years and a pattern of limited expansion during Lula and Rousseff's years, particularly in the last year of Rousseff's first term when she was running for re-election.

Table 14 – Annual cabinet evolution of number of civil servants

Year	Presidential term	Cabinet total number of civil servants*	Civil servants annual percent variation
1995	Cardoso's I	516,670	-
1996	Cardoso's I	518,250	0.31
1997	Cardoso's I	475,809	-8.19
1998	Cardoso's I	483,811	1.68
1999	Cardoso's II	471,080	-2.63
2000	Cardoso's II	460,329	-2.28
2001	Cardoso's II	459,350	-0.21
2002	Cardoso's II	460,081	0.16
2003	Lula's I	465,211	1.12
2004	Lula's I	483,953	4.03
2005	Lula's I	496,549	2.60
2006	Lula's I	516,607	4.04
2007	Lula's II	515,415	-0.23
2008	Lula's II	528,168	2.47
2009	Lula's II	542,811	2.77
2010	Lula's II	558,373	2.87
2011	Rousseff's I	563,921	0.99
2012	Rousseff's I	567,935	0.71
2013	Rousseff's I	578,014	1.77
2014	Rousseff's I	601,230	4.02

\*1996 values were used as a proxy for the year of 1995, Values of the subsequent year were used as proxy for the Chief of Staff 1996 and 1998 values, the Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform 1999 values and the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture 2009 values. For 1996 the data refers to the month of October, between 1997 and 2014 it refers to the month of December.

Source: The authors based on Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, and Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011.

In looking at Table 15 below, one can see the share of employees that a particular ministry has in relation to the total number of civil servants in the full cabinet. As has been briefly stated above, these kind of servants are hired in transparent and wide-open recruitment processes, which are called *concursos públicos* in Brazil. They provide a reasonable level of disclosure and each citizen who fulfills the particular requirements is able to apply. This is usually done through theoretical tests, and sometimes also physical and psychological tests. Once the applicant is approved by means of such an exam, he begins his activities as a civil servant and after a period of three years in a tenure track he is granted life tenure.<sup>57</sup> The minister has less influence with these kinds of civil servants than we can be expected in the case of the following

<sup>57</sup> It is important to state that the tenure track mentioned here has no similarity with the tenure track process observed in American universities, for example. In the former, it is basically a bureaucratic formality in which almost everyone running for it gets it, implying in positive terms that the life tenure is obtained when someone gets his approval on the *concurso público*. In the latter, the tenure track usually requires a minimum level of performance from the applicant in order to get the life tenure.



measure. Nevertheless, even although they hold a life tenure, the civil servants of any ministry are directly influenced by the decisions made by the his minister.

The rank (Table 15) shows that for every year of the specific period, the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for Health, and the Ministry for the Social Security gained the first three positions respectively. That occurred because all the school teachers, staff members, and other employees in federal state-owned schools and universities are civil servants, with the same being true of physicians, nurses, and health staff who work for state-owned hospitals, emergency rooms, and care centers. Finally, the third place on our rank of tenured civil servants – the Ministry for Social Security – probably held such a position for all those years because the Brazilian social security system is mainly enforced by the government, with approximately 1,065 offices countrywide, all of them replete with tenured civil servants. The low ranking positions in Table 15 are comprised of the secretariats that became ministries after 2003. Their payroll is significantly smaller than that of the other ministries and one should again not forget that they are run almost entirely by PT politicians.



Ministry for the Cities' Care	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	28	27	27	27	28	29	29	30	31	31	32
Ministry for the Environment	11	11	11	11	11	12	11	10	9	9	10	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Ministry for the Justice	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	23	14	17	15	16	17	17	20	19	21	20	21	21	21	21	19
Ministry for the Regional Integration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	27	28	28	28	29	30	30	31	30	30	30
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	22	22	22	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	13	13	14	14	15	13	13	13	13	15	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	14	13	13
Navy	9	9	9	8	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34	34	35	34	35	34	33	33
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	30	31	30	31	32	33	32	33	33	34	34
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	36	37	37
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	31	32	32	33	35	37	37	38	38	38	39
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	38
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	26	27	27	27	27	27
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	23	23	22
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	31	32	33	34	35	35	35
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	32	33	33	35	36	36	36	37	37	36	36
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	26	25

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

1996 values were used as a proxy for the year of 1995, Values of the subsequent year were used as proxy for the Chief of Staff 1996 and 1998 values, the Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform 1999 values and the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture 2009 values.

For 1996 the data refers to the month of October, between 1997 and 2014 it refers to the month of December.

Source: The authors based on the Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, and Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011.

The second variable dealing with cabinet employees is concerned with the relationship between the total number of political appointees that a ministry has and the total number of political appointees that the whole cabinet holds.

This is more related to a patronage strategy itself and is composed by the ratio between the number of employees who occupy senior management and advice positions (DAS according to the Portuguese acronym) in a ministry and the total number of DAS employees of the entire cabinet. Coming back to Barberia and Praça (2014) and their explanation concerning the process of bureaucratic appointment in Brazil, one sees that when the standard process of public tests (*concurtos públicos*) do not apply, as is the case from 2005 to the present, the Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management, together with the President's Chief of Staff, are responsible for nominating employees to DAS positions. Any citizen can be nominated as a DAS employee whether they are a civil servant or not. They are appointed according to political criteria, with a status ranging from one to six, where the DAS-1 are those with the lowest positions and responsibilities and the DAS-6 are those with the highest profiles, tasks, and wages. The DAS category comprises both ordinary citizens and civil servants with political connections. In the latter case, in addition to his regular paycheck, the civil servant also receives an extra monthly compensation due to his DAS status. This leads one to consider this kind of position as directly linked to the positive valuation of the minister's will and as an indication of the political importance of a particular ministry.

Table 16 shows the top ranked ministries as the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for Health, the Ministry for the Social Security, the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for Agrarian Development, and the Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management. As in Table 15, the lowest ranked ministries with regards to patronage are the secretariats that became ministries after 2003.

Finally, some older and well-known ministries that used to maintain reasonable scores in Table 16's ranking during Cardoso's two terms, such as the Ministry for Communication Systems and the Ministry for Labor have all been losing their status during the PT era.



Ministry for the Cities' Care	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	25	25	25	26	26	27	27	27	27	27	27
Ministry for the Environment	15	16	16	15	7	9	8	8	8	9	10	9	9	9	9	9	8	9	9	9
Ministry for the Justice	5	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	5	6	4	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	19	19	17	16	17	17	18	18	18	18	18	19	19	18	19	16
Ministry for the Regional Integration	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	10	10	9	8	8	3	3	3	4	4	4	6	8	8	8	6	6	6	6	6
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	24	24	24	24	24	25	25	25	26	26	26
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	13	12	12	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	8	7	7	6	12	12	12	10	11	11	11	11	11	11	12	12	12	12	13	13
Navy	20	22	23	23	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	30	29	30	30	31	31	31
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	28	29	29	30	31	32	28	28	28	28	28
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	27	28	28	30	32	31	32	32	32
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	31	31	31	33	34	35	36	37	37	38	38
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	35
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	33	31	34	34	34	34
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	30	30	30
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	27	28	29	29	29	29	29
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	30	32	32	34	35	36	35	36	36	36	36
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	29	30	30	32	32	34	34	35	35	37	37

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

1996 values were used as a proxy for the year of 1995, Values of the subsequent year were used as proxy for the Chief of Staff 1996 and 1998 values, the Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform 1999 values and the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture 2009 values.

Source: The authors based on SIAPE and Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Presidential Decree 820-May 13, 1993, Presidential Decree 1757-Dec. 22, 1995 Presidential Decree 16642-Sep. 25, 1995, Presidential Decree 1792-Jan. 1, 1996, Presidential Decree 1917-May 27, 1996, Presidential Decree 2890-Dec. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 1784-Jan. 11, 1996, Presidential Decree 2681-Jul. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 2776-Sep. 10 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2073-Nov. 14, 1996, Presidential Decree 2447-Dec. 30, 1997, Presidential Decree 1825-Feb. 29, 1996, Presidential Decree 1796-Jan. 24, 1996, Presidential Decree 2802-Oct. 13, 1998, Presidential Decree 2813-Oct. 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2926-Oct. 29, 1998, Presidential Decree 2663-Jul. 9, 1998, Presidential Decree 2619-Jun. 5, 1998, Presidential Decree 2599-May 19, 1998, Presidential Decree 2477-Jan. 28, 1998, Presidential Decree 3224-Oct. 28, 1999, Presidential Decree 3129-Aug. 9, 1999, Presidential Decree 2928-Jan. 8, 1999, Presidential Decree 3338-Jan. 14, 2000, Presidential Decree 3366-Feb. 16, 2000, Presidential Decree 3568-Aug. 17, 2000, Presidential Decree 4668-Apr. 9, 2003, and Presidential Decree 6972-Sep. 29, 2009.

### 3.2.4 Regulation capacity

Another important measure of political attractiveness is the ability a minister may have to regulate some branches of economic or social sectors and activities. In Brazil ministers are able to issue and sign acts that vary greatly in importance. Baptista (2007) classifies these acts into three kinds, namely, those that deal with system management and organization, those that cover financial issues regarding the ministry, and those that aim to implement and guide policies.

At first sight, analyzing the regulation capacity of a ministry by considering these rules and acts seems to be the best approach, but in fact it is not. One problem arises when there is a need to check all the rules issued by all ministries over a period of five presidential terms. With many ministers issuing over 1,000 acts per year, this makes it impossible to classify this huge number of acts according to their importance. For example, there may be situations in which Minister A issued many more acts than Minister B, but almost all Minister A's acts refer to minor things such as the job transfers of civil servants, while Minister B's few acts have great impact over an entire economic sector, such as the acts signed by the Finance Minister. It is impossible to read and classify all the acts signed during the period of analysis, which turns our attention to another source of information that allows us to measure the regulation capacity of ministries.

The strategy of classifying the ministries according to their ability to govern an economic sector involves finding which of them had at least one normative body under their domain in a particular year. The source of this information once more comes from the annual budgetary laws that enable one to map everything under a ministry's domain and to then analyze whether all these bodies, companies, agencies, and so on had any normative assignment. Some examples include the Civilian Aviation Department, the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission, the Coordination of High-Skilled Citizens Improvement, the Institute for Standardization of Measures and Procedures, the normative agencies, and others.

Because we are not interested in the number of these normative bodies but are only interested in whether a ministry had at least one of them, we do not have a proper rank with which to measure this normative power. Table 17 indicates all the ministries that had at least one normative body attached to its structure in a particular year with a "y" and it indicates all those that did not have this with an "n".

The majority of ministries kept the same classification during the entire period. The exceptions are the Ministry for Sports, the Ministry for Mining and Energy, the Ministry for Health, the Ministry for Culture, and the Ministry for Communication Systems. This information should not be strongly interpreted because, with the exception of the Ministry for Sports,<sup>58</sup> all of the others are well-established ministries. What may have occurred is that, by the early Cardoso years, although these ministries ruled these sectors, they did not have a normative body attached to them. Alternatively, these sectors may have previously been ruled by these ministries in a less direct and organized way in comparison to their current structure.

---

<sup>58</sup> The ministry for Sports received this status in 2011 because of the creation of the Public Olympic Authority, a normative body created to rule the whole Olympic Games process that falls under its budgetary structure.





Ministry for the Justice	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y
Ministry for the National Integration	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Ministry for the Regional Integration	n	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Social Security	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Ministry for the Tourism	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	-	y	y	y	y	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for the Welfare	n	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Transportation	n	n	n	n	n	n	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y	y
Navy	y	y	y	y	y	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for Human Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	y	y
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n	n

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

y represents yes, the ministry had at least one normative agency attached to it.

n represents no, the ministry had none normative agency attached to it.

Ministry for Sports 1996, Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management 1995, Ministry for the National Integration 1999, Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance 2007, and Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development 2013 indexes are proxies obtained using the value of the respectively following year.

Source: The authors based on the Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, and Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014.

### 3.2.5 Time capacity

The tenure for occupying the chairmanship of a ministry is the final variable that is assumed to be important for any party receiving this political grant. Retaining control of a particular ministry for as long as possible is a direct function of the political value that a ministry possesses. The longer the time that a party runs a ministry, the greater are the possibilities for it to implement its policy or political strategies.

The variable that is analyzed here is the average tenure in months for all ministries from 1995 to 2015. The data comes from the Library of the Presidency of Brazil, where the inauguration and termination date of each minister is available. The average tenure in each presidential term is not shown because many ministers remained in office after the end of a particular presidential term. This occurred especially when President Rousseff kept many of Lula's ministers in her Cabinet. To try to measure the tenure according to term, instead of according to the entire period of analysis, would involve a measurement error when considering those ministers who acted as chair of the same ministry for more than one president or presidential term in a row.

After the economic crisis of the 1980s when the tenure of every finance minister was remarkably short, a change occurred from 1995 to 2015. Thanks to Pedro Malan and Guido Mantega's long tenures, this value skyrocketed and this ministry gained the first position in rank. In contrast to the previous ranks discussed, this rank does not indicate a clear pattern favoring some ministries. Instead, one sees very important and famous ones, such as the Ministry for Health, just one position ahead the Secretariat for Harbor Maintenance, with both in the second half of the rank, while the Ministry for Education is a few positions above the Secretariats for Human and Women's Rights.

Table 18 – Rank of average tenure in months – 1995 - 2015

Ministry	Avg. tenure (months)	Ministry	Avg. tenure (months)
Finance Ministry	81.2	Navy	27.0
The Secret Service	81.2	Ministry for Communication Systems	26.9
General Inspector of the Union	71.6	Ministry for Mining and Energy	25.9
General Secretariat of the Presidency	70.6	Ministry for Defense	25.8
Central Bank	63.2	Ministry for the Tourism	24.7
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	48.7	Ministry for Labor	23.8
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	48.6	Ministry for Health	23.8
Ministry for Culture	48.4	Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	23.2
Ministry for Sports	46.6	Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	22.8
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	44.4	Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	22.3
Ministry for Education	40.6	Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	22.1
Attorney General	40.5	Ministry for the Social Security	20.7
Ministry for the Environment	40.5	Ministry for the Justice	20.2
Secretariat for Human Rights	36.9	Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	20.1
Secretariat for Women's Rights	36.5	Ministry for Transportation	19.1
Army	36.2	Ministry for the National Integration	18.3
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	35.8	Air Force	18.0
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	32.4	Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism	16.2
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	31.5	Secretariat for Institutional Relations	14.3
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	29.5	Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	13.4
Ministry for the Cities' Care	29.2	Ministry for Sports and Tourism	12.1
Chief of Staff	29.2	Ministry for the Regional Integration	na
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	27.3	Ministry for the Welfare	na
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	27.1	-	-

Source: The authors based on the Library of the Presidency of Brazil.

### 3.3 The elite survey

Having introduced the variables of political attractiveness (the  $v_i$ s in Equation Two), the index that is also based on Equation Two now looks like Equation Four:

$$PA_{\alpha}^y = \left( budg_{\alpha}^y \times w_{budg_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( unrs\_expe_{\alpha}^y \times w_{unrs\_expe_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( norm_{\alpha}^y \times w_{norm_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( net_{\alpha}^y \times w_{net_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( tenure_{\alpha}^y \times w_{tenure_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y \times w_{civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y} \right) + \left( unrs\_civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y \times w_{unrs\_civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y} \right) \quad (4)$$

Here  $PA_{\alpha}^y$  is the political attractiveness score of ministry  $\alpha$  in year  $y$ ,  $budg_{\alpha}^y$  is the ratio of the budget of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the size of the total budget of cabinet in year  $y$ ,  $unrs\_expe_{\alpha}^y$  is the percentage of unrestricted expenses of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the total amount of the cabinet's unrestricted expenses in year  $y$ ,  $norm_{\alpha}^y$  is one if ministry  $\alpha$  had under its domain at least one normative agency, regulatory, or policy agency in year  $y$  and otherwise zero,  $net_{\alpha}^y$  is the relation of agencies, companies, and others attached to ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the total number of these governmental agencies within the whole cabinet in year  $y$ ,  $tenure_{\alpha}^y$  is represented by the relation of the average tenure in months ministry  $\alpha$  had for the period of 1995-2015 divided by 240 which is the total number of months analyzed in this research,  $civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y$  is the ratio between the number of all the employees ministry  $\alpha$  had in year  $y$  and the sum of all the employees the whole cabinet had in the same year, and  $unrs\_civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y$  is the number of unrestricted contracted civil servants (the DAS ones) of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the DAS positions of the entire cabinet during year  $y$ .

Having introduced the selected variables of political interest, one must move one step forward in the creation of the rank of cabinet political attractiveness. One problem arises with the variables chosen and the data gathered, namely, what should be the ideal share of each of those variables in the aggregated score? Or, what are the  $w_i$  values in Equations Two and Four? Any answer to this question based only on the researchers' feelings and assumptions may be misleading. It was therefore decided to conduct an elite survey among House stalwarts who in fact often had the opportunity to choose a ministry to be run by their party. They were asked to differentiate between the best and the worst ministries in Brazil, to name the most important features that a ministry should have, and to appraise the performance of the three presidents analyzed based on their building and managing of coalitions, and so on.

Elite surveys are conducted when a researcher needs information that can only be provided by a few people who are within the context researched. They are selected to be part of the sample just because of who they are or the position they occupy. In other words, one looks for senior informants with a high level of experience in some activity, rather than freshmen who are only able to help with a broad understanding of some fact (Hochschild, 2009; Trambly, 1957). It was also decided to pursue an elite survey because the number of representative agents was feasible to work with, making this technique more appropriate than the key informant technique proposed by Kumar et al. (1993). According Saiegh (2009), these kinds of surveys are fairly reliable, despite minor problems such as the limited number of options the researcher can offer to the interviewee and the different meanings that a scale of intensity may represent to the different answering agents.

Another tool with which to check the behavior of some phenomena is the expert survey in which researchers in some field of activity are asked about their positions regarding certain variables, just as O'Malley (2007) did in order to check levels of prime ministerial power. In this dissertation, an expert survey was also conducted and is presented in Appendix E. It does not interfere with our rank of political attractiveness, but allows the reader to make a comparison between the representatives' views and the views of the people who have been studying them.

The elite survey was conducted from June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2015 to July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2015. 129 forms were sent to all representatives who complied with at least one of the following criteria. They were either a member of the House Board, president or first vice-president of House Standing Committees, a leader or first vice-leader of party delegations, or they had served at least five terms in a row. This choice was made because the opinion of novice representatives without leadership experience might not represent the true value that one expected to gain for the variables. Likewise, the stalwarts' opinion needed to truly reflect what really matters when one discusses cabinet positions as these politicians are usually responsible for appointing their party fellows to occupy such positions.

Because of practical reasons the forms were sent to these 129 representatives' institutional email addresses, using either an Internet-based answer system or a PDF file.<sup>59</sup> A series of phone calls were then made to their staff to explain the research and to ask for their collaboration.

---

<sup>59</sup> Because of a confidentiality clause, the names of the representatives who helped in answering the forms are not presented


Answers that came from the representative himself, his chief of staff, or his senior legislative assistant were accepted because it was thought that a staff member would not go against his boss's opinion and point of view on a wide range of subjects such as ours. Of the forms sent out, 62 valid answered forms were received back, giving a response rate of 48.06 percent. Charts 3 to 13 presents the results of this elite survey, with the title of the chart showing the question that was asked to the members of the House.<sup>60</sup>

When asked to rank the ministries according to their political importance, the representatives rated the five most important ones (Chart Three) as the Finance Ministry, followed by the office of the Chief of Staff, the Ministry for Education, the Ministry for Health, and the Ministry for Planning, Budget, and Management. The members of the House also had the opportunity to explain why they had chosen these ministries as the best ones. Some said that the head of the office of the Chief of Staff is basically the second most powerful political agent in Brazil, and that he walks hand in hand with the president and acts as a link – or bridge – between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. Some said that these important ministries are also responsible for the entire economic and political life of Brazil. With regards to the Ministry for Education and the Ministry for Health, the explanations were related to the great policy capacity that these two ministries have to influence the lives of many citizens in a direct way.

---

<sup>60</sup> Some other questions about coalition management, which are not directly linked to the variables of political interest, can be seen in Appendix D.

Chart 3 Elite - What are the three most politically important ministries in Brazil?



Answered questions: 61


Skipped questions: 1

Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.



In Chart Four, the question was inverted and they were asked for their opinion on the three least important ministries in Brazil. The Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture, the Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development, the Secretariat for the Promotion of the Racial Equality, and the Secretariat for Women's Rights were listed as the four least politically interesting ministries in the cabinet. Evenly matched in the fifth place were the Secret Service and the Secretariat for Harbor Maintenance. They were again offered the opportunity to explain their reasons for such choices. The main explanation given against the political importance of these ministries was that the activities developed by them are simply a branch of some broader activity or policy that has already been developed by other bigger ministries. Alternatively, it was said that they could easily be merged with other ministries. They were also against these ministries because of their limited budgetary capacity.

Chart 4 Elite - What are the three least politically important ministries in Brazil?



Answered questions: 57


Skipped questions: 5

Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Focusing on our variables proper, Charts 5 to 13 give the representatives' opinions on their importance within a ministry's structure. The survey reveals that monetary variables are highly regarded by them. But, contrary to what was expected, the total budget would seem to be much more important to them than the level of unrestricted expenses. Another very important variable is that of normative power; the interviewees showed great interest in the possibility of ruling a sector of the economy. The network capacity, or the number of attached agencies, companies, and so on, came next, followed by tenure, and last and seemingly also least were the patronage abilities.


They were also asked about the possibility a minister has to be a link between his party and the president, and how this translates into a high status within the party organization. This was considered to be quite an important variable but, because it is possessed by all ministers with some kind of party affiliation, it will not affect our score.

Chart 5 Elite - Sort according to your preferences the characteristics that a ministry in a presidential system has, with one being the most important, two the second most important, and so on until number six which represents the least important:




Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 6 Elite - The total budget of a ministry is:




Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 7 Elite - The share of unrestricted expenses of a ministry is:




Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 8 Elite - A ministry's influence over other agencies and public companies is:



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.


Chart 9 Elite - The total number of civil servants in a ministry is:<sup>61</sup>



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

<sup>61</sup> Including those who were not hired directly by the minister.

Chart 10 Elite - The share of civil servants hired directly by the minister as *cargo de confiança* in a ministry is:




Answered questions: 62

Skipped questions: 0

Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 11 Elite - The normative power and its capacity to influence other economic fields of activities for a ministry is:




Answered questions: 62

Skipped questions: 0


Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 12 Elite - The length of a minister's tenure as chair of some ministry is:



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 13 Elite - The chance to be the link between his fellow party members and the executive for a minister is:



Answered questions: 61  
 Skipped questions: 1  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Fortunately, the representatives' answers did give us some clue toward a scale and possible share each variable should have in our score but, they did not give us an exact value for this share or weight. Taking care of this is the objective of the next section.

### 3.4 Score of political attractiveness

Given the intention of this dissertation to quantify the item-importance ratings obtained from the answers presented in Charts 6 to 12 (not important, less important, reasonably important, very important, and extremely important) one needs to find a way to translate the representatives' opinions into weights. There are various methods of quantifying qualitative answers, each with its advantages and drawbacks. The five approaches that are most common when a researcher seeks to convert qualitative data into quantitative data are the probabilistic approach, regression techniques, single factor analysis on multiplicative scores, multivariate techniques, and the balanced statistic approach.

The probabilistic approach, based mainly on the Carlson-Perkin method, has had some of its main assumptions heavily criticized. There is strong evidence against the verisimilitude of the threshold constancy, symmetry, homogeneity, and general assumptions of unbiasedness. In addition, this approach usually requires a time-series of conducted surveys in order to offer its qualitative-based quantitative data. Moreover, it is also limited to three-options kind of questions, which are not present in this study as it involves only one survey rather than a time-series one, and the questions identifying the political importance of some characteristics all have five possible answers.

With regards to regression techniques, converting survey-ordered answers into numbers and the main tool used in this approach – the ordered probit model – unfortunately cannot be relied on. The only way it could be adopted would be by ranking the ministries according to the number of votes they received as seen in Chart Three. But doing that would only provide 11 ranked positions, and in such a small sample would not provide reliable coefficients at all.

The single factor analysis on multiplicative scores computed as the product of the item-importance ratings could be performed if the interviewees had been told about the numbers in the item-importance ratings scale for every question. But unfortunately they were not told this as it was considered difficult to explain that “nothing important” answers may be valued as five, for example, while the “extremely important” ones were only valued at one considering that all these values were quantitative rather than ordinals.



Multivariate techniques are usually viewed separately from the other techniques because of their fancy methods of statistical transformations. These usually have the same result as the simpler and clearer statistical balanced approach, in which the quantification of the survey answers coming from a multivariate approach looks exactly like a statistical balance of various percentages of answers.

Finally, the most commonly used way of measuring quantitative survey answers is the balanced statistic approach. The use of balanced statistics, which reflects the gap between highly important evaluation criteria (very important and extremely important) and less important evaluation criteria (not important and less important) can be considered as a way of quantitatively measuring the answers obtained during the survey process. This measure may be biased when dealing with long time series surveys that are repeated over time, and also when the respondents are uncertain about their opinions and experiences. However, neither of these limitations are applicable to this project as it does not deal with time series and it is unlikely that high profile representatives who are protected by a confidentiality clause and who do not need to identify themselves will be unsure about their opinions (Cunningham, 1997; Greene, 2003; Abeyasekera, 2005; D’Elia, 2005; Henzel & Wollmershäuser, 2005; Diaz et al., 2010; Galstayan & Movsisyan, 2010; Bascos-Deveza, 2011; Lahiri & Zhao, 2015).

Because there is no consensus about the best method to use, and based on the explanation above, it was decided to use the balanced statistic approach to convert the representatives’ answers into weights to balance all of the variables of political interest. Such an intention is expressed as follows:

$$Gross\_BS_i = \sum_{j=1}^2 high\_imp\_answer_j - \sum_{k=1}^2 minor\_imp\_answer_k \quad (5)$$

Here  $Gross\_BS_i$  represents the balanced statistics for the  $i$ th variable of political interest,  $\sum_{j=1}^2 high\_imp\_answer_j$  is the sum of the percentages of answers with  $j$  evaluating the political characteristics in a highly important way (“very important” and “extremely important” answers), and  $\sum_{k=1}^2 minor\_imp\_answer_k$  is the sum of the percentages of answers with  $k$  evaluating the political characteristics in a less important way (“less important” and “nothing important” answers).

Because a not so highly evaluated variable such as  $i$  might have the sum of its less important percentage as greater than the sum of its highly important percentage, thus implying in  $Gross\_BS_i < 0$  for that variable, a logarithmic transformation was performed in order to make all the weights positive. Considering that all the variables of political interest studied here must hold a positive value for all political parties, it would be senseless to suppose that some of these characteristics would make a party not want the chairmanship of a particular ministry. Indeed, the questions posed in Charts 6 to 12 do not express any negative impressions about any of the chosen characteristics. Instead, they only show a scale of positive answers and differ among themselves between those that express the huge importance of the variable and those that express that the variable is not so important. However, it is never noxious, which leads to:

$$tBS_i = \ln(Gross\_BS_i + a) \quad (6)$$

Here  $tBS_i$  is the transformed balanced statistic of the  $i$ th variable of political interest, and  $a$  a same constant added to the  $Gross\_BS_i$  value of all variables,  $a$  is defined in a way that  $\min(Gross\_BS_i) + a = 1.01$  implying that the less desirable variable will hold a positive weight that is the smallest weight. The final weight each variable will then get  $w_i$  is expressed according to Equation Seven:

$$w_i = \frac{tBS_i}{\sum_{i=1}^7 tBS_i} \quad (7)$$

After performing the steps posed by Equations Five, Six, and Seven, the budget measure of a ministry will be multiplied by 0.2177, the normative power by 0.1945, the unrestricted expenses by 0.1752, the network capacity by 0.1607, the tenure by 0.1542, the one regarding the total number of civil servants a ministry has by 0.0952, and the one referring to the ability to hire civil servants in an unrestricted way by 0.0025.<sup>62</sup> From that, and based on Equations Two and Four, we have the political importance of each ministry measured by:

$$PA_\alpha^y = (budg_\alpha^y \times 0.2177) + (unrs\_expe_\alpha^y \times 0.1752) + (norm_\alpha^y \times 0.1945) + (net_\alpha^y \times 0.1607) + (tenure_\alpha^y \times 0.1542) + (civ\_serv_\alpha^y \times 0.0952) + (unrs\_civ\_serv_\alpha^y \times 0.0025) \quad (8)$$

---

<sup>62</sup> An observation must be made on the ministries' relevance over time. While not denying that this might have changed during the 20 years of analysis, there are questions asked in the elite survey that have not yet been asked by any other researcher, and it is impossible to exactly capture the representatives' opinions in 1995, 1996, and so on. On this basis, we believe that our weights are the best possible way to measure the variables.

Here  $PA_{\alpha}^y$  is the political attractiveness score of ministry  $\alpha$  in year  $y$ ,  $budg_{\alpha}^y$  is the ratio of the budget of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the size of the total budget of the cabinet in year  $y$ ,  $unrs\_expe_{\alpha}^y$  is the relation of unrestricted expenses of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the total cabinet's unrestricted expenses in year  $y$ ,  $norm_{\alpha}^y$  is one if ministry  $\alpha$  had under its domain at least one normative agency, regulatory, or policy agency in year  $y$  and zero otherwise,  $net_{\alpha}^y$  is the relation of agencies, companies, and others attached to ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the total number of these governmental agencies within the whole cabinet in year  $y$ ,  $tenure_{\alpha}^y$  is represented by the relation of the average tenure in months ministry  $\alpha$  had for the period of 1995-2014 divided by 240 which is the total number of months analyzed in this research,  $civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y$  is the ratio between the number of all the employees ministry  $\alpha$  had in year  $y$  and the sum of all employees the whole cabinet had in the same year, and  $unrs\_civ\_serv_{\alpha}^y$  is the number of unrestricted contracted civil servants (the DAS ones) of ministry  $\alpha$  in relation to the whole cabinet's DAS positions during year  $y$ . The results of Equation Eight can be viewed in Table 19.

Table 19 – Weighed ministries – 1995 - 2015

Ministry	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Air Force	0.217	0.216	0.216	0.215	0.215	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Army	0.047	0.038	0.040	0.038	0.038	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Attorney General	-	-	-	-	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.028
Central Bank	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.236	0.236	0.236
Chief of Staff	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019
Finance Ministry	0.305	0.356	0.275	0.341	0.276	0.345	0.278	0.314	0.266	0.268	0.265	0.267	0.265	0.265	0.264	0.264	0.264	0.262	0.262	0.262
General Inspector of the Union	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241	0.241
General Secretariat of the Presidency	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.046
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	-	0.025	0.034	0.032	0.028	0.027	0.025	0.028	0.028	0.025	0.024	0.025	0.023	0.025	0.024	0.029	0.025	0.027	0.027	0.030
Ministry for Communication Systems	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.218	0.214	0.214	0.218	0.219	0.216	0.217	0.218	0.217	0.216	0.216	0.216	0.217	0.215	0.216	0.215	0.216
Ministry for Culture	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.037	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.038	0.037	0.037	0.233	0.230	0.232	0.235	0.232	0.234	0.233	0.239	0.232	0.233
Ministry for Defense	-	-	-	-	-	0.254	0.251	0.251	0.250	0.247	0.248	0.247	0.051	0.245	0.246	0.245	0.245	0.048	0.048	0.045
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	-	-	-	-	0.217	0.219	0.224	0.219	0.219	0.217	0.230	0.217	0.217	0.217	0.216	0.226	0.217	0.216	0.224	0.216
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	-	0.031	0.039	0.034	0.031	0.026	0.026	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.026	0.030	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.029	0.027	0.025	0.026	0.027
Ministry for Education	0.467	0.404	0.442	0.395	0.385	0.382	0.394	0.380	0.400	0.382	0.391	0.382	0.380	0.381	0.399	0.409	0.388	0.398	0.400	0.405
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	-	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.034	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.036	0.032
Ministry for Health	0.109	0.090	0.114	0.115	0.102	0.291	0.315	0.301	0.290	0.347	0.304	0.289	0.267	0.278	0.290	0.276	0.292	0.304	0.302	0.328
Ministry for Industry, Trade and Tourism	-	0.218	0.222	0.218	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ministry for Labor	0.040	0.054	0.035	0.034	0.053	0.034	0.037	0.048	0.042	0.041	0.040	0.048	0.037	0.037	0.038	0.035	0.047	0.036	0.035	0.034
Ministry for Mining and Energy	-	0.023	0.021	0.216	0.216	0.218	0.219	0.217	0.217	0.218	0.219	0.218	0.217	0.218	0.217	0.217	0.217	0.217	0.217	0.216
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	-	0.222	0.225	0.221	0.232	0.226	0.237	0.227	0.239	0.232	0.238	0.234	0.229	0.233	0.229	0.231	0.224	0.229	0.226	0.226



Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.211	0.209	0.212	0.211
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021
Secretariat for Women's Rights	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
The Secret Service	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052	0.052

- Represents non applicable because of missing data or because the ministry did not exist in that year.

Air Force, Army, and Navy values of unrestricted expenses for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 we use the value reported for the Ministry for Defense at *Portal dos Convênios* split by three

Ministries for Sports and Tourism and for the National Integration 1999 values, General Inspector of the Union, General Secretariat of the Presidency, Ministries for Sports, for Cities' Care, for the Tourism, the Secretaries for Human Rights, for Promotion of Racial Equality, for Women's Rights, and the Secret Service 2003 values, and the Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation 2011 values we used as a proxy their values of the ensuing years for the network capacity variable.

1996 values were used as a proxy for the year of 1995, Values of the subsequent year were used as proxy for the Chief of Staff 1996 and 1998 values, the Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform 1999 values and the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture 2009 values for the patronage capacity variables.

Ministry for Sports 1996, Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management 1995, Ministry for the National Integration 1999, Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance 2007, and Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development 2013 indexes are proxies obtained using the value of the respectively following year for the normative capacity measure.

Source: The authors based on *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Transparência*, Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014, SIAPE and Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Presidential Decree 820-May 13, 1993, Presidential Decree 1757-Dec. 22, 1995 Presidential Decree 16642-Sep. 25, 1995, Presidential Decree 1792-Jan. 1, 1996, Presidential Decree 1917-May 27, 1996, Presidential Decree 2890-Dec. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 1784-Jan. 11, 1996, Presidential Decree 2681-Jul. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 2776-Sep. 10 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2073-Nov. 14, 1996, Presidential Decree 2447-Dec. 30, 1997, Presidential Decree 1825-Feb. 29, 1996, Presidential Decree 1796-Jan. 24, 1996, Presidential Decree 2802-Oct. 13, 1998, Presidential Decree 2813-Oct. 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2926-Oct. 29, 1998, Presidential Decree 2663-Jul. 9, 1998, Presidential Decree 2619-Jun. 5, 1998, Presidential Decree 2599-May 19, 1998, Presidential Decree 2477-Jan. 28, 1998, Presidential Decree 3224-Oct. 28, 1999, Presidential Decree 3129-Aug. 9, 1999, Presidential Decree 2928-Jan. 8, 1999, Presidential Decree 3338-Jan. 14, 2000, Presidential Decree 3366-Feb. 16, 2000, Presidential Decree 3568-Aug. 17, 2000, Presidential Decree 4668-Apr. 9, 2003, Presidential Decree 6972-Sep. 29, 2009, *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

The scores proposed in Table 19 reveals the high level of stability through time of many ministries, but one can also see that some of the scores vary more than others. The Finance Ministry saw its unrestricted expenses shrink greatly from 2002 to 2003, which is the cause of its lower score since then. In 2005 and 2011 the ministries for Culture and for Sports had their scores increased due to their new status regarding normative power. Finally, the Ministry for Transportation had an increase in its final score due to increases in its unrestricted expenses and normative capabilities.

Table 19 also shows the longest lasting ministries. Having considered all the variables of political attractiveness, the three most important ministries in Brazil are the Ministry for Education, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry for Health. For the whole period, the Ministry for Education held an amazing score with regard to the number of attached agencies, followed by the size of its budget, its normative power, and the number of all its civil servants and its DAS. The Finance Ministry gained such a position due to the long tenure time that its chairs used to have during the period that was studied, in addition to the number of attached agencies, DAS positions, and its normative power, which were also noticeable. The Ministry for Health held one of the largest budgets of the whole cabinet and one of the larger shares of civil servants serving in its structure. It also had good scores on DAS positions and *convênios*.<sup>63</sup>

According to Chart Three, the three ministries cited above were in the list of the top ones mentioned by the representatives in the survey. Two other ministries figured on top positions in their opinion but did not feature in our rank. These are the office of the Chief of Staff and the Ministry for Planning, Budget, and Management. The reason why the former did not appear in our rank but did appear on their rates is because it does not control any budget, as all of its expenses are paid and controlled by other branches of government. Scoring zero in the budget measurement jeopardized its performance in the overall score. Moreover, the main reason the representatives cited it as being so important is because of its political influence over other ministries. But this is such a difficult variable to measure that it was not expected to have an outstanding score. With regard to the latter, one of the reasons for it appearing on

---

<sup>63</sup> Some outliers appeared in the analysis. They are the Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism in 1996, 1997, and 1998, the Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade in 1999 and 2005, and the Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development in 2013. The high score presented by those ministries reflects the astonishing level of unrestricted expenses freed up by their chairmen, which is probably supported by the Law 4320-Mar. 17, 1964 that allows extra non-budgetary-reported expenses to some agents. All the other variables composing their score did not have the same pattern.

representatives' rank but not in the rank of variables is its budgetary control. This ministry is in charge of authorizing and freeing up resources for other ministries, as well as authorizing new processes for the recruitment of civil servants. But unfortunately, this cannot be considered a normative power according our set of criteria as these functions are developed by the ministry's own structure and not by a normative agency under its domain.

On the other side of the discussion, and remembering that Chart Four revealed the lowest ranked ministries according to the representatives' opinion, one can compare those to the results of Table 19. These reveal that, with the exception of the Secretariat for Civilian Aviation, most of ministries created after 2003 such as the Secretariat for Human Rights, the General Secretariat of the Presidency, the Secretariat for the Promotion of Racial Equality, the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs, and the Secretariat for Women's Rights, had no political attractiveness at all.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture, the Ministry for the Cities' Care, the Ministry for National Integration, and the Ministry for Labor, all of which were usually granted to allied parties by PT presidents, also seemed to have no political attractiveness, and one can remember that the first one, the Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture, was classified as the least important ministry of all by representatives.

Based on this, a correlation index was run between the rank proposed in Chart Three and that of Table 19 in order to discover the relation between the representatives' opinions and what had been produced in the analysis based on the political characteristics considered important. This was done in order to check whether the index developed in the research is congruent and reflects reality. The correlations are presented in Table 20 below. There are two values, one for all ministries and another that excludes the two outliers, namely, the office of the Chief of Staff and the Ministry for Planning, Budget, and Management.

---

<sup>64</sup> Even with some good levels of unrestricted expenses and *cargos de confiança*, they are not enough to guarantee them a good position in the rank because of their poor performance in all other characteristics. It may be that the percentage of unrestricted expenses with regard to their budgets and the percentage of DAS with regard to the total number of civil servants they have is not so important and what may really matter is the absolute number of these variables.



Table 20 – Correlation between representatives' ranking and dissertation ranking

1995	Complete	0.4452	2005	Complete	0.3825
	Without outliers	0.8067		Without outliers	0.6167
1996	Complete	0.2968	2006	Complete	0.4306
	Without outliers	0.6307		Without outliers	0.6643
1997	Complete	0.3980	2007	Complete	0.4681
	Without outliers	0.6514		Without outliers	0.6814
1998	Complete	0.3139	2008	Complete	0.5104
	Without outliers	0.6355		Without outliers	0.7137
1999	Complete	0.2318	2009	Complete	0.5424
	Without outliers	0.5645		Without outliers	0.7247
2000	Complete	0.2004	2010	Complete	0.5367
	Without outliers	0.6115		Without outliers	0.7194
2001	Complete	0.1830	2011	Complete	0.5297
	Without outliers	0.5438		Without outliers	0.7008
2002	Complete	0.2820	2012	Complete	0.4996
	Without outliers	0.6423		Without outliers	0.6785
2003	Complete	0.2272	2013	Complete	0.5419
	Without outliers	0.6015		Without outliers	0.7076
2004	Complete	0.4138	2014	Complete	0.5389
	Without outliers	0.6447		Without outliers	0.6979

Source: the authors

Table 20 indicates that the variables considered important in this dissertation and the weights given to them based on the representatives' opinions do indeed seem to reflect what is shown on Chart Three in a reasonable way. In addition, the previous paragraphs together with Table 20 provide some indication that the selected variables seem to appropriately represent what really matters when a party has the opportunity to choose a ministry to control. Likewise, they are also relevant in the future when it presents its demands and complaints concerning its role within the coalition, and can also help the president to judge whether it has enough space within the alliance.

Table 21 gathers the weight of each individual ministry, together with the parties that held them in a particular year, in order to discover their real share within the cabinet.<sup>65</sup> It provides the proportions that enable one to compare the weighed (W) or real percentage that each party had

<sup>65</sup> Please check Footnote 44.

within the cabinet<sup>66</sup> with its gross share (Un),<sup>67</sup> and the percentage of House seats each party had in relation to the total number of House seats that all the coalitional parties had together.

---

<sup>66</sup> Considering all the variables of political attractiveness weighed according to the representatives' opinion.

<sup>67</sup> Considering only the number of cabinet positions each party had in relation to the total number of ministries within the whole cabinet.

Table 21 – Weighted and unweighted parties' share of cabinet positions – 1995 - 2015

Party	Cardoso's first term									Cardoso's second term														
	1995			1996			1997			1998			1999			2000			2001			2002		
	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W
Expert	-	43.5	57.1	-	45.8	53.1	-	41.7	45.4	-	45.8	42.2	-	30.8	37.7	-	31.8	40.2		31.8	35.9	-	54.5	65.3
PFL	33.4	13.0	2.3	28.3	12.5	6.8	28.3	12.5	6.8	28.3	12.5	12.7	29.8	11.5	11.5	29.8	13.6	12.0	29.8	13.6	11.3	-	-	-
PSDB	29.7	17.4	38.2	25.1	20.8	19.3	25.1	25.0	25.6	25.1	20.8	26.1	28.1	26.9	34.7	28.1	27.3	40.9	28.1	27.3	39.8	40.7	27.3	23.8
PTB	7.3	4.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PMDB	29.7	8.7	2.4	25.1	12.5	12.0	25.1	12.5	12.0	25.1	8.3	9.3	23.9	15.4	11.0	23.9	9.1	2.5	23.9	9.1	2.2	34.6	9.1	8.6
PPB	-	-	-	21.1	4.2	8.9	21.1	4.2	9.0	21.1	8.3	8.7	17.0	7.7	2.9	17.0	9.1	2.2	17.0	9.1	2.0	24.7	9.1	2.3
PPS	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.5	4.2	1.2	0.5	4.2	0.9	0.9	3.8	0.9	0.9	4.5	1.0	0.9	4.5	1.0	-	-	-
PV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	3.8	1.3	0.3	4.5	1.2	0.3	4.5	7.8	-	-	-
ONA	-	13.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Party	Lula's first term									Lula's second term														
	2003			2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010		
	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W
Expert	-	23.3	24.9	-	20.0	25.9	-	18.8	14.0	-	18.8	13.7	-	11.8	7.6	-	14.3	8.7	-	13.9	8.7	-	18.9	20.3
PTB	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.1	3.1	7.5	6.1	2.9	-	6.1	2.9	-	6.1	2.8	0.2	-	-	-
PMDB	-	-	-	27.9	6.7	8.5	27.9	9.4	14.3	20.4	6.3	11.3	26.0	17.6	20.3	26.0	17.1	25.7	26.0	16.7	26.1	27.7	16.2	25.7
PPS	10.8	3.3	1.1	8.5	3.3	0.7	8.5	3.1	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PV	3.1	3.3	1.2	2.4	3.3	0.9	2.4	3.1	6.0	1.8	3.1	6.0	3.8	2.9	6.3	3.8	2.9	5.9	3.8	2.8	5.8	4.0	2.7	5.9
PDT	8.7	6.7	19.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	3.1	6.2	6.6	5.9	7.5	6.6	5.7	7.0	6.6	5.6	7.0	7.1	5.4	7.0
PL	16.9	3.3	7.4	13.4	3.3	5.8	13.4	6.3	12.2	9.7	3.1	5.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PSB	14.4	6.7	7.5	11.3	6.7	6.5	11.3	6.3	6.7	8.3	9.4	7.7	8.1	5.9	6.7	8.1	5.7	6.3	8.1	5.6	6.2	8.6	5.4	6.2
PT	46.2	53.3	38.7	36.4	56.7	51.8	36.4	53.1	46.1	26.5	46.9	39.4	24.0	44.1	41.4	24.0	42.9	37.8	24.0	44.4	38.4	25.5	40.5	27.3
PC do B	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.5	3.1	0.9	3.8	2.9	0.9	3.8	2.9	0.9	3.8	2.8	0.8	4.0	2.7	0.9
PP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.7	3.1	1.5	11.8	2.9	2.7	11.8	2.9	1.6	11.8	2.8	1.0	12.6	2.7	1.1
PR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9.8	2.9	6.5	9.8	2.9	6.0	9.8	2.8	5.7	10.5	2.7	5.6

Party	Rousseff's first term											
	2011			2012			2013			2014		
	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W	HS	UnW	W
Expert	-	18.9	18.4	-	24.3	26.0	-	21.1	15.5	-	23.7	20.5
PMDB	24.1	16.2	14.3	23.5	13.5	9.3	20.4	13.2	13.9	22.3	13.2	13.2
PDT	8.0	5.4	6.6	7.8	5.4	6.6	6.8	5.3	6.6	7.4	5.3	6.2
PSB	10.5	5.4	1.4	10.2	5.4	1.6	8.9	5.3	1.4	-	-	-
PT	26.9	45.9	47.3	26.2	40.5	44.6	22.7	42.1	50.3	24.9	42.1	48.3
PC do B	4.6	2.7	5.2	4.5	2.7	5.5	3.9	2.6	5.7	4.3	2.6	5.2
PP	13.6	2.7	1.7	13.3	2.7	0.9	11.5	2.6	0.9	12.6	2.6	0.9
PR	12.3	2.7	5.0	12.0	2.7	5.3	10.4	2.6	5.2	11.5	2.6	4.9
PRB	-	-	-	2.4	2.7	0.2	2.1	2.6	0.2	2.3	5.3	0.6
PSD	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.3	2.6	0.3	14.6	2.6	0.3

W means the percentage each party held inside the Cabinet weighed by all the variables of political interest, UnW represents the neat percentage of ministries' chairmanship each party holds inside the Cabinet considering just the gross number of Cabinet positions, and HS means the percentage of House seats each party had inside all coalition House seats available.

Data refers to the party that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: The authors based on *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Transparência*, Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002, Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014, SIAPE and Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Presidential Decree 820-May 13, 1993, Presidential Decree 1757-Dec. 22, 1995 Presidential Decree 16642-Sep. 25, 1995, Presidential Decree 1792-Jan. 1, 1996, Presidential Decree 1917-May 27, 1996, Presidential Decree 2890-Dec. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 1784-Jan. 11, 1996, Presidential Decree 2681-Jul. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 2776-Sep. 10 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2073-Nov. 14, 1996, Presidential Decree 2447-Dec. 30, 1997, Presidential Decree 1825-Feb. 29, 1996, Presidential Decree 1796-Jan. 24, 1996, Presidential Decree 2802-Oct. 13, 1998, Presidential Decree 2813-Oct. 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2926-Oct. 29, 1998, Presidential Decree 2663-Jul. 9, 1998, Presidential Decree 2619-Jun. 5, 1998, Presidential Decree 2599-May 19, 1998, Presidential Decree 2477-Jan. 28, 1998, Presidential Decree 3224-Oct. 28, 1999, Presidential Decree 3129-Aug. 9, 1999, Presidential Decree 2928-Jan. 8, 1999, Presidential Decree 3338-Jan. 14, 2000, Presidential Decree 3366-Feb. 16, 2000, Presidential Decree 3568-Aug. 17, 2000, Presidential Decree 4668-Apr. 9, 2003, Presidential Decree 6972-Sep. 29, 2009, *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

During most of Cardoso's years, the real share of experts within the cabinet (or the one that considered the variables of political interest) was larger than the simple coalescence degree meant to be. The president's party – the PSDB – has a mixed pattern, while some coalitional fellows such as the PMDB and PFL usually had fewer representativeness within the cabinet in real terms than what is indicated by the gross number of cabinet seats.

A common complaint about PT presidents concerns the over-representation that they usually give to their own party when building their cabinets. The analysis undertaken in this dissertation shows that Lula did indeed over-represent his own party although in a less intense way, while Rouseff in addition to over-representing the PT, did exacerbated this by doing so in a greater way than that argued by a non-weighted analysis.

During Lula's administration the PMDB, PL (current PR), and PSB had a larger representation within the cabinet, but they remained under-represented although with a smaller gap. PT saw its percentage within the cabinet shrink a little when weighed according to the variables of political attractiveness. It remained over-represented although with a smaller gap. Other coalitional parties, such as the PV and PDT, saw their supposed under-representation actually become an over-representation when the variables of political interest were considered, particularly in 2005 and 2006. On the other extreme, the PPS, PC do B, and PP experienced even more under-representation when analyzed according to this index rather than the standard one.

According to Table 21, President Rouseff's pattern of cabinet distribution reveals that her own party – the PT – had an even greater percentage of cabinet resources when one considers all the variables of political attractiveness addressed here. The under-representation gaps of the PDT and PR were reduced a little, but they still did not receive a proportional percentage of cabinet positions. Rather, when all the variables of political attractiveness are considered, the PMDB, PP, PSB, PRB, and PSD had their under-representation magnified.

Finally, one can recalculate the coalescence degree based on the parties' percentage of House seats and their real share in the cabinet. We see below the unweighted coalescence (that considers the percentage of House seats and the number of cabinet seats each party held in a year) and the

weighted coalescence degree (in which one takes into account the percentage of House seats and the percentage of cabinet positions that each party held based on the scores of Table 19 that considers all the variables of political attractiveness).<sup>68</sup>

Table 22 – Weighted and unweighted coalescence – 1996 - 2015

		Unweighted coalescence with experts	Weighed coalescence with experts	Percent variation	Unweighted coalescence without experts	Weighed coalescence without experts	Percent variation
Cardoso's first term	1995	0.434	0.344	-20.74	0.652	0.629	-3.53
	1996	0.523	0.472	-9.75	0.752	0.737	-1.99
	1997	0.546	0.534	-2.20	0.755	0.761	0.79
	1998	0.504	0.563	11.71	0.733	0.774	5.59
	avg.	0.502	0.478	-4.78	0.723	0.725	0.28
Cardoso's second term	1999	0.628	0.547	-12.90	0.782	0.736	-5.88
	2000	0.604	0.460	-23.84	0.763	0.661	-13.37
	2001	0.604	0.448	-25.83	0.763	0.628	-17.69
	2002	0.455	0.347	-23.74	0.728	0.674	-7.42
	avg.	0.572	0.451	-21.15	0.759	0.674	-11.20
Lula's first term	2003	0.693	0.645	-6.93	0.810	0.770	-4.94
	2004	0.589	0.588	-0.17	0.689	0.718	4.21
	2005	0.639	0.728	13.93	0.733	0.798	8.87
	2006	0.584	0.681	16.61	0.678	0.749	10.47
	avg.	0.626	0.660	5.43	0.727	0.758	4.26
Lula's second term	2007	0.680	0.716	5.29	0.739	0.754	2.03
	2008	0.669	0.750	12.11	0.741	0.793	7.02
	2009	0.658	0.744	13.07	0.728	0.787	8.10
	2010	0.647	0.760	17.47	0.742	0.862	16.17
	avg.	0.664	0.742	11.75	0.737	0.799	8.41
Rousseff's first term	2011	0.621	0.606	-2.42	0.715	0.698	-2.38
	2012	0.611	0.547	-10.47	0.733	0.677	-7.64
	2013	0.590	0.551	-6.61	0.696	0.629	-9.63
	2014	0.562	0.553	-1.60	0.680	0.656	-3.53
	avg.	0.596	0.564	-5.37	0.706	0.665	-5.81

Data refers to the party that held the chairmanship for the longest amount of days in the referred year.

Source: The authors based on *Portal dos Convênios*, *Portal da Transparência*, Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Budgetary Law 8980-Jan.19, 1995, Budgetary Law 9275-May 9, 1996, Budgetary Law 9438-Feb. 26, 1997, Budgetary Law 9598-Dec. 30, 1997, Budgetary Law 9789-Feb. 23, 1999, Budgetary Law 9969-May 11, 2000, Budgetary Law 10171-Jan. 5, 2001, Budgetary Law 10407-Jan. 10, 2002. Conitue next page.

Budgetary Law 10640-Jan. 14, 2003, Budgetary Law 10837-Jan. 16, 2004, Budgetary Law 11100-Jan. 25, 2005, Budgetary Law 11306-May 16, 2006, Budgetary Law 11451-Feb. 7, 2007, Budgetary Law 11647-Mar. 24, 2008, Budgetary Law 11897-Dec. 30, 2008, Budgetary Law 12214-Jan. 26, 2010, Budgetary Law 12381-Feb. 9, 2011, Budgetary Law 12595-Jan. 19, 2012, Budgetary Law 12798-Apr. 4, 2013, Budgetary Law 12952-Jan. 20, 2014, SIAPE and Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 8, Dec. 1996, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 20, Dec. 1997, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 32, Dec. 1998, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 4, Dec. 1999, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 56, Dec. 2000, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 68, Dec. 2001, Payroll Statistical Bulletin n. 80, Dec. 2002, Payroll and Organizational Information Statistical Bulletin n. 224, Dec. 2014, Ministry for Economic

<sup>68</sup> Please check footnote 44.

Planning, Budget, and Management by SIAPE requested by the Law 12527-Nov. 18, 2011, Presidential Decree 820-May 13, 1993, Presidential Decree 1757-Dec. 22, 1995 Presidential Decree 16642-Sep. 25, 1995, Presidential Decree 1792-Jan. 1, 1996, Presidential Decree 1917-May 27, 1996, Presidential Decree 2890-Dec. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 1784-Jan. 11, 1996, Presidential Decree 2681-Jul. 21, 1998, Presidential Decree 2776-Sep. 10 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2073-Nov. 14, 1996, Presidential Decree 2447-Dec. 30, 1997, Presidential Decree 1825-Feb. 29, 1996, Presidential Decree 1796-Jan. 24, 1996, Presidential Decree 2802-Oct. 13, 1998, Presidential Decree 2813-Oct. 22, 1998, Presidential Decree 2926-Oct. 29, 1998, Presidential Decree 2663-Jul. 9, 1998, Presidential Decree 2619-Jun. 5, 1998, Presidential Decree 2599-May 19, 1998, Presidential Decree 2477-Jan. 28, 1998, Presidential Decree 3224-Oct. 28, 1999, Presidential Decree 3129-Aug. 9, 1999, Presidential Decree 2928-Jan. 8, 1999, Presidential Decree 3338-Jan. 14, 2000, Presidential Decree 3366-Feb. 16, 2000, Presidential Decree 3568-Aug. 17, 2000, Presidential Decree 4668-Apr. 9, 2003, Presidential Decree 6972-Sep. 29, 2009, *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, ministries' websites, the Brazilian House of Representatives, and Nicolau (2000).

What we find in Table 22 is that Cardoso's second term and Rousseff's first term, when considering the political attractiveness of the cabinet, had a lower level of proportionality in terms of cabinet composition. This implies a concentration greater than that depicted by the standard coalescence degree, which is usually portrayed by the number of chairmanships each party held. The opposite of this occurred during Lula's two terms, allowing one to see that when the political assets of ministries were considered, the proportionality is greater than that observed by considering the gross number of chairmanships offered, especially when they do not consider the experts within the cabinet.

In conclusion, one can say that when the many characteristics that a ministry has are not taken into account the results seem different to those obtained when they are taken them into account. While Cardoso seemed to rely more strongly on expert support to run his Cabinet than was expected, Lula relied mainly on his own party in order gain the largest share of the political assets at his disposal, but he did it in a lighter way than is generally thought. The same does not hold true for Mrs. Rousseff who chose to concentrate the greatest amount of real political resources in the hands of her fellow party members, thus depriving important political allies of outstanding cabinet positions, with the most impressive case being the extreme under-representation of the PP in her cabinet.

## CONCLUSION

We can end this dissertation by stating its main findings. The literature review found that after the first wave of studies with less than positive forecasts concerning the future and stability of multiparty presidential regimes, others emerged that sought to explain why these systems did succeed, even under stringent circumstances. Octavio Amorim Neto provided a valuable contribution, particularly for Brazil, explaining that minority presidents may achieve a certain level of legislative support by offering cabinet positions to other parties besides their own. Looking at other kinds of political resources, Carlos Pereira argued that the president can fine tune his coalition by using money granted to representatives for use in pork barrel strategies. José Cheibub and Marcus Melo dealt with the institutional approach, while Fernando Limongi and Argelina Figueiredo considered the role played by the party leader as a link between the president and the House delegations. In addition, there are studies that deal with the governor's responsibilities in executive-legislative relations. Taken together, these factors comprise what has come to be termed presidents' tool box, a set of instruments used by the heads of minority governments in order to achieve adequate levels of governability.

The comparative analysis carried out in Chapter Two showed that, in addition to the help of a high degree of ideological cohesion, the Chilean president also uses cabinet management in order to gain support from Congress. The Mexican president's powers are largely derived from party strength, which meant that he had to learn how to undertake *ad hoc* negotiations with opposition parties, and also use some resources for pork that are delivered to opposition mayors. In Guatemala, the president has to deal with a minimally productive and fragmented Congress that has to be organized by means of the distribution of positions in the Committees according to the share of seats each party holds. In seeking to identify whether multiparty cabinet examples had more political value than the selected cases of one-party cabinets, the variables showed some differences in favor of multiparty cabinets in regard to budgetary powers.

The analysis proceeded to consider only the Brazilian cabinet. The first conclusion reached is that PT governments definitely had a clear preference for larger cabinets rather than smaller ones. Moreover, in general terms the cabinet budget has been increasing since 2001, while its number of civil servants shows a shrinking pattern during Cardoso's terms and a slightly increase during Lula and Rousseff's terms.



The individual ranks for the selected variables of political attractiveness reveal that some ministries were top-ranked in almost all years, such as the Finance Ministry, the Ministry for Health, and the Ministry for Education, while the same could be observed of those on the lowest rank. The secretariats, which began to hold a ministry status after 2003, usually filled these low ranking places, especially when one is considering the budgetary, unrestricted expenses capability, number of civil servants, and patronage capabilities.

Based on the opinion of House stalwarts that monetary resources are preferable to normative resources, which are preferable to network assets, which are preferable to the size of the tenure, which is finally preferable to patronage endowments, one is able to rank all the Brazilian ministries. This leads to the finding that the most important ministries are the Ministry for Education, the Finance Ministry, and the Ministry for Health, allied with the office of the Chief of Staff and with the Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management (these last two only according to the stalwarts' opinions). It also seems that our rank holds reasonable levels of correlation with the ranks posed by the representatives. These can be found in Chart Three and provide some support for our analysis.

The rank and a unique weight of each ministry enabled us to recalculate the coalescence degree, which led to the discovery of some changes in the proportionality of the cabinets, in contrast to what had been accepted as the prevailing wisdom. It turned out that Cardoso's second term was little less proportional than assumed, that Lula's two terms were more proportional, and that Rousseff's presidency was even less proportional. Cardoso gave more real resources to experts and less resources to the PMDB and PFL than the unweighted score had assumed. Lula gave a smaller amount of real resources to the PT and a little more to the PMDB, PL, and PSB, but the former three retained their under-representation status, while he retained the over-representation of his own party (although in a lighter way). Finally, according to our index, Rousseff granted an even larger amount of political resources to her own party, the PT, at the expenses of many coalitional parties, with the PMDB, PSB, PP, PSD, and PRB being the most impaired.

## REFERENCES

- Abeyasekera, S. (2005) Quantitative analysis approaches to qualitative data: Why, when and how? In: Holland, J. D. and Campbell, J. (eds.) *Methods in development research: Combining qualitative and quantitative approaches*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition, Warwickshire, ITDG Publishing, pp. 97-106.
- Abranches, S. H. H. (1988) Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 31 (1), 5-34.
- Abrúcio, F. L. (1998) *Os barões da federação: Os governadores e a redemocratização brasileira*. São Paulo, HUCITEC.
- Alemán, E. & Navia, P. (2009) Institutions and the legislative success of ‘strong’ presidents: An analysis of government bills in Chile. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 15 (4), 401-419.
- Alston, L. J. & Mueller, B. (2005) Pork for policy: Executive and Legislative in Brazil. *The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 22 (1), 87-114.
- Altman, D. & Castiglioni, R. (2008) Cabinet determinants of structural reforms in Latin America, 1985-2000. *The Developing Economies*, XLVI (1), 1-25.
- Ames, B. (1995a) Electoral strategy under open-list proportional representation. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39 (2), 406-433.
- Ames, B. (1995b) Electoral rules, constituency pressures, and pork barrel: Bases of voting in the Brazilian Congress. *The Journal of Politics*, 57 (2), 324-343.
- Ames, B. (2002a) Party discipline in the Chamber of Deputies. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 185-221.
- Ames, B. (2002b) *The deadlock of democracy in Brazil: Interests, identities and institutions in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.
- Amorim Neto, O. (1994) Formação de gabinetes presidenciais no Brasil: coalizão versus cooptação. *Nova Economia*, 4 (1), 9-34.
- Amorim Neto, O. (2000) Gabinetes presidenciais, ciclos eleitorais e disciplina legislativa no Brasil. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 43 (3), 479-519.
- Amorim Neto, O. (2002) Presidential Cabinets, electoral cycles and coalition discipline in Brazil. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 48-78.
- Amorim Neto, O. (2006) The presidential calculus: Executive policy making and Cabinet formation in the Americas. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39 (4), 415-440.

Amorim Neto, O. & Borsani, H. (2004) Presidents and Cabinets: The political determinants of fiscal behavior in Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 39 (1), 3-27.

Amorim Neto, O. & Cox, G. W. (1997) Electoral institutions, cleavage structures, and the number of parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (1), 149-174.

Amorim Neto, O. & Samuels, D. (2010) Democratic regimes and Cabinet politics: A global perspective. *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudos Legislativos*, 1 (1), 10-23.

Amorim Neto, O. & Santos, F. (2001) The executive connection: presidentially defined factions and party discipline in Brazil. *Party Politics*, 7 (2), 213-234.

Amorim Neto, O. & Santos, F. (2003) O segredo ineficiente revisto: o que propõem e o que aprovam os deputados brasileiros? *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 46 (4), 661-698.

Amorim Neto, O. & Strom, K. (2006) Breaking the parliamentary chain of delegation: Presidents and non-partisan Cabinet members in European democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36 (4), 619-643.

Amorim Neto, O. & Tafner, P. (2002) Governos de coalizão e mecanismos de alarme de incêndio no controle legislativo das medidas provisórias. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45 (1), 5-38.

Amorim Neto, O., Cox, G. W., and McCubbins, M. D. (2003) Agenda power in Brazil's Câmara dos Deputados, 1989 – 1998. *World Politics*, 55 (4), 550-578.

Armijo, L. E., Faucher, P., and Dembinska, M. (2006) Compared to what? Assessing Brazil's political institutions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 39 (6), 759-786.

Arretche, M. & Rodden, J. (2004) Política distributiva na Federação: estratégias eleitorais, barganhas legislativas e coalizões de governo. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 47 (3), 549-576.

Avendaño, O. & Dávila, M. (2012) Rotación ministerial y estabilidad coalicional en Chile, 1990-2010. *Política*, 50 (2), 87-108.

Azpuru, D. (2005) The general elections in Guatemala, November-December 2003. *Electoral Studies*, 24 (1), 143-149.

Azpuru, D. (2008) The 2007 presidential and legislative elections in Guatemala. *Electoral Studies*, 27 (3), 562-566.

Azpuru, D. (2009) Perceptions of democracy in Guatemala: An ethnic divide? *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 34 (67), 105-130.

Azpuru, D. & Blanco, L. (2008) Guatemala 2007: un año de contrastes para la democracia. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 28 (1), 217-244.

Baptista, T. W. F. (2007) Análise das portarias ministeriais da saúde e reflexões sobre a condução nacional da política de saúde. *Cadernos de Saúde Pública*, 23 (3), 615-626.

Barberia, L. & Praça, S. (2014) *Who gets political appointments? Party loyalty and bureaucratic expertise in Brazil*. [Online] 72<sup>nd</sup> The Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Chicago, The United States of America, 3-6 April. Available from: <http://www.mpsanet.org/Conference/ConferencePaperArchive/tabid/681/Default.aspx> [Accessed 4<sup>th</sup> July 2015].

Bascos-Deveza, T. (2011) Quantifying qualitative data from expectation surveys: How well do expectation surveys forecast inflation? *Irving Fisher Committee Bulletin*, 34, 128-137.

Bresciani, E. & Cardoso, D. (Friday, 21<sup>st</sup> February, 2014) Insatisfeita com Dilma, base aliada planeja isolar PT. *O Estado de São Paulo – from Agência Estado*. [Online] Available from: <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,insatisfeita-com-dilma-base-aliada-planeja-isolar-pt,1132869> [Accessed 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2015].

Briscoe, I. (2007) *Reforma versus captura: Guatemala después de las elecciones*. [Online] FRIDE. Comentario noviembre. Available from: <http://www.fride.org/download/guatemala.pdf> [Accessed 20th June 2014].

Calvert, P. (2004) Executive leadership and legislative assemblies: Latin America. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 10 (2/3), 218-229.

Carey, J. M. (2002) Parties, coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 222-253.

Carey, J. M. (2003) Discipline, accountability, and legislative voting in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, 35 (2), 191-211.

Carey, J. M. & Reinhardt, G. Y. (2003) Impacto das instituições estaduais na unidade das coalizões parlamentares no Brasil. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 46 (4), 773-804.

Carey, J. M. & Shugart, M. S. (1995) Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas. *Electoral Studies*, 14 (4), 417-439.

Casar, M. A. (1999) Las relaciones entre el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo: el caso de México. *Política y Gobierno*, 6 (1), 83-128.

Casar, M. A. (2002) Executive-Legislative relations: The case of Mexico. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 114-144.

Center for Systemic Peace (2011) *Polity IV country 2010: Guatemala*. [Online] Center for Systemic Peace. Available from: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Guatemala2010.pdf> [Accessed 19th June 2014].

Chaisty, P., Cheesman, N., and Power, T. (2014) Rethinking the ‘presidentialism debate’: Conceptualizing coalitional politics in cross-regional perspective. *Democratization*, 21 (1), 1-23.

Chasqueti, D. (2001) Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en America Latina: evaluando la difícil combinación. In: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales. (eds.) *Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas em America Latina*. 1st edition. Buenos aires, CLACSO, pp. 319-359.

Cheibub, J. A. & Limongi, F. (2002) Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and Presidential democracies reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 5, 151-179.

Cheibub, J. A. & Limongi, F. (2010) From conflict to coordination: perspectives on the study of Executive-Legislative relations. *Revista Ibero-Americana de Estudios Legislativos*, 1 (1), 38-53.

Cheibub, J. A. (2002) Minority governments, deadlock situations, and the survival of presidential democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 284-312.

Cheibub, J. A., Elkins, Z., and Ginsburg, T. (2011) Latin American presidentialism in comparative and historical perspective. *Texas Law Review*, 89 (7), 1707-1740.

Cheibub, J. A., Figueiredo, A., and Limongi, F. (2009) Political parties and governors as determinants of Legislative behavior in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 51 (1), 1-30.

Cheibub, J. A., Przeworski, A., and Saiegh, S. M. (2004) Government coalitions and Legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34 (4), 565-587.

Colomer, J. M. & Negretto, G. L. (2005) Can Presidentialism work like Parliamentarism? *Government and Opposition*, 40 (1), 60-89.

Cox, D. & Morgenstern, S. (2001) Latin America’s reactive assemblies and proactive presidents. *Comparative Politics*, 33 (2), 171-189.

Cunningham, A. (1997) Quantifying survey data. *Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin*, 292-300.

Dávila, M. (2011) Tecnocracia y democracia en el Chile contemporáneo: el caso de los gobiernos de la Concertación (1990-2010). *Revista de Sociología*, 24, 199-217.

Dávila, M., Olivares Lavados, A., and Avendaño, O. (2013) Los gabinetes de la concertación en Chile (1990-2010). *América Latina Hoy*, 64, 67-94.

D’Elia, E. (2005) *Using the results of qualitative surveys in quantitative analysis*. Instituto di Studi e Analisi Economica Working Paper No. 56, Rome, Italy.

Desposato, S. W. (2004) The impact of federalism on National party cohesion in Brazil. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, XXIX (2), 259-285.

Desposato, S. W. (2006) How informal electoral institutions shape the Brazilian Legislative arena. In: Helmke, G. and Levitsky, S. (eds.) *Informal institutions & democracy: Lessons from Latin America*. 1st edition, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, pp. 56-68.

Diaz, C. (2004) Old hacks or new blood? The effects of inter-party competition on PRI candidates for the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, 1997-2000. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 10 (4), 107-128.

Diaz, S. R., Swan, K., and Ice, P. (2010) Student ratings of the importance of survey items, multiplicative factor analysis and the validity of the Community of Inquiry survey. *Internet and Higher Education*, 13 (1-2), 22-30.

Diaz-Cayeros, A. (2004) Dependencia fiscal y estrategias de coalición en el federalismo mexicano. *Política y Gobierno*, 11 (2), 229-262.

Estévez, F., Magar, E., and Rosas, G. (2008) Partisanship in non-partisan electoral agencies and democratic compliance: evidence from Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute. *Electoral Studies*, 27, 257-271.

Ferraro, A. (2008) Friends in high places: Congressional influence and the bureaucracy in Chile. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 50 (2), 101-129.

Figueiredo, A. C. & Limongi F. (1995) Mudança constitucional, desempenho do legislativo e consolidação institucional. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 29, 175-200.

Figueiredo, A. C. (2007) Government coalitions in Brazilian democracy. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 1 (2), 182-216.

Figueiredo, A. C. & Limongi, F. (1997) O Congresso e as medidas provisórias: abdicação ou delegação? *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 47, 127-154.

Figueiredo, A. C. & Limongi, F. (1999) Poder de agenda, disciplina e apoio partidário na Câmara dos Deputados. In: Figueiredo, A. C. & Limongi, F. (eds.) *Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional*. 1st edition. Rio de Janeiro, FGV, pp. 101-124.

Figueiredo, A. C. & Limongi, F. (2000) Presidential power, Legislative organization, and party behavior in Brazil. *Comparative Politics*, 32 (2), 151-170.

Figueiredo, A. C., Limongi, F., and Valente, A. L. (1999) Governabilidade e concentração de poder institucional – o governo FHC. *Revista de Sociologia da USP*, 11 (2), 49-62.

Figueiredo, A. C., Canello, J., and Vieira, M. (2012) Governos minoritários no presidencialismo Latino-Americano: determinantes institucionais e políticos. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 55 (4), 839-875.

Figueiredo, A. C., Salles, D., and Vieira, M. M. (2010) Presidencialismo de coalizão na América Latina. *Insight Inteligência*, 12, 126-133.

- Foweraker, J. (1998) Institutional design, party systems and governability – differentiating the presidential regimes of Latin America. *British Journal of Political Science*, 28 (4), 651-676.
- Galstayan, M. & Movsisyan, V. (2010) Quantification of qualitative data: The case of the Central Bank of Armenia. *Irving Fisher Committee Bulletin*, 33, 202-2015.
- Gama, P. (Sunday, 4<sup>th</sup> August, 2013) Base de Dilma no Congresso é a menos disciplinada desde 89. *Folha de São Paulo*, p. A4.
- Greene, W. H. (2003) *Econometric analysis*. 5<sup>th</sup> edition. New York, Prentice Hall.
- Henzel, S. & Wollmershäuser, T. (2005) *An alternative to the Carlson-Parkin Method for the quantification of qualitative inflation expectations: Evidence from the Ifo World Economic Survey*. Ifo Working Paper No. 9, Munich, Germany.
- Hochschild, J. L. (2009) *Conducting intensive interviews and elite interviews*. Workshop on Interdisciplinary Standards for Systematic Qualitative Research. Cambridge, MA.
- Huneus, C. (2005) Las coaliciones de partidos: ¿Un nuevo escenario para el sistema partidista chileno? *Política*, 45 (primavera), 67-86.
- Kumar, N., Stern, L. S. & Anderson, J. C. (1993) Conducting interorganizational research using key informants. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 36 (6), 1633-1651.
- Laakso, M. & Taagepera, R. (1979) “Effective” number of parties: A measure with application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (3), 3-27.
- Lahiri, K. & Zhao, Y. (2015) Quantifying survey expectations: A critical review and generalization of the Carlson-Parkin Method. *International Journal of Forecasting*, 31, 51-62.
- Lapiente, V. & Nistotskaya, M. (2009) To the short-sighted victor belong the spoils: Politics and merit adoption in comparative perspective. *Governance*, 22 (3), 431-458.
- Leoni, E., Pereira, C., and Rennó, L. (2003) Estratégias para sobreviver politicamente: escolhas de carreiras na Câmara dos Deputados no Brasil. *Opinião Pública*, IX (1), 44-67.
- Lima de Oliveira, R., Guerreiro, J., and Mauerberg, A. Jr. (2015) *Ministers as active political actors in Brazil: Pork barrel inside the Cabinet from 2011 until 2014*. [Online] 33<sup>rd</sup> Congress of the Latin American Studies Association. San Juan, Puerto Rico, 27-30 May. Available from: <http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/auth/prot/Congress-papers/Past/lasa2015/files/45689.pdf> [Accessed 4<sup>th</sup> July 2015].
- Limongi, F. & Figueiredo, A. C. (1995) Partidos políticos na Câmara dos Deputados: 1989-1994. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 38 (3), 497-525.
- Limongi, F. & Figueiredo, A. C. (1998) Bases institucionais do presidencialismo de coalizão. *Lua Nova*, 44, 81-98.
- Limongi, F. & Figueiredo, A. C. (2002) Incentivos eleitorais, partidos e política orçamentária. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45 (2), 303-344.

- Limongi, F. & Figueiredo, A. C. (2007) The budget process and Legislative behavior: Individual amendments, support for the Executive and Government programs. *World Political Science Review*, 3 (3), 1-34.
- Linz, J. (1973) Presidencialismo ou parlamentarismo: faz alguma diferença? In: Lamounier, B. (ed.) *A Opção Parlamentarista*. 1st edition.
- Linz, J. (1990) The perils of presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (1), 51-69.
- Londregan, J. (2002) Appointment, reelection, and autonomy in the Senate of Chile. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 341-376.
- Lopes, E. & Madueño, D. (Thursday, 12<sup>th</sup> May, 2011) Insatisfação na base aliada aumenta e já compromete agenda de votações. *O Estado de São Paulo*. [Online] Available from: <http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,insatisfacao-na-base-aliada-aumenta-e-ja-compromete-agenda-de-votacoes,718505> [Accessed 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2015].
- Lujambio, A. (2001) Adiós a la excepcionalidade: régimen presidencial y gobierno dividido en México. In: Lanzaro, J. (ed.) *Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América Latina*. 1st edition, Buenos Aires, CLACSO, pp. 251-282.
- Magar, E. & Romero, V. (2008) México: reformas pese a un gobierno dividido. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 28 (1), 265-285.
- Mainwaring, S. (1990) Presidentialism in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 25 (1), 157-179.
- Mainwaring, S. (1991) Politicians, parties and electoral systems: Brazil in comparative perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 24 (1), 21-43.
- Mainwaring, S. (1997) Multipartyism, robust federalism, and presidentialism in Brazil. In: Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M. S. (eds.) *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 55-109.
- Mainwaring, S. & Pérez-Liñán, A. (1997) *Party discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress*. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper Series, No. 235, Notre Dame, IN.
- Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2011a) *Designing Cabinets: Presidential politics and Cabinet instability in Latin America*. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper No. 375, Notre Dame, IN.
- Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2011b) Out of the Cabinet: What drives defections from government in presidential systems? *Comparative Political Studies*, 45 (1), 62-90.
- Melo, M. A. (1998) Constitucionalismo e ação racional. *Lua Nova*, 44, 55-79.
- Melo, M. A. (2009) Strong Presidents, robust democracies? Separation of powers and rule of law in Latin America. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 3 (2), 30-59.



Melo, M. A., Pereira, C., and Figueiredo, C. M. (2009) Political and institutional checks on corruption: Explaining the performance of Brazilian audit institutions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (9), 1217-1244.

Melo, M. A., Pereira, C., and Werneck, H. (2010) Delegation dilemmas: Coalition size, electoral risk and regulatory governance in new democracies. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 35 (1), 31-56.

Meneguello, R. (1998) *Partidos e governo no Brasil contemporâneo: 1985-1997*. Rio de Janeiro, Paz e Terra.

Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management (2013) *O que é orçamento de investimento?* [Online] Available from: <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/servicos/faq/governanca-das-empresas-estatais/orcamento-de-investimento-das-estatais/o-que-e-orcamento-de-investimentos> [Accessed September 9<sup>th</sup> 2013].

Nacif, B. (2002) Understanding party discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The centralized party model. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 254-286.

Nacif, B. (2004) Las relaciones entre los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo tras el fin del presidencialismo en México. *Política y Gobierno*, 11 (1), 9-41.

Negretto, G. L. (2006) Minority Presidents and democratic performance in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 48 (3), 63-92.

Nicolau, J. (2000) Disciplina Partidária e Base Parlamentar na Câmara dos Deputados no Primeiro Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998). *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 43 (4).

Nolte, D. (2003) El congreso chileno y su aporte a la consolidación democrática en perspectiva comparada. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 23 (2), 43-67.

O'Malley, E. (2007) The power of prime ministers: results of an expert survey. *International Political Science Review* 28 (1), 7-27.

Pereira, C. & Melo, M. A. (2012) The surprising success of multiparty presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy*, 23 (3), 156-170.

Pereira, C. & Mueller, B. (2000) Uma teoria da preponderância do executivo. O sistema de comissões no legislativo brasileiro. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais*, 15 (43), 45-67.

Pereira, C. & Mueller, B. (2002) Comportamento estratégico em presidencialismo de coalizão: as relações entre executivo e legislativo na elaboração do orçamento brasileiro. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 45 (2), 265-301.

Pereira, C. & Mueller, B. (2003) Partidos fracos na arena eleitoral e partidos fortes na arena legislativa: a conexão eleitoral no Brasil. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 46 (4), 735-771.

- Pereira, C. & Mueller, B. (2004) The cost of governing: Strategic behavior of the President and Legislators in Brazil's budgetary process. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37 (7), 781-815.
- Pereira, C. & Orellana, S. (2009) Hybrid political institutions and governability: The budgetary process in Brazil. *Journal of Politics in Latin America*, 1 (3), 57-79.
- Pereira, C. & Rennó, L. (2001) O que é que o reeleito tem? Dinâmicas político-institucionais locais e nacionais nas eleições de 1998 para a Câmara dos Deputados. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 44 (2), 323-362.
- Pereira, C. & Rennó, L. (2003) Successful re-election strategies in Brazil: The electoral impact of distinct institutional incentives. *Electoral Studies*, 22 (3), 425-448
- Pereira, C., Power, T., and Rennó, L. (2005a) Under what conditions do Presidents resort to decree power? Theory and evidence from the Brazilian case. *The Journal of Politics*, 67 (1), 178-200.
- Pereira, C., Power, T., and Rennó, L. (2005b) Opinião pública, estratégia presidencial e ação do Congresso no Brasil: “quem manda”? *Opinião Pública*, XI (2), 401-421.
- Pereira, C., Singh, S. P., and Mueller, B. (2011) Political institutions, policymaking, and policy stability in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society*, 53 (1), 59-89.
- Power, T. J. (2010a) Optimism, pessimism, and coalitional presidentialism: Debating the institutional design of Brazilian democracy. *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 29 (1), 18-33.
- Power, T. J. (2010b) Brazilian democracy as a late bloomer, reevaluating the regime in the Cardoso-Lula era. *Latin American Research Review*, special issue, 218-247.
- Przeworski, A., Michael, A., Cheibub, A. C., and Limongi, F. (1996) What makes democracies endure? *Journal of Democracy*, 7 (1), 39-55.
- Raile, E. D., Pereira, C., and Power, T. J. (2011) The executive toolbox: Building legislative support in a multiparty presidential regime. *Political Research Quarterly*, 64, 323-334.
- Ribeiro, J. (Wednesday, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 2012) Base mostra insatisfação e derrota governo em indicação a ANTT. *O Estado de São Paulo – from Reuters*. [Online] Available from: <http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,base-mostra-insatisfacao-e-derrota-governo-em-indicacao-a-antt,845422> [Accessed 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2015].
- Saiegh, S. M. (2009) Recovering a basic space from elite surveys: Evidence from Latin America. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 34 (1), 117-145.
- Samuels, D. (2000) Concurrent elections, discordant results – Presidentialism, Federalism and governance in Brazil. *Comparative Politics*, 33 (1), 1-20.
- Samuels, D. (2002) Progressive ambition, federalism and pork-barreling in Brazil. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 315-340.

Samuels, D. & Shugart, M. S. (2010) *Presidents, parties and prime ministers: How the separation of powers affects party organization behavior*. 1<sup>st</sup> edition. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Santos, F. (1997) Patronagem e poder de agenda na política brasileira. *Dados – Revista de Ciências Sociais*, 40 (3), 465-492.

Santos, F. (2008) Brazilian democracy and the power of “old” theories of party competition. *Brazilian Political Science Review*, 2 (1), 57-76.

Schneider, B. R. (1993) The career connection: A comparative analysis of bureaucratic preferences and insulation. *Comparative Politics*, 25 (3), 331-350.

Shin, J. H. (2013) Cabinet duration in presidential democracies. *Political Science Quarterly*, 128 (2), 317-339.

Shugart, M. S. & Carey, J. M. (1992) *Presidents and assemblies: Constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Shugart, M. S. & Mainwaring, S. (1997) Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the terms of the debate. In: Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M. S. (eds.) *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 12-54.

Siavelis, P. M. (1997) Executive-Legislative relations in post-Pinochet Chile: A preliminary assessment. In: Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M. (eds.) *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 321-362.

Siavelis, P. M. (2002) Exaggerated presidentialism and moderate presidents: Executive-Legislative relations in Chile In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-113.

Stepan, A. & Skach, C. (1993) Constitutional frameworks and democratic consolidation: Parliamentarism and presidentialism. *World Politics*, 46 (1), 1-22.

Tremblay, M-A. (1957) The key informant technique: A nonethnographic application. *American Anthropologist*, 59 (4), 688-701.

Weldon, J. A. (1997) Political sources of presidencialismo in Mexico. In: Mainwaring, S. and Shugart, M. (eds.) *Presidentialism and democracy in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 225-258.

Weldon, J. A. (2002) The legal and partisan framework of the legislative delegation of the budget in Mexico. In: Morgenstern, S. and Nacif, B. (eds.) *Legislative politics in Latin America*. 1st edition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 377-410.

## APPENDIX A - List of Brazilian ministries – 1995 - 2015

Table 23 - List of Brazilian ministries – 1995 - 2015

<b>Ministry</b>	<b>Creation</b>	<b>Extinction</b>
Air Force	January 20, 1941	June 10, 1999
Army	May 20, 1905	June 10, 1999
Attorney General	February 12, 1993	
Central Bank	August 16, 2004*	
Chief of Staff	October 5, 1992*	
Finance Ministry	October 2, 1992	
General Inspector of the Union	January 1, 2003*	
General Secretariat of the Presidency	May 28, 2003*	October 2, 2015
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	February 14, 1990**	
Ministry for Communication Systems	October 19, 1992*	
Ministry for Culture	March 15, 1985	
Ministry for Defense	June 10, 1999	
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	July 19, 1999*	
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	January 1, 1995*	
Ministry for Education	March 15, 1985	
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	June 26, 2009*	
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	December 26, 1904	
Ministry for Health	August 6, 1953	
Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism	October 19, 1992	December 31, 1998
Ministry for Labor	October 8, 1992*	October 2, 2015
Ministry for Mining and Energy	May 13, 1992*	
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	October 27, 1992**	
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	January 23, 2004	
Ministry for Sports	January 1, 1995***	
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	December 31, 1998	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	September 29, 1996	
Ministry for the Cities' Care	January 1, 2003	
Ministry for the Environment	January 1, 1999	
Ministry for the Justice	March 15, 1967*	
Ministry for the National Integration	July 29, 1999	
Ministry for the Regional Integration	November 19, 1992	May 27, 1998
Ministry for the Social Security	May 2, 1974	October 2, 2015
Ministry for the Tourism	January 1, 2003*	
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	May 27, 1998	January 1, 1999
Ministry for the Welfare	September 2, 1988	May 27, 1998
Ministry for Transportation	October 2, 1992*	
Navy	March 10, 1808	
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	May 15, 2007	
Secretariat for Human Rights	May 28, 2003*	October 2, 2015
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	July 21, 2005	October 2, 2015
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	March 21, 2003	October 2, 2015
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	April 1, 2013	October 2, 2015

Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	June 18, 2007	
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	March 18, 2011	
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	March 29, 2007*	
Secretariat for Women's Rights	January 1, 2003	October 2, 2015
The Secret Service	September 24, 1999*	October 2, 2015

---

Creation means when its chairman got the status of minister and extinction means when its chairman lost this status. Also they mean the date of foundation and extinction of the department.

\*Ministries which already existed but started to hold a ministry status by this date.

\*\* Assumed this name in this date but had held the exact same functions previously.

\*\*\* From 1995 until 1998, coming back in 2003.

Source: *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, and ministries' websites.

## APPENDIX B – List of Brazilian ministers 1995 - 2015

Table 24 – List of Brazilian ministers 1995 - 2015

Ministry	Name	Party*	Minister in	Minister out
Air Force	Mauro José Miranda Gandra	expert	January 1, 1995	November 21, 1995
Air Force	Lélio Viana Lobo	expert	November 21, 1995	January 1, 1999
Air Force	Walter Werner Bräuer	expert	January 1, 1999	June 10, 1999
Army	Zenildo Gonzaga	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Army	Zoroastro de Lucena Gleuber Vieira	expert	January 20, 1997	December 29, 1998
Attorney General	Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão	expert	January 6, 1995	January 24, 2000
Attorney General	Gilmar Ferreira Mendes	expert	January 31, 2000	June 20, 2002
Attorney General	José Bonifácio Borges de Andrada	expert	June 20, 2002	January 1, 2003
Attorney General	Álvaro Augusto Ribeiro Costa	expert	January 1, 2003	March 11, 2007
Attorney General	José Antonio Dias Toffoli	expert	March 11, 2007	October 23, 2009
Attorney General	Luís Inácio Lucena Adams	expert	October 23, 2009	March 3, 2016
Attorney General	José Eduardo Cardozo	PT	March 3, 2016	**
Central Bank	Henrique Meirelles	expert	August 16, 2004	January 1, 2011
Central Bank	Alexandre Tombini	expert	January 1, 2011	**
Chief of Staff	Clóvis de Barros Carvalho	PSDB	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Chief of Staff	Pedro Parente	PSDB	July 19, 1999	January 1, 2003
Chief of Staff	José Dirceu de Oliveira e Silva	PT	January 1, 2003	June 21, 2005
Chief of Staff	Dilma Vana Rousseff	PT	June 21, 2005	March 30, 2010
Chief of Staff	Erenice Alves Guerra	PT	March 31, 2010	September 17, 2010
Chief of Staff	Antonio Palocci Filho	PT	January 1, 2011	June 8, 2011
Chief of Staff	Gleisi Helena Hoffmann	PT	June 8, 2011	February 3, 2014
Chief of Staff	Aloizio Mercadante Oliva	PT	February 3, 2014	October 2, 2015
Finance Ministry	Pedro Sampaio Malan	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 2003
Finance Ministry	Antonio Palocci Filho	PT	January 1, 2003	March 28, 2006
Finance Ministry	Guido Mantega	PT	March 28, 2006	January 1, 2015
General Inspector of the Union	Franciso Waldir Pires de Souza	PT	January 1, 2003	March 31, 2006
General Inspector of the Union	Jorge Hage Sobrinho	PDT	June 27, 2006	January 1, 2015
General Secretariat of the Presidency	Luiz Soares Dulci	PT	May 28, 2003	January 1, 2011
General Secretariat of the Presidency	Gilberto Carvalho	PT	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	José Eduardo de Andrade Vieira	PTB	January 1, 1995	May 2, 1996
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Arlindo Porto Neto	PMDB	May 8, 1996	April 4, 1998
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Francisco Sérgio Turra	PPB	April 7, 1998	July 19, 1999
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Marcus Vinicius Pratini de Moraes	PPB	July 19, 1999	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	João Roberto Rodrigues	expert	January 1, 2003	July 7, 2006
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Luis Carlos Guedes Pinto	expert	July 3, 2006	March 23, 2007

Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Reinhold Stephanes	PMDB	March 23, 2007	March 31, 2010
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Wagner Gonçalves Rossi	PMDB	March 31, 2010	August 17, 2011
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Jorge Alberto Portanova Mendes Ribeiro Filho	PMDB	August 18, 2011	March 15, 2013
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Antônio Eustáquio Andrade Ferreira	PMDB	March 15, 2013	March 17, 2014
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock, and Supply	Neri Geller	PMDB	March 17, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Communication Systems	Sérgio Roberto Vieira da Motta	PSDB	January 1, 1995	April 13, 1998
Ministry for Communication Systems	Luiz Carlos Mendonça de Barros	PSDB	April 30, 1998	November 25, 1998
Ministry for Communication Systems	João Pimenta da Veiga Filho	PSDB	January 1, 1999	April 3, 2002
Ministry for Communication Systems	Juarez Martinho	expert	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Communication Systems	Quadros do Nascimento Waldomiro Abdalla Teixeira	PDT	January 1, 2003	January 23, 2004
Ministry for Communication Systems	Eunício Lopes de Oliveira	PMDB	January 23, 2004	July 8, 2005
Ministry for Communication Systems	Hélio Calixto da Costa	PMDB	July 8, 2005	March 31, 2010
Ministry for Communication Systems	José Artur Filardi Leite	PMDB	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Communication Systems	Paulo Bernardo Silva	PT	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Culture	Francisco Correa Weffort	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Culture	Gilberto Passo Gil Moreira	PV	January 1, 2003	August 1, 2008
Ministry for Culture	João Luiz Silva Ferreira	PV	August 1, 2008	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Culture	Anna Maria Buarque de Hollanda	expert	January 1, 2011	September 13, 2012
Ministry for Culture	Marta Teresa Suplicy	PT	September 13, 2012	November 11, 2014
Ministry for Defense	Élcio Álvares	PFL	June 10, 1999	June 11, 1999
Ministry for Defense	Geraldo Magela da Cruz Quintão	expert	January 24, 2000	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Defense	José Viegas Filho	expert	January 1, 2003	November 8, 2004
Ministry for Defense	José Alencar Gones da Silva	PL	November 8, 2004	March 31, 2006
Ministry for Defense	Francisco Waldir Pires de Sousa	PT	April 3, 2006	July 25, 2007
Ministry for Defense	Nelson Azevedo Jobim	PMDB	July 25, 2007	August 4, 2011
Ministry for Defense	Celso Amorim	expert	August 5, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Clóvis de Barros Carvalho	PSDB	July 19, 1999	September 8, 1999
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Alcides Lopes Tápias	expert	September 14, 1999	July 31, 2001
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Sérgio Silva do Amaral	expert	August 23, 2001	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Luiz Fernando Furlan	expert	January 1, 2003	July 29, 2007
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Miguel João Jorge Filho	expert	March 29, 2007	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Fernando Pimentel	PT	January 1, 2011	February 14, 2014

Ministry for Economic Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade	Mauro Borges Lemos*	expert	February 14, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	José Serra	PSDB	January 1, 1995	June 1, 1996
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Antônio Kandir	PSDB	June 4, 1996	March 31, 1998
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Paulo de Tarso Almeida Paiva	expert	March 31, 1998	March 31, 1999
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Martus Antônio Rodrigues Tavares	PSDB	July 19, 1999	April 3, 2002
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Guilherme Gomes Dias	PSDB	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Guido Mantega	PT	January 1, 2003	November 19, 2004
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Paulo Bernardo Silva	PT	March 22, 2005	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Economic Planning, Budget, and Management	Miriam Aparecida Belchior	PT	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Education	Paulo Renato Souza	PSDB	January 1, 1995	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Education	Cristovam Ricardo Cavalcanti Buarque	PDT	January 1, 2003	January 23, 2004
Ministry for Education	Tarso Fernando Herz Genro	PT	January 23, 2004	August 1, 2005
Ministry for Education	Fernando Haddad	PT	August 1, 2005	January 23, 2012
Ministry for Education	Aloizio Mercadante Oliva	PT	January 24, 2012	February 2, 2014
Ministry for Education	José Henrique Paim Fernandes	PT	February 3, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	Altemir Gregolin	PT	June 26, 2009	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	Ideli Salvatti	PT	January 1, 2011	June 13, 2011
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	Luiz Sérgio Nóbrega de Oliveira	PT	June 13, 2011	March 2, 2012
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	Marcelo Bezerra Crivella	PRB	March 2, 2012	March 17, 2014
Ministry for Fishing and Aquaculture	Eduardo Benedito Lopes	PRB	March 17, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Luiz Felipe Lampreia	expert	January 1, 1995	January 12, 2001
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Celso Lafer	expert	January 29, 2001	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim	expert	January 1, 2003	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Antonio Aguiar Patriota	expert	January 1, 2011	August 27, 2013
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado	expert	August 28, 2013	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Health	Adib Jatene	expert	January 1, 1995	November 7, 1996
Ministry for Health	Carlos César da Silva Albuquerque	PSDB	December 18, 1996	March 31, 1998
Ministry for Health	José Serra	PSDB	March 31, 1998	February 21, 2002
Ministry for Health	Barjas Negri	PSDB	February 21, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Health	Humberto Sérgio Costa Lima	PT	January 1, 2003	July 8, 2005
Ministry for Health	José Saraiva Felipe	PMDB	July 8, 2005	March 31, 2006
Ministry for Health	José Agenor Álvares da Silva	PTB	August 2, 2006	March 16, 2007
Ministry for Health	José Gomes Temporão	PMDB	March 16, 2007	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Health	Alexandre Rocha Santos Padilha	PT	January 1, 2011	February 3, 2014
Ministry for Health	Ademar Arthur Chioro dos Reis	PT	February 3, 2014	September 30, 2015



Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism	Dorothea Fonseca Furquim Werneck	NA	January 1, 1995	May 2, 1996
Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism	Francisco Oswaldo Neves Dornelles	PPB	May 7, 1996	March 31, 1998
Ministry for Industry, Trade, and Tourism	José Botafogo Gonçalves	PPB	March 31, 1998	January 1, 1999
Ministry for Labor	Paulo de Tarso Almeida Paiva	expert	January 1, 1995	March 31, 1998
Ministry for Labor	Edward Joaquim Amadeo Swaelen	expert	April 7, 1998	January 1, 1999
Ministry for Labor	Francisco Oswaldo Neves Dornelles	PP	January 1, 1999	April 3, 2002
Ministry for Labor	Paulo Jobim Filho	PP	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Labor	Jaques Wagner	PT	January 1, 2003	January 23, 2004
Ministry for Labor	Ricardo José Ribeiro Berzoini	PT	January 23, 2004	July 12, 2005
Ministry for Labor	Luiz Marinho	PT	July 12, 2005	March 29, 2007
Ministry for Labor	Carlos Roberto Lupi	PDT	March 29, 2007	December 4, 2011
Ministry for Labor	Carlos Daudt Brizola	PDT	May 2, 2012	March 15, 2013
Ministry for Labor	Manoel Dias	PDT	March 15, 2013	October 2, 2015
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Raimundo Mendes de Brito	PFL	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Rodolpho Tourinho Neto	PFL	January 1, 1999	February 23, 2001
Ministry for Mining and Energy	José Jorge de Vasconcelos Lima	PFL	March 13, 2001	March 8, 2002
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Francisco Luiz Sibut Gomide	expert	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Dilma Vana Rousseff	PT	January 1, 2003	June 21, 2005
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Silas Rondeau Cavalcante Silva	PMDB	July 8, 2005	May 24, 2007
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Edson Lobão	PMDB	January 21, 2008	March 31, 2010
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Márcio Pereira Zimmermann	PMDB	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Mining and Energy	Edison Lobão	PMDB	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	José Israel Vargas	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Luis Carlos Bresser Gonçalves Pereira	PSDB	January 1, 1999	July 21, 1999
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg	expert	July 19, 1999	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Roberto Átila Amaral Vieira	PSB	January 1, 2003	January 22, 2004
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Eduardo Henrique Accioly Campos	PSB	January 23, 2004	July 21, 2005
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Sérgio Machado Rezende	PSB	July 21, 2005	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Aloizio Mercadante	PT	January 1, 2011	January 24, 2012
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Marco Antonio Raupp	expert	January 24, 2012	March 17, 2014
Ministry for Science, Technology, and Innovation	Clelio Campolina Diniz	expert	March 17, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	Patrus Ananias de Sousa	PT	January 23, 2004	March 31, 2010
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	Márcia Helena Carvalho Lopes	PT	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Social Development and Hunger Alleviation	Tereza Helena Gabrielli Barreto Campello	PT	January 1, 2011	**
Ministry for Sports	Edson Arantes do Nascimento	expert	January 1, 1995	April 30, 1998
Ministry for Sports	Agnelo Santos Queiroz Filho	PT	January 1, 2003	March 31, 2006

Ministry for Sports	Orlando Silva de Jesus Júnior	PC do B	April 3, 2006	October 26, 2011
Ministry for Sports	José Aldo Rebelo Figueiredo	PC do B	October 28, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	Rafael Valdomiro Greca de Macedo	PMDB	January 1, 1999	May 2, 1999
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	Carlos Carmo Andrade Melles	PFL	May 9, 2000	March 8, 2002
Ministry for Sports and Tourism	Caio Luiz Cibella de Carvalho	PSDB	March 8, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Raul Belens Jungmann	PPS	April 30, 1996	April 4, 2002
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	José Abrão	PSDB	April 4, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Miguel Soldatelli Rossetto	PT	January 1, 2003	March 31, 2006
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Guilherme Cassel	PT	June 27, 2006	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Afonso Bandeira Florence	PT	January 1, 2011	March 14, 2012
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Gilberto José Spier Vargas	PT	March 14, 2012	March 17, 2014
Ministry for the Agrarian Development	Miguel Soldatelli Rossetto	PT	March 17, 2014	September 8, 2014
Ministry for the Cities' Care	Olívio de Oliveira Dutra	PT	January 1, 2003	July 22, 2005
Ministry for the Cities' Care	Márcio Fortes de Almeida	PP	July 22, 2005	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the Cities' Care	Mário Silvío Mendes Negromonte	PP	January 1, 2011	February 3, 2012
Ministry for the Cities' Care	Aguinaldo Velloso Borges Ribeiro	PP	February 3, 2012	March 17, 2014
Ministry for the Cities' Care	Gilberto Magalhães Occhi	PP	March 17, 2014	January 1, 2015
Ministry for the Environment	Gustavo Krause Gonçalves Sobrinho	PFL	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Ministry for the Environment	José Sarney Filho	PV	January 1, 1999	March 5, 2002
Ministry for the Environment	José Carlos Carvalho	expert	March 5, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Environment	Maria Osmarina Marina da Silva Vaz de Lima	PT	January 1, 2003	May 15, 2008
Ministry for the Environment	Carlos Minc Baumfeld	PT	May 27, 2008	March 31, 2010
Ministry for the Environment	Izabela Mônica Vieira Teixeira	expert	March 31, 2010	**
Ministry for the Justice	Nelson Jobim	PMDB	January 1, 1995	April 8, 1997
Ministry for the Justice	Iris Rezende Machado	PMDB	May 22, 1997	April 1, 1998
Ministry for the Justice	José Renan Vasconcellos Calheiros	PMDB	April 7, 1998	July 19, 1999
Ministry for the Justice	José Carlos Dias	expert	July 19, 1999	April 14, 2000
Ministry for the Justice	José Gregori	PSDB	April 14, 2000	November 14, 2001
Ministry for the Justice	Aloysio Nunes Ferreira Filho	PSDB	November 14, 2001	April 3, 2002
Ministry for the Justice	Miguel Reale Júnior	expert	April 3, 2002	July 10, 2002
Ministry for the Justice	Paulo de Tarso Ramos Ribeiro	expert	July 10, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Justice	Márcio Thomaz Bastos	expert	January 1, 2003	March 16, 2007
Ministry for the Justice	Tarso Fernando Herz Genro	PT	March 16, 2007	February 10, 2010
Ministry for the Justice	Luiz Paulo Telles Ferreira Barreto	expert	February 10, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the Justice	José Eduardo Martins Cardozo	PT	January 1, 2011	March 3, 2016
Ministry for the Justice	Eugênio Aragão	expert	March 15, 2016	**

Ministry for the National Integration	Fernando Luiz Gionçalves Bezerra	PMDB	August 3, 1999	May 15, 2001
Ministry for the National Integration	Ramez Tebet	PMDB	June 20, 2001	September 20, 2001
Ministry for the National Integration	Ney Robinson Suassuna	PMDB	November 14, 2001	April 5, 2002
Ministry for the National Integration	José Luciano Barbosa da Silva	PMDB	June 5, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the National Integration	Ciro Ferreira Gomes	PPS	January 1, 2003	March 31, 2006
Ministry for the National Integration	Pedro Brito do Nascimento	PSB	April 3, 2006	March 16, 2007
Ministry for the National Integration	Geddel Quaddros Vieira Lima	PMDB	March 16, 2007	March 31, 2010
Ministry for the National Integration	João Reis Santana Filho	PMDB	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the National Integration	Fernando Bezerra de Souza Coelho	PSB	January 1, 2011	October 2, 2013
Ministry for the National Integration	Francisco José Coelho Teixeira	expert	October 1, 2013	January 1, 2015
Ministry for the Regional Integration	na	na	na	na
Ministry for the Social Security	Reinhold Stephanes	PFL	January 1, 1995	April 3, 1998
Ministry for the Social Security	Waldeck Vieira Ornelas	PFL	April 7, 1998	February 24, 2001
Ministry for the Social Security	Roberto Lúcio Rocha Brant	PFL	March 13, 2001	March 8, 2002
Ministry for the Social Security	José Cechin	expert	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for the Social Security	Ricardo José Ribeiro Berzoini	PT	January 1, 2003	January 23, 2004
Ministry for the Social Security	Amir Francisco Lando	PMDB	January 23, 2004	March 22, 2005
Ministry for the Social Security	Romero Jucá Filho	PMDB	March 22, 2005	July 22, 2005
Ministry for the Social Security	Luiz Marinho	PT	July 12, 2005	March 29, 2007
Ministry for the Social Security	Nelson Machado	PT	July 22, 2005	March 29, 2007
Ministry for the Social Security	José Barroso Pimentel	PT	June 11, 2008	March 31, 2010
Ministry for the Social Security	Carlos Eduardo Gabas	PT	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the Social Security	Garibaldi Alves Filho	PMDB	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Ministry for the Tourism	Walfrido Silvino dos Mares Guia Neto	PSB	January 1, 2003	March 23, 2007
Ministry for the Tourism	Marta Teresa Suplicy	PT	March 23, 2007	June 4, 2008
Ministry for the Tourism	Luiz Eduardo Pereira Barretto Filho	PT	July 19, 2008	January 1, 2011
Ministry for the Tourism	Pedro Novais Lima	PMDB	January 1, 2011	September 15, 2011
Ministry for the Tourism	Gastão Dias Vieira	PMDB	September 16, 2011	March 17, 2014
Ministry for the Tourism	Vinicius Nobre Lages	PMDB	March 17, 2014	April 16, 2015
Ministry for the Union Administration and State Reform	Luiz Carlos Bresser Gonçalves Pereira	PSDB	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Ministry for the Welfare	na	na	na	na
Ministry for Transportation	Odacir Klein	PMDB	January 1, 1995	August 16, 1996
Ministry for Transportation	Eliseu Lemos Padilha	PMDB	May 22, 1997	November 16, 2001
Ministry for Transportation	João Henrique de Almeida Sousa	PMDB	April 3, 2002	January 1, 2003
Ministry for Transportation	Anderson Aduauto Pereira	PL	January 1, 2003	March 15, 2004
Ministry for Transportation	Alfredo Pereira do Nascimento	PL	March 15, 2004	March 31, 2006
Ministry for Transportation	Paulo Sérgio Oliveira Passos	PL	April 3, 2006	March 29, 2007
Ministry for Transportation	Alfredo Pereira do Nascimento	PR	March 29, 2007	March 31, 2010

Ministry for Transportation	Paulo Sérgio Passos	PR	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Ministry for Transportation	Alfredo Pereira do Nascimento	PR	January 1, 2011	July 7, 2011
Ministry for Transportation	Paulo Sérgio Oliveira Passos	PR	July 12, 2011	April 3, 2013
Ministry for Transportation	César Augusto Rabello Borges	PR	April 3, 2013	June 26, 2014
Ministry for Transportation	Paulo Sérgio Passos	PR	June 26, 2014	January 1, 2015
Navy	Mauro César Rodrigues Pereira	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 1999
Navy	Sérgio Gitirana Florêncio Chagasteles	expert	January 1, 1999	June 10, 1999
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	Pedro Brito do Nascimento	PSB	May 15, 2007	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	José Leônidas Menezes Cristino	PSB	January 1, 2011	October 4, 2013
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	Antonio Henrique Pinheiro Silveira*	expert	October 4, 2013	June 26, 2014
Secretariat for Harbors Maintenance	César Augusto Rabello Borges	PRB	June 26, 2014	January 1, 2015
Secretariat for Human Rights	Nilmário de Miranda	PT	January 1, 2003	July 21, 2005
Secretariat for Human Rights	Paulo de Tarso Vannuchi	PT	December 21, 2005	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Human Rights	Maria do Rosário Nunes	PT	January 1, 2011	April 1, 2014
Secretariat for Human Rights	Ideli Salvatti	PT	January 1, 2014	April 16, 2015
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Jaques Wagner	PT	July 20, 2005	March 31, 2006
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Tarso Fernando Herz Genro	PT	April 3, 2006	March 16, 2007
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Walfrido Silvino dos Mares Guia Neto	PTB	March 23, 2007	November 26, 2007
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	José Múcio Monteiro Filho	PTB	November 26, 2007	September 28, 2009
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Alexandre Rocha Santos Padilha	PT	September 28, 2009	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Luiz Sérgio Nóbrega de Oliveira	PT	January 1, 2011	June 13, 2011
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Ideli Salvatti	PT	June 13, 2011	April 1, 2014
Secretariat for Institutional Relations	Ricardo Berzoini	PT	April 1, 2014	January 1, 2015
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	Matilde Ribeiro	PT	March 21, 2003	February 6, 2008
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	Édson Santos Souza	PT	February 20, 2008	March 31, 2010
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	Eloi Ferreira de Araújo	PT	March 31, 2010	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Promotion of the Racial Equality	Luiza Helena de Bairros	PT	January 1, 2011	January 1, 2015
Secretariat for Small Companies and Enterprises Development	Guilherme Afif Domingos	PSD	May 9, 2013	October 2, 2015
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	Roberto Mangabeira Unger	expert	June 19, 2007	July 3, 2009
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto	expert	October 20, 2009	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	Wellington Moreira Franco	PMDB	January 1, 2011	March 15, 2013
Secretariat for Strategic Affairs	Marcelo Cortes Neri	expert	March 22, 2013	February 5, 2015
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	Wagner Bittencourt de Oliveira	expert	April 6, 2011	March 15, 2013
Secretariat for the Civilian Aviation	Wellington Moreira Franco	PMDB	March 15, 2013	January 1, 2015
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	Franklin de Souza Martins	PT	March 29, 2007	January 1, 2011

Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	Helena Maria de Freitas Chagas	expert	January 1, 2011	February 3, 2014
Secretariat for the President's Advertisement	Thomas Timothy Traumann	expert	February 3, 2014	March 25, 2015
Secretariat for Women's Rights	Emília Therezinha Xavier Fernandes	PT	January 1, 2003	January 23, 2004
Secretariat for Women's Rights	Nilcéa Freire	PT	January 23, 2004	January 1, 2011
Secretariat for Women's Rights	Iryny Nicolau Correia Lopes	PT	January 1, 2011	February 10, 2012
Secretariat for Women's Rights	Eleonora Menicucci de Oliveira	PT	February 10, 2012	January 1, 2015
The Secret Service	Alberto Mendes Cardoso	expert	January 1, 1995	January 1, 2003
The Secret Service	Jorge Armando Felix	expert	January 1, 2003	January 1, 2011
The Secret Service	José Elito Carvalho Siqueira	expert	January 1, 2011	October 2, 2015

\*Refers to the minister party affiliation or profile during his tenure.

\*\*Still running the office by the end of this thesis.

Source: *Portal da Legislação*, Library of the Presidency of Brazil, ministers' websites, and ministries' websites.

## APPENDIX C – Elite survey questions in Portuguese

*Questão 1 - De quem deveria ser o papel principal na montagem do ministério?*

- a) Da Presidência da República;*
- b) Da Liderança do partido detentor da Presidência da República;*
- c) Da Liderança de todos os partidos que integram a base aliada;*
- d) Todos os anteriores.*

*Questão 2 - Atualmente o papel principal na montagem do ministério é:*

- a) Da Presidência da República;*
- b) Da Liderança do partido detentor da Presidência da República;*
- c) Da Liderança de todos os partidos que integram a base aliada;*
- d) Todos os anteriores.*

*Questão 3 - A atual distribuição de ministérios entre os partidos da coalizão governista é adequada.*

- a) Concordo totalmente;*
- b) Concordo parcialmente;*
- c) Não concordo nem discordo;*
- d) Discordo parcialmente;*
- e) Discordo totalmente.*

*Por quê?*

*Questão 4 - O(a) presidente que soube melhor montar e gerir sua coalizão foi:*

- a) FHC em seu primeiro mandato;*
- b) FHC em seu segundo mandato;*
- c) Lula em seu primeiro mandato;*
- d) Lula em seu segundo mandato;*
- e) Dilma em seu primeiro mandato;*
- f) Dilma em seu segundo mandato.*

*Questão 5 - É mais fácil influenciar a política pública participando diretamente do executivo do que participando indiretamente através da ação legislativa.*

- a) Concordo totalmente;*
- b) Concordo parcialmente;*
- c) Não concordo nem discordo;*
- d) Discordo parcialmente;*
- e) Discordo totalmente.*

*Questão 6 – O impacto gerado junto a sociedade por um ministro de qualquer das 38 pastas atuais é maior do que o gerado por qualquer posição dentro da Câmara dos Deputados, com exceção da posição de presidente da Casa.*

- a) Concordo totalmente;*
- b) Concordo parcialmente;*
- c) Não concordo nem discordo;*
- d) Discordo parcialmente;*
- e) Discordo totalmente.*

*Questão 7 - Ordene de acordo com suas preferências as características que um ministério pode possuir, sendo 1 a MAIS importante, e assim sucessivamente até chegar a MENOS importante, número 6:*

- ( ) Capacidade orçamentária e de gasto;*
- ( ) Tempo em que o ministro fica no cargo;*
- ( ) O tamanho do quadro total de funcionários do ministério e a possibilidade de contratar novos funcionários;*
- ( ) O poder normativo de regular diversas atividades econômicas;*
- ( ) A influência exercida sobre outros órgãos da administração indireta;*
- ( ) Possibilidade de atuar como ponte entre a bancada de seu partido e o Executivo.*

*Além das características anteriores, gostaria de citar alguma outra? Qual?*

Questão 8 - Os três ministérios **MAIS** importantes politicamente são:

- ( ) *Advocacia-Geral da União*
- ( ) *Banco Central do Brasil*
- ( ) *Casa Civil*
- ( ) *Controladoria-Geral da União*
- ( ) *Gabinete de Segurança Institucional*
- ( ) *Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento*
- ( ) *Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação*
- ( ) *Ministério da Cultura*
- ( ) *Ministério da Defesa*
- ( ) *Ministério da Educação*
- ( ) *Ministério da Fazenda*
- ( ) *Ministério da Integração Nacional*
- ( ) *Ministério da Justiça*
- ( ) *Ministério da Pesca e Aquicultura*
- ( ) *Ministério da Previdência Social*
- ( ) *Ministério da Saúde*
- ( ) *Ministério das Cidades*
- ( ) *Ministério das Comunicações*
- ( ) *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*
- ( ) *Ministério de Minas e Energia*
- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário*
- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome*
- ( ) *Ministério do Esporte*
- ( ) *Ministério do Meio Ambiente*
- ( ) *Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*
- ( ) *Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego*
- ( ) *Ministério do Turismo*
- ( ) *Ministério dos Transportes*
- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*
- ( ) *Secretaria da Micro e Pequena Empresa*



- ( ) *Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Aviação Civil da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Comunicação Social da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Portos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República*

*Por quê?*

**Questão 9 - Os três ministérios *MENOS* importantes politicamente são:**

- ( ) *Advocacia-Geral da União*
- ( ) *Banco Central do Brasil*
- ( ) *Casa Civil*
- ( ) *Controladoria-Geral da União*
- ( ) *Gabinete de Segurança Institucional*
- ( ) *Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento*
- ( ) *Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação*
- ( ) *Ministério da Cultura*
- ( ) *Ministério da Defesa*
- ( ) *Ministério da Educação*
- ( ) *Ministério da Fazenda*
- ( ) *Ministério da Integração Nacional*
- ( ) *Ministério da Justiça*
- ( ) *Ministério da Pesca e Aquicultura*
- ( ) *Ministério da Previdência Social*
- ( ) *Ministério da Saúde*
- ( ) *Ministério das Cidades*
- ( ) *Ministério das Comunicações*
- ( ) *Ministério das Relações Exteriores*
- ( ) *Ministério de Minas e Energia*

- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário*
- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome*
- ( ) *Ministério do Esporte*
- ( ) *Ministério do Meio Ambiente*
- ( ) *Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão*
- ( ) *Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego*
- ( ) *Ministério do Turismo*
- ( ) *Ministério dos Transportes*
- ( ) *Ministério do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior*
- ( ) *Secretaria da Micro e Pequena Empresa*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Aviação Civil da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Comunicação Social da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Direitos Humanos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Políticas para as Mulheres*
- ( ) *Secretaria de Portos da Presidência da República*
- ( ) *Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República*

*Por quê?*

*Questão 10 - A possibilidade de se firmar a maior quantidade possível de convênios dentro de um ministério é:*

- ( ) *Extremamente importante;*
- ( ) *Muito importante;*
- ( ) *Razoavelmente importante;*
- ( ) *Pouco importante;*
- ( ) *Nada importante.*

*Questão 11 - O tempo em que o ministro fica no cargo em um certo ministério é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 12 - O número total de funcionários de um certo ministério é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 13 - A influência exercida sobre certas áreas econômicas através de normativas e atos de um certo ministério é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 14 - O tamanho do orçamento total de um certo ministério é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 15 - O número total de funcionários em cargos comissionados e de confiança em um certo ministério é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 16 - A influência exercida sobre outros órgãos da administração indireta por um certo ministério é:*


- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*

*Questão 17 - A possibilidade de atuar como ponte entre a bancada de seu partido e o Executivo para um ministro é:*

- Extremamente importante;*
- Muito importante;*
- Razoavelmente importante;*
- Pouco importante;*
- Nada importante.*


APPENDIX D – Elite survey general questions

Chart 14 Elite - Who should be mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in multiparty presidential systems like Brazil?



Answered questions: 60  
 Skipped questions: 2  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 15 Elite – Who is currently mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in Brazil?




Answered questions: 58  
 Skipped questions: 4  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Figures Three and Four provide some evidence about the process of coalition building – or cabinet appointment – in Brazil today. Most stalwart representatives think that the president must lead the


process, while in fact what currently happens is that the president shares this responsibility with the leadership of all the allied parties.

Chart 16 Elite - The current layout of the cabinet in Brazil regarding the distribution of cabinet seats to allied parties is proportional.



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.


Chart 17 Elite - The Brazilian president who best knew how to build and manage his or her coalition was:



Answered questions: 59  
 Skipped questions: 3  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.


Regarding the distribution of cabinet seats, Charts 16 and 17 provide some evidence of a level of dissatisfaction regarding its current layout. More specifically, Mrs. Rousseff received a shameful rating when members of congress were asked to classify the ability of the three presidents to build and manage their coalitions.

Chart 18 Elite - An ordinary congressman in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil judges it is easier to influence public policy processes by being a member of the executive body than by being a member of the legislative body.



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 19 Elite - A minister in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil has more power to influence society than a congressman, with the exception of the House Speaker.



Answered questions: 62

Skipped questions: 0

Source: The authors based on representatives' opinion.

Chart 18 reveals that if asked in a broader and more indirect way about ordinary or randomly representative behavior regarding their preference for joining the executive or remaining in the legislative, the representatives were inclined toward the former, whereas if confronted in a more direct way, as in Chart 19, they gave mixed answers. This may be because the range of importance of a ministry is too wide as with 38 ministries in 2015 it may sometimes be better to be a representative than to be the head of a low profile ministry. Alternatively, this may be because the distribution of preferences is in fact scattered.



APPENDIX E – The expert survey

Period: 07/16/2015 – 08/07/2015


Forms sent: 346

Valid received forms: 45

Response rate: 13.04%

Target: researchers who are faculty or graduate students of Latin American studies in Political Science Departments, or those who have published any paper discussing executive-legislative relations in Latin America, or to those who have joined panel sessions about the same subject at APSA, MPSA, IPSA, and LASA conferences.

Chart 20 Experts - Who should be mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in multiparty presidential systems like Brazil?




Answered questions: 45

Skipped questions: 0


Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 21 Experts - Who is currently mainly responsible for the executive coalition building in Brazil?




Answered questions: 42  
Skipped questions: 3  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 22 Experts - The current layout of the cabinet in Brazil regarding the distribution of cabinet seats to allied parties is proportional.




Answered questions: 35  
Skipped questions: 10  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 23 Experts - The Brazilian president who best knew how to build and manage his or her coalition was:




Answered questions: 35  
 Skipped questions: 10  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 24 Experts - An ordinary congressman in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil judges it is easier to influence public policy processes by being a member of the executive body than by being a member of the legislative body.




Answered questions: 35  
 Skipped questions: 10  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 25 Experts - A minister in a multiparty presidential system such as that of Brazil has more power to influence society than a congressman, with the exception of the House Speaker. (here)




Answered questions: 35  
 Skipped questions: 10  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 26 Experts - What are the three most politically important ministries in Brazil?




Answered questions: 31  
 Skipped questions: 14  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 27 Experts - What are the three least politically important ministries in Brazil?




Answered questions: 30  
 Skipped questions: 15  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 28 Experts - Sort according to your preferences the characteristics that a ministry in a presidential system has, with one being the most important, two the second most important, and so on until number six which represents the least important:




Answered questions: 35  
 Skipped questions: 10  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 29 Experts - The total budget of a ministry is:




Answered questions: 32  
Skipped questions: 13  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 30 Experts - The share of unrestricted expenses of a ministry is:




Answered questions: 32  
Skipped questions: 13  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 31 Experts - A ministry's influence over other agencies and public companies is:



Answered questions: 62  
 Skipped questions: 0  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.


Chart 32 Experts - The total number of civil servants in a ministry is:<sup>69</sup>



Answered questions: 32  
 Skipped questions: 13  
 Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

<sup>69</sup> Including those who were not hired directly by the minister.

Chart 33 Experts - The share of civil servants hired directly by the minister as *cargo de confiança* in a ministry is:




Answered questions: 32

Skipped questions: 13

Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 34 Experts - The normative power and its capacity to influence other economic fields of activities for a ministry is:




Answered questions: 31

Skipped questions: 14

Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.




Chart 35 Experts - The length of a minister's tenure as chair of some ministry is:



Answered questions: 31  
Skipped questions: 14  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.

Chart 36 Experts - The chance to be the link between his fellow party members and the executive for a minister is:



Answered questions: 32  
Skipped questions: 13  
Source: The authors based on experts' opinion.